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2ABSTRACT
The thesis is concerned mainly with the political development 
of the Muslims in the Punjab during the years 1936 to 19^ +71 though 
it takes into account certain aspects of their socio-economic life, 
mainly as a background to the political study. For this purpose an 
examination has been conducted into the degree to which Muslims 
participated in the economic life of the Province in comparison to the 
other two major communities in the Punjab (Hindu and Sikh), with 
particular reference to the areas of land-ownership, finance and debt, 
industry, education and the public services.
The political analysis contained in this work is largely confined 
to the struggle for supremacy which occurred between the Unionist Party 
and the Muslim League from 1936 onwards. This period, for the purpose 
of the study, has been divided into four main sections - the election 
of 1937, the Ministries of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan and Sir Khizar Hayat 
Khan Tiwana, and the election of 19^ +6. During each phase the changing 
fortunes of the two contenders (the Unionist Party and the Muslim League) 
are recorded and discussed in the light of provincial and national 
developments. Thereby the thesis embraces the decline of Unionism, and 
the eventual triumph of the League at the polls in 19^6, whilst, 
analysing those factors which frustrated and fostered the growth of 
Muslim nationalism (as expressed in the demand for 'Pakistan') in the 
Punjab. The thesis concludes by considering the events which prevented 
the Muslim League from realising power following its election victory in 
19^6, and by examining the periods of coalition government and Governor's 
rule immediately prior to Partition.
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GLOSSARY
Bajra - A food-grain, being a species of millet.
Crore - 10,000,000.
Dap>tra#s/ - A member of a Darbar, i.e. a court, audience or levee.
Doab - A tract of land lying between two rivers.
Fiqah - Islamic jurisprudence.
Gadcfci' - A throne or seat.
Ghee - Clarified butter.
Gram - The term usually referred to varieties of pulse, notably the 
chick-pea.
Gurdwara - Sikh temple.
Hadis - The traditional sayings and doings of the Prophet Mohammad.
Hakim - Physician.
Hartal - Strike.
Inamdar - The holder of a rent-free grant of land.
Jagirdar - Holder of a revenue-free grant of land. Usually the recipient 
received the award in recognition for service to the Government
Jehad - Holy war.
Jirga - Council of elders.
Jowar - A species of millet, sown in July and reaped in November and 
December.
Kalima - Islamic creed.
Kanungo - Revenue official operating both at village and District level.
This officer usually kept the records relating to the value, 
tenure, extent and transfers of holdings, and assisted in the 
measurement and survey of agricultural land.
Lakh - 100,OCX).
Lambardar - A village headman.
Mantras - Prayers.
Maulvi - A learned man or teacher (especially of Arabic), an expounder of 
Islamic law.
Maund - A weight equal to approximately lbs.
Mian - A term of respect, similar to 'sir' or 'master' applied to an old 
or respected person.
'Muhhaqqaq' - Researcher.
Mullah - A religious teacher or learned man.
Munshi - A writer or secretary; the term was often applied by Europeans 
to teachers and interpreters of Persian.
Nawab - During Moghul rule this title was conferred on a Governor of a 
Province. Under British rule, however, it became merely a term 
applied to men of high social rank, no office being attached to it
Pachotra - Village headman's fee.
5Glossary (continued)
Patwari - Village accountant, whose duty it was to keep and produce, 
when required by government revenue officers, all accounts 
relating to lands, produce, cultivation, changes of ownership, 
and past assessments of the village.
Rais - Head of an old-established family, landed gentleman, Chief.
Rabi - The spring harvest; the grain was usually sown in October and 
November and harvested between March and May.
Sajjada Nashin - Successor to the Saint.
Sufedposh - Village dignitary.
Tahsildar - A Revenue Collector.
Thai - Grazing ground^ anecc /’a a, .
Tumandar - A tribal chief.
Ulema - Religious leaders.
Zamindar - A landowner. In the Punjab the term specifically applied to 
a cultivating proprietor.
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INTRODUCTION
Had the All-India Muslim League failed to secure the support of 
the political and religious leaders of the Punjab's thirteen and a 
half million Muslims Pakistan, in all probability, would never have 
been realised as an independent and sovereign nation. The vast 
majority of the Muslim political and religious elites, together with 
the Muslim electorate, however, drawn by the vision of a Muslim home­
land, which seemed to promise not only an Islamic haven but also a 
state in which Muslims would prosper economically and socially, 
pledged their allegiance to the Muslim League, as was convincingly 
demonstrated by the 19^6 elections. A variety of factors had influ­
enced that outcome: an Islamic state as epitomised by 'Pakistan'
appealed to the pious and God-fearing, whilst a nation in which Muslims 
were to be dominant held obvious attractions for the more material­
istic and ambitious amongst the 'Believers', especially as in the 
future all political and economic power would reside in Muslim hands. 
Yet a decade earlier Muslim nationalism had failed to excite or 
attract the Muslim leadership of the day in the Punjab, the Province's 
political life having been dominated by provincial considerations as 
personified by the Unionist Party. In fact none of the Unionist 
Party's Muslim leaders - Fazl-i-Husain, Sikander Hyat Khan, Khizar 
Hayat Khan Tiwana - believed in the desirability of communal politics 
or a Muslim state. Thus the Muslim League's success in the Punjab 
culminated only after nine years of struggle to undermine the influence 
of Unionism and to persuade the large landed Muslim magnates who domi­
nated and led the Unionist Party to forsake it in favour of the Muslim 
League and 'Pakistan'. It is the aim of this thesis, therefore, to 
analyse the dramatic change which occurred in the political alliances 
and loyalties of Muslims in the Punjab in the period 1936 to 19^7, 
whilst at the same time attempting to place the events of those years 
in social and economic perspective.
Before the British occupation in 18^9 the Punjab lying in the 
north-west corner of India had for centuries provided the route 
whereby virtually every foreign invader of Hindustan had assailed the 
country. The most dramatic effect of this process had been the estab­
lishment of the political ascendancy of Islam in certain parts of the 
Province as early as the tenth century A.D.. By the nineteenth cen­
tury Islam had emerged as the dominant religion in the region. The
9
spread of Islam and the continued existence of Hinduism, the dominance 
ofwhichithad broken, led to a coexistence of faiths which at times was 
decidedly uneasy. This in turn prompted Guru Nanak (1^69-1539)» the 
founder of Sikhism, to preach a new religion which sought to incorpor­
ate the most appealing elements of Islam and Hinduism. Whilst the 
Sikh religion did attract a substantial following it never rivalled 
in numbers either Islam or Hinduism, though for a while it did play a 
dominant political role in the Punjab, and until the end of British 
rule the Sikhs enjoyed an economic importance far in excess of their 
population status. As a consequence of these religious developments 
the twentieth century Punjab was largely inhabited by the members of 
three main communities - Muslim, Hindu and Sikh - whose adherents 
frequently shared a common racial or tribal ancestry and identity, as 
in the case of the Rajputs and Jats. Despite past common ties, how­
ever, all three religious groups radically divided Punjabi society.
In the case of the Muslims the religious divisions or differences, 
which identified them as a separate community, were made all the more 
poignant by the fact that by the late nineteenth and twentieth cen­
turies a more marked degree of poverty and lack of opportunity also 
distinguished the average Muslim from his non-Muslim neighbours in 
the Province.
Thus in spite of the presence of a small class of extremely 
wealthy Muslim zamindars who controlled vast tracts of land princi­
pally in the western portion of the Province, the Muslims as a whole 
represented an economically depressed section of society in comparison 
to Hindus and Sikhs. Their numerical superiority had not spawned a 
similar dominance in such areas as land ownership, credit, commerce 
and industry, or in the realms of education, the professions and gov­
ernment service. A number of factors had coalesced to mould the 
Muslim condition. The collapse of Mughal power in India in the 
eighteenth century removed the advantages the Muslim Empire had 
afforded its Muslim subjects, whilst the political ascendancy of the 
Sikhs in the Punjab (1772-18^9) resulted in substantial tracts of 
land passing from Muslim to non-Muslim hands (see pp.21-22). The 
advent of 3ritish rule in 18^9 merely accelerated this trend, not 
because of deliberate government policy, but as the inescapable con­
sequence of the laws and customs the British introduced concerning 
land ownership, the payment of land revenue, and the repayment of 
mortgage debts (see pp.22-29). The changes led to a considerable 
rise in the value of land, which in turn made the money-lenders 
extremely anxious to acquire control over it. British rule further
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aided their designs in that law courts frequently forced peasant culti­
vators and large landowners alike to forfeit their land if they default­
ed in the payment of interest, often compounded, on the loans they had 
secured. The money-lender, therefore, graduated from his traditional 
role as village accountant and financier, to become a major investor 
in land, his gains having been made largely at the expense of Muslim 
agriculturists. The overwhelming majority of money-lenders were Hindus 
drawn principally from the Bania, Khatri and Arora castes, though 
from the beginning of the twentieth century Sikh money-lenders also 
began to come into prominence particularly in the rural areas. The 
Hindus and Sikhs, by the 1930's and 19^+0's, controlled approximately 
half of the agricultural resources of the Province. In addition the 
Hindus dominated the industrial and commercial spheres, and the civic, 
economic and educational life of the Punjab (see chapters I,II and 111).
Education under British rule had taken on a western direction and 
flavour; the indigenous system of learning which had largely been 
under Muslim control had been denigrated and replaced. It was not 
surprising, therefore, that the Muslim attitude was lukewarm especially 
as western educational practices were often regarded as offensive to 
their religious and moral values. Also the greater degree of poverty 
which existed amongst Muslims as a whole restricted their entry into 
government schools and institutions. By contrast the Hindus and Sikhs 
were less affected by cultural and pecuniary considerations, and they 
responded to the new educational order with a far greater degree of 
vigour and enthusiasm. Though the British, in the closing years of 
the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth, did 
attempt to make the learning process more economically accessible to 
Muslims no serious steps were taken to appease their cultural ob­
jections. The result was that throughout the British period Muslims 
lagged behind Hindus and Sikhs, most particularly at the higher 
stages of education, as was reflected by their low level of partici­
pation in the professions and government service generally.
Despite the comparative economic and educational backwardness of 
the community, however, the Muslim landed elite played a prominent 
rSle in the political life of the Punjab in the twentieth century.
This resulted from a number of factors. To begin with the Paramount 
Power desired to ally itself firmly with the landed aristocracy and 
squirearchy of the Province as a means of entrenching its own 
position. That strategy found expression in the Land Alienation Act 
of 1901, whereby the British in effect protected all landowners, of 
whom the large Muslim magnates of the western Punjab were the most
10a
influential, from losing land and thereby power to the traditional
2money-lending castes. Furthermore as the process of limited democrat!- 
sation accelerated during the course of the twentieth century the 
influence of the large zamindars was translated into political power.
The Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 by recognising the pre­
dominant rural composition of the Punjab dictated that in future the 
rural block and leadership, namely the large and powerful landowners, 
should monopolise political power. Muslims as such, however, were 
denied a statutory majority to which their population status would 
otherwise have entitled them, a factor which prompted Fazl-i-Husain 
in 1923 to found the Unionist tarty (see pp.1^1, 1 *+3-1^ 5) - a 
political structure which by promising to advance the interests of the 
rural community and its leaders sought to attract sufficient non- 
Muslim adherents to permit the rural Muslim leadership, in coalition 
with their non-Muslim allies, to dominate the Legislature in the Pro­
vince. Its class interests, therefore, overrode any communal appeal, 
as was apparent from the fact that the Party adopted and espoused a 
non-communal philosophy. By the late 1930's and the early 19^0's, 
however, national politics began to intrude into the Punjab, 
eventually eroding the Unionist Party's non-communal stance.
The imminence of the 1937 elections caused Jinnah, the President 
of the All-India Muslim League to woo provincial Muslim leaders to 
pledge their support to the League in order to improve League pros­
pects at the polls and to transform it into a truly national organi­
sation. Jinnah's overtures for cooperation were rejected by the 
Unionist leadership which feared that any intrusion by the League into
Punjabi politics would encourage the growth of factionalism in Muslim 
3
Unionist ranks . Furthermore the Unionists, dependent as they were 
upon non-Muslim cooperation, could not afford to subscribe to the 
communal creed of the Muslim League. Consequently in 1937 the Muslim 
Punjab following the dictates of its Unionist leaders forcibly rejected
k
Jinnah and the League. Unionist ascendancy, however, did not pro­
hibit Sikander Hy&t Khan, the Punjab Unionist Premier, from seeking a 
rapx-rochement with Jinnah in October 1937 (Sikander-Jinnah Pact). 
Recognising the potential of the Muslim League to ferment future 
divisions amongst his Muslim supporters he sought to curtail that 
threat by gaining control of any future League organisation in the 
Province, whilst at the same time assisting the League to safeguard 
wider Muslim interests in India as a whole (see pp.177-179)- Ambition 
also helped to spawn Sikander's actions, desirous as he was for a 
national r6'le for himself.
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Sikander's national ambitions, however, were doomed to failure. 
Jinnah was determined that the Muslim League should not remain subor­
dinate to the Unionist Party in the Punjab, and that he should continue 
at the helm of Muslim national affairs. A number of inter-related 
events greatly influenced the outcome of this contest, and ultimately 
favoured Jinnah. The outbreak of war in 1939 led the Indian National 
Congress to demand India's immediate independence as the price the
British should pay to secure the country’s cooperation in the prose-
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cution of the war. Such a development was unwelcome to the Muslim 
League and the British; the League was totally opposed to majority 
rule as it would have placed the future of the Muslim community in the 
hands of the Hindu controlled Congress, whilst the British had no 
intention of forfeiting their great Asiatic reservoir of manpower and 
raw materials, at least for the duration of the war. As a result 
Jinnah and Linlithgow, the Viceroy (1936-19^ +3)» entered into a secret 
pact designed to protect their respective positions from the Congress 
challenge. The outcome was that both sought to establish that the 
Congress alone could not make constitutional demands in the name of 
India. In March 19^ +0 the All-India Muslim League adopted the 
potentially popular demand for the establishment of an independent 
Muslim state or states, and in August 19^ +0 the British insisted that 
any future constitutional advancement theoretically depended on its 
acceptance by the minorities - which in practice meant Jinnah's Muslim 
League. But for the Viceroy to continue to frustrate the Congress by 
stressing that it did not represent certain large and influential 
groups in India, whose interests could not be ignored, it was 
essential that the Muslim League should remain united and free from 
internal wrangling; Linlithgow refused therefore to countenance 
Sikander's claims for Muslim leadership, or to give the Punjab Premier 
the assistance he sought to outmancjuvre Jinnah (see pp. 18^ -19*+).
Despite his eventual failure in the national orbit Sikander 
proved to be a formidable adversary to Jinnah in the Punjab, as did 
his Unionist successor as Premier (Dec. 19^ +2) Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana. 
By the mid-19*+0's, however, Unionism was fast becoming an obsolete 
political philosophy which could not compete with the Muslim League's 
demand for an independent Muslim homeland, or satisfy Muslim aspi­
rations constrained as it was by a non-communal creed. Also the 
Unionist Party was no longer in a position to guarantee to the large 
Muslim zamindars, who until that time had provided its most effective 
support, the power and privileges they demanded in return for their 
allegiance. Once it became clear that the British were sincere in their
11a
determination to abandon their hold on India the powerful Muslim 
landlords realised that the Muslim League, as one of the probable 
successors to the British Raj, alone could provide for their interests 
in the future. The result was an exodus of landed support from 
Unionist ranks which heralded the final disintegration of the multi- 
communal party and its philosophy.
As the 19^ +6 elections approached it became increasingly apparent 
that the Unionists were a spent force; its Muslim leadership had 
defected in large measure to the Muslim League, and it possessed 
little or no popular following, the Muslim masses and electorate 
having been intoxicated to a great extent by the League's promise of 
'Pakistan'. The elections in fact were the prelude to disaster in 
the Punjab. The Unionist Party was decisively routed at the polls.
The Muslim League extensively employed religious leaders to legiti­
mise its cause and objectives, and to discredit the Unionists by 
persuading the Muslim electorate and populace in general that only the 
League could serve the interests of Muslims and Islam. Such tactics 
helped to secure a landslide victory for the League, the partition of 
the Province and India became inevitable and so too did the holocaust 
that accompanied that 'surgery'.
The division of the Punjab, together with that of Bengal, symbol­
ised the birth-pangs of the infant nation of Pakistan. In the Punjab 
that process was particularly bloody as the Province was submerged in 
internecine warfare. Regardless of the horror and brutality which 
accompanied Partition, however, it is evident that without the 
inclusion of the western Muslim majority districts of the Punjab, 
Pakistan as has been stated previously, in all probability would have 
remained a politicians’ dream, and would have failed to achieve a 
territorial reality. Despite the importance of the Punjab's r$le in 
that process the study of the Province's history in the third and 
fourth decades of the twentieth century has been a largely neglected
g
field. Only a limited number of people, notably C. Baxter, D. Gil-
7 8 9martin, Imran Ali, and I.Talbot, 7 have attempted to analyse some of
the political developments which occurred in these years. Even so
none of them have sought to examine Muslim society in depth with
regard to their economic, educational and industrial backwardness as
compared to the Hindu and Sikh communities. This is an omission
which needs to be rectified for the comparatively retarded Muslim
condition, or the realisation of it, seems to have played an
important part in spurring Muslim separatism in the Punjab. Also in
studying the relationships and rivalry which existed between the
12
Unionist Party and the Muslim League no adequate explanation has 
been given for Sikander's decision to join the Muslim League and to 
advise his fellow Muslim Unionists to do likewise (Sikander-Jinnah
N 10Pact). This is a serious defect considering the importance of that
development and the momentous effect it was to have on the future
fortunes of the League in the Province. Also Sikander Hyat Khan's
national ambitions have been either ignored or neglected, together
with the considerations which occasioned them, as has the special
relationship which existed between the President of the All-India
Muslim League and the Viceroy - a factor which seriously compromised
the Unionists and which had a direct effect upon the events which
led eventually to the division of the Province. Similarly although
Sikander's resignation from the Viceroy's National Defence Council
(August 19^1) - an episode which emphasised Jinnah's undisputed
control over Muslim national politics - has been recognised as an
important development, the Punjab Premier's actions in this regard
11have not been adequately explained. In addition the r6le of 
Khizar Hayat Khan (Sikander's successor as Premier), who continued 
his predecessor's policy of attempting to thwart the League in the 
Punjab, has not been subjected to serious analysis. Again such an 
oversight merits attention, considering the fact that Khizar was 
influenced to a great extent by the British Governor of the Province, 
Sir B. Glancy (see Chapter VI), and that their close relationship was 
a major factor in frustrating Jinnah's Punjab policy. Furthermore 
although the vital 19^6 elections have been scrutinised, and despite 
the fact that attention has been drawn to the economic factors which 
influenced the outcome,and to the support which the Muslim League 
enjoyed from the Province's Muslim landed and religious leaders, no 
in-depth study has been undertaken of the degree of official inter­
ference, bribery and intimidation which occurred, or of the great 
impact which the pro-League Firs' threats of divine displeasure and 
social ostracism had on the Muslim electorate.
Finally the period following the 19^6 elections, when the League 
failed to form a Ministry in the Punjab, has been largely neglected, 
as has the role the British played in the saga of Pakistan. The 
attitude of the Imperial power was crucial to the prospects for the 
realisation of a Muslim homeland, and thereby to the survival of the 
Unionist Party. Linlithgow, who was personally opposed to the devel­
opment, could have poured 'cold water' on the scheme at its 
conception and thus have seriously compromised the demand, but he
12failed to do so for fear of undermining his anti-Congress strategy.
12a
Wavell (Linlithgow's successor) though anxious that the Pakistan 
issue should be publicly examined to demonstrate its impracticalities, 
was prevented from achieving that objective by the vacillating 
attitude of the Attlee government in Britain (see pp.190-191* 246-250). 
'Pakistan', therefore, was never fully exposed to the full glare of 
official and public scrutiny in India, and as such its shortcomings, 
such as the probable necessity for the division of the Punjab, were 
never publicly admitted by the League or commented upon by the 
British. Consequently 'Pakistan' was presented by pro-League Muslim 
politicians as the panacea for the problems of all sections of 
Punjabi Muslim society, and the reward for all their ambitions, a 
factor which contributed in no small measure to the success of its 
appeal in the Punjab and to the destruction of the Unionist Party.
It is the purpose of this thesis, therefore, to attempt to 
rectify the omissions which have been referred to above, and to 
produce a balanced, analytical history of Muslim political develop­
ment in the Punjab from 1956 to 194?, whilst not neglecting to study 
and consider the socio-economic disadvantages and pressures which 
many Muslims were subject to. Such a study is essential for the 
understanding of the growth and spread of Muslim nationalism and the 
support for Pakistan which this generated - a process which in the 
past has been examined all too often with reference solely to the 
Muslim minority provinces and Bengal.
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CHAPTER I
THE MUSLIMS OF THE. PUNJAB - THE DEPRESSED MAJORITY
The Muslims of the Punjab owed their existence as a community to a
common allegiance to Islam. Muslim society constituted a multi-layered
structure ranging from a small extremely wealthy ^ lite of very large
zamindars or landowners, paying in excess of Rs.1000 per annum in land
revenue charges, to landless labourers. Also included were artisans,
industrialists, urban workers, and a literate, professional middle-class.
Powerful magnates together with the other categories mentioned above,
however, were untypical of Punjabi Muslim society, which was dominated
by a peasant class of very small proprietors and tenant farmers: only
3*3% of all the agricultural holdings in the Punjab exceeded 50 acres,
the majority were ten acres or less, 25% ranging from one to three 
1
acres. Viewed as a whole, and irrespective of the divisions which
existed within it, the Muslim community appears to have been economically
backward as compared to the Hindu and Sikh communities. It is the
purpose of this chapter, therefore, to attempt to estimate the investment
which Muslims possessed in the Punjab in comparison to the other major
groups (Hindus and Sikhs), and to analyse their economic failings. As
such the enquiry has not been limited to an examination of a few
specific regions and their inhabitants, or of a cross-section of
individuals, as either method could easily give rise to distortions,
and prove unrepresentative of the picture as a whole,
Punjabi Muslims constituted the largest single community in the
Province (excluding the Princely States)accounting for 56% of the popu- 
2
lation. In common with the other major communities (Hindu and Sikh), 
the overwhelming number of Muslims occupied the rural areas, where they 
contributed 59*2% of the rural populace. They formed the majority 
community in 17 districts in the western portion of the Province - 
Lahore (59%)1 Gurdaspur (51%)1 Sialkot (62%), Gujranwala (71%)1 
Sheikhupura (66%), Gujrat (85%), Shahpur (83%), Jhelum (89%), Rawal­
pindi (83%), Attock (91%)1 Mianwali (87%)» Montgomery (71*5%)1 Lyallpur 
(67%), Jhang (8*+%), Multan (81%), Muzaffargarh (87%), and Dera Ghazi 
Khan (89%) - whilst they were dominant in Jullundur (44%), Ferozepur 
(45%) and Amritsar (47%). The Hindus, in contrast, formed the majority 
in only six districts, all of which fell in the eastern part of the 
Province - Hissar (65%)» Gurgaon (67%)* Rohtak (81%), Karnal (66%),
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Simla (78%) and Kangra (91%) - and constituted the most numerous group 
in two districts - Ambala (47%) and Hoshiarpur (40%). The Sikhs had 
no clear majority in any district, though they were the predominant
4communal group in Ludhiana (47%). a
Despite the numerical superiority which the Muslim community
enjoyed, they constituted in the main an economically depressed section
of society, though this fact is not always apparent from the 1931 Census
(Punjab) returns, viz. occupations. In attempting to conduct a survey
based on this source, it should be pointed out that workers, earners,
dependents, etc., were classified according to caste and religion, and
no distinction was made between the British Punjab and the Punjab
States. Thus in considering the position of the Muslims in relation to
the Hindus and Sikhs it must be borne in mind that in Punjab as
a whole Muslims accounted for 52% of the population, as compared to 50%
for Hindus (including Depressed Classes), and 14% for Sikhs. For the
6purpose of this chapter 41 castes were examined, embracing 24,174,OCX)
7individuals, representing 85% of the population of the entire Punjab
g
(British and Princely States). Even so in presenting the following 
findings it must be stressed that the Census provided a rough guide to 
society, rather than an absolutely accurate analysis; statistics were 
sometimes faulty, and thereby misleading. Nevertheless the 1931 Census 
is interesting in that it does provide a general indication of the 
comparative state of the Muslim community in the 1936-1947 period. As 
is evident from Appendix A Muslims were active in all the major 
spheres of provincial economic life, though their degree of partici­
pation was often inferior to that of non-Muslims in terms of their 
percentage of involvement, as compared to their status as the majority 
community.
Even though they appeared to account for the largest single earning 
group (52%), the economic demands made on them were much greater than 
for Hindus and Sikhs, in that Muslims supported the largest number of 
non-working dependents (see Appendix A). But the 1931 Census suggests 
that in all but one aspect Muslims dominated the agricultural life of 
the Province; 54% of all cultivators were drawn from the community, as 
were 61% of estate managers and agents, planters, forest officers and 
rent collectors, and 74% of all herdsmen. In the important area of 
persons living off the rent of land, Muslims were in the minority 
(49%)1 whilst at the menial level 55% of all field labourers and 60% 
of the hunting and fishing community were Muslims (see Appendix A). The 
comparative superiority which the Muslims exhibited in the majority of 
these spheres clearly reflected the fact that they were the most numerous
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group in the rural areas, and that they were not subject to the socio­
religious restrictions which caused many high caste Hindus to avoid 
direct cultivation, especially ploughing. Even so their position was 
not as healthy as suggested by the Census returns. In i/e vital area 
of land-ownership, which decided to a great extent the community's 
share of the gross agricultural production and thereby the wealth of 
the Punjab, Muslims did not control a percentage comparable to their 
status, either as the principal community in the Province, or the 
rural areas, as will be demonstrated later.
Turning to the spheres of mineral exploitation and industrial 
development, the Census is grossly misleading; it suggests that Muslims 
dominated both (see Appendix A). This misconception results from the 
fact that owners, managers, and clerks were included in the same 
category for the purpose of enumeration. In reality the industrial 
life of the Punjab was largely the reserve of the non-Muslims, particu­
larly the Hindus, in terms of ownership, investment and profit (see 
pp.Vf-^9). In the professional field the Muslim position has also 
been misinterpreted. The Census records that of all lawyers, 
doctors and teachers were Muslims (see Appendix A). Though this 
figure indicates that in comparison to Hindus and Sikhs, the Muslims 
had not achieved a percentage reflecting their majority status, in 
reality their representation fell far short of this. The Census returns 
had been greatly exaggerated by the inclusion of bazaar hakims, and the 
indigenous teachers who were attached to every mosque throughout the 
Province. The reality of the situation is truly revealed when one 
considers that of the 576 pleaders, drawn from the major communities, 
who were enrolled on the register of the Punjab High Court between 
January 19^0 and July 19^7 only 148 (26%) were Muslims; the remainder 
comprised 318 Hindus (55%) and 110 Sikhs (19%)*^ In addition out of a 
total of 2,122 Indian doctors of medicine practising in the Province in 
19^31 whether they were registered under the British Medical Acts, or 
were graduates of the University of the Punjab, only 560 (26%) were 
Muslims."*^
With regard to the other categories of occupation included in 
Appendix A whilst they should be treated with caution, in view of the 
observations made above, they do appear to be more representative of 
the Muslim condition; less than ^5% of those persons who enjoyed a 
private income were Muslims, ^8% of all domestic servants were recruited 
from the community, as were ^7% of the clerk-cashier group, 68% of the 
more menial labourers, and 76% of the most socially degraded group, 
consisting of beggars, prostitutes, criminals, and the inmates of jails
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and asylums. The fact that Muslims were in the minority as recipients 
of private incomes is consistent with the fact that they did not enjoy 
the same economic advantages as the non-Muslims, as will be demonstrated 
in due course. Their minority status as clerks and cashiers, and the 
predominance they experienced in the labouring ranks reflected that 
they comprised the most educationally backward group in the Province 
(see Chapter II). In respect of vagrants, etc., it is evident that 
the enumeration of beggars and prostitutes would prove a difficult, 
not to say delicate task, to allow for total accuracy, but in the case 
of criminals, prisoners and lunatics, court, prison and hospital 
records would facilitate an accurate estimation.
In order that a more realistic appreciation of the contribution 
made and benefits derived by the Muslim community in the economic life 
of the Punjab can be made, three specific areas have been chosen for 
detailed analysis. These consist of land-ownership, money-lending - as 
a source of both income and debt - and industry. In examining these 
avenues, particular consideration has been given to the fact that they 
made vital contributions to the exchequer of the Province, and exercised 
the greatest influence on the material well-being of the people.
In attempting to calculate the amount of land which the Muslim 
community owned in the year 1936 to 19^7 it has proved necessary to 
draw on sources, in the form of Assessment Reports, which frequently 
pre-dated this period, as they contained the most up-to-date records of 
land-holdings in each district. Unfortunately the assessments were not 
conducted in sequence, but despite the lack of consistency, in terms of 
a fixed period of time, it has been possible to arrive at a realistic 
estimation. Also it should be borne in mind that land-ownership statis­
tics recorded in Assessment Reports were expressed in terms of tribal, 
rather than religious groupings, though information available in these 
reports, supplemented by that provided by Settlement Reports and 
District Gazetteers facilitated a religious categorisation. Some in­
accuracy, however, must be allowed for in respect of land held by Hindus
and Sikhs, as at times the Assessment Reports exhibited a degree of
11confusion in distinguishing between the two. In respect of Muslim 
landowners, however, no such difficulties were encountered. The 
findings of the survey are detailed in Appendices Bi - Biv.
As will be seen each Appendix has been constructed with regard to the 
information contained in the various assessments, thus Appendix Bi 
deals with the division of land between Muslim and Sikh owners, as 
statements concerning the number of Hindu owners were omitted, though
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it was possible to calculate the amount of land held, and land revenue 
which they paid; Appendix Bii contains details of the number of land­
owners and shareholders, the total area held and the land revenue paid 
for each community;Appendix Biii deals only with the number of owners 
and shareholders and total land held; Appendix Biv is restricted to the 
amount of land held by each community. The information so collated was 
drawn from every district of the Punjab, with the exception of Simla, 
and as such represents a near total appreciation of the Province.
Even so, as Clive Dewey has explained, throughout the period of 
British rule the "accuracy of the official agricultural statistics was 
directly related to the efficiency of the agency through which they 
were collected". In the Punjab the patwaris were responsible for 
maintaining the land revenue records of each village. Though technically 
village servants, in reality they emanated from the highest stratum of 
village society, belonging to rich peasant families, or those of influ­
ential traders and money-lenders. Though the work produced by patwaris 
was, in theory, scrutinised by their immediate superiors, the kanungoes 
and tahsildars (revenue assessment officials), errors did occur. As 
long as village revenues were paid punctually, the statistics prepared 
by the patwaris remained largely unchecked and unchallenged. Between 
1880 and 191^ attempts were made to.convert the patwaris into efficient 
civil servants, but those improvements which were achieved were piece­
meal, and the capabilities of individual patwaris continued to vary 
enormously. The post, in fact, was largely hereditary, thus standards 
of literacy varied greatly and many of the older officers were unable 
to comprehend the collation of modern statistics. Efforts were made to 
improve standards through recruitment, but difficulties were frequently 
encountered. Members of the mainly Hindu commercial class, the great 
reservoir of literacy in the Province, were generally reluctant to 
serve in remote districts, and the British were wary of employing them 
in large numbers, as they were often absentees who neglected their work, 
or they used their position to further the expropriation of peasant 
debtors in favour of their money-lending caste-fellows. Although some 
improvements were made, they were spasmodic. In the inter-war years
the entire land revenue system deteriorated, and the compilation of
12agricultural statistics was affected by this decline. Thus in con­
sidering the information which follows it is imperative that it should 
be regarded as an indication of the communal pattern of land ownership 
that existed in the Punjab, rather than an absolutely accurate statement 
of fact.
On the basis of the available information it seems that Muslims
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owned over 50% of the land in 15 (Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, 
Lyallpur, Montgomery, Gujrat, Attock, Dera Ghazi Khan, Mianwali,
Jhelum, Jhang, Shahpur, Rawalpindi, Multan, Muzzaffargarh) of the 28 
districts examined. All of the former were Muslim majority districts, 
though in only six of them did the community possess a percentage of 
the land comparable with, or which exceeded their population ratio at 
the district level. In the remaining districts where they were 
numerically dominant - Lahore and Gurdaspur - they held only y\% and 55% 
of the land respectively, though in Jullundur where they constituted the 
predominant group, they held a percentage of the land (43%) almost 
equivalent to their population status (44%). In only three (Gurgaon, 
Ludhiana and Karnal) of the eight Muslim minority districts surveyed 
did Muslims hold a proportion of the land comparable to their population 
ratios in those areas (see Appendices Bi-Biv). Consequently in the Pro­
vince as a whole, the Muslim share of land appears not to have been 
equivalent to their predominant status in the rural areas. At the time 
of the various assessments the total land farmed in the Punjab, whether 
cultivated or uncultivated, amounted to 40,850,983 acres exclusive of
Shamilat (land held in common by proprietory body of a village),
13village abadi (village sites) and Government property. The Muslims
representing 59•2% of the rural populace possessed 22,802,355 acres
(56%), of which 18,^56,209 acres (81% of the total Muslim land holding)
were situated in the 15 Muslim majority districts and Jullundur;
10,938,112 acres (27%) was in Hindu hands, the latter accounting for
26.3% of all rural inhabitants; 5 ,968,920 acres (14.6%) was owned by
the Sikh community, which comprised 14.5% of the rural population. Of
the remaining land (2.4%) amounting to 1,141,596 acres, ownership was
not specified in the district assessment reports in the case of 944,504
14acres (2%), whilst 197,092 acres (0.4%) was owned by Christians.
The Muslim position was even weaker than it appeared to be. By
1936 of all the land situated in Jullundur, and the 15 districts where
Muslims possessed the major holding, 11% was subject to usufructuary
mortgage (see Appendix C). Whilst it is impossible to discern exactly
what percentage of the land so mortgaged was Muslim owned, there is
little doubt that Muslim property accounted for most of it, considering
that it occurred in those areas where agriculture was Muslim dominated,
15and that the Muslim community was the most indebted in the Province.
If one assumes therefore that of the 11% of alienated land,at least 8% was 
Muslim owned,and translates that percentage to the findings recorded in 
Appendices Bi-Biv, it is found that 1,894,976 acres of the Muslim land
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situated in the western districts and Jullundur was probably mortgaged 
16with possession. Of the money-lenders who held this land, the majority 
were almost certainly non-Muslims. From information available in the 
Punjab Land Revenue Administration Report for 1936, it has been possible 
to calculate that of the 11% of territory mortgaged, 5% was to non- 
agriculturists and 6% to agriculturists (see Appendix C). Practically 
all of the former were non-Muslims; in the case of the latter it is not 
possible to be so specific, though the Punjab Banking Enquiry Committee
of 1925 discovered that by and large the majority of agriculturist money-
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lenders were non-Muslims. For the purpose of this study it has been 
assumed that at least 70% of the mortgaged Muslim land would have been 
alienated in favour of non-Muslims, thus of the 1,894,976 acres involved, 
1,326,483 in all probability would have been held by Hindu and Sikh 
money-lenders. Therefore out of the entire provincial Muslim holding of 
22,802,355 acres, in reality the community was in possession of only 
approximately 21,475i872 acres, or 51*5% of the entire agricultural land. 
This figure does not take into account the amount of Muslim land subject 
to usufructuary mortgage in those districts where non-Muslims held the 
major portion of the land, as there it is not possible, given the infor­
mation available,to arrive at an equitable estimation. Even so, given 
the fact that some Muslim land would have been mortgaged with possession 
in those areas, it is probable that the amount of land actually farmed 
by Muslims throughout the Province was even less than the percentage 
estimated above.
Another factor which detracted from the Muslim position was that
despite the fact that the community owned the major portion of the rich
18canal-colony land (64%), in general Muslim land appears to have been
less fertile than that in the possession of non-Muslims. On the basis
of information available for 20 (Lahore, Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Sialkot,
Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Gurgaon, Gujrat, Attock,
Dera Ghazi Khan, Ambala, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur, Ferozepore, Ludhiana,
Rohtak, Karnal and Mianwali) of the 28 districts surveyed, it can be seen
that whilst Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs owned approximately 55%» 24% and
20% of the land respectively in those areas, the Muslim community
accounted for only 48% of the assessed land revenue, as compared to 20%
19paid by Hindus, and 31% paid by Sikh landowners, ? indicating thereby 
the inferior productivity of the Muslim holdings. Also in respect of all 
owners paying land revenue charges of, and in excess of Rs.5 per annum, 
Muslims were in a minority in all but the lowest category, which suggests 
that comparatively more Muslims were found in the petty cultivating 
class than was the case for non-Muslims. Out of 1,398,000 landowners
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assessed in 1932, Muslims accounted for 50% of the very small owners
liable to charges of between Rs.5 and Rs.10, kS% of those small owners
paying between Rs.10 and Rs.25, and k&% of those paying Rs.25 and above
(see Appendix D) - a category including medium owners cultivating between
20 and *f0 irrigated, or up to 200 unirrigated acres, and large owners
who possessed at least 50 acres in a canal-colony or more than 200 acres
20of unirrigated land. Whilst with regard to the wealthiest section of 
landowners, records compiled in 1909 demonstrate that despite the exist­
ence of vast Muslim owned estates in the western half of the Province, 
less than 50% of the great landed magnates were Muslims, in that of those 
wealthy zamindars subject to annual land revenue payments of,and in
excess of Rs.1000 k7% (173) were Muslims, y\% (115) were Hindus, 16%
21(58) were Sikhs and 6% (23) were Christians.
The overall pattern of Muslim land-ownership present in the Punjab 
by the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century was the result 
in the first place of conquest and conversion,and secondly of the ruth­
less alienation of land which occurred following the annexation of the 
Province by the British in 18^9* The establishment of Islam began with 
the intrusion of Arab traders in Multan in the eighth century A.D., re­
ceiving impetus from the succession of Muslim invasions which took place
22from the twelfth to the sixteenth century, culminating in the establish­
ment of the Mughal Empire (which included the Punjab, and stretched from
23Kabul to the borders of Bengal) by Babur, following his military vic­
tories over the Afghan Sultan of Delhi and the Rajput leader Rana Sanga 
in 1526 and 152?. Though the foundations of Muslim dominance in the 
western Punjab had already been laid through the activities of determined 
proselyters in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, including Sheikh Baha 
-ud-Din Zakaria (b.ll82) from Khwarizm and Baba Farid Shakarganj (b.1175)• 
It was the zeal of these spiritual leaders, and those who followed them,
which was largely responsible for the conversion of the Hindu agricultur-
2.kists, rather them the sword of any conqueror. For although the Awan,
Biloch, Mughal and Pathan tribes all claimed descent from Muslim invaders 
25and colonisers, the Muslim Jat and Rajput tribes, which together formed
the backbone of the Muslim community in the Punjab, in common with the
26Ghakars and Gujars had been converted to Islam.
By the time the Mughal Empire finally disintegrated (1761), and the 
Punjab first passed under the sway of Pathan,and then Sikh rulers, the 
Muslims had emerged as the major numerical group, being most numerous in 
the western districts, though the community lost both prestige and land 
during the Sikh period. The Sikhs oppressed those sections of Muslim 
society which they believed constituted a threat to their power. The
22
Ghakhar tribe in particular suffered from this policy; their leaders 
were reduced to the position of tenant cultivators. Many of the leading 
Muslim .families and tribes occupying the Cis-Indus area in the Salt 
Range and in the northern table-land were driven into exile, or forced
27
to accept tenant status. The Muslim Rajput aristocracy suffered 
similar treatment; they were over-taxed, oppressed by Sikh officials; 
their villages were frequently destroyed and their mosques desecrated. 
Temple (settlement officer) writing of their plight in Jullundur in the 
early 1850*s concluded that as a result of Sikh persecution the Rajputs 
in that area had become a "bye-word" for "destitution”, as there was
28
hardly a Rajput estate in the district which was not in a state of decay. 
Also the policy and class sympathies of Diwan Sawan Mai, appointed by the 
Sikh government as governor of Multan, resulted in the acquisition by
Hindus of large tracts of land by purchase and direct grant in Multan and
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Jhang. The accumulative effect of these policies resulted in the con­
trol of land passing from Muslim to non-Muslim hands.
With the advent of British rule this trend was accelerated, though 
not as a result of direct Government policy or persecution, but as an 
inevitable consequence of the introduction of British customs and laws in 
respect of land-ownership and debt. Indebtedness itself was not a con­
sequence of British rule, the Indian Famine Commission of 1879 considered 
that the agricultural population of India had not at any known period of 
their history been generally free from debt. Prior to the arrival of 
the British, however, usurers had advanced credit on the security of the 
crops, not the actual land. Though proprietary rights, with the power 
to sell or mortgage, had existed in some parts of the Punjab under Sikh 
rule, the exercise of the right of transfer had been restricted by a num­
ber of considerations. Joint-ownership had been far more common in the 
pre-annexation period, and it was extremely difficult to effect a trans­
fer of property held in common either by groups of individuals, or the 
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village community. In addition a more potent impediment existed, land 
was not viewed as a desirable asset in the pre-British period. The crops 
were divided on a fifty-fifty basis between the cultivator and the State,
thus if the cultivator and the proprietor were different persons, the
32
latter received very little of the division of the harvest'; The State, 
therefore, frequently absorbed the owners' rental, and they were res­
tricted in making excessive demands on their cultivators because they 
needed to retain sufficient tenants to work the land, the result was that 
land itself "was not a commodity that the possessors of capital desired
to purchase." Consequently it was exceedingly difficult to raise a mort- 
33gage on land, as was reflected in the low incidence of mortgages in the 
Province; immediately prior to British rule it was estimated that only
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3*+6# of the whole area of Gurdaspur district had been mortgaged, whilst in
Amritsar district less than 1# of the cultivated area was subject to 
35mortgage.
Under the British all this changed. Following annexation summary 
settlements were executed in the countryside, under which many of those found 
to be in cultivating possession of land were treated as proprietors, as a 
result proprietory rights spread through the Province. At the same time 
a fixed cash revenue demand was introduced, replacing the elastic assess­
ment practised by the Sikhs, which had been decided annually on the size 
of the harvest and paid in kind. These changes had a dramatic effect on 
rural economics. The fixed assessment, which in good years meant that
cultivators were left with a considerable portion of their crop, in that
36the average demand rarely exceeded 15# to 20# of the harvest, as com­
pared to 50# levied by the Sikhs, combined with the settled conditions
which prevailed in the Province after 1857i and the extension of trans- 
37port facilities making markets more accessible, raised both the value 
38of crops and land. Had the cultivators been experienced in money
matters the lessening of the burden of assessed revenue could have worked
to their benefit, but ignorance caused surplus money to be squandered,
and the failure of a crop often resulted in heavy borrowing to meet the 
39revenue demand.
Loans, however, were easily secured, for the introduction of 
property rights had "made an unconditional gift of a valuable estate to 
every peasant proprietor in the Punjab'1, raising his credit from the
kosurplus of an occasional good crop, to the market value of his holding. 
Whilst in contrast to Sikh times, the money-lending classes appreciating 
the new value of land were anxious to make advances on the security of 
land. Wilson, who conducted the Shahpur settlement of 1887-9^» was con­
vinced that the "chief cause of the numerous transfers” in his district 
"undoubtedly is the great rise in the money value of land, which made the 
money-lending classes anxious to get hold upon it by advancing money on 
every opportunity to the improvident Musalroan landowners..." . The 
result often proved disastrous for the peasant cultivators; ignorant of
the real value of money, and unable to judge the future consequences of
*t2debt, they borrowed heavily.
To the money-lenders the situation offered a hitherto unknown oppor­
tunity for exploitation, and they seized it. Prior to 1865 only 23 mort­
gages with possession had been recorded in the Amritsar tahsil; between 
1865 and 1880 that figure increased to 798, whilst by 1900 it stood at
1*3
9*6^5* Likewise in Gujranwala district prior to 1868 less than 1# of 
the land had been sold and approximately 1# was mortgaged. During the
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succeeding 25 years no less than 16.5% of the total area, and 21# of the
cultivated area, paying 25% of the revenue demand, had changed hands,
either by sale or usufructuary mortgage. 53% of the land sold, and 69%
of the land mortgaged had passed into the hands of money-lenders, who by
1894 held 60% of the alienated land, including 13.5% of the total culti-
44vated acreage of the district.
The money-lender had ceased to be merely the village accountant and
45financier, a role he had fulfilled for centuries, to emerge as a major
investor in land. The rewards such speculation offered were extremely
lucrative, as is evident from the fact that between l88l and 1911 the
number of bankers, money-lenders and their dependants in the Province
mushroomed from 90,793 to 193»890^  Despite the presence of some Muslim
47money-lenders in the frontier districts, usury was opposed to the strict
precepts of Islam, which discouraged greater involvement by the community.
The overwhelming majority of money-lenders were Hindus, the ’profession'
being dominated by three main castes, the Bania operating principally in
the area south of the Sutlej, the Khatri in the central Punjab and the
49Arora or Kirar, predominating in the west of the province. In general
Hindu money-lenders were referred to collectively as 'Banias1 (crBunrriahs)
or 'Kirars'. These terms were synonymous with extortion and greed:
"Shylock was a gentleman by the side of Nand Lall Bunniah 
...His greed for grain, the shameless effrontery with which 
he adds 50 per cent, to a debt, calls the total principal 
...with interest at 36 per cent, per annum...and cajoles or 
wearies him |_the debtor_J into mortgaging.. .an ancestral 
plot of good land...have entirely alienated the sympathies 
of district officers from men of his calling."^
Yet it had been the establishment of British rule that had endowed the 
money-lending classes with the opportunity to profit from high interest 
charges, and the power to gain control over land which had been offered 
as security against a loan.
Under Hindu law, interest on money loans could not exceed the 
principal, though it did appear that a bond for the amount of the prin­
cipal and interest not exceeding the principal could bear future interest. 
During the period of Sikh rule in the Province no creditor could recover 
as interest more than half the value of the principal in the case of
money, or no more than an equivalent amount of principal in the case of 
51produce. Conversely British law allowed interest to accumulate without 
limit. This practice frequently proved ruinous to the debtor. Darling 
has cited two cases which effectively demonstrate this point. In 1896 a 
blacksmith ofHissar mortgage!hds small plot of land for Rs.26 at 37^> interest. 
By 1906 the debt, without further borrowing, had increased through com­
pound interest to Rs.500, and in 1918 a court order was obtained whereby
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the money-lender was to be paid in full. Similarly a Jat peasant over
the course of twenty years borrowed Rs,350, repaying Rs.*+50» leaving a
52balance of Rs.1,000 outstanding, still to be paid. Also in the pre-
British Punjab, the transfer of ancestral land had been forbidden, thus
53it could not be seized in lieu of debt. In contrast following annexation 
landowners were permitted both by sale and mortgage to transfer either 
acquired or ancestral property, on the condition that the near relatives 
of the proprietor, and after them other ancestral shareholders, had the 
right of pre-emption. If that right was not exercised, the proprietor
5^
could sell or mortgage at will. Furthermore in 1866 the Chief Court had
been established in Lahore and a code of civil procedure was introduced
whereby all property became liable to attachment and sale in execution of
a civil decree. In theory both the civil court and the district officer
could avert the compulsory sale of land to meet a debt, if sufficient
money could be raised from the land in other ways. In practice, this
afforded little protection to those proprietors who were hopelessly
55burdened by debt.
Punjabi landowners, though predisposed to mortgage land, were loath 
to lose their proprietary rights. In l8?3 the number of voluntary sales 
recorded in the Province averaged less than 6,000 per annum, only one 
owner out of every 33** selling his land. The aggregate area of assessed 
land so transferred annually was less than one acre per square mile. The 
money-lender, therefore, could not purchase land easily, but the law gave 
him the opportunity to acquire it in default of debt. Under the circum­
stances many loans were advanced purely with the intention of eventually 
gaining the land: "Mortgage is often considered but one step from sale,
56
and is almost as favourite a mode of investing money as buying outright,"
The transfer was frequently effected by charging very high interest rates,
and by refusing further credit to borrowers in periods of economic dis-
57tress, e.g. famine or drought.
British courts provided the vehicle whereby such manoeuvres could 
be realised, Mr. Justice Melvill, commenting in the early 1870's that 
civil courts were generally oppressive to debtors, and that it was Common 
for decrees to be given for as much as four times the amount of the prin­
cipal, land and immovable property being frequently alienated as a re- 
58suit. The money-lenders1 position was strengthened further by the active
sympathy of court officials. By l&8k the majority of money cases were
decided by Indian judges or Munsifs. They were
"largely recruited from the Bunniah class, and are mostly 
men of town extraction and of good education. As a body they 
are ignorant of rural affairs, have no sympathy with agricul­
turists, and do not thoroughly understand their patois."
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The Munsifs, therefore, were often partial:
’•the chief function performed by this class of Judge 
is to terrorize defendants into coming to terms with 
their Bunniah-plaintiffs. Thus, out of 1,71*651 suits 
decided by munsifs in 1884, in only 48,177, or 28 per 
cent., were judgements delivered after contest”,
the remainder were not contested, either being disposed of by compromise,
59confession, withdrawal, or dismissal for default. ^
British law in effect gave money-lenders a charter to dispossess 
their debtors and acquire land, without offering adequate protection to 
the landowners, who at best were ill-educated, and at worst illiterate.
As such they fell easy victims to the money-lenders' wiles. Bonds were 
frequently drawn up, and the agriculturist, having no knowledge of what 
they contained, had to rely on verbal assurances, but such bonds were in­
violable in the eyes of the law. Also once in debt, cultivators were 
completely at the mercy of their creditors, because of the system where­
by interest was charged and allowed to compound. Interest payments were 
frequently paid in kind and in following this custom,agriculturist 
borrowers often failed to receive the true value of their crops, whilst 
money-lenders through the manipulation of records, which were frequently 
falsified, received more than was their due. The opportunities, there­
fore, for debtors to clear their debts were rare, and as they were more 
often ignorant of such malpractices, injustices were committed, in 
effect, with the concurrence of the law,^ The result was that the 
creditor class, overwhelmingly Hindu in composition, acquired vast 
tracts of land, either through mortgage with possession, or in default 
of debts. The victims of these proceedings were all too often Muslims, 
both in the western and eastern districts of the Province. Though it is 
not possible to be precise in calculating the effect which this had in 
reducing the total Muslim landholding in the Province, it was very 
substantial as is indicated in the early Settlement and Assessment 
Reports.
In the Ambala district (East Punjab) between 1855 1888 it was
estimated that 8-J% of the cultivated area had been sold and approximately 
14# mortgaged. Professional Hindu money-lenders held half of the mort­
gaged land in the Rupar and Kharar tahsils, one-third in Ambala and 
four-fifths in the Naraingarh tahsil, and either as mortgagees or 
vendors they had acquired practically all the land which had been 
forced onto the market. These two groups were so wealthy that in the 
Jagadahri tahsil they paid one-third of the total land revenue, and one- 
quarter in the Naraingarh and Ambala tahsils. Their economic advance
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had occurred largely at the expense of the heavily indebted Rajputs,
61three-quarters of whom were Muslims. Similarly in Attock (N.W.Punjab)
the Hindus (accounting for only 8 .5$ of the population by 1930), notably
the Khatri, Arora and Brahman castes, who controlled trade and money-
lending in the district, had gained possession of Muslim lands through
purchase and mortgage: "A few acquired land in Sikh times... But the
great proportion of Hindu interest in land has been acquired by sale or
mortgage. More thrifty, patient and far-seeing than the Muhammadan
peasant...” they succeeded "often as the result of accumulated interest
on small original debts" in taking possession of substantial areas in 
62the district. The same process was discernible in Dera Ghazi Khan 
(S.W. Punjab). Between 1869 and 1897 Hindu financiers gained control 
over 30$ of the land in three of the four tahsils in the district, 
acquiring property rights to 10$ and more of the land in those areas.
The vast majority of the property, whether alienated or sold, was or had/■y
been Muslim owned. Muslim lands also passed to Hindu money-lenders in
Gujrat district (central Punjab). In the twenty-year period following
annexation the acreage owned by Brahmins and Khatris increased by 130$,
and that of the Labanahs (Hindus and Sikhs) grew by 80$. These gains
occurred largely at the expense of three Muslim tribes - the Syeds,
6^Mughals and Pathans. In Gurgaon (S.E. Punjab) up until the l880's the
Muslim Meos had constituted the largest single land-holding tribe owning
nearly the whole of the Firozepur tahsil and the greater part of the Nur
tahsil, possessing 387 of the 1,270 villages in the district. They were
notoriously thriftless, and extremely poor cultivators, however, and
these failings combined with the severe drought of 1877-78 caused them
to fall easy victims to the Hindu credit machine. By June 1877 it was
believed that 7% of the entire cultivated acreage of the district was
mortgaged, rising to 10$ in 1883, at least 6$ of which was held by
Hindus of a non-agriculturist tradition. The gains of this class had
occurred largely to the detriment of the Meos, reducing still further
65the total percentage of land owned by Muslims in the Punjab.
The Muslim community was to suffer an even more serious reversal in 
Jullundur (N.E. Punjab). In 18^9 the Jats, the majority of whom were 
Muslims, held half the land, and paid half the revenue assessment.
Large tracts had also been owned by Muslim Rajputs, Syeds, Mughals, 
Pathans and Sheikhs, making it primarily a Muslim district in terms of 
land-ownership. Temple, the Settlement Officer, however, foresaw in 
1831 the effect which the combination of debt and British law would have 
on the land-owning pattern in the district and he was convinced that the
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Hindu 'Khutrees* would emerge as the major beneficiaries.
"They are both the writers and the merchants of the 
Punjab. They are sure to thrive and multiply under 
British rule; as yet they possess but little land, 
and that little they have acquired by sale, mortgage 
and suchlike transactions ... many years hence it will 
be instructive to see whether Khutree proprietorship 
has, or has not, increased in this Doab."
Evidently Temple would not have been surprised to learn that by 1915-16 
Hindus owned of the land in the district, whilst the total Muslim 
holding had been reduced to ***+% (see Appendix Bii). Multan and 
Muzaffargarh (S.W. Punjab) were two further areas where Muslims experi­
enced serious losses to the Hindu money-lending classes. In Multan 
Muslim Jats were the principal victims. The land area mortgaged by the 
quinquennium 1897-98 was more than twice as large as in the quinquennium 
ending 1877-78, whilst the area sold was four times as large. The area 
under mortgage at the settlement of 1896-1901 was 272,57*+ acres, or 50% 
more than had been mortgaged at the settlement of 1873-80. The area 
sold in the twenty years between the first (1855-59) and second Settle­
ment (1873-80) stood at 95*251 acres; that sold in the period between the 
second and third Settlement (1895-1901) was more than three times that 
amount. Of the land under mortgage by the third Settlement it was 
estimated that 89% was held by Hindu money-lenders, and of the land sold 
between 1880 and 1901 it was believed that 61% had been acquired by that 
class. The result was the steady accumulation of land by Hindus: at
the first Settlement at had been calculated they had owned 17% of the
proprietary area; this had risen to 20.3% at the second, and 26.8% at
the third, so that by 1901 they owned half as much land again as they
67in the early l870's. Similarly in Muzaffargarh between 1873 and 1908
1*+% of the cultivated area had been sold, the alienations being made
largely in favour of Hindu money-lenders, who by 1908 possessed 20% of 
the total cultivated acreage in the district. Furthermore they held an 
additional 8% of the arable acreage on usufructuary mortgage, as com-
C Q
pared to 0.8% at the Settlement of 1873-80.
The alienation of land was not confined the examples quoted above,
it was widespread throughout the Province, and increasing with each 
69successive year. By 1877-78 it was estimated that 7% of the total
agricultural acreage of the Punjab had been mortgaged; in l87*+-75 alone
32,000  acres had been bought by money-lenders, and 119,000 taken on
mortgage, and in 1892-93 money-lenders acquired 153,000 acres through
70sales, and 223,000 acres through mortgage. Whilst in the twelve month 
period 1899 to 1900, a total of 67*+, 01*+ acres, which included **91,089
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cultivated acres, had either been mortgaged with possession, or claimed
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by creditors in lieu of debts. The major feature of this accumulative 
alienation was that the total Hindu land holding in the Province expanded 
largely at the cost of the Muslim cultivating body. As such the process 
played a significant role in shaping the land-ownership pattern current 
in the Punjab in the first four and a half decades of the twentieth 
century.
The expropriation continued unabated in the Punjab for almost fifty 
years following annexation. Though it had been recognised as a feature 
of provincial life from the earliest years of British rule, official 
opinion had been divided over whether it constituted an acceptable or
72
retrograde trend, and whether measures should be adopted to control it. 
Some officers like Melvill, the Deputy Commissioner of Ambala from 1858 
believed that the takeover of land by capitalists should not be dis­
couraged as it would lead to more efficient cultivation, thereby in­
creasing its revenue potential. Others, however, including Arthur 
Brandreth, the Commissioner of the Multan Divison warned that the unabated 
alienation of land could have grave political consequences for the British,
in that it could cost them the traditional loyalty of the landed
classes. The controversy was only finally resolved in 1901 with the 
passing of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act. The Government of India
in enacting the measure had finally been convinced by the political
argument, for although it hoped that it would improve the peasants* 
plight, the Act's primary purpose was to safeguard British interests 
and to cultivate the continuing support of the rural populace against 
the spread of Congress inspired nationalist agitation.73
The most important provisions of the Act, which was designed to 
prevent proprietors being expropriated by money-lenders, divided the 
Punjabi tribes.into agriculturist and non-agriculturist categories, the 
latter including Banias, Aroras and Khatris. Non-agriculturists were 
forbidden to buy land from agriculturists, nor could they take it on
mortgage for a period in excess of twenty years, also an agriculturist's
7^land could no longer be sold in execution of a money decree. These 
measures, though they led to a substantial decrease in the area being
transferred annually through mortgages, did not entirely exclude non-
75agriculturist money-lenders from gaining land. ^ The latter, operating 
through agriculturist agents, were still able to acquire land by sale 
and mortgage; such evasions were known as benami transactions. Follow­
ing 1901, however, the position of the non-agriculturist, money-lending 
castes was generally eroded in the case of morfeage debt, and a class of
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agriculturist creditors came to the fore. Thus the expropriation of 
land was not eradicated in the Punjab, as the disqualifications inherent 
in the Act did not apply to agriculturist usurers. It was to be almost 
forty years before further major legislation would be enacted ostensibly 
to further safeguard the position of agriculturist debtors.
In 1938 the zamindari Unionist Government, anxious to justify its 
claim to be the protector of the poor cultivators, adopted a series of 
measures designed, so it was claimed, to improve the position of the 
indebted cultivating community. The resultant legislation, emanating 
from a government dominated by wealthy zamindars, did nothing to restrict 
the privileges enjoyed by rural creditors. The Land Alienation Act was 
amended to prevent land being held on usufructuary mortgage from being 
exhausted by the mortgagee, and to outlaw benami transactions. The 
latter were declared to be illegal, and the alienor was entitled to re­
possess the land. Also no member of an agricultural tribe was allowed 
to make a permanent alienation of land in favour of an agriculturalist
creditor, and no transfer of land was permitted unless a five year period
76had elapsed since the full payment of the debt. These amendments, how­
ever , did not prevent the agriculturist money-lenders from takiqg land for a 
period in excess of twenty yeara Also an sgrxmlturdst money-lender could purchase 
land from those indebted cultivators who were not his debtors. Thus 
the measures did not place the same restrictions on agriculturists , as 
on non-agriculturist money-lenders. By the Punjab Restitution of Mort­
gaged Lands Bill,the Ministry determined to restore to agriculturists 
lands mortgaged by them to non-agriculturists before such transactions 
were forbidden by the Land Alienation Act. It stipulated that if 
interest derived by the mortgagee was found to equal or exceed the 
amount of the mortgage, then the latter would be liquidated and the 
creditor would receive no compensation. Whilst this legislation 
certainly benefited zamindars who were indebted to non-agriculturists 
prior to 1901, it placed no censure on agriculturist creditors who
continued to receive interest in excess of the principal from mort-
77gages enacted before 1901. In fact the Punjab Registration of Money­
lenders Bill, constituted the only measure which discriminated equally 
against both classes of creditor. The central provision of the Bill 
determined that all money-lenders who were not registered, and who did 
not possess a valid licence would receive no assistance from the courts 
in recovering a loan. The Bill also stipulated that a money-lender's 
licence would be cancelled if he charged interest in excess of the 
maximum laid down by the Relief of Indebtedness Act of 1 9 3 ^  if he
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failed to keep adequate accounts, or if he was found guilty of forgery 
79or fraud.
Despite these enactments indebtedness continued to be a dominant 
feature of rural life in the Province. The Unionist Ministry in common 
with preceding administrations failed to initiate a vigorous policy to 
eradicate the most fundamental cause of the problem - the vicious system 
of credit which ensured that once a cultivator fell into debt, he
8n
generally remained in that state. Although co-operative societies
had been formed in many villages in the Punjab following the passing of
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the Co-operative Societies Act of 190*t, as a means of providing a cheaper 
and safer source of credit, the movement never possessed sufficient 
capital to seriously challenge or undermine the established system: in
1917-18 those monqy-lenders who enjoyed annual incomes of Rs.500 and over, 
and were liable to taxation, alone advanced Rs.28,000,000 in loans; 
by comparison the Co-operative Societies provided only Rs. 7^ lakhs to 
borrowers in 1923, ^  this figure rising to Rs. 111.50 lakhs in 1938-391 
and Rs. 112 lakhs by 19*+3-^> Debt was to remain the major problem 
which confronted the cultivating classes of the Punjab, and the Muslim 
community in particular. As investors in the highly lucrative credit 
business Muslims never equalled the commanding position enjoyed by non- 
Muslims, whilst they accounted for the vast majority of the debtor class.
After agriculture, money-lending was the most important 'industry' in
85the Province. In 1920 Calvert calculated that the net income of those
money-lenders earning over Rs.500 per annum was approximately Rs.500 lakhs,
and if allowance was made for those below that income bracket, the total
was well in excess of that sum. When compared with the fact that the
net income of the North-Western Railway in 1917-18 amounted to Rs. 76^
lakhs, and the net revenue from the major irrigation works in the Punjab
for the same year was Rs. 267 lakhs, the significance of the money-lender*s
business of the Province is apparent. Tax returns for the 1917-18 period
emphasise this fact, out of a provincial total of Rs. 30.7 lakhs, Rs.
7.^ lakhs were paid by money-lenders. There were more tax payers amongst
this group than for any other trading or professional class: 15,033
money-lenders were assessed on collective incomes amounting to Rs.
351000,OCX) compared to a total provincial income which was subject to
tax, of Rs. 730 lakhs. On the basis of these findings Calvert observed
"the province is dominated by the money-lender. He 
represents the richest single class. His profits 
probably exceed those of all the cultivators put together.
Beside him, the professional class is inconsiderable; the 
industrial class is insignificant; even trade and commerce 
take second place."”®
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Though Calvert's figures emphasise the economic power of the money-
lending community, it is not possible to gauge from them the total number
of usurers in the Province, as they were concerned only with those
subject to tax* As a result calculations concerning the size of the
community vary considerably. Calvert himself estimated in 1920 that
the proportion of money-lenders, large and petty, to the total population
was in the region of 1;100, as compared to 1:367 in the rest of India.
In effect that meant that although the populace of the Punjab comprised
only one-eleventh of the whole population of India, it supported one-
87
fourth of all the money-lenders in the country. In 1930 the Provincial
Banking Enquiry Committee.was of the opinion that between 351000 and
, 8859,000 usurers were operating in the Province, i.e. 1:3*K) persons.
Though these findings vary tremendously, both indicate that an enormous 
number of individuals were connected with the advancement of credit.
As previously stated the Land Alienation Act (1901) effectively 
divided the money-lending community into non-agriculturist and agricultur­
ist categories. Though Muslims were to be found in both groups, the 
credit machine continued to be monopolised by non-Muslims, both Hindus 
and Sikhs, the Sikhs having come into prominence after 1901. There 
were two main classes of non-agriculturist money-lenders, the Sahukars 
advancing rural credit, and the urban usurers operating in the towns and 
cities. Together they controlled the majority of debt in the Province,
despite the fact that three-quarters of mortgage debt was held by agri-
89 90 . .culturists. The Sahukars were the most important group, consisting
almost entirely of Hindu Banias, Khatris and Aroras, though there was ^  
a small element of Muslim Khojas operating mainly in Chiniot and Shahpur. 
Despite the legislation of 1901 the Sahukar group had survived, primarily 
because there was no alternative source of credit, especially for un­
secured loans, in certain parts of the Province, notably Karnal, Hohtak, 
Attock, Gurgaon and Mianwali: in 83# of 8,000 villages examined between
1926 and 1928 by the Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry there were no 
agriculturist money-lenders. The influence which the Sahukars continued
to wield was apparent from the fact that in 1928-29 they accounted for
92nearly 20# of all the income-tax assessees in the Province.
In the case of urban money-lenders, they usually combined usury with 
some other form of business, generally advancing loans for private 
consumption, rather than for industry and commerce which were financed 
largely by indigenous bankers. This class of money-lender was over­
whelmingly Hindu in composition, though two small Muslim groups were 
discernible - the Khojas and the Pathans. The Pathans operated mainly
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in Lahore, the centre of their operations being the Landa Bazaar, thus 
although they belonged to a notified agriculturist tribe, their zone
of activity resulted in them being classified in the urban category in
93this instance.
Also in respect of agriculturist creditors the Muslims constituted
a small minority. The Land Alienation Act of 1901 had strengthened the
9**position of this class of creditor, and expanded their numbers. By 
1928-29 it was estimated that there were approximately 19*000 such money­
lenders operating in the Punjab, approximately 1,000 of whom were Muslims. 
These calculations were based on the findings of a survey of 8,000 
villages (23% of the total number of settlements in the Province) con­
ducted between 1926 and 1928, which revealed the presence of **,3^0 
agriculturist creditors, **9% of whom were Hindus, *+5% Sikhs and 6% 
Muslims. The Sikhs predominated in the central Punjab, the Hindus in 
the Ambala division and Kangra, whilst the Muslims were most strongly
represented in the districts of Rohtak and Jullundur, followed by Ambala,
93Hoshiarpur and Hissar. The comparatively low number of Muslim money­
lenders, whether agriculturist or non-agriculturist, was also reflected 
in the number of suits instigated by Muslims for the recovery of debts 
in the periods January 1939 to December 1939* and January 19^1 to
August 19^7* Of approximately *t,729 creditors involved, only 15% (69*0
96were Muslims, as compared to 6*f% (3*056) from the Hindu community.
There were two main reasons for the low level of Muslim partici­
pation - religion and lack of capital. The receipt of interest was
97contrary to the teachings of Islam. Even so some Muslims were prepared
to sacrifice religious scruples in the pursuit of profit. The Arains
of Multan had been openly engaged in the mortgage business since the
98turn of the century, though others sought to enjoy the benefits of 
money-lending without offending against Islam. The Arains of Attock who 
advanced credit did so in return for a share of the produce of the mort­
gaged property, rather than for cash interest payments. Similarly 
Muslim agriculturist creditors operating in the rural areas surrounding
Lahore lent money in return for labour, and the supply of supposedly
99'free' gifts of fodder and manure. Regardless, however, of whether
individual Muslims sought to evade, or chose to ignore the teachings of 
their Faith in respect of usury, it is apparent that to an extent 
Islam did pose a barrier to greater Muslim participation. The main 
zones of operation for Muslim agriculturist usurers, with the exception 
of Jullundur, were those districts where the Hindu community was dom­
inant. Many Muslims originating from these areas were not so orthodox
3k
as their co-religionists in the western Punjab, and it appears that
Muslim creditors were restrained from operating at a similar level in
the more conservative Muslim majority districts. Thus whilst the Nawab
of Mamc'ot, one of the wealthiest zamindars in the Province, and the
principal Muslim landowner in Ferozepore was enjoying an income from
money-lending in 1915, as late as 1930 there were no known Muslim
agriculturist money-lenders in eight of the 12 districts of the
101Rawalpindi and Multan divisions.
Nevertheless religion clearly did not present an absolute bar. By 
the 1930's there were groups of Muslims who were prepared to advance 
credit in return for cash interest payments. . This caused the Provincial 
Banking Enquiry Committee of 1929-30 to conclude that "the Muhammadan 
attitude towards the taking of interest is changing" as it was dis­
covered that interest payments were received in Lyallpur and Okara, and
102even in so conservative a district as Multan. Also of the 55*582
Muslim depositors who had savings accounts with Post Office Banks in
105
1928-29, only 237 (0.^%) refused to receive interest payments. It
is reasonable to assume, therefore, that where religious observance did
not pose a deterrent to Muslim participation in the credit business,
lack of resources did, particularly as the Muslim community in general
did not possess anything approaching the amount of accessible capital
available to the non-Muslim communities. This is indicated by the fact
that in 1906-07 out of a total of 17,815 persons paying income tax on
earnings of, and in excess of Rs.1000 per annum, only 8% (1 ,^38) were
Muslims; of the remainder 79% (1^,1^) were Hindus, 3% (1,^01) were
104
Sikhs and 5% (832) were Christians, whilst of the 252,339 persons
who had deposits amounting to Rs.395-85 lakhs in Post Office Savings
Banks throughout the Punjab and the Punjab States in 1928, Muslims
accounted for only 22% of the savers, commanding Rs. 6l.V? lakhs, i.e.
105only 15*5% of the total capital invested. Similarly of the 97 
banking offices situated in the city of Lahore by 19^6, which between 
them possessed a working capital in excess of Rs. 100 crores, only
seven which jointly controlled only half a crore of rupees were Muslim
, 106 owned.
Furthermore in the same year in Lahore city Rs.92^,358 were paid 
by non-Muslims in the form of Urban Immovable Property Tax, as compared 
to Rs. 396,189 (30%) paid by Muslims. Non-Muslims also paid Rs. 
519*203/3/“ in tax on the sale of goods, as compared to Rs.66,323/2/- 
(11%) paid by Muslims. This pattern seems to have been current through­
out the province. As with Lahore, non-Muslims controlled the capital
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of Amritsar. In 1945-46 there were 6,292 non-Muslims assessees paying
Rs. 3*833»79^ per annum in Urban Immovable Property Tax; Muslim
assessees totalled 1,500 paying Es.71,800 (2$), Whilst the figures
relating to the payment of the Sales Tax exhibited a similar disparity:
Rs. 25,500 (2.4%) was paid by Muslims, as against Rs. 1,030,648 by non-
Muslims. In respect of income tax Muslims paid only Rs. 33»922 (7%)
as compared to Rs. 441,382 paid by non-Muslims.^^ A similar trend
was also apparent in the districts of Lyallpur, Gujranwala and
Sialkot, as is demonstrated in Appendix E.
These statistics indicate the considerable extent to which non-
Muslims controlled the capital, and in particular the urban wealth of
the Province. Especially when one considers that in four of the areas
cited above and in Appendix E Muslims accounted for over 50% of the
population - 59% in the district of Lahore (58% in the city of Lahore),
63% in Lyallpur, 62% in Sialkot and 71% in Gujranwala; in Amritsar
district the Muslim community was predominant, comprising 47% of the 
*1 08total populace. The pecuniary advantages so enjoyed by the non- 
Muslim communities further helps to explain their control of the credit 
machine in the Province, and the low level of Muslim participation.
By contrast the Muslims appear to have been the most indebted com­
munity in the Province. Various estimations arrived at during the last 
twenty-five years of British rule, and in the early post-independence 
period, suggest that Muslims were responsible for in excess of 60% of 
the Provincial debt. Darling calculated in the early 1920's that the 
total debt of the Punjab amounted to approximately Rs. 75 crores (mort­
gaged debt amounted to 45% of the whole), of which the Muslim community
*109
owed at least Rs. 50 crores, possibly as much as Rs. 60 crores, 7 i.e.
between 67% and 80% of the whole debt. By 1929 mortgaged debt alone
110accounted for an estimated Rs. 63 crores, 60% of which occurred in
those districts where Muslims were in the majority, or predominated
111(Jullundur, Gundaspur and Ambala.) Whilst research conducted in
1121950 disclosed that in those districts ceded to Pakistan in 19471
Muslims had been responsible for 78% of the total debt in the years
1920 to 1950, though of that percentage 11% referred to the post- 
113partition period.
It is not possible to explain the heavy rate of Muslim debt purely 
in terms of the fact that they were the largest group in the Province, 
as in percentage terms their liabilities surpassed their population 
ratio. One must consider other reasons in attempting to arrive at a 
balanced conclusion. Many causes of debt, in fact, were common to all
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Punjabis, regardless of their religion. In the first place there was
no stigma attached to indebtedness as it was considered prestigious to
command credit, as is reflected in the Punjabi saying, "A man cannot
be forgiven without priestly aid, or be respectable without a banker’s
Tllf „ , 115
aid". Also high interest rates, ranging from 12% to 50% by the 1930Ts,
meant that once a cultivator was in debt he remained in that state. Re­
payment customs conspired to aggravate this; the majority of indebted 
zamindars paid their creditors in kind, usually parting with the bulk 
of their harvests each year to meet interest charges. The result was
that they rarely received the full value of their crop, and thus were
116rarely in a position to redeem the principal. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that one of the main causes for borrowing was the repayment 
of previous loans. In 1923 the Punjab Co-operative Society allocated
the largest portion of its budget to assist its members to redeem old
117
debts; ' in 1925 an investigation in Ferozepur discovered that 6^J% of
all consideration money was utilised to repay previous debts. Whilst
an enquiry conducted in the south-west of the Province in the late
1930’s revealed that the repayment of existing loans resulted in further
118debts being incurred in over 40% of all cases examined.
Inheritance customs also increased the likelihood for debt. On the
death of a landowner the holding was usually sub-divided amongst his
heirs, a process which continued through each succeeding generation,
until the properties were reduced to extremely small plots, which were
119uneconomic, and thereby vulnerable to debt. This problem was most
acute in the more fertile areas of the Province, e.g. the densely
populated districts of Hoshiarpur and the central Punjab, as exceptional
fertility and large populations were synonymous, resulting in a high
120level of fragmentation. Though even in less productive tracts, heavy
populations often caused the same result. In the mainly Muslim village
of Bhambu Sandila in Muzaffargarh district 58% of the holdings were
jointly held by more than five persons; ^3% of the cultivators farmed
2 acres or under, and 63% 5 acres or less. The majority of owners,
therefore, enjoyed a very small margin of profit, "indeed most of them
had no margin at all", thus the smallest aberration in the form of
cattle disease or drought posed a major crisis, resulting in heavy 
121borrowing. Similar conditions prevailed throughout the district,
by 1900 8?.^% of the mainly Muslim proprietory body held on average only
2.5 acres per owner, at a time when it was estimated that a landed
family required between 13 and 15 acres to subsist. The result was
122widespread debt involving 95% of all owners.
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Even where land was plentiful and fertile the vicissitudes of nature 
could neutralize these advantages. The failure of the monsoon, water­
logging, flooding, and the consequent destruction of crops, followed by- 
famine, all resulted in the accumulation of debt. Drought was res­
ponsible for the "enormous increase" in transfers through mortgage in 
the Ambala district in the late l860's, and in 1877-78 it resulted in
1245% of the cultivated land in Rohtak being mortgaged. In the Hissar
district between 1901 and 1916 a succession of poor harvests caused the
125mortgage rate to triple. Diseases amongst livestock also contributed 
to borrowing; draught animals were essential for cultivation, and the 
loss of cattle proved so serious between 1918 and 1923 that the Co­
operative Society allocated 22.2% of its loan budget to provide
126borrowers with the means to replace stock. As the century progressed
127natural disasters continued to play a part in increasing indebtedness.
In the Punjab as a whole Darling observed that out of a five year cycle, 
the farmer generally experienced one good year, one bad year, and three 
"middling" years. In a bad year he would be forced to borrow for all 
his needs - domestic, professional and social - and though it was pos­
sible if he was thrifty to pay interest charges during the "middling" 
years, it was only in a good year that he could actually reduce his debt:
"Once in debt, therefore, it is almost impossible to 
escape. If he were thrifty and business-like he might 
succeed,but he is rarely either the one or the other, 
and the money-lender is always there to tempt him deeper
into the m i r e .  "^8
This lack of thrift, which was common amongst all the religious 
groups to varying degrees, compounded the ’natural* problems agricul­
turists faced. Local custom demanded lavish expenditure for social 
celebrations, which in turn often caused recourse to the money-lender.
The average Punjabi preferred to incur debt for expenditure on a
marriage or the ceremonies attendant upon births and deaths, rather than
129face the humiliating comments of his neighbours. Even poverty did
not prohibit such unproductive extravagance. An enquiry conducted in
19^0 into the affairs of poor artisans resident in Lahore revealed that
in the case of 31 Muslim and 23 Sikh families examined, marriage expenses
were a major cause of borrowing. The Muslim and Sikh families lavished
2b% and 25% respectively of all the 3oans they incurred on marriages, which
represented the largest single item in the Muslim, and the second
130largest in the Sikh case. ^
Borrowing to finance social observances was economically unproduct­
ive, and it appears that in general the Muslims were the worst offenders.
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In 1888 Iyall, the Lieutenant Governor, noted that whilst debt in the
eastern districts of the Punjab was largely a result of genuine shortages
and poverty, in the Muslim majority western districts this was not always
the case. There indebtedness was frequently spawned and aggravated by
displays of extravagance totally out of proportion to the means of the
131owners, both large and small. Observations of this nature frequently 
recurred throughout the British period, and in the immediate post­
independence years. In the l870's Steedman, the Settlement Officer in
Jhang, stated that there was hardly a Muslim zamindar in the district
132who was not in debt, largely as a result of extravagance. In
Muzaffargarh in the early l880*s it was observed that in comparison to
the Hindus, Muslims were "spendthrift and improvident", lavishing far
more than their resources could bear on marriages, betrothals, circum-
133cisions and funerals. Similarly the Gazetteer for Dera Ghazi Khan
compiled in 1898, recorded that Muslim landowners, two-thirds of whom
were in debt, preferred to squander resources on such celebrations,
13*frather than exercise thrift. Such ostentation was judged to have
contributed,to a large extent, to Muslim indebtedness in Multan and
135
Mianwali in the pre-1920 period. A decade later Commissioners and 
Deputy Commissioners in the Province recognised that extravagance con­
tinued to contribute to the problem of debt, especially in the
136divisions of Jullundur, Lahore and Rawalpindi. ^ In addition Muslims, 
particularly in the conservative western districts, often regarded them­
selves as the murids (disciples) of a particular Pir or spiritual 
leader. Offerings were made at the shrines frequented by these 
’Divines', resulting only too frequently in borrowing by the devotees:
"They Qnurids]] pay constant visits to shrines and places 
of pilgrimages, and make offerings there which they 
cannot afford ... the agriculturists make them £pirs[] 
presents out of all proportion to their incomes, and vie 
with one another in the largeness of their gifts."137
The volume of Muslim debt resulting from these practices, marriages in
particular, can be assessed to some extent from the fact that by 1930
loans to finance social functions and observances accounted for the
third largest single cause of debt amongst all classes of Muslims in-
138habiting those areas of the Punjab which were ceded to Pakistan.
Litigation proved a further cause of unproductive debt. Sections 
of the Punjab peasantry, at least until the early 1920's, most particu­
larly in the districts of Jullundur, Mianwali, Amritsar, Muzaffargarh, 
Lahore, Ferozepore, Hoshiarpur and Gurdaspur, seemed to possess an 
almost passionate obsession for litigation as a means of settling
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disputes. As such an over-burdened people often dispersed limited 
resources in this way. Calvert estimated that in the early 1920's 
two and a half million people, approximately 40# of the adult popu­
lation, were involved in court cases, either as contesting parties or
witnesses; the result was the wasteful expenditure of between 3 or ^
139crores of rupees per annum. By the mid-1920's and 1930's, however,
1*f0the volume of litigation in the province appeared to be decreasing, 
and Darling's research led him to conclude that it was only of secondary
importance vis-a-vis debt in the Province as a whole, though it continued
“  1?1 
to pose a major problem in the districts mentioned above. Also evi­
dence does exist to suggest that in the case of the Muslim community, it
was not a serious cause of debt. Following Partition it was discovered
142that only 3# of Muslim debt resulted from expenditure on court cases.
Though the vagaries of nature and extravagance were clearly potent
causes of debt, ironically the problem was also aggravated by the wealth
potential of the land:
"It would be a mistake to suppose that...debt is in all 
cases a sign of poverty. It is on the contrary often an 
indication of easy credit and careless affluence; over 
and over again the richest and best irrigated villages 
will be found to be most heavily indebted.”^^3
Where owners possessed little credit, in the form of productive, and
therefore valuable land, debt was uncommon. Thus there was a lower
incidence of debt in the less fertile areas of the south west, where
in the 1920's land could be bought for Rs.50 an acre, than in highly
fertile central districts, where an acre of land could command Rs.500.
It is hardly surprising therefore that by the turn of the century, five
of the eight most heavily mortgaged districts (Lahore, Amritsar,
Ferozepore, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur, Ludhiana, Sialkot and lyallpur) were
1
amongst the most productive in the Province. Significantly it was
found thirty years later in the village of Bhadas in Gurgaon district,
1^5that "the only zemindars free of debt are those who have no credit.”
A further indication between credit and debt is provided by the 
fact that despite the presence of poor quality land in the south-west, 
and in certain areas of Dera Ghazi Khan, Muzaffargarh and Multan, the 
Province as a whole was very prosperous. From 1868 to 1920 the popu­
lation had increased by 20#, whilst in the same period cultivation ex­
panded by 50#, and the gross value of the produce rose from approximately 
Rs.35 crores to Rs.100 crores. At the same time the pressure on the 
land declined. The total population per 100 cultivated acres decreased 
from 86 in 1868 to 76 in 1911, and the number of agriculturists per 100
ko
acres declined from k6 to Vj. Consequently the average value of gross
produce per head of population rose from less than Rs.22 in 1868 to
Rs .60 by 1920, indicating that the average income of an agricultural
family had trebled. Increased productivity was responsible for this
development. In 1872 the Punjab had received only lakhs of rupees
for its surplus grain, in 1913 the figure was l,Mf8 lakhs, and in
1918-19 approximately 2,^57 lakhs. From 1890 to 1920 exports increased
sevenfold in value, whilst imports increased only fourfold. The wealth
of the Punjab was such that between 1911 and 1913 Rs.1,000 lakhs worth
of gold and silver had been absorbed in the Province, and by the 1920's
that figure had increased to Rs.2,l69 lakhs, whilst the average amount
deposited in Punjabi banks was double the average for the remainder of 
1^6India. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that only the
better-off could borrow. Even the small owner possessed a valuable
commodity in land, but he was often poor in the sense that he did not
have the necessary liquid assets to meet his everyday expenses, hence
his recourse to the money-lender. Once indebted, despite the continuing
value of his holding, he became in effect the tenant of his creditor
who enjoyed the surpluses produced as interest. Thus in this sense
*\k7poverty was both a cause and an effect of indebtedness.
So far this examination of the factors which contributed to debt
were applicable to all the communities in the Province, irrespective of
religion. The question remains, therefore, why were the Muslims so
heavily indebted in comparison to the Hindus and Sikhs? The answer is
partly given by comparing the characteristics of some of the major tribes
which contributed to the composition of the various communities:
"As a general rule, whatever be the nature of the soil he 
cultivates...the caste of the agriculturist, which 
determines his habits and custom and natural disposition 
will determine his economic condition.
Evidence suggests that many Muslim cultivators were not as proficient as 
their non-Muslim neighbours, and therefore more vulnerable to borrowing. 
The classic example which demonstrates this point was the constant com­
parison made by British officials between the excellent husbandry of 
Hindu and Sikh Jats, and the inferior efforts of Muslim Jats and Rajputs, 
though the failings of the latter were frequently shared by the non- 
Muslim clan members. Purser and Fanshawe, the Settlement Officers in 
Rohtak in the 1870's, noted that the Hindu Jats in the district were 
very good cultivators, and the Muslim Mula Jats "though generally recent 
converts, are already far inferior to the Hindus", whilst the worst 
cultivators were the Muslim Rajputs. ' This view, particularly of the
*t1
Rajput, persisted; the 1907 assessment report for Gohana tahsil
stated, "Their houses are always inferior, their fields ill-weeded, the
sound of the mill begins late, and the sun generally catches them 
150a-bed." This condemnation of the Rajput, especially Muslim tribal
151members, was practically universal throughout the Punjab,
This dichotomy, between Jat and Rajput, is explained to a great
extent by the divergence of socio-cultural tradition between the two
tribes. The yeoman Jat was the backbone of the Punjab peasantry.
Though they often exhibited extravagance in celebrating marriages and
152conducting funerals in all other respects they were generally
"thrifty to the verge of parsimony" whilst being "unremitting in toil
153
...self-reliant in adversity, and enterprising in prosperity". By 
contrast the Rajput, who by tradition regarded himself as a warrior 
rather than a farmer regardless of his actual social and economic cir­
cumstances, was constrained by the inherent belief that he was the heir 
to his tribe's former aristocratic supremacy in the Province. Conse­
quently a Mian (Rajput), to preserve his name and honour unsullied, 
attempted to observe four fundamental maxims: he should never marry a
social inferior; he should not accept bridal payments; his female house­
hold were expected to observe strict purdah; he should refrain from 
q Rif
ploughing. The last two observances were the most damaging. Some
Rajputs shunned cultivation altogether, preferring to rent their lands
155to the more industrious Jats, and when they did farm in person, by
retaining purdah they deprived themselves of a valuable source of
labour, in that Rajput women, as opposed to those of the Jats, generally
1 *56did not assist their menfolk in the fields. Such practices, combined
157with the Rajputs' delusions of social supremacy spawned indolence.
Purely Muslim tribes also came in for similar condemnation. The
Muslim Meos of Gurgaon district were regarded as thriftless and poor
158 159cultivators, as were the Bilochis of Rohtak and Dera Ghazi Khan.
Similarly the Muslim cultivators of Multan, regardless of their tribal
affinity with the exception of the Arain market-gardeners were described
160as lazy and apathetic, whilst the Hindu farmers of Attock were pro­
claimed to be more thrifty, patient and far-seeing than the Muslim 
161peasantry. This criticism was repeated in Gurgaon. There the Hindu
Ahirs had sunk wells to avert the adverse effects of drought. The
Muslim Meos, however, declined such labour, preferring to rely on the
presence of surface water and risk the consequences should water short- 
162ages occur. In Muzaffargarh district, the comparison between Hindu
and Muslim cultivation was very marked:
k2
"On the holdings of the former [[Hindus]] are found good 
cattle, decent brick buildings, fruit trees and such 
intensive crops as cane, pepper and vegetables, while 
on the latter [[Muslims], half-starved worn-out cattle,^, 
mud huts and no better crops than indifferent wheat”;
remarks which strongly echoed those of Brandreth who effected the
16^settlement of the Ferozepur district almost eighty years before.
These comparisons between Muslim and non-Muslim cultivators were drawn 
from official reports covering the period 1851 to 1935» and therefore 
were indicative of the general state of Muslim husbandry.
Various explanations have been offered for the comparative inferior­
ity of Muslim cultivation, and the resultant heavy indebtedness of the 
Muslim peasantry, and community in general. Ibbetson, the author of the 
Punjab's contribution to the l88l Census, was convinced that Muslim 
inferiority emanated directly from their adherence to Islam. He believed
conversion had resulted in their degeneration, causing conceit, extrava-
165gance, thriftlessness and indolence. ^ This view, however, was disputed
by Fenton, who compiled the Jullundur Gazetteer of 190^. He based his
opinion on the fact that many Muslims were neglectful of their religion,
citing the Muslim Rajputs as a prime example; he claimed that the latter
were so wedded to Hindu ways that they frequently patronised Hindu
priests, and maintained Hindu customs. In common with Ibbetson, however,
he accepted that Muslims did exhibit a degree of character inferiority,
in comparison to non-Muslims:
"Conversion from Hinduism was generally the result of 
persecution, thus one could expect the descendants of 
men who could not resist persecution to be inferior to 
those who could...the weakness of mind leading to con­
version, would show itself in worldly affairs."
Though he qualified this statement by postulating that large portions of
the Muslim community were less developed than Hindus because they were
only just emerging from the pastoral stage, which had long been sur-
166mounted by the latter. Fenton's explanations echo the Darwinian 
theory of 'survival of the fittest', which was current in the mid- and 
late Victorian period. Though they do dispose of Ibbetson's claim to an 
extent, they prove no more satisfactory in providing a rational expla­
nation for the Muslim predicament.
One factor appears evident. Muslims, the majority of whom shared 
a common ancestry with Hindu and Sikh Punjabis, were not congenitally 
inferior. Though it is apparent that the Muslim character had been 
shaped to an extent by Islam, but not in the way supposed by Ibbetson 
and Fenton. In this context Thor[f 141^ 4 provides a far more plausible 
explanation:
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"Sikhism and Hinduism do not interfere with a manfs 
natural desire to better himself in the world by his 
own exertions. Mahomedanism teaches its disciples to 
accept every misfortune as the will of 'Allah'. It 
unfits him for the struggle of life. Accordingly, we 
find, whenever Sikhs, Hindus, euid Musalmans cultivate 
side by side, that the last-named are the worst 
farmers."167
Though Thornburn's assessment is guilty of generalisation, it is rele­
vant, in tlpt fatalism, particularly in the more orthodox districts, did 
militate against the pursuit of enterprise. This was particularly 
evident in the Division of Multan, which was conspicuous for the lack of 
diversity exhibited by its Muslim inhabitants. Despite the fact that 
the area experienced the highest summer temperatures in the Province, 
which combined with a general scarcity of water, made agriculture un­
certain, very few cultivators sought to implement their earnings through
168emigration or army service. The absence of enterprise was also
apparent in Muzaffargarh. There Muslims outnumbered Hindus by eight to
one, and of the Muslim proprietors by the l880's 70% were in debt, as
compared to only 30% in the case of Hindus, the reason being that
Muslims were more improvident, and lacked their enterprising zeal:
"Muhammadans are mostly spendthrift and improvident. The 
Hindus are the reverse... Muhammadans have only one source 
of income, viz., agriculture. Hindus who own and cultivate 
land, almost always combine money-lending and trade with 
agriculture. Hindus acquire land as payment for debts,
Muhammadans generally borrow money to buy land."^69
In the final analysis, however, the locations which many Muslims inhab­
ited throughout the Province, probably exerted the most crucial influences 
on the leMel of Muslim industry and thereby indebtedness. It was a
feature of the Province that the 'Bet' areas, or riverain tracts, were
170occupied primarily by Muslims. The possession of Bet lands was a
mixed blessing. Though the soil was rich in alluvial muds, placing it
amongst the most fertile in the Punjab, the localities were subject to
frequent devastating flooding, and were the most unhealthy in the
Province because of the high incidence of fever, particularly malaria.
In 1924 the river Beas flooded a dozen times, devastating villages and
171crops over a twenty square mile area. Malaria was so prevalent in
Ludhiana in the months of August to November that "one can scarcely
find...an able-bodied meui who is not suffering from it"; in the period
1891 to 1900 the annual average death toll was approximately l4,8lO,
and in 1892 and 1900 epidemics were responsible for 20,653 and 26,861
172deaths respectively. The heavy flooding and accompanying fever had
a weakening effect on the population, resulting in broken constitutions,
kh
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apathy and poor cultivation. ' But the land was highly productive,
and as such attracted heavy speculation on the part of money-lenders,
'\7kwho found a ready market where such precarious conditions prevailed.
Geography, therefore, often resulted in a high level of indebted­
ness. No one factor alone, however, could be held responsible for the 
greater involvement of the Muslims as compared to the Hindu and Sikh 
communities. That resulted from an amalgamation of causes. In the 
final analysis, it would appear that location, a comparatively higher 
degree of extravagance, a lower level of general productivity, and 
possibly a more entrenched belief in God's will as opposed to man's 
free will, all combined to make the Muslim community the most vulnerable 
to debt.
Thus so far it is apparent that Muslims were economically depressed.
This pattern was evident in the industrial sphere. Though the Punjab's
economy was dominated by agriculture, industrial production by the
1930's and 19^0 's was not insignificant in terms of the contribution it
made to the Province's wealth. By 1937-38 it was valued at Rs.157»^07»500,
as compared to Rs.586,699»000 representing the aggregate value of the
175principal agricultural crops, (a further *+ crores of rupees was contri-
176
buted by dairy farming). Prior to the turn of the century the mass
of artisans had worked, not in factories or for capitalists, but as
177individual craftsmen. Industry, such as existed, concentrated on
small scale production. It was the expansion of communication routes,
178particularly roads and railways, which stimulated industrial growth.
By 1911 3*750 miles of rail had been laid throughout the Punjab, linking
the Province with the port of Karachi, in addition to which 2,000 miles
of metalled and 20,000 miles of unmetalled roads had been constructed.
Furthermore the river Indus and the lower reaches of the Jhelum, Chenab
and Sutlej were navigable throughout the year, as were 387 miles of the
*179immense canal system. Even so the Punjab was completely land-locked,
and its distance from the sea, in spite of the link with Karachi, acted
as a tariff barrier against competitive imports, which in turn stimulated
production for local requirements, but checked the export of bulky
1 80commodities for consumption abroad. The advantages, however, far
outweighed the disadvantages, especially since Swadeshi banking in the
1911-17 period had proved extremely successful in eliciting capital
from private hoards, which combined with the inability of banks to
secure adequate short term investments, had forced them to concentrate
on industrial investments, which in turn led to the growth of new 
181companies.
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The Provincial Government, though conscious of this increased 
industrial activity, remained an interested bystander. Rather than 
giving encouragement to large scale production, which could have proved 
detrimental to Britain's export market, it concentrated on fostering 
cottage industries. Thus hand-weaving was encouraged through the 
founding of a model weavery; the production of raw silk was promoted 
through the establishment of Salvation Army owned cocoon farms at 
Changa Manga, Lahore, Chaua pail and Ludhiana, and the Mayo School of 
Arts attempted to resuscitate cotton printing. But the Government
182refrained from giving any direct help to the cotton power industry.
The attitude of the Government was reflected in the fact that 'Industries'
183formed a small sub-department of the Department of Agriculture. But 
the report of the Royal Commission on Indian Industries in 1918, a^d the 
demands of the 1914-18 war had the effect of stimulating interest in 
industrialisation, both for defence purposes and economic development.
The Punjab Government responded by founding a separate Department for 
Industries in 1920. In theory it was charged with the control of Govern­
ment educational institutions dealing with technology and industry, and 
the examination of the industrial potential of the Province. Also it was 
expected to provide an advisory service for factory owners and potential 
industrialists; to establish model factories; to organise marketing 
facilities, and to provide loans to those concerns in need of financial
assistance. In practice, however, the Department concentrated on
184educational ventures, neglecting its other responsibilities.
In spite of these shortcomings, by the 1920's the process of indus­
trialization, through private enterprise, was established in the Punjab:
"Large-scale production, a necessary consequence of the 
introduction of machinery, had been accompanied by Qthe] 
centralization and monopolization of control in the hands 
of a few."^°5
Of this 'few' the overwhelming majority were non-Muslims. In 1921 there
were 763 factories in the Province in each of which at least ten persons
had been employed between 14 March and 14 May. Hindus owned 435
(60$), Sikhs 45 (6%) and Muslims 96 (12.5%); of the remainder 102 (13%)
were operated by the Government or local authorities, 38 (5%) were
registered companies in the control of European, Anglo-Indian and Indian
directors, 18 (2%) were owned by Europeans and Anglo-Indians, 8 (1%) by
Parsis, and there were 2 (0.2$) listed as belonging to 'others'. In all
the factories a total of 769 managers were employed - 513 (67%) Hindus,
54 (7%) Sikhs, 112 (14.5%) Muslims, 76 (10%) Europeans and Anglo-Indians, 
187and 9 (1%) Parsis. This similarity between the two sets of statistics
J+6
suggests that managers were generally employed on communal grounds.
This trend was also observed by Faiz Ilahi in 19^1; many of the artisans
he interviewed in Lahore, admitted that employers tended to patronize
188employees belonging to their own communities.
By 1921, therefore, the evidence available demonstrates that non-
Muslims, particularly the Hindus, dominated the industrial life of the
Province, both at the proprietor and managerial levels. The
1921-1931 decade witnessed considerable industrial advancement in the
Punjab. This was encouraged by further expansion of the transport
system, the provision of sidings to large mills and factories, and an
improved electricity supply, as a result of the Mandi Hydro-Electric
scheme. The resultant industrial growth can be judged from the fact
that in 1921 there had been 297 factories registered under the pro-
1 89visions of the Indian Factories Act employing ^2,^28 operatives, 
whilst by 1930 there were 526 such factories, with a combined work force 
of 49,5^9* In spite of the increase in the number of concerns, there 
had not been a corresponding growth in the number of employees. This 
was due, in part, to the fact that the larger factories, e.g. railway 
workshops, had introduced mechanization. Also many of the newer estab­
lishments represented small concerns, employing small labour forces,
190e.g. hosiery factories, rolling-mills, flour mills, etc.
This industrial growth did little to alter the communal status quo
in respect of ownership and financial control. From factory lists
contained in the District Gazetteers, it has been possible to assess from
the names of the various concerns the community to which the proprietors
191belonged. 87^ Factories were listed as being in operation in 1931•
This figure is much larger than that given in the Census of 19311 as it 
included 'factories’ both within and outside the provisions of the 
Factories Act. Of the total number it was not possible in the case of 
91 concerns (10%) to determine the ownership; of the remainder, 50h 
(58%) were owned by Hindus, 61 (7%) by Sikhs, ll*f (13%) by Muslims, 6 
(0.7%) by foreigners, 63 (7%) by Government, 23 (3%) by 'Others' and 
12 (1.3%) were of mixed ownership. Not only did Hindus and Sikhs to­
gether control the majority of the factories, they appear to have 
employed more operatives than were found in Muslim concerns, suggesting 
a heavier economic investment. Of a total of 23,2M* operatives who were 
engaged in the Hindu, Sikh and Muslim owned establishments, 17,938 (77%) 
worked for Hindu owners, 2,17*+ (9%) for Sikhs, and 3,112 (14%) for
Muslims, representing an average work force of 36 and 29 for non-Muslim
192and Muslim owned factories respectively.
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There were only two branches of industry in which Muslims played 
a dominant role - tanning and the production of iron at Batala.
According to the 1931 Census, 13,322 persons were involved in the 
tanning and leatherwork industry, 11,312 of these following the pro­
fession as their principal occupation. There is some doubt, however,
whether this figure is truly representative, as only one person was
193recorded as a tanner in the whole of the Multan district, ' whereas
an enquiry conducted in 1938 revealed that more than 60 people were
194engaged in tanning in the city of Multan alone. In the absence of 
accurate returns it is impossible to state how many persons were in­
volved, but it would seem to have been larger than indicated in the 
Census.
Despite the discrepancy recorded above it is clear that tanning and
associated leather crafts made a substantial contribution to industrial
output in the Punjab. After weaving, it was the second biggest employer 
193of labour; at least 167,343 boot, shoe and sandal manufacturers
196depended on it as a source of raw material. The method of curing
leather, however, was crude and wasteful, and the industry generally
was the preserve of illiterate cottage tanneries. By 1939, only two
tanneries were registered under the provisions of the Factories Act -
one in Wazirabad, the other in Sialkot. Tanning in the villages was
mostly done by Chamars, who were predominantly Muslim, though other
groups involved included Muslim Khatiks and Chamrangs, the mainly
Muslim Dabgars, and the Hindu Pasis. Hindu involvement, both at the
labourer and financier levels was extremely small, owing to the caste
prejudices against handling animal products. As a result the industry
was almost exclusively financed by Muslims, the Khojas exercising a 
197virtual monopoly.
The location of foundries at Batala, resulted mainly from the suit­
ability of the local sand deposits, which proved very valuable in the 
construction of moulds, and the fact that the surrounding area was 
populated by large numbersof Lohars (blacksmiths). The origin of the 
industry dated back to the l880's when a local capitalist., Rai Sahib 
Ganda Mai, began manufacturing sugar cane presses in response to local 
demands. It was the sons of his Muslim mechanic, Mirani Bux, however, 
who expanded the industry by founding independent concerns, Mai having
discontinued production when a boiler in his foundry exploded, killing
.. 198three men.
By 1941 there were 26 foundries in Batala, 22 of which were owned 
by Muslim Lohars, most of whom were illiterate, and who relied on clerks
48
to carry out clerical work. The labour force was similarly dominated by
Muslims; all of the 49 mould-contractors were Muslims, so were 78 of the 
19979 moulders. This Muslim dominance, however, occurred in an industry
which made only a comparatively small contribution to the over-all
industrial wealth of the Province. In 1932 the iron industry earned 
200Rs.2,251,250, a figure which represented the entire iron production 
of the Province, which by 1939 had 46 foundries, including those at 
Batala. The Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry attempted in 194l to 
discover the capital investment in the Batala concerns, but it proved 
to be a complicated task. Not only was there the problem of evaluating 
land, buildings and machinery, but the working capital fluctuated with 
the measure of industrial activity, the foundry owners taking short-term 
loans according to their immediate requirements. Even so it was estab­
lished that of the 26 foundries, one, a limited company, had a paid up 
capital of Rs .107|250, of the others the largest investment was esti­
mated to be Rs .80,000, and the smallest Rs.6,000. Thus on the whole 
they were small establishments, added to which at the outbreak of war 
in 1939 the industry was placed under strict Government control to con­
serve scrap iron, and output was confined to a limited number of 
articles, e.g. ploughing implements, etc., for which there was only a 
seasonal demand, as a result of which the foundries were idle for a 
number of months each year. The industry was further handicapped 
because it lacked adequate capital, and high interest rates demanded for 
that which was available inhibited growth. Also the industry was re­
tarded, because the majority of the illiterate owners employed no 
trained business assistants, salesmen or qualified engineering staff;
only one of the 26 foundries was under the supervision of a trained 
201engineer.
The Muslim community, therefore, only exercised control over two
spheres of the Punjab's industrial life. Of these, tanning, though
important, was backward, ill-organised and wasteful, representing a
cottage industry, rather than an intensive branch of production, whilst
the enterprises at Batala were mainly petty concerns, operating on a
small profit margin. Neither demanded large capital investments.
Industry in general, however, received its greatest impetus from the
availability of capital:
"As in the previous decade, the demand for industrialisation 
came from those seeking to employ capital and from the 
middle classes seeking employment outside the overcrowded 
literary professions."2^2
As in the case of money-lending,Muslims in general simply did not possess
^9
comparable resources to match the degree of investment made by non- 
Muslims, Hindus in particular, whilst the professions were 
almost the preserve of the latter (see p. 16).
In many respects, therefore, the Punjab was a Muslim province in 
name only. Though the community dominated the Province numerically, 
it barely controlled 50% of the agricultural land, it was the most em- 
burdened in respect of debt, and in the crucial economic spheres of 
usury and industry it constituted only a small minority amongst the 
investors. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, the 
comparative backwardness which Muslims experienced was reflected in 
their low level of participation in the field of education, and that 
in turn had a retrograde effect on the number of Muslims who entered 
the 'professions', particularly the Provincial and Indian Civil Services, 
The fact that Muslims as compared to Hindus and Sikhs failed to achieve 
levels of participation and employment comparable with their majority 
population status did not,to begin with,influence the course of 
provincial politics. The political life of the Province was dominated 
by an extremely wealthy Muslim zamindar elite, which collectively felt 
neither socially nor economically threatened by the Hindu and Sikh 
industrialist, trading and administrative classes. Also although some 
Muslim politicians expressed concern over the general unsatisfactory 
state of their less fortunate co-religionists, the need in the late 
1950’s and early 19^0's to maintain a multi-communal coalition in the 
Province, to enable the Muslim controlled Unionist Party to command a 
majority in the Provincial Assembly prevented any reforms being enacted 
to specifically benefit the Muslims. It was only with the growth of 
Muslim nationalism and the emergence of a Muslim League Opposition 
Party in the Punjab that the retarded economic condition of the Muslim 
community in general, as compared to that of non-Muslims, assumed a 
political dimension. Even so it represented,by and large,an offshoot of 
communalism, in that the resentment of the poorer and deprived sections 
of Muslim society was directed mainly against the Hindu economic elite, 
rather than against privileged sections of Muslim society.
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CHAPTER II
POLICY, PREJUDICE AND POVERTY - 
THE MUSLIM RESPONSE TO WESTERN EDUCATION IN THE PUNJAB, 1849 to 19^7
The spread of western education in the Punjab was a direct conse­
quence of the annexation of the province by the British in 18^9* Whilst 
Hindus and Sikhs exhibited a willingness to embrace the new learning, 
Muslims were far less enthusiastic. The roots of this phenomenon lay in 
the cultural confrontation born out of British paramountcy in India, and 
the general poverty which afflicted the Muslims to a greater degree than 
the other communities. For many Muslims the new educational order was a 
living reminder of lost political hegemony, and was regarded as consti­
tuting a dangerous challenge to their culture, society and religion.
There were others, however, who though free from such prejudices were 
unable to bear the cost of western learning. Initially Muslim alienation 
and lack of opportunity was intensified by British refusals to compromise 
on the vital issues of religious teaching, which was forbidden in govern­
ment schools, or to allow financial inducements to encourage greater 
Muslim participation. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, and 
during the first two decades of the twentieth century, however, a con­
ciliatory approach was adopted to gain Muslim co-operation. Though it 
contributed to removing some of the economic barriers which inhibited 
greater Muslim enrolment, religious education was never sanctioned as 
part of the regular curriculum, as a result there remained in the com­
munity a strong seam of religio-cultural prejudice towards government 
learning and institutions.
To begin with British educational policy constituted a direct 
attack on traditional Muslim scholarship. As a result Muslims resented 
the new system. Up until 18^9 the Muslims had controlled the indigenous 
education system: "As educators [[Muslims”! are in possession of the
field; not only is the Koran taught in every mosque, but outside a great 
many mosques the standard Persian works are taught to all comers....” 
Consequently Muslim schools were recognised to be ”the most genuine 
educational institutions in the country.” In spite of these compliment­
ary observations, however, the British clearly regarded the Muslim 
madrasas (schools) as an obstacle to the introduction of government 
sponsored western learning through the medium of government schools.
Thus whilst the Director of Education in July 18^7 noted that ”the idea
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of education is not new to the Panjabis. We find all the school 
phraseology ready made to our hand, and chiefly supplied by the Muhamma­
dans", he made it clear that Muslim educationalists would not receive 
government support. "Certainly I find that the natural tendency of 
things, if left to themselves, is to throw the whole weight of Govern­
ment in this matter of education on to the side of the Muhammadans - a
2
tendency to be much resisted."
The Director's concluding phrase revealed the official objective:
the Muslim educational system was to be replaced. This development
resulted from the Government's determination to establish a system in
keeping with its traditions, culture and administrative needs, and which
would reflect its political dominance. To achieve these ends the
British were prepared to be ruthless in breaking the Muslim monopoly.
The Deputy Commissioner of Jhujjar suggested in 1859 that "The evil may
be gradually remedied by selecting Teachers from amongst the Hindu
3
pupils of Tahsili school." The use of the word 'evil' to describe
Muslim control demonstrated the strength of feeling behind the British
strategy. The remedy seemed simple; if Muslim teachers were removed,
then Islamic teaching practices would disappear with them. It was a
proposal which the Director of Education supported and expanded:
"we cannot supercede [[sic^ them so long as they 
retain their popularity. District Officers, however, 
might prepare the way for a gradual change by encour­
aging more Hindus to qualify as teachers, and by 
appointing them to schools where the residents are 
not too strongly prejudiced in favour of Mahomedan 
instructors."
District officials, however, employed more than persuasive measures 
to accomplish this goal. Government schoolmasters, zaildars, lambardars, 
and tahsildars,at times used intimidation to ensure that boys attended 
government schools rather than Muslim institutions. Furthermore 
occasionally persecution was directed against those who maintained 
indigenous and unaided schools in competition with government insti­
tutions. Leitner, the Orientalist and educationalist, quoted instances 
of teachers having been expelled from their ancestral villages, of a 
jagirdar being prevented from returning a muafi (rent-free grant of land) 
to an indigenous school, and of muafis being resumed on the death of
teachers who left no heirs, instead of the grants being maintained for
5educational purposes,
Widespread resumption undoubtedly played a part in the destruction 
of the Muslim educational system. Leitner claimed that the majority of 
teachers and maulvis had been in possession of rent free grants of land. 
After annexation, the Province had been expected to provide revenue for
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the imperial coffers; this was achieved in part by resuming rent-free
lands. No distinction was made by the Government between land which had
been awarded for service to the state and that granted for charitable
educational purposes. The latter generally inalienable up to 1849, also
had been resumed:
"it was a common custom in former times to give grants 
of rent-free land to persons who were bound in return 
to teach youth. Most of these grants...have been 
resumed...."
In only a few places was the continuance of such grants permitted
(Sultanpur in Amritsar District, Badanath in Sialkot District, Jugraon
in Ludhiana District and Lashari and pakpattan in Gugaira District), on
the condition that schools so endowed were subject to government inspec-
c.
tion, and would "be gradually made to conform to the rules laid down..V 
Thus loss of independence, and thereby their character, was the price 
demanded in exchange for their continuance.
As a result of the various measures taken by the government, there 
was a serious decline in pupil attendance at indigenous schools. Whereas 
in 1854 at least 333*550 pupils attended such schools,*'7 by 1883 their
g
number had fallen to 135*385* This development, and especially the 
role which resumption was believed to have played in it, was counter 
productive to securing Muslim participation in the government system.
It was not the scale of resumption but its effect on the Muslim mind, 
which associated the general decline of Muslim society, especially the 
scholastic classes, with government policies: the National Muhammadan
Association claiming in February 1882 "that these [resumption_J proceed­
ings entailed wholesale ruin on the Muhammadan community in general, and
9
the scholastic classes in particular..." .
British officialdom to justify its actions added insult to injury by 
denigrating the content of Muslim education. In l88l Ibbetson, the 
Punjab Censor, declared "The primary education of the Musalman is con­
fined to learning parts of the Quran by rote, and perhaps being able to
10read, though never to understand it." It was an observation not con­
fined to the Punjab; Griffith, the Director of Education for the North- 
Western Province, complained that in Muslim schools
"there is no mental training, nothing in fact which 
can be called education... The eye learns to recognise, 
and the hand to form the Persian characters. Words are 
then committed to memory; and this is nearly all the 
instruction that the teacher wishes to impart or the 
pupil to receive."
Griffith also objected to what he considered to be the highly immoral
character of some of the works which were studied, referring to the
11
"elaborate indecency of the Bahar-o-Danish....".
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Only one 'Punjab' official championed the cause of Muslim learning, 
though he weakened his case to an extent by basing it solely on the 
achievements of an institution situated outside of the Punjab, and which 
was untypical of Muslim schools in general. Using the Deoband Perso- 
Arabic school as his example, Leitner described a course of education 
which entailed seven years of study, and included the use and consider­
ation of works in Urdu dealing with Islam, a vocabulary in verse in 
Arabic, Persian and Hindi, verbal roots and conjunctions, admonitions in 
verse, an early letter writer with epistolary exercises, and a lexicon 
in Arabic and Persian. Literary pieces which were studied involved the 
works of famous poets, and the letters of Aurangseb to his sons. In 
addition Leitner demonstrated that the sciences were not neglected, as 
both mathematics and medicine were studied at Deoband. Having estab­
lished that Muslim schools could be genuine and efficient places of 
learning, he dismissed such official criticisms as voiced by Ibbetson
and Griffith, attributing them to the possession of only "an elementary
12knowledge..." of Persian education.
The contending arguments in this controversy appeared in part to 
echo the battle of an earlier age between Macaulay and the British Orien­
talists in Bengal, who in 1823 founded Sanskrit College,not as a bastion
of Hindu conservatism or reaction,but as an educational experiment in cul- 
13tural fusion. In the Punjab, however, the debate concerning the merits
of Muslim education was purely academic because Muslim learning, having
lost official patronage, had ceased to be of relevance. Persian had been
14abolished in 1837 as the language of the courts, whilst in 1864 the Cen­
tral Government had ruled that only English would in future constitute
15the examination medium for the senior covenanted appointments. As early
as 1834 the significance of the supercession of Persian by English had
been apparent to the Directors of the East India Company:
"persons who possess a Knowledge of English are preferred 
to others in many employments, public as well as private, 
a very moderate proficiency in the English language is 
often looked upon by those who attend school instruction 
as the end and object of their education..."^6 .
The introduction of English, and the importance of western education 
impressed a small body of Muslims. Sir Sayid Ahmed Khan (educational re­
former, founder Aligarh Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College) and the 
British India Association of N.W.P. determined to encourage increased 
Muslim participation in the sphere of western education. In a letter to 
the Governor-General in August 1867, Sir Sayid outlined the Association's 
concern at the poor Muslim response to western learning, and its desire 
to reverse the trend:
6*f
"I would especially call their attention to 
the urgent necessity there is for the study 
of English. It is not only requisite on account 
of the many lucrative posts which it enables 
those who study it to fill, but on account of 
the manifold uses it confers in the daily routine 
of life."1?
Whilst Sir Sayid's advice was sound, and the rewards tempting, 
there were profound socio-religious considerations which discouraged the 
adoption of western education by many Punjabi Muslims. These were cited 
by Muslim critics to the Education Commissions of 1871 and 1882. Some 
of the commentators were of the opinion that government education was un­
popular because it corrupted the manners and morals of Muslim pupils,
and as a result the 'better classes' refused to subject their sons to
18
such damaging contact. In this context they complained that western 
learning failed to devote sufficient attention to the cultivation of 
qualities inherent in traditional Islamic etiquette and culture: the
19
reverence of God, and consideration for parents, teachers, and the aged. 
Consequently many of the wealthier families preferred to educate their 
children privately at home. This practice was also popular because the 
'better-born' were usually unwilling to permit their heirs to associate 
at classroom level with pupils of a lower social status.^
Muslim reluctance to acquire the new education, however, was not 
confined solely to the elite, and even in that category rejection did 
not always occur on account of apprehension concerning etiquette and 
social exclusiveness. In response to the l8?l Commission, Kahim Khan, 
Medical Fellow and Member of the Punjab University Senate, portrayed 
Muslim society as consisting broadly of three classes. These comprised 
the upper class including nawabs, jagirdars and rich zamindars; the 
middle class which included maulvis, munshis and respectable government 
servants; the lower class which consisted of tradesmen, e.g. carpenters, 
blacksmiths, etc. Rahim claimed that members of the upper and lower 
strata, as a rule were indifferent to the education of their children.
The rich classes had no need to acquire western learning whereas the 
poor rejected it because they considered it essential for their heirs to 
acquire ancestral professions. It was only the 'middle class', Rahim 
contended, who "having no riches and no other profession than "that of
21
the pen"devote their heart and soul to the education of their offspring."
Social considerations, and family and professional traditions did 
not pose the only obstructions to the adoption of western education. A 
further contributory factor was that certain means of instruction in use, 
namely picture books, were offensive to Muslim traditions. It was an 
obstacle which the Reverend Forman, "the Nestor of schoolmasters in the
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Punjab", recognised and condemned. Forman had observed from Lahore to the
Frontier districts the "strongest aversion among the lower classes of
Muhammadans to our schools in consequence of the extent to which
pictures of living objects were depicted in our books", as Islam forbade
the portrayal of animate objects. As a result of Forman's criticism the
Senate in June 1879 advised that such books should not be employed in 
22
Frontier schools, though their use continued throughout the remainder 
of the Province.
Of all the non-economic social factors, however, which contributed 
to limit the appeal of government education, the exclusion of religious 
instruction was the greatest. The Muslim members of the Punjab Univer­
sity Senate had bluntly stated in response to the 1871 Commission that
western education would "never be thoroughly popular with the Muhamma-
23dans, as it ignores their religious teaching....". The Registrar of
the University, however, refused to be drawn on the issue, stressing
that the Senate "cannot advocate the introduction of religious teaching
in Government Schools, as this would be infringing one of the fundamental
2kprinciples of our educational system." This was in keeping with
Imperial policy. The Viceroy, Mayo, in initiating the 1871 Commission
had made it clear that whilst he supported the inclusion of classical
subjects to broaden the appeal of government schools to Muslims, he
25would not permit the introduction of religious instruction.  ^ Provin­
cial administrations in the Punjab rigidly subscribed to this view for 
the greater part of British rule, thereby maintaining the barriers its 
exclusion constituted, though by 1915 official attitudes had relaxed to
the extent that religious teaching was allowed in school premises out of
26school hours and not as part of the official programme.
The refusal to provide for Muslim religious instruction was a 
symptom of the general lack of sympathy displayed by Punjab officials 
for the community as evinced by their reactions to the two Commissions 
of Inquiry of 1871 and 1882. The Provincial Government on both 
occasions even refused to admit that the community was educationally 
backward. In 1871 the Lt. Governor, Davies, claimed that "In the Punjab 
Proper...the Muhammadan population avail themselves of the educational 
opportunities offered to them to as great a degree in proportion to 
their numbers as the Hindu population."2^ This statement was misleading 
and false as it ignored the evidence of the University Senate, which had 
been presented to the local government. The Senate had observed that 
Muslims, who accounted for 55% of the population, constituted only 38% 
of the total number of pupils in government village schools, 20% in 
government English schools, and only 5% in. government colleges. It was
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a state of affairs which had caused the University Registrar to con­
clude "it appears that Muhammadans do not avail themselves of the
28education offered so readily as the Hindus...". Ten years later the 
Provincial Government continued to display an unrealistic attitude. It 
argued that "The Muhammadans are not backward in taking advantage of 
the existing educational facilities", a deduction based on the fact 
that total Muslinj^representation had increased from 35% in 1871-72 to 
over 38% in l88l! This low increase, coupled with the fact that the 
Muslim community had not achieved a position in education comparable to 
its population ratio (51% in l88l) demonstrated that they were backward!
However inadequate the conclusions of the Punjab Government were, 
the 1871 Commission which was devoted solely to examining the Muslim 
position, and whose findings as far as the Punjab was concerned, drew 
heavily on the views expressed by the Punjab University Senate member­
ship, revealed that the main factors behind Muslim reticence were 
religious, social and pecuniary. In 1882 these views remained un­
challenged, and were incorporated in the Punjab’s contribution to that 
inquiry. Nevertheless the European Senate members had tended to dis­
regard the socio-religious sensitivities of the Muslim community, 
whilst a majority of them opposed the provision of any financial 
inducements to alleviate Muslim difficulties. The Registrar noted that 
"the strongest reason alleged £for the low level of Muslim enrolment^ 
is the general poverty and unthrifty habits of the Muhammadan people,
owing to which they fail to secure for themselves advantages which they
30would gladly accept."^ Although this view, as will be seen later, was
not entirely representative of the opinions of the Muslim members of
the Senate, the latter did acknowledge that poverty prevented many from
enjoying the educational facilities, and they urged that financial aid
in the form of scholarships be provided by the Local Government to
31reduce the scale of the problem.
The adverse reactions of the European Senate members to the Muslim 
recommendation revealed not only a lack of sympathy, but a degree of 
prejudice which partly contributed to the perpetration of Muslim back­
wardness in education. Of the twelve European members, excluding the 
Registrar, whose views were recorded, nine were currently serving as
civil servants, whose periods of service in India ranged from 12 to 27
32years. Of the non-officials, Forman was one of the leading education­
alists in the Punjab. The majority, therefore, should have been capable 
of balanced judgments. Of the total, however, only three demonstrated 
any sympathy for the Muslims, six were strongly opposed to offering 
financial assistance to the community, and only two questioned the
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assertions of the Registrar and the Provincial Government that Muslims 
were not in need of any special consideration. In addition a strong
33current of anti-Muslim bias was apparent throughout their deliberations.
In opposing the provision for special scholarships for Muslims as
requested by the Muslim Senate Members, Lindsay (Judge of the Chief Court
of the Punjab) wrote, "I think such a system would give rise to much
bitter feeling, and I doubt whether the result as regards Muhammadans
3*fwould justify the measure." Whilst Maclagan (Chief Engineer, Public
Works Department) interpreted their low attendance in Government schools
as a character defect common to all:
"The Muhammadans as a rule, are more inert [[[than Hindus^ ],
- a smaller proportion of them rise to the higher 
efforts required for higher attainments, a larger pro­
portion taking to employments which can be obtained with 
less learning or smaller exertion."-^
Griffin (Officiating Secretary to Punjab Government) even went so far as 
to deny that the Muslim community represented a backward class within 
Punjabi society, as they held a majority of 'good appointments' under 
the Government, and as such were not in need of any special consider­
ation in the field of education: "They had far more than the share
which, taking their numbers into consideration, might be thought their 
right...". Furthermore in opposing the giving of grant-in-aid to Muslim 
schools, Griffin revealed the depth of his contempt; "It is to throw 
the education of the masses into the hands of the priests, and those who
advocate it should logically advocate the education of the youth of
36Europe being again entrusted to the Jesuits."
The tone these gentlemen adopted reflected an almost total lack of 
concern for the predicament of the Muslim community. In fact, Griffin's 
claim that the Muslims did not represent a depressed section of society, 
an assertion he based on their employment level in the bureaucracy was a 
blatant misrepresentation. Ten years after he made those remarks Muslins 
represented a majority in only one class of the services, accounting for 
5^ out of the Extra Assistant Commissioners posts, in comparison to 38 
appointments held by the Hindus. Out of a total of 312 administrative 
and judicial appointments Muslims held only l4l, whilst of the M+0 
positions which included executive and assistant engineers, assistant 
surgeons, professors and headmasters, and forest rangers, Muslims
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accounted for only 168. In addition to which in l8?2 even Pearson, 
the Registrar, had openly admitted that Muslims constituted a minority 
in the services, particularly with regard to those appointments where a 
knowledge of English was required:
"when we come to departments where English is necessary,
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the Hindu has the advantage, and consequently... 
if the average salary of the two were calculated, 
that of the Hindu would be found far the highest, 
because English„work receives, as a rule, higher 
remuneration.
The absence of concern displayed by the European Senate members was
also complemented by ignorance of which the following case is but one
example. C. Boulnois (Judge of the Calcutta Court of Small Causes)
offered a novel explanation for Muslim failures in English education.
He stated that "For an Indian Muhammadan to acquire English really well
would draw largely on an imitative faculty which their customs seem to 
39me to discourage." Presumably it had not occurred to him that Muslim 
custom required prayers to be spoken in a foreign language (Arabic) 
which, to the vast majority, necessitated the exercise of considerable 
imitative ability! It seems almost inconceivable that Boulnois' point 
of view was conveyed unchallenged to the Provincial Government, but its 
inclusion is indicative of the superficial way in which Muslim 
difficulties were often treated in the Punjab.
In fact only two European Senate members were inclined to admit 
that Muslims were in need of special help, which they believed could be 
provided through scholarships. Melvill (Commissioner of Rawalpindi) 
believed that such a provision was desirable and just, but only in so 
far that it would equip Muslims for Government service. T.E. Brown, a 
Government surgeon, adopted a similar stance. He argued that by grant­
ing special scholarships specifically for the study of English, Muslims 
would be better equipped to compete in those areas of the service where 
a knowledge of the language was required. In advocating this approach 
Melvill and Brown were in a minority of two, and their views were not 
even considered by the Registrar who, in presenting his report, dis­
missed the idea of providing scholarships specifically for Muslims: "if
a number of additional stipends were specifically given for their 
benefit, the holders would not do anything worth the outlay."
In making this comment the Registrar reflected the majority opinion
of his European colleagues. The reasons for their general prejudice,
especially regarding the Muslim character, had both political and social
origins. It occurred in part, according to Leitner, from misconceptions
concerning the Muslim role in the Mutiny,^ although by the 1870's and
*8 0's it seems to have been engendered to a greater extent by the belief
that Islam and degeneracy were synonymous. It was an opinion clearly
expressed by Ibbetson in the Punjab Census of l88l:
"It is curious how markedly for evil is the influence 
which conversion to even the most impure form of
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Mahomedanism has upon the character of the Panjab 
villager; how invariably it fills him with false 
pride and conceit, disinclines him from honest toil 
...when we move through a tract inhabited by Hindus 
and Musalmans belonging to the same tribe, descended 
from the same ancestor, and living'under the same 
conditions.. .[]we]] find that as we pass each village, 
each field, each house, we can tell the religion of 
its owner by the greater idleness, poverty, and 
pretension, which mark the Musalman...
Also the opposition to offering grants-in-aid, so forcibly expressed 
by Griffin, was in keeping with earlier British policy. As late as 
l88l, and in spite of the decline which had occurred in indigenous 
education, of the total number of pupils in the Punjab were enrolled 
in private institutions, the vast majority of which were controlled and
il c
attended by Muslims. It is not surprising that the provincial admin­
istration, of which Griffin was a senior member, should be unenthusiastic 
about aiding a system which continued to command a formidable following 
in the Province, and whose monopoly it was the purpose of British policy 
to undermine. Thus although the University Senate on 27 January 1872, 
had approved the establishment of Muslim aided schools, the activity was 
limited to the Rawalpindi Division, and did not include the provision of 
such grants to established institutions.^ Political considerations of 
a communal nature were also voiced in opposition to the adoption of 
pecuniary measures to aid the community. Although only two European 
members of the Senate, Lindsay and Griffin, proffered this objection, 
Griffin's position as Secretary to the Government gave it weight. The 
latter contended, "I believe it is impolitic and certain to lead to
after embarrassment...to stimulate the education of one class at the
1+7
expense of any other."
In presenting the opinions of the European Senate members to the
Imperial Government, both the Registrar and the Provincial Government
were at pains to establish that Muslim education in the Province was
being conducted along the lines suggested by the Viceroy at the time of
the Commission's appointment, and as a result no further measures were
necessary. In July 1872 the Registrar pointed out that in accordance
with viceregal policy "the principle of promoting the cultivation of the
vernaculars and of the study of oriental classics has from the first
^8been maintained by the Senate...", whilst the appointment of Muslim 
teachers in English schools had not been overlooked. As a result, the 
Lt. Governor could safely, if erroneously, claim in February 1873 that 
"The suggestions of these gentlemen [^Members of Senate]]] for the 
encouragement of Muhammadan education show that no special action is 
necessary on the part of the Government." Furthermore, in support of
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these views Griffin assured the Imperial Government that the Hindu and
Muslim members of the Senate were unanimous "as to the absence of all
just complaint with the Government system £of education] in the Punjab,^
Griffin's assertion, however, was spurious. The Registrar and the
local government had conspired to engineer Muslim evidence to suit their
purpose, and had rejected such Muslim recommendations which were at
variance with their own point of view. Thus in presenting their case
the Muslim Senate members on 8 July l8?2 had pointed out that they had
been compromised with regard to the scope of their criticism:
"As it is the desire of Government not to make any 
alterations in the subjects of education, but only 
to amend the mode of education, we therefore confine 
our remarks to the latter; otherwise, we would have 
expressed our opinion at more length on all points 
connected with the improvement of education."
In the event they recorded their approval of the British system's treat­
ment of the English, Arabic and Persian languages, recognising the 
importance of English education in particular, but they tempered this 
with a strong plea to the Government to recognise the general poverty of
the community, and to provide pecuniary assistance in the form of grants
50-in-aid and scholarships to encourage the recruitment of Muslim pupils.
The validity of these observations was further reduced by the fact 
that they represented a second, and muted, appraisal. The original 
memorandum, presented in April 1872, had been decidedly critical. As 
previously stated, the Muslim Senate members deprecated the absence of 
religious instruction in government schools, and the government's reluc­
tance to give financial aid for their co-religionists. In fact they had 
made a specific request for the appointment of teachers of all denomi­
nations to cater for the pupils' religious needs, and for the provision 
of stipends for Muslims in all government schools. In addition they 
regretted that the study of 'Oriental Classics' had been designated a 
subordinate position to western learning, claiming that it would not 
encourage the learned classes to support the British system. Defending 
Oriental studies they argued that to pass the lowest oriental examination 
at the Punjab University College required infinitely more study than to 
take the B.A. degree at Calcutta University. They laid stress on the 
high standards set by Indian scholars and added, "to consign native
scholars, many of whom could teach the most eminent European Orientalists,
51
to a position of inferiority is neither just nor expedient."
Moreover the original memorandum had been accompanied by statements 
supporting to various degrees the criticisms and recommendations it con­
tained, which had been contributed by representatives of three sections
71
of Muslim society - religious, academic, and journalistic. The Sunni 
Maulvis, whose views were recorded, and Muhammad.latif, the editor of 
the Anjuman-i-Funjab, recommended the immediate introduction of 
religious study, stressing that the government system would remain 
unpopular amongst Muslims so long as it was omitted. Latif even urged 
that special Muslim schools should be established in which instruction 
in the Koran would be permitted, and that the Fiqah and Hadis should 
form part of the curriculum in all government schools.^ Conversely 
Rahim Khan, the academic, though he supported the demands for special 
pecuniary measures to aid Muslims, did not press for the introduction of 
religious study. Though he conceded that its exclusion was responsible 
for the rejection of government learning by "the lower order of the 
community", he was confident that the "enlightened members" would enrol 
their children if special stipends were available in government schools 
and colleges.
The Muslim members of the Senate and the other Muslim commentators 
therefore had two main complaints with the existing system - the 
exclusion of religion and the absence of financial assistance. Both 
were an anathema to the Government, whilst all the views expressed 
denied the official claim that Muslims supported and were satisfied with 
the education available. In addition Muslim pleas for financial aid 
constituted a serious challenge to the views of the majority of the 
European Senate members, that such consideration was unnecessary. In 
short the Muslim contribution to the proceedings constituted an embar­
rassing analysis which the administration preferred to ignore. Their 
evidence was therefore rejected on two specific counts. That of the 
Muslim Senate members was refused credence because the Lt. Governor 
regretted that it "has been submitted in such a form as to deprive it of 
much of the weight to which it would naturally be entitled...", i.e. it 
had not been signed by the individual commentators. Whilst the support­
ing statements were ignored because they represented "The anonymous 
production of certain gentlemen unconnected with the Senate...and, 
though they may contain some suggestions worthy of consideration...no 
weight can be attached to any such communications..." because "the 
request of the Government was merely for the opinion of the members of 
the Senate..."
These reasons proffered by Griffin on 26 April 1872 were far from 
satisfactory. In the first place the Registrar had assured him that the 
April memorandum of the Muslim Senate members did represent their 
genuine feelings, and had been compiled by Leitner from the reports of
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"frequent discussions upon this subject in the Executive Committee of
the Senate..."^. In considering why it had been unsigned, Griffin had
complained that the•Lt. Governor was unable to understand why any
'native gentlemen' should be unwilling to append their signatures to
56views recorded by them. The reason, however, was obvious. To express 
opinions totally out of favour with the Government would court the dis­
pleasure of the Lt. Governor, whose prerogative it was to sanction 
privilege and forward opportunity. This was partly borne out by Leitner, 
who attributed the Muslim commentators' reluctance to sign to the fact 
that "so strongly, if erroneously, did the Muhammadan community believe 
itself under the disfavour of Government, that its most prominent
members gave me their views...with the injunction not to mention their 
57names." In dismissing the independent Muslim statements which had 
been submitted in support of the Muslim Senate members' views, one 
cannot deny that the Government was within its rights to reject opinions 
it had not sought. Nevertheless it was a short-sighted and unrealistic 
move in view of the fact that Griffin had admitted the possibility that 
they merited consideration. Also not all the statements had been 
anonymous as he claimed. Latif and Rahim Khan had signed theirs, and 
the latter was a member of the Senate, which Griffin evidently 'over­
looked* when he stated that they were all unconnected with that 
institution.
It is evident that the opinions were rejected on account of their 
content and not their presentation. Griffin's plea that the memorandum
C-O
of April 1872 would have received attention if signed cannot be 
accepted as the signed memorandum of July 1872 which succeeded it, had 
also been disregarded and largely misinterpreted. This lack of consider­
ation was synonymous with the fact that the Provincial Government deter­
mined not to concede that the Muslim community was backward or in need 
of special consideration and assistance. This attitude continued to 
govern provincial educational policy throughout the following decade and 
a half. Thus in response to the Commission of 1882 the Punjab Governmert 
remained rigidly attached to the position it had adopted in 1872,
refusing to consider the introduction of special measures to assist the 
59Muslim community.
By the early l880*s, therefore, as a result of a combination of 
government policy, and Muslim conservatism and poverty, an impasse had 
been reached regarding Muslim participation in government education. The 
position was to alter within the following decade. This was the result 
of a change in Central Government policy and the social and political 
re-awakening within Muslim society. The former resulted largely from
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the attitude of Dufferin, the new Viceroy, and the recommendations of 
the Hunter Commission (1882), both of which were out of sympathy with 
the Punjab’s stance. The Government of India and the Viceroy in par­
ticular had begun to view with alarm those middle-class, Hindu dominated 
political organisations, such as the three Presidency Associations
(Calcutta, Bombay, Madras) established in 1851-52, which coalesced in
60I885 to form the Indian National Congress. Official opinion from the
mid-l880’s grew increasingly suspicious of their aims, believing that
they were committed to undermine British rule in India. Hence
Dufferin's willingness to appear sympathetic to the Muslims betrayed
a desire to use that community as a counterweight to the Hindu
62controlled Congress. As for the movement for Muslim renewal, it was
the result of a determined effort on the part of the Muslim educated
elite to confront Government with the dilemma facing their co-religion-
ists. This concern found expression at the national and provincial
levels through the endeavours of the National Muhammadan Association and
the Anjuman-i-Islamia.
Dufferin, at the outset of his viceroyalty, had assured the Muslim
leaders of Western India that he would consider the representations whith
had been submitted to his predecessor by the National Muhammadan Associ-
63ation in February 1882. The Muslim leaders through the memorial had 
sought to impress upon the Government the deteriorating state of Muslim 
education. The serious decline in their opinion was the result of the 
resumption proceedings, the supersession of Persian by English, and the 
order of 186^ which ruled that English alone would constitute the exam­
ination medium for the more coveted government appointments.^ Whilst 
the 1882 Commission, which considered the memorial as part of its exam­
ination of education in general, did not admit the Association’s charges, 
it adopted a conciliatory and constructive attitude towards Muslim edu­
cation. In spite of the Punjab Government's assertion that no change 
was necessary, the Commission under the chairmanship of W.W. Hunter, 
made a number of recommendations designed to reconcile Islamic cultural 
needs with western education. Although it was adamant in its opposition 
to the introduction of religious instruction, it urged that provision be 
made for Persian to be taught in middle and high schools situated in 
Muslim majority areas. The Commission further recommended that 
indigenous Muslim schools should be liberally encouraged to introduce 
purely secular courses in their curricula; it advised an increased 
employment of Muslim inspecting officers, and the establishment of 
normal schools to train Muslim teachers. In addition it recommended 
that a graduated system of special scholarships for Muslims should be
7b
established and that in all classes of maintained schools a proportion 
of free studentships for Muslims should be reserved for the community. 
Furthermore, to prevent Muslim claims for assistance being overlooked, 
the Commission suggested that for the purpose of departmental reports
65the community should be treated as a special class requiring assistance.
These provisoes, which received full support from the Viceroy, made
it extremely difficult for the Punjab Government to maintain its
previous uncompromising attitude. Dufferin in 1885 declared that he
attached 'special importance' to the recommendations concerning the
treatment of Muslims as a special class. According to the Viceroy "a
liberal provision of scholarships..." was essential to attract Muslims
into the realms of higher education, and he cautioned that "their wants
must not be overlooked in the framing of any general scheme of scholar-
66’ships for any Province..." . This directive completely rejected the
Punjab Government's position as enunciated by the Lt. Governor to the
Commission of 1882: "It is not for the Government to confer special
privileges upon any one class of its subjects when they have failed to
67avail themselves of the opportunities freely offered to all."
The publication of the Commission's findings and recommendations in
1883* together with the sympathetic attitude of the Viceroy, spurred
Muslim leaders in the Punjab to take positive steps. In 1885 the Anjuman
-i-Islamia was founded in the Province, to promote the dissemination of
western learning and religious instruction amongst Muslims, especially
68the poorer classes. On 3 January 1887 the Anjuman submitted a 
memorial to Aitcheson, the Lt. Governor. It was a skilful piece of work, 
which refrained from recrimination and prejudice. It appealed for the 
Lt. Governor's aid; the memorialists assured him that they had no 
sympathy for those who blamed the Government for the Muslim plight, 
claiming that it was due as much to their own apathy as to other causes. 
They emphasised that they did not seek assistance as a special privilege, 
but as a community which had erred and was in need of help. In spite of 
some increase in Muslim attendance in English schools, the Anjuman 
stressed that the community remained backward because of its general 
poverty, which posed the main stumbling block to their further partici­
pation in education. Finally it astutely reminded Aitcheson of the 
Commission's recommendations that "nothing short of special scholarships 
would enable the Muhammadans to keep up with the wealthier sections of 
the community." Whilst soliciting financial assistance for the community, 
the memorialists pointed out that the Governments of Bombay, Bengal, and 
Madras, in compliance with the Commission’s advice, had already inaugu-
75
69rated schemes to provide pecuniary aid for the Muslim community. ^
The tactful presentation of the problems by the Anjuman had the 
desired effect. In February 1887 Aitcheson sanctioned the establishment 
of special awards * known as 'Jubilee Scholarships' for the encouragement 
of education amongst Muslims. Of these 14 were to be awarded annually 
on the results of the 'Entrance', 'Intermediate', and Bachelor of Arts 
examinations of the Punjab University. In addition 44 Jubilee Scholar­
ships of Rs. 4 per mensem were to be awarded annually on the results of 
the middle school examinations, to be tenable in high schools. Half of 
these awards were to be given to those Muslim candidates who had been 
successful in the vernacular examination. The scholarships were of two 
years duration, though in the case of students desiring to study English 
they were extended to four years. District and municipal boards were 
also authorised to grant Jubilee scholarships to the value of Rs. 2 per
mensem tenable in middle schools, to Muslim boys, on the result of upper
70primary school examinations in each district. In addition by 1890 one
half of the free scholarships awarded in secondary schools, and one half
of the half-fee places available in those institutions and colleges,
71were reserved for Muslims,
By the end of 1898, 264 Jubilee scholarships had been instituted,
20 in colleges and 244 in schools. The change that had occurred in pro­
vincial thinking on the subject of Muslim education and financial 
assistance was evident from the fact that inspecting officers held the
unanimous opinion that the awards, together with fee concessions enjoyed
72by the community, were essential for its continued progress. Moreover 
other financial inducements were provided by the local government to 
encourage Muslim enrolment. These included Zamindari, Open, Victoria and 
College scholarships. By 1900, 44 high school Victoria scholarships
were available to Muslims, though with the creation of the N.W.F.P, as a
73separate province in 1901, the number was reduced to 35* As from the 
beginning of the 1914-15 financial year the Provincial Government 
decided that Victoria, together with Open and Zamindari Scholarships 
would be paid from provincial revenues at the rate of Rs. 6 per mensem
74
the last two classes of awards being open to members of all communities.
Zamindari scholarships, however, by virtue of the fact that they were
reserved specifically for agriculturists, were of great benefit to
Muslims who constituted the majority of that class.
Six Open scholarships were also assigned to each district, with the
75exception of Simla which received two. Also one Zamindari scholarship
was allotted to each district, and by 1914 the distribution of Victoria
76scholarships followed the same pattern. In addition, by 1913 the
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Local Government annually awarded 32 College scholarships on the results
of the matriculation examination, 15 of which were reserved for Muslims.
The value of each was Rs.10, plus full payment of fees, and they were
77valid for a 21 month period.
The Anjuman-i-Islamia had played a prominent role in pleading the
cause for such measures. Its activities, however, were not limited
solely to lobbying the Local Government: it attempted to further
Muslim educational activity through the founding of institutions of its
own. The Education Report of 1889-90 recognised the part played by
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Muslim gentlemen and societies in promoting western education. Of 
these the Anjuman emerged as, and remained the most important Muslim 
organisation in the Punjab engaged in that work. Its philosophy was to 
promote western education, but not at the expense of Islamic learning, 
seeking to provide a programme to accommodate the two. Its main 
ambition in pursuing that objective was to promote educational parity 
between Muslims and non-Muslims, especially the Hindus, and thereby 
provide employment opportunities for the members of the Muslim communi?^.
The Anjuman started by founding an upper primary school for boys in 
1886, catering for 191 pupils. In 1888 ‘middle' classes were introduced, 
and in 1889 'high' classes were added. By 1912, the number of students 
numbered 2,1^9 which warranted the division of the school into two insti­
tutions. In addition the Anjuman maintained a number of primary and 
religious schools for girls, one Anglo-vernacular middle school for 
girls, and the Hamidia school, established with the object of spreading 
advanced Arabic learning and the training of Muslim missionaries. In 
keeping with the Anjuman's policy, these institutions adopted a course 
of study which, whilst imparting secular instruction in accordance with 
the official departmental curricula, also catered for the religions 
needs of the pupils. The institutions were highly efficient, as a 
result of which they were recognised by the Department of Education and 
the University, and District Board scholarships were made tenable to 
them. The Anjuman, however, neither applied for, nor accepted grants-in 
-aid until 1907» by which time it required financial assistance. The 
needs of the body had outgrown the funds which it collected privately,
go
and which were no longer sufficient to finance its educational projects.
The Anjuman's most ambitious undertaking concerned the founding of 
Islamia College in 1892. To begin with it comprised Intermediate Arts 
(F.A.) classes. In 1900 B..A. and M.A. courses were started, the latter 
devoted solely to the study of Arabic. At that time the college had an 
attendance of 10^ students. By 1912 it had been extended considerably: 
it possessed a hostel accommodating approximately l*+0 boarders, a
77
library, a main block consisting of 16 lecture rooms, four science 
laboratories, and a hall. It was served by a staff of 11 (Principal, 
five professors, two readers and three maulvis) and had 200 scholars on 
its rolls. Despite these extensions it was not large enough to meet the 
increasing demands placed upon it. Between 1910 and 191*+ the number of 
students had doubled, and it was estimated that by the 1920's the 
college would have to make provision for 1,000 places. Expansion on 
this scale was considered essential by the College Committee to enable 
Muslims to rectify the deficiency they experienced in the realms of 
higher education, for in 1912 the community accounted for only 5^7 of 
the 2,539 students enrolled in the Arts Colleges of the Punjab University
The Committee's ambitions entailed an expenditure programme which 
could only be met by seeking government assistance, or to an extent by 
increasing fees dramatically. The latter was not feasible in view of 
the Anjuman's aims to provide education for the, poorer sections of 
Muslim society. As Fazl-i-Husain (the Honorary Secretary, Islamia 
College Committee), pointed out, the general poverty of the community 
required that fees be kept as low as possible. Thus the Committee 
refused to increase the existing scale of charges which stood at Rs. h 
per month in Intermediate Arts classes and Rs. 5 per month in B.A. 
classes. Besides the cost involved in the basic expansion of the 
college, the Anjuman was also anxious to promote further enrolment 
through the provision of eight merit scholarships to the total value of 
Rs .98 per month, and to provide free scholarships for 15% of the total 
number of students in each class. Also it proposed to continue to 
provide the Rs.200 it paid each month in small stipends to poor students, 
"such stipends being generally only just sufficient to cover...college 
fees."
In an attempt to realise these aims, the Committee, through Fazl-i- 
Husain, sought the assistance of the Provincial Government in April 191*+. 
It requested a maintenance, as well as a building grant. The former was 
for Rs.18,000 a year to be increased after 1916 to Rs.40,000 per annum.
In respect of the latter, Rs. 8 lakhs were solicited to be given in three 
instalments; 2 lakhs in 191*+, and two equal sums of 3 lakhs in 1913 and 
1916. In addition the Government was also asked for technical assistance 
in the surveying of the Shadara site and the construction of the build­
ings. In penning these requests Husain argued that it was the Govern­
ment's duty'to help the Mussalmans to regain lost ground in the 
educational race", especially as the Anjuman's institutions had con­
sistently maintained a high record of discipline, and "unflagging
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loyalty to the Government." Also Husain suggested that the granting of
aid would achieve a reciprocal end, in that it would benefit Muslims,
and thereby assure the Government of their continuing support and
loyalty: "it will prove a source of strength both to the Government and
82the Muhammadan community."
The Punjab Government's response was sympathetic. Q’Dwyer the Lt.
Governor agreed in April 1914 that the proposed expansion was necessary
to meet the growing demand of Punjabi Muslims for higher education. But
any pecuniary help from the Government was made contingent on the Muslim
contribution towards meeting a reasonable proportion of the costs
involved. In addition, more crucial conditions were stipulated. The
College accounts were to be properly audited, and initially the recurrirg
grant would be given for three years only; its periodic renewal being
"subject to the working of the College being proved to be satisfactory
not only as regard educational results,but in respect of the tone and
discipline of the institution". The most significant condition the
Government imposed, however, was that the College Committee would not be
free in the matter of appointing staff: "new staff shall be subject to
83the approval of Government." If the Committee accepted these con­
ditions, which amounted to a considerable degree of government control 
over the College, the Government of India was prepared to make a grant 
of Ks.25,800 towards the initial cost of the scheme, and an annual
84allocation of fis.30,000 for the College.
The demands made by O ’Dwyer represented a strategy in keeping with 
Imperial policy. In April 1911 the Viceroy, Hardinge, had directed 
Harcourt Butler (Education Member, Gov.General’s Council) to maintain 
contact with those Muslim leaders, concerned to accept government
85control being exercised over the proposed institution. This was 
considered essential in order to prevent educational institutions caus­
ing the Government political embarrassment. Thus, when in 1900 the 
Secretary of the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, Mohsin- 
ul-Mulk, had re-organised the Urdu Defence Association in retaliation 
against Macdonnel's (Lt. Governor N.W.P. 1895-1901) Hindi resolution, 
the latter had been able to force Mohsin-ul-Mulk to abandon his protest
86under threat of the withdrawal of the government grant from the College.
For although theoretically Aligarh represented a private venture, in
87practice Government patronage assured its continuance.
Fazl-i-Husain was deeply suspicious of permitting any measure of 
88government control, but financial considerations overrode his personal 
objections. In April 1915 the College Committee by seeking the Provin­
cial Government's approval for the appointments of M.Hamid Khan as
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Professor of Biology and M.Muhammad Shafi as Professor of Arabic and 
89Persian, demonstrated its willingness to abide by the Government's 
stipulations. This pattern was thereby established for future College- 
Government relations.
Regardless of the Government's determination to limit the inde­
pendence of the College Committee, the establishment of the College by 
the Anjuman represented the height of Muslim endeavour and achievement 
in the promotion of western education in the Punjab. In terms of simple 
numbers, however, the College could not hope to compete with those 
institutions which had been founded for the advancement of the Hindu and 
Sikh communities. By 191^ Islamia College had approximately 300 
students in attendance, by comparison the D.A.V. College had an enrol­
ment of 1,000 students, whilst the Dyal Singh College catered for 400
students, the Khalsa for between 200 and **00, and the Hindu College for 
90approximately 100. In fact private Muslim enterprise never equalled
that of the non-Muslim in the field of education. The Education Report
for 1923 maintained that the general poverty of the Muslim community
prevented it from exhibiting the same degree of enterprise in establish-
9*1ing communal schools as was displayed by the other communities. Thus 
out of a total of 311 private Anglo-vernacular middle and high schools 
for boys which had been established throughout the Province by 1933-3^, 
only 58 (l8.6%) were managed by Muslims. In comparison 13^ (^3-09%) and 
7^ (23.79%) were run by Hindus and Sikhs respectively.^2 By 19^6, ex­
cluding those institutions managed by the University and the Government, 
of the 16 colleges situated in Lahore, only three were controlled by the
Muslim community. Similarly of the ko privately managed high schools,
93only 13 were in Muslim hands.
The contribution which private Muslim institutions could make,
therefore, was limited. The 1923 Education Report recorded that in that
year the additional Muslim enrolment which had occurred had been almost
9^entirely in government schools. This clearly represented the norm. In 
1927-28, ^5*003 Muslims were enrolled in government and private insti­
tutions in the Ambala Division, of whom only 7,537 attended the latter. 
Similarly in the Rawalpindi Division lV?,650 Muslims were in receipt of 
both types of instruction, but only 3*525 of these were registered in
private schools.95
These figures demonstrate not only the comparatively low numbers 
which were involved in the private sector, but that the earlier 
prejudices and reservations which had posed a barrier to Muslim partici­
pation in government schools were breaking down. Progress had been 
gradual but constant, and seems to have begun in the early l890's.
8o
During the academic year 1891-9 2, the figures clearly show that the
number of Muslims receiving English education had started to increase
significantly. In secondary schools there had been an increase of 10%,
mainly at the Anglo-vernacular level, whilst in arts colleges the
improvement had been over 13%. In spite of this progression, however,
Muslims remained backward in comparison to Hindus and Sikhs. In the
case of government school attendance, only one in 17 Muslim boys and one
in 88 Muslim girls of school-going age ettended. By comparison one in
nine Hindu boys and one in 22 Hindu girls were enrolled, whilst one in
eight Sikh boys and one in %  Sikh girls were receiving government 
96instruction. During the first two decades of the twentieth century 
the number of Muslim pupils in government schools increased dramatically 
from 671663 in 1900?^ to 16^,982 by 1919_20.^ These developments 
reflected the community's awareness of the necessity for western edu­
cation, and were in part also a response to the changed attitude of the 
Punjab Government, whose earlier hostility and contempt towards the 
community had under Central Government prompting given way to concern 
and encouragement. Even so, though scholarships reflected the Govern­
ment's change of heart, and had played a part in making western educa­
tion more accessible, their scope was limited by the relatively small 
numbers they affected. The significant factor in encouraging greater 
Muslim participation was the Government's determination to reduce the 
prohibitive economic barriers which continued to restrict Muslim involve­
ment, through the revision of the fee system.
During the l880's pupils in government English schools were charged 
fees in relation to their parental income. The lowest grade of charge 
being for an income of below Rs.25 per mensem,the highest for income in 
excess of Rs.200. Fees were prescribed accordingly in the various 
classes of primary, middle and high departments; the lowest being two aras, 
rising to six annas per month for pupils studying English, whilst the 
highest fee charged was Rs. 5 in high departments. In vernacular 
schools the rate varied according to locality, though the sons of agri­
culturists who contributed to the 1% agricultural cess received free 
education. In contrast non-agriculturists were generally charged one 
anna per month in primary schools and from one to two annas in middle 
schools. In the Ludhiana district, however, there was a fixed rate for 
each class rising from one to four annas in primary schools, and five to 
six annas in middle schools. In English schools run by missionaries,
fees were charged, but there was no uniform rate, and in aided vernacular
99schools no charges were made.
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The change in Local Government policy, which had resulted in the
granting of scholarships to Muslims, prompted a re-assessment of the fee
system. In February 1889 the Provincial Government sought the approval
of the Government of India for the abolition of fees at the primary
level, as an inducement to encourage greater agriculturist participation.
The Viceroy, Lansdowne, responded by offering no more than tacit approval
He sanctioned only a temporary suspension, insisting that free education
100would not be appreciated. The local government, however, chose to
ignore the Viceroy's caution, and the temporary measures became a
permanent feature of provincial educational policy which preceded by 17
years a similar move by the Government of India.
The Central Government did not seriously consider following the
Punjab's example until 1906, by which time it regarded it
"both as a form of relief to certain classes of the 
community akin to the reduction of taxation, and as 
an educational measure intended to remove sin obstacle 
to the spread of primary education." 0
Not unnaturally the Punjab Government supported the move and the phil­
osophy behind it. Despite this in March 1910, lack of funds forced the
102Government of India to shelve the scheme. This did not have an
adverse effect in the Punjab where, as a result of the policy adopted in
1889, agriculturists’ children, and those of village kamins (menials)
continued to enjoy exemption from fees in all five vernacular primary 
103classes. In addition, though similar concessions did not apply in
the upper primary classes of Anglo-vernacular schools, there only half
rates were levied in the case of agriculturists, and by 1911 50% of all
places in all secondary classes were reserved free of charge for pupils
whose parents were unable to meet educational expenses. This concession
also applied to the children of teachers in recognised schools whose
10*f
salaries did not exceed Rs .30 per mensem.
The introduction of the fee concession principle led officers at the 
district level in the Punjab to seek a wider application. In January 
191^ the Deputy Commissioner for Jhelum urged the Provincial Government 
to extend similar benefits to Muslims studying in English schools in his 
district. In making this request he pointed out that although the 
community, which was mainly agriculturist, represented 8896 of the local 
population, as a result of its general poverty it accounted for only 27% 
of the pupils in the high, 3^% in the middle, and 4o# in the upper 
primary departments of English schools. In order to rectify the 
position he suggested that though "No concession can be made to
105Muhammadans as such...concessions may be made to them as agriculturists."
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The Provincial Government readily agreed. In March 191^ it sanctioned a
fee reduction for agriculturists; in high departments half rates were to
be levied, whilst in middle and upper schools the class would be
required to meet only three-eighths of the charges. The following
month the Mianwali district was included in the scheme, and Godley, the
Director of Education, asked the Commissioner of the division, Popham
Young, to give his views for an even wider application of the concession
to include Attock and Shahpur: "these being also districts containing a
107large number of Muhammadans who are educationally backward." Popham 
Young agreed, but he proposed a more generous application of the con­
cessions to include the entire tract between the Indus and Jhelum rivers, 
excluding urban areas, as "Poverty and all the causes which make for
108backwardness in education..." were manifest throughout the region.
Godley responded favourably, sanctioning a uniform levy of fees at half
the ordinary rate for agriculturists attending secondary and upper
primary classes in all government and Anglo-vernacular schools, to take
109effect from 1 April 191^. As a consequence of this decision District
Officers between 191^ and 1916 sought and obtained similar benefits for
110agriculturists in the districts of Gujrat, Dera Ghazi Khan and 
111Muzaffargarh.
Though the scheme was aimed at agriculturists, it had been
engineered by Godley and Popham Young specifically to benefit Muslims.
By the 1930's it had been expanded to the extent that Muslims enjoyed
1125C$ fee concessions in all Anglo-vernacular schools, and in the 
secondary departments of all the schools in the Province. There is 
no doubt that these fee reductions acted as a tremendous inducement in 
encouraging the enrolment of Muslims in government schools. The Edu­
cation Reports for 1932-33 and 1933-3^ bear testimony to this. Both 
claimed that without them there would have been a considerable decrease 
of pupils at the primary and middle stages of Anglo-vernacular schools.
In addition to fee concessions, the Provincial Government adopted 
other measures to increase Muslim participation. These included the 
employment of Muslim teachers in their home localities, by instituting 
training units in conjunction with high schools in remote parts of the 
Province (eig. Kot Adu in Muzaffargarh, Taunsa in Dera Ghazi Khan,
Pasrur in Sialkot and Dharamsala in Kangra), and by admitting Muslim
students from backward areas on special terms to receive Anglo-vernacular
115training at the Central Training College, Lahore. Also in the 1920’s, 
’3 0's and ,AK>'s efforts were made at co-ordinating the instruction in 
village schools with the actual needs of the rural population, thereby 
making education more relevant. Syllabuses were enlarged to cater for
83
116gardening, rural pursuits and village account keeping.
The Government, as well as offering inducements to promote partici­
pation, also employed a measure of compulsion, but it met with little 
success. The Primary Education Act of 1919 bad established the principle 
of compulsory education for boys of all communities at the primary level. 
As applied in the Punjab, however, the Act represented a paradox, for it 
was admitted by the Education Report for 1924-25 that it could only
succeed on a voluntary basis, with the villagers rather than local bodies
117
enforcing the measures. In essence, its main purpose was to ensure
that pupils who were enrolled at the primary level, completed that stage
of their education, rather than securing the attendance of all boys of 
118school-going age. The Government had baulked at employing it to
achieve the latter, believing that it would not be worth the cost 
119involved. In retrospect it proved largely unsuccessful in attaining
even its limited aim, for although it met with success in urban areas
such as Lahore and Amritsar where a measure of enforcement was possible,
ensuring that 93% &nd 9^% respectively of boys of school-going age were 
120in attendance, in the Province as a whole its achievements were far
less spectacular. By 193^-35» 2,982 areas were subject to compulsion,
but in the majority of these, the leakage of pupils at the primary level
was as bad as in non-compulsory areas, the reasons being that the
process of law was too slow and contained too many loopholes to achieve
121
enforcement; litigation was prohibitive; and punishments were ineffective.
Government action concerning provincialisation, however, certainly
forwarded the cause of Anglo-vernacular education, and was of great
benefit to Muslims in particular. It was adopted as official policy in
1922 thereby relieving District Boards, many of which were impoverished,
of the expense of maintaining high schools, thus enabling a concentration
of finance on expanding Anglo-vernacular middle schools. This in turn
enabled the brighter pupils in the rural areas to complete high school
courses, free from the handicap which had previously existed as a result
122of their ignorance of the English language. Grants were provided to 
aid the process, based on the needs and resources of each district, which 
was graded in accordance with this principle. Initially a rich district 
received 50% of its approved additional expenditure in the form of main­
tenance grants, whilst poor and backward districts received between 50%
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and 90% of the necessary expenditure. By 1936-37 the districts of 
Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Simla were graded at 100%; Kangra, Attock and 
Mianwali at 90%; Rohtak, Gurgaon, Sialkot, Muzaffargarh and Dera Ghazi 
Khan at 80%; Hissar, Ludhiana and Lahore at 70%; all the remaining
124
districts had a grade of 60%, except Lyallpur which was graded at 50%.
8^
As early as 192?» Leitch Wilson (Inspector of Schools, Rawalpindi)
claimed that provincialisation and the subsequent encouragement of
Anglo-vernacular education had conferred benefits especially on the 
125Muslim population, by making Anglo-vernacular learning more accessible 
to them.
The granting of concessions, especially in respect of fees, whilst
they went some way in alleviating the financial problems which faced
Muslims, did not eliminate them. The absence of full fee concessions at
the secondary and higher levels inevitably caused Muslim numbers to
diminish. In an attempt to offset this disability and improve Muslim
prospects Fazl-i-Husain introduced a limited scheme of reservation.
Husain had been appointed the Province’s first Minister of Education in
1921 under the system of dyarchy established by the Montagu-Chelmsford
Report of 1918, and the subsequent Reforms Act of 1919i whereby
education in common with other subjects - public health, public works,
local self-government and agriculture (but not land revenue) - were
transferred from central control to Ministers responsible to the
126Provincial Legislatures. The Muslim Minister used his position to
ensure that the small Muslim attendance at the highest levels of
education would not be reduced still further through open competition.
In November 1921 and in 1922, 40% of the admissions to Government
College, Lahore, and the medical schools in Lahore and Amritsar, and the
Central Training College for teachers in Lahore were reserved for 
127Muslims.
The use of reservation, as a means of assisting Muslim education,
was not widely applied in the Province, and thus the advantage which it
offered the community was limited. It was bitterly resented by the vast
majority of the non-Muslim members of the Legislative Council, who under
the leadership of Raja Narendra Nath attempted unsuccessfully in March
1281923 to move a censure motion against the Education Minister. Its
lack of success did not diminish the Raja's opposition. He continued to
oppose the reservation principle as a member of the Auxiliary Committee
of the Indian Statutory Commission appointed in 1929 to consider the
129education question. Narendra Nath claimed that such a measure would
result in class rivalries and jealousies, and would hinder the reali­
sation of responsible government, as envisaged by the Montagu-Chelmsford 
130Reforms. Despite this objection the Auxiliary Commission supported 
the reservation principle and advised the Provincial Government to 
consider carefully reserving places for Muslims in those publicly 
managed institutions in which it was not possible to admit all appli­
cants. The Punjab Government, which was keenly aware of the dangers of
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communal preferment, declined this advice, though it did so on other 
grounds. It argued that the measure was not needed in any school in the 
Province, as the number of Muslim pupils had risen from 159*791 in 1917 
to 516,831 by 1927. 131
This increase, however, had occurred primarily at the primary level 
as a consequence of the provision of free education. The Punjab quin­
quennial report on education ending 1921-22 recorded that the Muslim 
community was in the lead regarding the aggregate number of pupils under 
instruction in all types of institutions, the Muslim total being 241,743 
as compared to 212,005 for Hindus and 76,376 for Sikhs. This represented
an increase of 42.3% for Muslims, 19-6% for Hindus and 47.7% for Sikhs,
132during the five years under review. By 1924-25 Muslims accounted for 
50% of all primary school pupils, which represented an overall increase 
of 7% from the 1919-20 period, when Muslim pupils in primary schools had 
numbered 116,722 out of a total of 272,478. By 1935-56 the Muslim per­
centage at the primary level had dropped slightly to 48%, and from then 
until 19^5 it remained constant at 47%. At the middle and high levels 
of secondary education, however, Muslim percentages, in comparison to 
their primary position, dropped sharply. The Education Report for 1919- 
20 demonstrated that only of all pupils in middle schools were 
Muslims. Their position had improved only slightly by 1944-45, when the 
community contributed 39$ of middle school participants, and although 
they achieved 4l% in 1930-31* and 39*5% in 1936-37* the figure remained 
fairly constant at either 38% or 39$ in the period up to 1945* With 
regard to high schools, in 1919-20 Muslims comprised only 31% of the 
total number of pupils on the rolls, dropping to 28% by 1924-25, though 
Muslim enrolment had increased slightly by 1930-31 when it stood at 29%. 
During the succeeding years up to 1945* there was only a minimal
improvement, Muslims representing 32% of pupils receiving high school
133education m  this period.
In respect of those Muslims willing to enrol their children in 
government schools, it is evident that poverty and not prejudice 
prevented a similar level of participation at the higher, as at the 
primary level. Also, this poverty explains to an extent why Muslim 
enrolment was not even higher at the primary stage, despite the incent­
ives which were offered. Throughout the 1930's and '40's poverty
continued to be cited in provincial education reports as a crucial
134factor in preventing greater Muslim involvement. In the 1939-40 
Report, the Inspector of Schools for Rawalpindi wrote that the communit^s 
backwardness was "mainly due to its appalling poverty in the countryside 
...", and he stressed that substantial relief was still required in the
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form of fee remissions, and the provision of free books and writing 
135materials. Even so, such methods could only help those Muslim 
families who were in a position to allow their children to attend 
schools. In many of the poorer agricultural families children consti­
tuted an integral part of the economic unit, and could not be spared.
An economic inquiry conducted in the mainly Muslim village of Bhadas in 
Gurgaon District in 1936 observed that the offspring of tenants were 
employed, as soon as they were old enough, in tending cattle and with 
cultivation generally. This was especially important in those areas 
where the cost of hired labour could not be met. The survey concluded 
that whilst the tenants were often not in a position to pay school fees, 
the children in any case, because of the vital contribution they made to
136the family's finances, could not be allowed to attend school. These 
observations were applicable to all poor agriculturists throughout the 
Punjab, the majority of whom were Muslims.
Though poverty continued to be of paramount importance in limiting 
Muslim participation, other factors also contributed: Muslim conserva­
tism, apathy, the prevailing economic depression and unemployment were 
all cited by the Education Report of 1937-38. Parental indifference,
the scattered population in rural areas, and the fatalistic attitude of
138the community also played a part in limiting the Muslim response, as
did the belief held by many cultivators that government education would
make their sons unfit for agriculture. Although this prejudice was
139cited by Godley in 1912, as a reason for Muslim non-participation,
its relevance in the 1930's was recognised by Waheed who in a work on
the evolution of Muslim education published in 1936, a*gued that Indian
Muslims who were mainly agriculturists, had totally different educational
needs from the urban intelligentsia for whom the English educational
140system had initially been devised. The Government was evidently 
aware of this problem, for in the 1930's, as has been stated, it intro­
duced an agricultural bias into rural education in the form of kitchen
1VIgardens and village and farm accounting.
Of all the social factors, as opposed to purely economic ones,
which prevented a wider acceptance of the Government system, religious
considerations remained the most obdurate. The Government of India for
its part recognised that the issue had to be resolved, and showed a
willingness to relax the views which it had held previously concerning
purely secular education. Although Curzon in 190^ had re-affirmed the
Central Government's commitment to maintaining an exclusively secular 
1^2system, this philosophy was challenged by the findings of the
1^3
Allahabad Educational Conference qf 1911. Of the nine Directors of
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Education whose views were recorded, five (Coverton - Burma; Hallward - 
E. Bengal and Assam; de la Fosse - U.P.; Kichler - Bengal; and Wright - 
Central Provinces) recognised the demand for religious instruction.
Whilst practically all of the other commentators, both Muslim and non- 
Muslim, with the sole exception of R.N. Mudholkar, were favourably dis­
posed to the introduction of religious learning. Mudholkar*s reser­
vation resulted from the fact that the establishment of a school at 
Amraoti, combining instruction in the principles of Hinduism with 
education suitable for modern requirements, had subsequently contributed 
to religious reaction and political propagandism. None of the other 
speakers who contributed to the debate (Maulvi Syed Shams-ul-Huda, the 
Bishop of Lucknow, Masani, Gokhale, Pandit Sundar Lai, Mudhava Rao 
(previously Dewan, Mysore), Arundale (Central Hindu College), Subramani 
Aiyar, Nawab Abdul Majid, Zia-ud-din Ahmed, Rev* Golland, Rev.Dr.Ewing), 
however, supported this view or opposed religious education in govern­
ment schools. Although de la Fosse recognised that problems did exist 
in limiting the use of religious learning:
"The public are of opinion that moral instruction must 
be based on religious sanctions. But religious 
instruction to be effective must be dogmatic, and this 
stood in the way of any general adoption of such teach­
ing in public schools."
Against this, Maulvi Shams-ul-Huda stressed that the Muslim community
"greatly felt the need of direct religious instruction though they also
appreciated the difficulties of Government." Nevertheless he predicted
"If religious instruction is insisted on English education will become
more popular with Muhammadans."
Godley*s contribution to the proceedings was in part confusing. He
in the Punjab
stated that in secondary schools/religious teaching was given by various
bodies, Christian, Muslim and Hindu, whilst in Board primary schools,
such instruction was absent, though moral instruction was given both by
1^5example and the study of set text books. In respect of his statement
concerning secondary schools, religious instruction was not permitted in
1*f6Government schools until 1915* &nd then only out of school hours. 
Presumably the Director of Education was referring to those secondary 
schools which were outside the Government fold. With regard to moral 
instruction, this type of learning, not based on any religious ideology, 
was an integral part of the Curzonian plan. It is clear that its 
conception was prompted by the desire to provide an acceptable substitute 
for religious instruction to meet the concern for the teaching of 
personal behaviour and responsibility, but free from theological con­
ceptions.
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The Allahabad Conference examined this medium and found it wanting.
Richey (Director of Education, N.W.F.P.) declared that in his Province
it was impossible to divorce moral from religious instruction, and Ewing
(Principal, Forman Christian College, Lahore) observed that moral teach-
148ing by means of special textbooks was impossible. Both these opinions 
reflected the feelings of the majority of headmasters and school 
inspectors in the Punjab, who were highly sceptical of the value of this 
type of instruction, though this was not revealed by Godley to the Con­
ference. Moral instruction in the Province was provided through the 
medium of a set of reading books prepared by Holroyd (Director of Public 
Instruction 1868-1891). These contained much information, which seemed 
to have little relevance to personal morality, e.g. the study of animals, 
their structure, habits, utility, etc. Only those in use in the upper 
primary and lower middle vernacular classes directly inculcated love of 
parents, loyalty to the Government, charity, punctuality, industry, 
honesty, etc. Moral readers in Anglo-vernacular high departments con­
tinued these themes under such headings as 'My Duties', 'Duties to Self*, 
'Others' and 'God*. Only in denominational schools were sacred books 
(the Bible, Quran, etc.) used to impart moral tuition, and the Anjuman- 
i-Islamia accepted the responsibility for the circulation of such litera­
ture in Muslim schools. In Christian Mission schools, teaching was 
denominational also, though such schools, so it was claimed, were usually 
"careful, while basing their instruction on the Bible,, to teach only such 
principles as are generally acceptable" to all. Despite the official 
questioning of the value of moral instruction given in government 
schools, the Anjuman-i-Islamia favoured its continuance, though it
149
stressed that it would be more effective if based on religious doctrines. 
It was a timid stance which the Anjuman adopted, but it clearly preferred 
to have half the cake than none at all!
Though Godley refrained from criticising the principle of moral
teaching, the obvious disillusionment expressed by other speakers at
150Allahabad, notably Richey, de la Fosse, Gokhale and Ewing, impressed 
the Government of India with the need to re-examine its position regard­
ing religious instruction. In September 1911 all the Provincial Govern­
ments were invited to consider the problem. In February 19131 the Vice­
roy, Hardinge, in referring to the Allahabad discussions, observed that 
the most thoughtful minds in India lamented the tendency of the existing 
system of education to develop the intellectual at the expense of the 
moral and religious faculties. Hardinge was sympathetic to their views, 
and urged a re-thinking of the secular doctrine declaring that he hoped 
that enlightened opinion and accumulated experience would provide a
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practical solution to what was unquestionably "the most important 
educational problem of the time". That he did not go further in promot­
ing this theme resulted from what he termed the necessity of the Govern­
ment of India to maintain a position of complete neutrality in matters 
151of religion. By openly recognising the problem and the dissatisfac­
tion with official religio-educational policy, however, Hardinge had 
revealed the willingness of the Central Government to reconsider its 
previous stance.
This development clearly influenced events in the Punjab. In 1915 
the Local Government decided to allow religious instruction in govern­
ment schools, on the understanding that it would be conducted out of
school hours, and only if requested by parents. Also the cost involved
152was not to be met from public funds. The Government of India was
satisfied with the Punjab's decision, and in 1921 it urged all local
governments to adopt a similar policy, subject to the same conditions,
arguing that it was of "the opinion that the embargo which hitherto had
been placed on the introduction of religious instruction in publicly
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managed schools may be removed." In 1929 a Committee presided over 
by Sir Philip Hartog (Member of the Public Service Commission), which had 
been appointed by the Indian Statutory Commission to review the growth 
of education in British India, recommended that a more positive policy 
should be adopted regarding religion and education, particularly in the 
case of Muslims. It reasoned that the educational backwardness of that 
community was the result not only of its general poverty, -but also 
reflected the Muslims' preference for religious instruction. It urged 
those provinces where Muslim educational progress was impeded by 
religious difficulties not to leave religious teaching solely to private 
institutions, as the latter generally had achieved very little in rais­
ing educational standards. Rather, the Committee advised that Provincial 
Governments should secure sounder education for Muslims by catering for 
their demand for combined religious and secular education. Thus the 
Hartog Committee advocated a more thorough integration than that pro­
posed by the Government of India in 1921, or as employed in the Punjab 
from 1915 onwards. Only one member of the Committee, Raja Narendra Nath,
objected to the proposal, complaining that it would yield to the senti-
154
mental conservatism of the Muslims. ^ The Raja, however, had long been 
an opponent of any preferential treatment being given to Muslims in the 
field of education, and his stance reflected his continued communal pre­
occupation.
The Punjab Government did not adopt the Committee's advice, prefer­
ring to continue the policy introduced in 1915* Its policy in educational
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matters continued to be dictated by the fact, that throughout the 
1920-^6 period, education officials persistently viewed Muslim backward­
ness in economic terms, acknowledging the religious aspect mainly as
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being of only minor importance. ^ Thus although in 1937 the official 
Punjabi attitude towards religious education relaxed slightly, this was 
confined only to one district in the Multan Division. In 1937 the 
District Board, encouraged by the Multan Inspector of Schools, sanctiorai 
Rs.1,000 as payment to mullahs to give religious instruction in govern- 
ment schools after school hours. ^ The innovation proved an unqualified 
success, in so much as the district alone was responsible for approxi­
mately two-thirds of the total increase of pupils which occurred through-
157
out the entire Division in 1938-39*
This was proof indeed of the beneficial effect which could be pro­
duced by catering for Muslim religious sensibilities, and also of the 
constraining effect which the absence of religious instruction continued 
to exercise in the field of education. It is apparent from Education 
Reports compiled during the last ten years of British rule that this 
policy was never expanded to include the entire Province, and Muslim 
politicians and educationalists in the 19^0 's continued to stress the 
need for religious instruction in schools. In an address to the All- 
India Muslim Educational Conference held at Agra in December 19^51 
Liaquat Ali Khan (secretary, All-India Muslim League) claimed that any
educational scheme which ignored religious teaching would fail to appeal 
158to Muslims. Four years before this, Sheikh Muhammad Ashraf, in pre­
senting a case for the need for religious instruction, had quoted Iqbal 
as saying that Muslim education must be grounded on the ’’rock of 
religious and moral principles...» Though Ashraf himself was of the
opinion that both the Quran and Hadith should be interpreted in the light
159of modern knowledge. Similarly F.K. Durrani who, as a member of 
A.I.M.L.'s Education Committee, was clearly a spokesman for the League, 
appealed for religious teaching in conjunction with modern education. 
Though he cautioned that most religious instruction was a relic of the 
Muslim imperial age, "and not until it emancipates itself from that 
tradition will it be able to make any contribution to the revival of 
Islam.” He desired that all Muslim pupils should be instructed in the 
basic tenets of their faith and religious duties, but without permitting 
any interference in scientific studies, claiming that there was no such
thing as an Islamic viewpoint on the study of chemistry, physics, and
• 160 the other sciences.
The ideas expressed by both Ashraf and Durrani were free from
bigotry, both regarded the roh.e of religion as complementing rather than
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opposing the acquisition of secular knowledge. Yet their treatises 
(Al-Minhaz - The Evolution of Curriculum in the Muslim Educational 
Institutions of India and A Flan of Muslim Educational Reform), both of 
which were published in Lahore, failed to influence Government thinking 
on the matter. The majority Muslim Government in the Punjab, following 
the Unionist victory in 1937% failed to accommodate more fully Muslim 
sensibilities on the religious instruction issue, or expand the success­
ful Multan experiment. Several reasons for these failures are apparent. 
The Unionist Party was a multi-communal coalition. Its continued 
existence depended on the pursuit of policies that the minority communi­
ties within it, who held the balance of power in the legislature, would 
not object to. The Government could not risk a repeat of the 1923 
episode when Fazl-i-Husain had faced a censure motion, because it was 
believed he was favouring Muslims at the expense of the other communities 
Secondly, and more significantly, the education question never developed 
into a major issue of contention in the Legislative Assembly. Because 
questions in the Assembly on the communal composition of the services, 
and the inferior position of Muslims, proved a grave embarrassment to the 
Unionist Government, Sikander Hyat Khan, the Premier, introduced a con­
vention in 1938 whereby no Minister would answer any question likely to
16lresult in communal misunderstanding or embitter communal feelings.
This resulted in the practical exclusion of communally orientated 
debates, a development which narrowed considerably the scope for the 
introduction of 'educational' and other disputes involving communal 
comparisons. Lastly, as has been stated previously, in spite of the 
Hartog Committee's recommendations, Muslim participation continued to be 
viewed by education officials in general in the light of economic, rather 
than religious, considerations. Thus no pressure was placed upon the 
Government, from Muslim M.L.A.s or officials to accept a change of 
emphasis, and introduce religious instruction in Government schools as 
part of the curriculum.
The cumulative effect of the Government's failure in this respect,
and the persistent poverty of the community, was that Muslims remained
the most educationally backward section of Punjabi society. In no
sphere of education was this more apparent than at the university level,
as is demonstrated in Appendix F. Of the students who graduated in
1938, 19391 19^1» 19^3 and 1 9 ^ 1 Muslims accounted for only 2?%, 26%,
1 6238%, 2*+% and 38% respectively. The comparatively high percentages 
recorded in 19^1 and 19^ ,  however, are misleading, as in both years the 
records were incomplete, and this tended to exaggerate the Muslim 
position. (If one compares the graduate percentages for the years under
92
review, with those for Muslims attending degree courses in Appendix F
it is clear that performance and enrolment percentages correspond
approximately for all the years other than 1941 and 1944.) In respect
of the degrees taken, Muslims, on account of their cultural heritage,
were more attracted to the Arts, particularly Arabic and Persian, than
the Science disciplines. The Punjab Gazette for 1941 recorded that out
of 2,499 successful B.A. candidates, 725 (29%) were Muslim. In the same
year, of the 193 B.Sc. candidates who graduated in April and 44 who
graduated in November, only 26 (13%) and three (6.8%) respectively, were 
165
Muslims. Similarly in 1944, of 2,751 B.A. and 366 B.Sc. graduates,
164Muslims accounted for only 678 (25%), and 50 (14%) in each class.
Furthermore Muslims were backward in other scientific disciplines. In
1939 Muslims received only 42 (28%) of the 151 Medical, and eight (20%)
165of the 39 Agricultural Science degrees awarded in that year. The
figures for 1941 revealed a similar low performance. Of the 117 Medical
166degrees, only 37 (32%) went to Muslim recipients, whilst in 1945 the 
Muslim share decreased further: Muslim students received 23% (45 out of
193) of the Medical, and 36% (38 out of 104) of the Agricultural Science 
degree. . 167
The Punjab University provided the most advanced form of education 
available in the Province, and potentially, the highest reward in employ­
ment terms. The failure of the Muslims to enjoy the former, or compete 
for the latter in greater numbers, reflected their backward position 
regarding post-secondary education in general. As all pupils, regardless 
of community, advanced from one stage of learning to the next, their 
numbers obviously diminished as a result of the selective process. With 
regard to Muslim pupils and aspiring scholars, however, their .numerically 
inferior position at the secondary stage was depleted even further at 
the high school and particularly at college and university levels. 
Financial factors certainly influenced this process, particularly since 
the expense of education became more demanding at each successive stage 
of learning. But there is little doubt that lack of incentive also 
played a crucial part in limiting Muslim participation in the higher 
spheres of education. Advanced levels of instruction were largely the 
reserve of the economic /lite, thus the lack of Muslim students cannot 
be explained purely in financial terms, as there existed in the Punjab - 
as in Bengal - a wealthy land-owning Muslim class capable of financing 
their offsprings* careers to the highest level. In general, however, 
this class remained indifferent to higher education. They were not 
subject to the same economic pressure which caused those of a profession­
al background to seek education as a means of guaranteeing future
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economic stability, having placed their reliance on the possession of
land. Also they did not exhibit the desire to acquire knowledge for its
168own sake to the same degree as the members of other communities.
Nevertheless, it is remarkable, considering the social and 
economic disadvantages which Muslims were subjected to, that they 
participated to the extent to which they did. The indigenous system of 
learning which the community had developed and controlled prior to annex­
ation, and which had catered specifically for their socio-religious 
needs, had been attacked, undermined and largely replaced. Furthermore 
it had been succeeded by a code of education which many sections of 
Muslim society found offensive, and which the vast majority could not 
afford. In addition its supersession had been perpetrated by rulers who, 
to begin with, not only displayed open contempt for Islamic learning, 
but who were unsympathetic towards the community's needs and diffi­
culties. Muslim participation, limited though it was, had been prompted 
by various considerations. There was the economic pressure on the land, 
which caused some to seek alternative avenues of employment through 
education. In addition social pressures existed, resulting from the 
endeavours of Muslim societies concerned with the propagation of western 
education in drawing attention to the disadvantages the community experi­
enced, as compared to other communal groups, by abstaining from govern­
ment education. In the final analysis, however, the fact that Muslims 
participated at all owed as much to their realisation of the necessity 
of western education for the advancement both of the individual and the 
community as a whole, and the willingness of many Muslims to set aside 
religious and social objections to achieve those ends, as to the earnest 
endeavours of some British officials to remove and reduce some of the 
economic barriers which had previously prevented a very considerable 
number of the community from achieving their educational ambitions.
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CHAPTER III
THE STRUGGLE FOR MUSLIM EMPLOYMENT IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE
The general educational backwardness of the Muslim community was 
reflected in the low level of appointments held by Muslims in the Pro­
vincial Public Services, which included the Provincial Civil Service 
(P.C.S.),and an the Indian Civil Service (l.C.S.). It was a serious fail­
ing considering that government officials, as the administrators of 
British India, enjoyed more than a little power, influence and prestige, 
as well as significant financial rewards. Thus Muslim leaders, drawn 
mainly from the educated elite, determined to reduce the disadvantages 
their co-religionists experienced in securing posts for them in govern­
ment service. They strove to persuade the Provincial and National Gov­
ernments to adopt recruitment procedures whereby appointments would re­
flect the population status of the Muslim community as a whole (56% in 
the Punjab, 25% in British India) rather than the academic ability of the 
contesting candidates. In short they sought to increase the Muslim share 
of government appointments through nomination and reservation, rather 
than by the existing system of competition and selection, both of which 
reflected academic achievement. Their efforts began to achieve concrete 
results from the mid 1920’s onwards. To begin with, however, the Punjab 
and Central Governments had adopted a cautious approach in attempting to 
accommodate Muslim demands, though gradually they conceded the validity 
of the Muslim argument. In the late 1930’s and the 19^0’s, however, the 
situation in the Punjab was complicated by the necessity of the Muslim- 
dominated Unionist Government to maintain a multi-communal coalition in 
order to retain its majority in the Legislature. It was forced to re­
frain from overt communal acts, and although the Ministry did facilitate 
an improvement in the level of Muslim participation in the Provincial 
Services, it was not proportionate to their population status. Even so 
by the 1930's and 19^0's the overall Muslim position in the Provincial 
Services and the l.C.S. had improved, largely as a result of the petition­
ing by the Muslim elite, and the responses of the Provincial and National 
Governments. In analysing the factors which controlled, and the 
measures which promoted Muslim employment, the enquiry cannot be limited 
solely to the 1936-^ +7 period, especially as recruitment to the Provincial 
Services and the l.C.S. from all the communities, had been subject to 
practices and rules established prior to that period.
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As early as l86? Sayid Ahmed Khan (1817-98, educational reformer, 
founder of Aligarh Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College) had urged his co­
religionists to equip themselves educationally to secure service under 
the British. Whilst in 1882 the National Muhammadan Association of Cal­
cutta, in view of the paucity of Muslims enjoying government employment, 
had petitioned the Viceroy, Ripon, to introduce measures to increase 
Muslim representation. The views of the provincial Administrations were 
sought in respect of this request. The Punjab Government responded by 
dismissing the plea, claiming that the Muslims, who numbered 12^ million 
as compared to 8^ million for Hindus and Sikhs in the Province, "have 
their full share of high uncovenanted appointments...."^ In support of 
this claim the Provincial Government produced the following figures:
Appointments Muhammadans Hindus
Extra Assistant Commissioners 3b 58
Tahsildars 50 72
Munsiffs 28 b6
Superintendents of Settlement 9 15
Total Administrative and Judicial Appointments 1^1 171
Executive and Assistant Engineers, Public Works Dept. 2 18
Assistant Surgeons 15 52
Professors and Headmasters, Education Dept. b 22
Forest Rangers 8 9
Grand Total 168 272
In effect the Local Government’s assertion rested solely on the fact 
that Muslims accounted for 3b of the 92 Extra Assistant Commissioners.
In every other branch of the services, however, Muslims had failed to 
achieve a percentage of posts to equal those held by Hindus, or propor­
tionate to their population status. The Punjab Government was careful 
to absolve itself of responsibility. It placed the onus squarely on the 
educational backwardness of the community, commenting that in branches 
requiring special and technical knowledge (e.g. public works, medical 
and educational) Muslims lacked the necessary qualifications, and there­
fore they accounted for only an "insignificant minority" amongst govern­
ment employees. Furthermore the Local Government insisted that the 
Muslim position of inferiority did not result from any anti-Muslim bias 
on its part. In order to substantiate its analysis, it pointed out that 
even in those professions which were independent of government control, 
Muslims because of their educational failings were in the minority: out
of 15*+ pleaders registered in the Province only 27 were Muslims, the
b
remainder being Hindus.
It was a convincing argument. Yet the view had persisted in Muslim 
circles that the community's initial low share of government appoint­
ments resulted not from an inferior educational standard, but because it
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had been penalised for the role it played in the 'Mutiny* of 1857.^ 'A 
Punjabee' claimed that Muslim numbers in the services started to de­
crease after 18571 though he qualified this statement by observing that 
"a few far-seeing British officers realised that the administration was 
passing rapidly into Hindu hands", as a result of which the Provincial
Government attempted to increase the Muslim intake, compatible with
£
educational requirements. At least one British official, writing in
1882, testified to the existence of British resentment towards the
Muslims: Leitner cited the Education Department in the Punjab as
exhibiting anti-Muslim "prejudice" in respect of appointments, but he
7
insisted that the reaction represented only a temporary phase.
Thus though prejudice had undoubtedly played a part in limiting 
Muslim participation in government service, its effect had been short­
lived. By the l880's the crucial factor which persisted in aggravating 
the Muslim predicament was the fact that the majority of the Muslim 
'elite had failed to acquire western learning, particularly a knowledge 
of English. This was affirmed by Holroyd (Director of Education 1869-9X)
in 1883:
"This [paucity]] is due neither to favouritism of any kind, 
nor to want of intellectual power or of physical energy 
on the part of the Muhammadans...but simply to the fact 
that so few Muhammadans are available who have received 
an English University Education."
Holroyd's explanation appears justified in that although Muslims were in 
a minority in all but one branch of the Provincial Services, they had 
been admitted to those senior uncovenanted posts for which stringent 
educational qualifications were not required. Until the late l870's the 
appointment of Extra Assistant Commissioners had occurred solely on the 
recommendations of High Court Judges and Financial Commissioners.
Persons so appointed were required to pass examinations only after nomi­
nation. Also in respect of this rank, and that of Tahsildar and Munsiff,
a knowledge of English was not required, though candidates for the last
9
two posts had to pass the prescribed examinations.
Despite the barrier which the education factor posed to increased 
Muslim involvement the Central Government, in considering the represen­
tations of the National Muhammadan Association, refused to exempt 
Muslims from the examination process. In respect of appointments which 
occurred through patronage, however, it suggested that Muslims should 
enjoy preferential treatment in those provinces where they held only a
small number of appointments, in order that they could gradually achieve
10their full share of state employment. In the communally charged 
atmosphere of the Punjab, however, such a suggestion was fraught with
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problems. Communalism was endemic in the l880's and by 1900 it had
11become the dominant feature in the Province. Even so the Lt.Governor, 
Lyall (l887“92)i was sympathetic to the Muslim case and he desired to 
improve it. When therefore the Anjuman-i-Islamia in 1887 raised the 
matter of the under-employment of Muslims in government offices, Lyall 
conceded that appointments should reflect the respective proportions of 
Muslims and Hindus amongst the middle and upper classes (landowners, 
merchants, shopkeepers), from which recruitment mainly occurred. But he 
refused to introduce rules for proportional representation in the 
services. Sensible of the communal repercussions his actions could en­
gender, he secretly requested all Departmental Heads, Commissioners and 
Deputy Commissioners to "assign a due proportion of appointments to 
Muhammadan candidates" so far as was compatible with the best interests 
of the service and the availability of qualified men. Also in 1888 the 
Punjab National Muhammadan Association was encouraged to prepare and
circulate a list of qualified men amongst Departmental Heads, whilst the
12Rafiq-i-Hind undertook to publish vacancy notices free of charge.
Lyall*s initiative, however, and the actions of the Muhammadan Associ­
ation and the Rafiq-i-Hind, achieved no dramatic results.
During the following ten years the situation remained unchanged.
It was this stagnation coupled with continuing Muslim discontent which 
prompted Thor|rU> 0  (Financial Commissioner) in 1899 to advocate Govern­
ment action to secure a higher proportion of Muslim officers. Though he 
recognised that educational backwardness had militated against Muslim 
prospects, he suggested a formula whereby Muslims would be required to 
possess adequate qualifications to gain admission to the services, but 
would be free from open competition with candidates from other commun­
ities. This was to be achieved by reserving a percentage of ministerial
13and gazetted appointments for members of the community. The Provincial
Government acted on Thorktu»rt.'s advice. In 1900 it was decided that
four (36%) out of every eleven appointments to the Judicial Branch
14
would be conferred on Muslims, and the following year the Local
Government decreed that in all the districts except Kangra and Simla
"should less than 30 per cent, of the ministerial appointments be filled
by Muhammadans or more than 70 per cent, by any one class." These
directives, however, to prevent any sectarian repercussions remained 
15confidential.
Even so by the turn of the century the reservation principle had 
been established in the Province. During the following 25 years it was 
extended, though largely as a means to protect rural or agricultural 
interests, especially those of the zamindar community, against
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competition from urban Hindus. The Provincial Government, in common
with the Government of India, regarded the rural classes, especially in
the large zamindars as their principle source of political support. In
order to strengthen this relationship the Punjab Government promoted a
blatant paternalistic policy to promote zamindar rights; one of its
objects being to drive a wedge between the rural masses on the one hand
16and the urban £lite and the Congress Party on the other. In short,
provincial policy was intended, in the words of W.R. Wilson (D.C.Jhelum),
1?to create a "Junker" class for the protection of British interests.
This principle was also applied to the public services, in that the 
Government intervened following the First World War to regulate recruit­
ment to the advantage of the zamindar community, by limiting the need 
for them to compete against the more highly educated urban Hindu 'elite. 
The war provided the Local Government with the opportunity to initiate 
such a policy, in that in appointing a committee in 1918 to consider 
zamindar representation in the services it stressed that "The response 
of the rural classes throughout the province to the call for recruits 
during the war gave emphasis to their claims for greater representation 
in the civil services...."1^
Both the committee and the Provincial Government agreed that the 
zamindar's share of appointments should be increased. In justifying 
this decision O'Dwyer, the Lt. Governor, again cited the military contri­
bution of the class, but he sought to strengthen even further their
A
claim for greater employment by emphasising the important role it played 
in the affairs of the Province. He pointed out that 90% of the Punjab*s 
population was rural, 5^% of whom were zamindars, who contributed 66% of 
the total provincial and imperial revenue from the Province. In recog­
nition of their importance, therefore, the Government ruled that in
future in certain branches of the services appointment percentages would
19be reserved for zamindars:
Provincial Civil Service (Executive and Judicial Branches) 50%
Tahsildars and Naib-Tahsildars 66%
Munsif fs 66%
Excise Dept. 50%
Agricultural Dept. - no percentage fixed, though preference 
to be given to zamindars 
Veterinary Dept. 66%
Co-operative Dept. 80%
Forest Dept. 66%
Jail Dept. - no percentage fixed 
Medical Dept. - no percentage fixed, same as for 
Agricultural Dept.
Sanitary Dept. 60%
Public Works Dept. (Building and Roads) - no percentage,
zamindars to be encouraged to avail themselves of technical 
training
10?
Public Works Dept. (Technical Posts) - as for Buildings 
and Roads Branch
Revenue Branch 66%
Clerical Establishments in all Departments - no percentage; 
where proportion of zamindars was unduly low, preference 
was to be given to zamindar candidates who possessed the 
necessary qualifications 
Police - at least half of the direct appointments
No time limit, however, was fixed for their attainment. Such a
provision would have been impracticable as the reforms were subject to
the condition that a sufficient number of adequately qualified
20candidates were forthcoming. Thus although an attempt had been made 
to ensure improved zamindar employment, educational qualifications 
remained an important prerequisite for its achievement. Also the 
Provincial Government had been careful to avoid any communal compli­
cations by treating all zamindars as a backward class irrespective of
religion. Nevertheless it was acknowledged in Government circles that
21the action would especially benefit Muslim agriculturists.
The Provincial Government’s preoccupation with providing oppor­
tunities for Muslims in particular was further revealed in 1925- In 
that year instructions were issued to the effect that whilst it was not 
possible to stipulate rigid proportions, attempts were to be made to 
create a departmental structure in the Irrigation Branch of the Public 
Works Department, to allow for 40% Muslim participation, 20% Sikh and 
40% Hindu and 'others'. Similar guidelines were also laid down in 
respect of recruitment to the Executive Branch of the Punjab Civil
Service, where nominations were to be made in accordance with communal 
22strength. In continuation of this policy, in 1932 40% of the student
places in the Central Training College for government teachers were
reserved for Muslims, applicants from that community being required to
possess only the minimum educational qualifications. In the same year
Muslims were also guaranteed 50% of all future appointments in the
23subordinate service of the Irrigation Branch (F.W.D.).
For all practical purposes, therefore, the Provincial Government 
had provided for reserved recruitment for Muslims, at least in certain 
departments. Its actions in promoting Muslim prospects, though not the 
method employed, were in keeping with the recommendations of the Public 
Service Commission of 1911» which had advised against permitting any one 
class to dominate the services, and the decision of the Central Govern­
ment in 1923 to encourage a more representative participation through
24nomination, to achieve a balance between Hindus and non-Hindus. The 
surreptitious manner in which the Punjab Government had attempted to 
improve the Muslim position, coupled with the fact that the Government
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of India had refrained from reserving definite percentages for Muslims, 
failed to satisfy Muslim leaders in the Punjab Legislature.
In July Feroz Khan Noon had requested the Local Government to submit
25detailed information on the composition of the Provincial Services.  ^On 
29 June 1926 the Government complied with the request (the statistics were
26not reproduced in the published proceedings of the debate). The circu­
lation of the information demonstrated the respective strength and weak­
ness of the non-Muslims and Muslims. The resulting debates which this 
evoked emphasised the existing conflict of communal interests. Whilst 
non-Muslims advocated the retention of the full competitive system,Muslim 
members demanded nomination and reservation programmes. Sardar Ujjal 
Singh on 19 July 1927 introduced a resolution into the Legislative Coun­
cil advocating that all departmental posts should be filled by open com­
petition, or failing that by the most highly qualified candidates irres-
2?pective of caste or creed. This demand was strongly supported by the 
urban Hindu members; the Muslim element opposed it, Sayid Muhammad 
Husain insisting that only a fairer sharing of the "loaves and fishes of
28appointments" would ease communal tension. These sentiments were echo­
ed by Faiz Muhammad when on 22 July he proposed in resolution form, in 
retaliation to TJjjal Singh’s measure, that the Council should recommend
the Government to increase the number of Muslim officers in the Provin-
29cial Services to at least 55$ of the total cadre in each branch.
These developments were an acute embarrassment to the Local Govern­
ment. They threatened to undermine its declared urban-rural philosophy 
in respect of appointments, by forcing it either to rely solely on 
academic merit, or to adopt a blatantly communal approach to recruitment 
at a time when it was already in the process of attempting to achieve a 
communal balance in the services through reservation, though without 
declaring it to be official policy. Consequently the Government refused 
to be drawn in the matter, and it acted to de-fuse the situation in the
Legislature by persuading Ujjal Singh and Faiz Muhammad to withdraw their 
30resolutions. Furthermore it declined to acknowledge that definite 
percentages had been, or would be adopted in respect of Muslim appoint­
ments. Instead in order to satisfy Muslim leaders that the Government 
was conscious of the plight of their co-religionists, whilst not unduly 
alarming Hindus and Sikhs, the Governor, de Montmorency (1928-1933)» 
defined official policy in the least inflammatory manner. He declared 
that recruitment would be conducted to avoid preponderance by any one
class, whilst ensuring that competition would continue to be employed
31whenever the best interests of the services demanded it. Despite the 
fact that Muslims continued to represent a minority in the Provincial
109
Services the Local Government refused to deviate publicly from de 
Montmorency's policy statement, or admit to, or expand the limited meas­
ures of reservation which had been introduced. It decided, largely for 
politico-communal considerations, to abstain from further action until 
the leaders of the various communities themselves arrived at an accept­
able solution concerning the vexed question of service percentages. It 
made this position clear in response to an enquiry by the Central Govern­
ment in February 193*+» The Punjab Government opposed the introduction of 
rigid percentage rules, arguing that though "Muslims are inadequately 
represented...process of readjustment must be gradual...". It emphasised 
that any attempt to "force the pace" would have the "most unfortunate
results": "To introduce a drastic change in advance of consent of all
32communities could, not fail to rouse strong communal feeling."
Academic qualifications remained the crucial requisite for aspir­
ants seeking entry into the Provincial Services, though competitive 
examinations were the exception rather than the rule. A B.A. degree con­
stituted the minimum requirement necessary to permit appointments to the
Provincial Civil Service and to the posts of Deputy Superintendent of 
33Police, a condition which also applied to Tahsildar appointments from 
1929 onwards. Appointees to the post of Forest Ranger, Naib-Tahsildar
and Sub-Inspector of Police were required to have passed the Inter-
35mediate Examination in Arts and Sciences, whilst even the lowly clerk
had out of necessity to be literate and pass qualifying tests.
36Recruitment to the Provincial Services occurred mainly as the
result of direct nomination or by promotion from the subordinate 
37services. Only in the case of the Provincial Civil Service was open 
competition employed and that too only in the case of 25$ of the appoint­
ments. Of the remainder, 37$ were made through nominations from amongst 
Tahsildars,12^$ resulted from nominations from the subordinate Minis­
terial service, and the remainder were nominated by the Governor. In 
the case of specialist posts (e.g. Engineering Branch of P.W.D., and 
Posts and Telegraph Dept.) officers were usually appointed on a selec­
tion basis, though with regard to the subordinate services, which 
accounted for the majority of Government servants ranging from Tahsildars
TC Q
to clerks, competitive tests were rarely used. The nomination process
had been widely applied only after 1923» its aim being to facilitate a
39more equitable distribution of appointments. Recommendations for such 
appointments were submitted to the Governor by a Selection Board, which 
received proposals from Divisional Commissioners and Senior Departmental 
Heads. In making its recommendations the Board took into consideration 
the educational qualifications and personal suitability of the candidates
110
as well as the record of service and loyalty of the candidates' 
families.^
Even nomination, however, had failed to give a fair representation 
to Muslims, particularly with regard to senior appointments. Muslim 
educational backwardness was largely responsible for their continued low 
numbers. Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana(Punjab delegate,elected to Council of 
State 1920), speaking in the Council of State in March 1925» had alluded 
to this handicap and its causes. He pointed out that Muslims, the 
majority of whom were poor agriculturists occupying rural tracts, were 
not in a position to finance the education necessary for their sons to
41achieve qualifications of the standard required for government service.
It was a luxury which only a small minority could afford (see Chapter IlX 
Tiwana's assertions were borne out by the fact that in the period 1923 
to 1928 Muslims accounted for only 94 out of the 355 pupils (26.5$) 
attending the Maclagan Engineering College at Mughalpura. During the 
same period only 183 (27.2%) of the 671 pupils studying at the Govern- 
ment School of Engineering at Rasul were Muslims. With regard to 
successful candidates who had passed the civil engineering course at the 
Thomson Civil Engineering College at Roorkee in the year 1925 to 1934, 
only 11 (7*3%) out of a total of 150 were Muslims. Similarly of the 4^8 
and 102 successful pupils in the overseer and draughtsman classes at the
Government Institute at Rasul during the same period, Muslims had
k-z
numbered 1*0 (31$) and 17 (16.7$) respectively. These low levels of
participation and performance were reflected in the composition of
departments requiring technical qualifications, e.g. only 10% of the
gazetted officers and 34.1% of non-gazetted officers serving in the
44Irrigation Research Institute in 1938 were Muslims.
Muslim educational weakness was similarly apparent in a non­
technical branch of the Provincial Service. In the subordinate judiciary 
four out of every 11 appointments had been reserved for Muslims. If the 
community failed to secure this proportion at the preliminary selection, 
non-Muslim candidates who had achieved higher marks were passed over to 
ensure the requisite number of Muslim appointments. An examination of 
the results of the qualifying examinations for Sub-Judge candidates held 
in 1930* 1931 and 1932 provides a clear indication of the competitive 
and academic failings of Muslim candidates, as well as the low perform­
ance which the Government was obliged to accept in order to maintain the 
reserved level of Muslim representation. This is apparent from the fact 
that in 1930 the selected Muslim candidates had stood 7th, 11th, 62nd,
and 69th in order of merit, whilst in 1931 and 1932 they had stood 13th,
Lf.
l4th, l6th, and 33rd, and 11th, 24th, 25th, and 28th respectively.
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In the light of this evidence 'Punjabee' in commenting on Muslim 
employment in the Provincial Services, was wrong to dismiss the edu­
cation factor as being no longer applicable. In 1936 he wrote
"It is one of the fictions which have been proved 
to be fictions but are so perseveringly persisted 
in... Even among Hindus and Sikhs it is not merit 
that is the passport to Government offices, but 
favouritism and nepotism of the men round about the 
posts which fall vacant."^7
'Punjabee', however, was merely echoing a widespread belief. In February 
1934 a special supplement to the Lahore based Weekly Mail had been 
printed in the form of an open letter to the Governor. It complained 
that there was widespread nepotism in the services, though it concen­
trated its exposure on the Hydro-Electric Branch of the P.W.D. It 
charged the Minister in charge of the Department, Gokul Chand Narang, of 
being a communalist, and of using his influence to promote the interests 
of non-Muslims and of undermining the Muslim position. In support of 
these allegations the article revealed that of the 48 gazetted officers
in the Department, and 140 non-gazetted (technical) officers, Muslims
48numbered only nine and 43 respectively.
These accusations, though in the specific case of Gokul Chand they
remained unproved, should not be totally dismissed, despite the fact
that they ignored Muslim educational failings. The appointment system
in the Punjab was open to abuse. The majority of appointments were made
by Departmental Heads, who were only required to consult Ministers in
49the case of important subordinate posts. Though they were charged to
50
ensure that no one class or community predominated in their departments,
the Government did not prohibit the employment of relatives, which in
51itself encouraged suspicions of unfair practice. In the circumstances 
corrupt practices did occur as was admitted by Maynard (Finance Minister) 
in March 1923* He revealed that some candidates had been unfairly "over­
looked because someone wished to put in a friend of his own or a member
52
of his own community."
In the 1930's, however, the evidence suggests that nepotism was not
widespread, as in the years 1930 to 1934, only one appointment resulting
53from communal partiality was detected. Furthermore, at least m
theory, the Government of India Act (1935) bad limited the scope for
such corruption. It focused attention on the rights of the minority
communities, especially regarding Government employment: Provincial
Governors were invested with special responsibilities to protect
minority interests and "to secure a due proportion of appointments to
54the several communities".
Thus whilst corrupt advancement did occur in the pre-1935 period,
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it was not of the intensity to affect dramatically the Muslim position. 
The comparatively low number of Muslims in the Provincial Services 
resulted, in the final analysis, because of their educational backward­
ness and lack of appropriate educational qualifications, rather than 
from a concerted intrigue perpetrated by influential Hindu and Sikh 
officials. This is borne out by the fact that the Muslim share of 
appointments was highest in those areas of subordinate employment (see 
below), where the potential for unfair preferment, particularly by Heads 
of Departments, was greatest.
The extent to which Muslims had failed by the mid-1930's to secure
an adequate percentage of Government appointments, comparable with their
population status (Muslim, Hindu and Sikh communities accounted for
approximately 56$, 23$ and 13$ of the population of the Punjab in
551931), was demonstrated by a Government survey on the composition of 
the services conducted in 1933 (see Appendices G and H). Out of 
37,006 Government posts - ranging from District Officers to clerks - 
which were held by Indians, Muslims had secured only 17,737 (48$) of the 
total (Hindus and Sikhs held 40$ and 10$ of the appointments respec­
tively, whilst members of other minorities had secured the remaining 2%). 
In addition the vast majority of Muslim appointments occurred in the 
subordinate and clerical branches of the services, as is evident from an 
analysis of fifteen branches of the Punjab service, accounting for 52$ 
of the entire personnel employed in the Provincial Administration (see 
Appendix I). Here, Muslims held 53$ of the subordinate and 46$ of 
the clerical appointments, but only 34$ of the superior positions. Thus 
Muslims only approached parity with the other communities in respect of 
positions not demanding high academic achievement, and where the element 
of nomination was strongest.
The relative paucity of Muslim officers in the services continued
to be a point of contention in the pre-election (1937) period, and this
was reinforced by the persisting belief among Muslims that the community
continued to suffer as a result of communal bigotry on the part of non-
Muslim officers. Such feelings gave birth to the Muslim Rights
Protection Board in 1934, which included amongst its patrons Malik Barkst
Ali (Advocate, Board's President) and Iqbal (Philosopher, President
A.I.M.L. 1930). The body was organised to advance Muslim interests
generally, and in particular to secure the rights of Muslins in the
56public services by bringing pressure to bear on the Government? The 
efforts of the organisation, however, were frustrated by the attitude of 
the Local Government and the political temper of the time. Even Fazl-i- 
Husain, the most influential Muslim leader in the Punjab, a man who had
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previously achieved reservations for Muslims in the sphere of education
(see pp. 84-85 ) could not afford to publicly support similar measures
in respect of the services. Husain appreciated that the Muslim dominated
Unionist Party, which he had founded (1923), would be unable to achieve
a majority in the post-election Legislature unless it formed a multi-
communal coalition (see p. 144). As such in 1935 he refused to
accommodate Feroz Khan Noon's suggestion that a Muslim Zamindari Party
be created to promote Muslim interests, and in particular "To secure [[a |
57proper share of the Public Services for the Mussalmans."
Husain's determination not to allow the service question to develop
into a serious electoral issue, or to subscribe to any radical reform
programme which would alienate non-Muslim Unionist supporters or
possible allies, is apparent from the treatment it was afforded in
Punjab Politics. This pamphlet was a pro-Unionist propaganda publi-  -----------
cation, written with the knowledge and support of Fazl-i-Husain, which
59he hoped would pave the way for inter-communal political co-operation.
As such although the pamphlet referred in detail to the paucity of 
Muslims in the services, it did not advocate a radical solution to the 
problem. Instead it preached moderation, placing the onus for any future 
settlement on inter-communal agreement: "It is for the sister communi­
ties to decide whether they will let the Muslims have their legitimate 
share in the "shamilat" of the province or whether they will try to do 
them out of it and thus cause friction and trouble." A possible basis 
for agreement was proffered whereby Muslims and non-Muslims would 
receive a 4l$:49% appointment allotment, but there was no suggestion 
that it should be achieved through legislation. Rather it was stressed 
that non-Muslim acceptance of the formula would prevent more extreme 
Muslim demands occurring in the future.^
In spite of its conciliatory approach the sentiments expressed in 
the pamphlet were indicative of a desire to improve the Muslim lot in 
the services, and it recognised, though it did not openly approve or
61promote the Muslim desire "to obtain their rights on population basis". 
With the Unionist victory in the 1937 elections, it was inevitable that 
some of its Muslim supporters would not be satisfied by the prosecution 
of a socio-economic programme which did not relate specifically to 
Muslim needs. The community remained a minority in the services, and a 
number of Muslim M.L.A.s, notably Mian Abdul Rab (Jullundur South, 
Muhammadan Rural), determined to make an issue of the matter. This 
posed a particularly thorny problem for Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, the 
Unionist Premier. The exclusion of questions leading to communal con­
troversy remained essential for the continuance of the multi-communal
11*+
62coalition, yet 2*t out of the 28 questions relating to service percent­
ages, which were raised by Muslim M.L.A.s in the period from 22 March
631938 to 20 April 1939> came from the Government benches.
In an attempt to prevent communally orientated debates damaging the 
Party, the Premier, Sikander Hyat Khan, announced in March 1938 that all 
questions likely to cause communal misunderstanding, including those ^  
pertaining to service percentages, would not be answered in the Assembly, 
though later he conceded that statements pertaining to communal topics 
would be allowed to unstarred questions. It was a shrewd tactic, for 
answers given to that class of question seldom caught the attention of 
the press. Also the right of posing supplementary questions did not 
exist, and as a result no opportunity existed for further examination of
C. n
the Government's response. Thus the possibility for resultant acri­
monious communal exchanges was prevented.
The Premier's action, born out of political necessity, belied a 
desire on his part to improve the Muslim position in the services. In 
1933) in an attempt to achieve an inter-communal consensus on recruit­
ment, Sikander had attempted, in concert with Hindu and Sikh leaders, to 
arrive at a solution beneficial to his co-religionists. He had suggested 
that whilst 20% of all service appointments ought to remain subject to 
competition, the remainder should be distributed on a population ratio 
basis. This did not appeal to the non-Muslim negotiators. Sir Jogendra 
Singh (Sikh leader, Minister of Agriculture) countered with a proposal 
that 50% of all appointments should be reserved for Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs 
arri'others' receiving 28%, 17% and 5% respectively. Though this compromise
favoured non-Muslims, who would receive proportions in excess of their
66population strength, Sikander was inclined to accept it. At the time
those tentative discussions achieved no positive result, but they
clearly contributed to moulding future Unionist policy.
To begin with, communal considerations caused Sikander's Ministry
to adopt a cautious approach to the reservation question. Initially the
Ministry based its policy on the British precedent, to prevent any one
class monopolising the services, whilst securing an equitable share of
67appointments for agriculturists. The amount of Muslim dissatisfaction,
especially from within the Unionist Party, forced Sikander to abandon
this formula and introduce tenable reforms which would satisfy his
Muslim supporters, whilst not causing a breach with his non-Muslim
allies. On 11 April 1938 the Ministry undertook to correct 'inequitable'
68representation through future recruitment. In order to achieve this, 
the Premier directed in March 1939 that Muslims were to be guaranteed 
50% of all appointments, whilst Sikhs would receive 20% and Hindus and
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69’others', the remaining 3Q$* In order to ensure that the new recruit­
ment rules were enforced, all departments were required to supply the
Government with six-monthly statements recording communal employment
+ • 70ratios.
To achieve the adoption of the reservation principle regarding 
Muslim recruitment, the Premier, out of necessity, had to make con­
cessions to the Sikh and Hindu communities. Thus they were guaranteed 
levels of recruitment in excess of their population percentages. In 
essence it was the price that had been solicited for co-operation in 
1933* and this demand did not diminish once Sikh and Hindu elements had
realised the position of virtually holding the balance of power in the 
71
Unionist Ministry. The introduction of a 50$ reservation for Muslims
72was a compromise. Whilst it left some Muslim elements dissatisfied,
and caused resentment among a number of non-Muslims, who regarded it as
73an infringement of their vested interests, ^ it did nothing to disrupt 
the communal complexion of the Unionist Ministry.
The measures adopted by the Unionist Government to encourage Muslim 
recruitment, though restricted by political considerations, did achieve 
a small measure of success in the period up to 19^6. It is apparent, 
however, that increased Muslim employment was more marked amongst 
officers of mainly ’Provincial’ rank (see note 36 ) serving in the
7if
Civil Department at the District and Divisional levels than amongst
the personnel of 'Provincial' and 'Subordinate' rank (see note 37)
employed in the departments generally. Between 1936 and 19^6 the number
of Indian personnel in the Civil Establishment (Provincial Rank) in the
Divisions increased from 77^ to 1,057* In every Division Muslims
benefitted from this expansion, their share of such appointments rising
from 29$ (38) to 31$ (50) in the Ambala Division, 33$ (^7) to 38$ (78)
in the Jullunder Division, 35$ (70) to A-5$ (122) in the Lahore Division,
^5% (63) to 55$ (113) in the Rawalpindi Division, and kl% (66) to 51$
(109) in the Multan Division. With regard to Muslims serving as Tah-
sildars (subordinate appointments) the percentage fell slightljfrom 57$
(6?) to 5^ -$ (60), whilst that for Naib-Tahsildars remained constant at 52$
75(85 in 1936 and 8lin 19I+6). This over-all increase in the percentages of
Muslim officers resulted from the Ministry's policy of attempting to
ensure that the ratio of officers, particularly in the offices of
Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners and Revenue establishment, should
76reflect the communal composition of the local populations. As such it
represented an important public relations exercise specifically intended
to satisfy those Muslim critics who complained of the paucity of Muslim
77officers in Muslim majority areas.
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In respect of the services as a whole the increase of Muslim 
officers of all grades (Provincial and Subordinate) was much smaller. 
This is evident from a survey conducted to include 20 of the 35 Depart­
mental and Office Lists recorded in the Punjab Civil Lists for 1936 and 
19^6. In 1936 the combined cadre for the sections examined accounted 
for 2,089 'Provincial and Subordinate' positions held by Indians. Of 
these 778 (37$) were held by Muslims, 927 (M+$) by Hindus, 369 (18$) by 
Sikhs and 15 (0.7$) by members of the minority communities, mainly 
Indian Christians. By 19^6 the Indian element in these branches of the 
service had expanded to include 3 2^7? officers, of whom 1 ,351 (*+1%) were 
Muslims, 1,268 (39$) were Hindus and 6^ +5 (20$) were Sikhs; once again 
Indian Christians accounted for most of the remainder (13)* Thus the 
overall Muslim improvement in these areas of service was a mere (see 
Appendix J).
As a result of government measures the actual number of Muslim 
employees had increased in all but three of the branches, whilst in 
terms of the proportion of appointments held Muslims enjoyed an increase 
in 15 of them. This process had clearly been aided by the growth in 
manpower which had occurred in the majority of the departments and 
sections. Such expansion had been most dramatic in the Public Works 
Department and in the Canal Supervision and Maintenance Section. Even 
so in one branch which had enjoyed a significant increase in personnel 
Muslim representation had seriously declined. Although the number of 
Indian Secretaries, Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries to the 
Government had multiplied from seven to 52, Muslim appointments had 
risen from three to only 15 (see Appendix J). Educational factors 
no doubt were to an extent responsible for this, for as the posts were 
under ministerial control it is unlikely that unfair practices had 
occurred, considering that the Premier and the Ministers of Public Works 
(Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana) and Education (Abdul Haye) were Muslims, and 
were in a position to check any communal excesses on the part of their 
three non-Muslim cabinet colleagues. In the case of H.Q. Office Super­
intendents, the area of employment where Muslim representation had 
suffered the most serious decline (see Appendix J ) the cause is not so 
apparent. Such appointments usually occurred as the result of promotion 
on the basis of seniority from the ranks of the head clerks - positions 
traditionally dominated by non-Muslims. Of approximately 222 Assistant
Superintendents and head clerks serving in the transferred departments
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in 1933 only 65 (29$) were Muslims. This could help to explain the 
Muslim paucity amongst Office Superintendents in 19^ +6, but not the fact 
that ten years earlier Muslims had held almost half of these posts (see
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Appendix j). Two possible explanations for the Muslim decrease are
that either qualified candidates were genuinely not available, or a
degree of preferment in fevour of Hindus in particular had occurred in
spite of Government policy.
Despite this setback the Muslim position in the services had
improved, but not dramatically. This gradual progression resulted from
a number of factors. To begin with it was not possible for the Unionist
Ministry to achieve a spectacular result in nine short years without its
employing radical measures, which were precluded by political necessity.
Thus the Ministry’s decision that the percentage reservations should
79apply only to fresh recruitment dictated that the increase of Muslim 
officers in government service would be a slow and gradual process. In 
effect it could only occur in relation to the growth in service 
personnel, and as a result of vacancies caused through retirement. Also 
Muslims remained educationally handicapped, and this at times clearly 
negated the advantages which had been proffered by the reservation 
process.
The community's comparative educational backwardness was apparent
from the low number of Muslims, as compared to Hindus, who applied for
the posts of Statistical Officer, Physical Chemist and Physicist which
were advertised by the Irrigation Research Institute in 1937 and 1938.
Of the 106 applicants for the first post, only six were Muslims, five of
whom held Masters' degrees. By comparison, there were 94 Hindus, all
graduates, and 69 possessed Masters' degrees. Of the 22 applicants who
competed for the appointment of Physical Chemist, 19 were Hindu
graduates, including three Doctors of Philosophy, two Doctors of
Science, seven Masters of Science, and one Master of Arts. Only one
Muslim, an M.Sc., applied. In respect of the third post, of the 25
applicants, 23 were Hindus, l8 of whom held Masters' degrees, and one a
Doctorate. There were only two Muslim applicants, holding the degree of
80
Master of Science and Doctor of Science respectively. The paucity of
Muslim candidates was further demonstrated by the number who appeared at
the Joint Public Service Commission examinations from 1937 onwards. In
1937-38 and 1938-39 Muslims accounted for only 32$ and 39$ of those who
qualified. Whilst with regard to the Ministerial Services (Junior
Clerks) examinations conducted in 1939-40 and 1940-41, though Muslims
represented 49$ and 42$ respectively of the candidates, they accounted
81for only 40$ and 38$ of those who qualified. Even in Departments 
where posts were specifically reserved, there were not enough qualified 
Muslims to fill various vacancies. For example, in the period 1937-41 
and 1945-46 the Commission was unable to recommend any Muslim candidates
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for the following reserved posts - Lecturer in Surveying and Drawing at 
the Punjab Engineering School, Rasul; Assistant Dental Surgeon, de 
Montmorency College, Lahore; Superintendent of Industries, Assistant 
Conservator of Forests, Lecturer in Civil Engineering, Rasul; Executive 
Engineer, P.W.D., Bridges and Roads Branch; Deputy Warden of Fisheries;
Executive Engineer, P.W.D., Public Health Branch; Shift Engineer, P.W.D.,
82Electricity Branch.
The increased involvement of Muslims in the Provincial Services in
the Punjab had only assumed real significance in the 1920's and 1930's.
The same period witnessed a Muslim campaign at the national level to
secure for the community a guaranteed percentage of appointments to the
Indian Civil Service. It involved two influential Punjabi Muslim
leaders, Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana and Fazl-i-Husain. Although both
promoted the All-India interests of their community, their efforts
could not fail but to enhance the prospects of Punjabi Muslims, who by
1924 had secured 25$ of the appointments held by their co-religionists
in the l.C.S. Only one province, the U.P., had contributed more Muslim
0-2
officers to the service - six as compared to the Punjab's five. The 
Indian Civil Service was the most important of all the services, and as 
late as 1924 its personnel was overwhelmingly European. Of the 1,363
84members of the service only 189 were Indians, 25 of whom were Muslims. 
Muslim leaders in the Indian Legislative Assembly and the Council of 
State were concerned that the Muslim proportion of appointments should 
reflect more fully their population status in the country as a whole.
The logic behind this desire was expressed succinctly by Maulvi Abdul 
Karim (Muhammadan Rural Division, Dacca) in the Indian Assembly in 
March 1923: "a community in a country derives its importance, its
influence and its powers on various grounds, on population, on wealth,
on education, and I may add, on the share it has in the administration
85of the country."
Two significant developments stimulated Muslim interest in the 
question of l.C.S. recruitment - the Montagu-Che1msford Reforms, as 
embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919* and the acceptance by 
the Central Government of the Lee Commission Report of March 1924. The 
former had accepted the terms of the 'Lucknow Pact* which recognised the
right of Muslims to enjoy a consistent proportional representation in
86 87the Provincial Assemblies, but the Lee Commission, which had begun
its enquiries in 1923t though it advocated expanding the Indian element
in the l.C.S, to a position of parity with the European officers, did
88not recommend a fixed proportion of appointments for Muslims.
In fact leaders of the Indian minorities, in an effort to influence
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the Lee Commission had launched their campaign to secure appointment 
reservations in the l.C.S. before the Commission published its findings. 
In January 1923 Sir H. Gidney (Anglo-Indian leader) had introduced a 
resolution in the Indian Assembly calling on the Government of India to 
modify the competitive system to allow for a greater intake of candi­
dates from the minority communities into the l.C.S., to be achieved
through nomination. Of the 19 Muslims who took part in the division, 18
89voted for Gidney*s motion, which despite this support was defeated.
This reversal did not end the matter. Two months later K. Muppil Nayar
(V/.Coast and Nilgris, Non-Muhammadan Rural) re-opened the question by
recommending that the Central Government should adjust the recruitment
procedure so as to discriminate in favour of candidates from those
communities and classes which were poorly represented in the l.C.S.,
subject to the proviso that such persons should be adequately qualified
90to discharge their duties. This resulted in a heated and divisive 
debate demonstrating the passion with which the Hindu majority, whose 
co-religionists dominated the Indian membership of the l.C.S., and the 
minority members defended the respective positions of their communities. 
Hailey, the Home Member, alarmed by the acrimonious exchanges, inter­
vened in an attempt to pacify both sides. He made it clear that whilst 
the Government of India had no intention of acting on Muppil Nayar*s 
proposal, it would endeavour to "prevent the preponderance in the Indian
Civil Service of the representatives of any one community or any 
91Province."
This assurance failed to satisfy the Muslim leaders, who believed
that the rights of their community could only be protected through a
strict reservation policy. Consequently in February 1924 K. Ahmed
(Rajshahi Division,Muhammadan Rural) introduced a resolution into the
Indian Assembly to the effect that in the Muslim majority and minority
provinces, Muslims should be guaranteed a representation of 52$ and 25$
respectively both in the provincial legislatures and the government
services. He suggested that the l.C.S. percentage could be achieved by
92following the precedent of the Bengal Pact, whereby Muslims satisfying
a basic academic test would continue to be appointed in preference to
93non-Muslims until the 25% appointment ratio had been achieved.
Ahmed failea, however, to gain unanimous Muslim support. Maulvi
Muhammad Yakub (Rohilkund and Kumaon Divisions, Muhammadan Rural)
denounced the resolution because it adhered too closely to the Bengal
94agreement, which many Hindus and Muslims had refused to accept.
Although this objection was valid, Yakub's main concern in opposing 
Ahmed was to protect Muslim political interests in the U.P., his home
120
province. He feared that if adopted, Ahmed's proposal would undermine 
the terms of the Lucknow pact which, as ratified by the Act of 1919, had 
guaranteed a Muslim representation of in the Provincial Legislaturi? 
Motilal Nehru (U.P.Cities, Non-Muhammadan Urban) took advantage of this 
division of Muslim opinion to ensure that the motion was abandoned, by 
proposing that the question should be settled by a 'Hound Table'
96conference as had previously been agreed by the Assembly members.
Muslim leaders in the Indian Legislative Assembly and the Council
of State, notably Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, were not prepared to leave
the matter to such arbitration, especially as the Lee Commission had
failed to support the reservation principle. On 10 June 1924 Tiwana
97organised a meeting of Muslim representatives from both Houses; it was
unanimously agreed to request the Government of India to reserve a fixed
percentage of appointments for Muslims by conducting examinations "in
such a manner as to ensure adequate representation of the Muslims in the 
98Services." This demand was voiced in a petition to Sir Alexander
Muddiman, the President of the Council of State, outlining Muslim
grievances; it demonstrated that in some areas of government service
there were no Muslim officers, whilst in others they did not account for
of the total, and that of the 2,000 officers employed by the Indian
99Railways, less than 50 were Muslims. This submission was accompanied
by a series of notes compiled by Maulvi Abdul Karim (Bengal) detailing
the paucity of Muslims in the l.C.S. and the other services. He
succinctly portrayed their appalling position in the table reproduced on
p.120, observing "The figures speak for themselves and comment would we
 ^00
sicj superfluous."
Karim emphasised that if the Lee Commission's recommendations
resulted in the further domination of Indian appointments in the l.C.S. by
Hindu officers, it would cause great resentment amongst Muslims. He
argued that that outcome could be avoided as there was no shortage of
101suitable Muslim graduates for government service. But he contradicted
this assertion by attacking the very criterion - university education -
on which I.C.Si recruitment was based, by stating that it should not be
102considered the sole requisite for employment. In fact Karim's incon­
sistency revealed the essential weakness of Muslim candidates, which was 
their inability through competition to secure a percentage of appoint­
ments compatible with their population strength. Most important of all, 
however, Karim warned the Government of India that if it failed to
rectify the existing disparity in the l.C.S. it would risk jeopardising
103the traditional Muslim loyalty it enjoyed.
Tiwana's petition supported by Muslim leaders from the Upper and
120a
co
0
S?
-P
d
0OuOft
(M LA OO t~ 
o j 4-’  lA
ON ON O
• • *
CM t~ -4
(M LA CM OO
• • • •
t -  r *  oO r -
O
CM
H
0
-P
CM A- VO t- t—CA IA VO t- LA
(Ar»
r~
CM (A -4 IA
IA  lA  4 -  
O  IA  CM
(A A- CM fA  
A- OO O  VO 
IA  rA rA
O
CA ftO
03
a
IQ
3
S
LA (A  A- -4" -4 CM
4  4  fA  IT\
CM
VO LA LA 
CM CM
LAt—
CM
CDo»
tO
>
-4  
CM 
CA i—I
0
O -4 LA VO r* t -  -4 A- CO A-
CM CM LA r -  -4 LA -4 IA VOfA r - fA t—
-4 * -4
fA  VO VO
-4
l_o
LA
IS OH CQ 
0  bp d  0 d 0 ft < -H O T3 § 'O A 3  d  H  
W 0
A~ -4" -4  -4  VC O  VO CM O  -4  fA  -4
CM C M V O A * Q  fA  O  CO A- r -  -4  A-
VO t -  LA CM IA  A- r -  (A t -  t -
-4t-
LA
LA
d
0
nT3
*23S
d
0)TJ
0o
•H
u0
CO
10
0o
>
d0
CO
O
•rl
«H
•H
"d
0
•rl
O
•p rH
d r-t i—1 0
•P 0 •H 3 0 •H
0 o O O O
0 •H -P •H i—1 •H *H
d H d d *H T3 TDo O 0 & 0 3ft ft o < E *~3
0
O
•H
>
d
0
CO
i—I 
*H 
>  
•H 
O
d
0
•H
d
i—i
0
-po
a
CO
o
-p
&
3
<
oto
121
Lower Chambers, combined with harim's implied threat had a decisive
impact on the Central Government. It accepted the Muslim claim that the
competitive system contained inherent flaws: "The basic fact is that
unrestricted competition will undoubtedly result in the preponderance of
104certain communities" to the exclusion of Muslims. In order to check
this trend and satisfy Muslim demands, Haig (Officer on Special Duty with
the Home Dept.) suggested that a more equitable communal balance could
be achieved in the I.C.S. if the recruitment rules were modified to
allow for one third of future appointments to be reserved from the corn-
105petitive process, for distribution amongst the minority candidates.
The Viceroy, Reading, acted on Haig’s suggestion, and on 27 August 192*t 
he recommended to the Secretary of State (Birkenhead) that new recruit­
ment rules should be formulated to satisfy legitimate communal claims.
In support of this assertion he pointed out that of the +^5 successful 
Indian candidates who had sat the I.C.S. examinations in London and 
Allahabad between 1922 and 192^, not one had been a Muslim. Whilst in 
the same period only three of the eight candidates (three Muslims, two
Hindus, two Burmese, one Anglo-Indian) who had been nominated for the
106service were Muslims. In order, therefore, to prevent "absolute
Hindu predominance..." Reading recommended that one third of all future
vacancies should be exempt from direct competition to allow for an
107increased intake of entrants from the minority communities. The 
Viceroy, to ensure acceptance of the formula, emphasised that it would 
not result in a deterioration of the service, as only nominees possess-
108ing high academic qualifications would be admitted. In spite of some
initial qualms that the proposal would upstage the Lee Commission's
109 110recommendations, the Secretary of State authorised its adoption.
The introduction of the new system, however, left some Muslim
leaders dissatisfied. In March 1930 Muhammad Yakub complained that
Muslim interests had been prejudiced by the fact that they were required
111
to share the 33^ appointment reservation with other smaller communities.
The time was propitious for a sympathetic hearing, for the Government of
India was eager to reward the Muslim community for having remained aloof
112from Gandhi’s civil disobedience movement. It therefore authorised a 
survey of I.C.S. personnel recruited since 1925» to be completed by 
1932. The findings, which embraced all of the All-India Services (see 
Appendix K ), proved the validity of Yakub's claim, the Government of 
India admitting that Muslims had failed to receive a fair share of 
appointments. It noted that although the community comprised approxi­
mately 25% of the population of British India, and was thus entitled to 
a major share of the 33^  reservation, they had received annually
122
between 18% and 20% of the appointments, and at times even less.11^ Of
the 193 Indians, exclusive of Burmese, who had been selected for the
I.C.S. by examination and nomination in the period only 39 had been
Muslims, as compared to ten Indian Christians, six Sikhs, three Parsis
11^and one Anglo-Indian. The result, as the Government of India pointed
115
out, was that the smaller communities had gained at the Muslims' expense.
In order to rectify this anomaly the Government of India, in March
1933» advised the Secretary of State that out of the 335% reservation
25% should be specifically reserved for Muslims, the remaining 83% to be
distributed between the non-Muslim minority contenders. If, in any one
year, no other minority candidates were forthcoming, the Central Govern-
116ment proposed that the Muslims should receive the full 335% quota.
These conditions were to apply only to initial recruitment; promotion
117was to continue to be decided solely on the basis of merit.
In an attempt to gain further concessions Sir Umar Hayat Khan
Tiwana, who was serving on the Services and General Committee which had
118been appointed to consider the Government of India's proposals, and
Fazl-i-Husain, who at the time was a member of the Viceroy's Executive
Council, appealed to the Central Government to be even more generous.
Tiwana argued that on population grounds Muslims were entitled to a
29-3% reservation quota, Indian Christians and Anglo-Indians 2.35%»
Sikhs 1.67% and Parsis 0.1% respectively. He conceded, however, that
Anglo-Indians should be exempt from such a procedure to satisfy defence 
119needs, but once the Anglo-Indian element had been appointed he
insisted that the remainder of the 335% quota should be distributed
amongst the other candidates from the minority communities strictly on a 
120population basis. Fazl-i-Husain was also of the opinion that the
concessions postulated for the non-Muslim minorities were far greater
than their population status warranted. He regarded the proposed 23%
reservation quota as being totally inadequate to permit Muslims to
121recover lost ground, and he urged the Central Government to guarantee
his community 35% of all fresh appointments until such time that Muslims
122occupied 25% of the administrative posts. Similarly the Muslim 
League criticised the Government of India's proposed programme; it 
advocated that the percentage reservation should reflect Muslim repre­
sentation in the Indian Legislature (335%)*^^
These complaints and recommendations failed to influence the Central 
Government. Tiwana's plea for proportional representation had been 
rejected by the Service and General Committee on the grounds that its
enforcement would have resulted in the practical exclusion of all
12*+minority candidates, other than Muslims and Anglo-Indians. The
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Government of India, therefore, refused to consider permitting the 
Muslim quota (except when no other minority entrants were forthcoming) 
to exceed 25%.
Though the Indian Government’s reform programme disappointed some
Muslim leaders because it had not gone far enough, it was greeted with
reservation at the India Office where it was believed in some circles
that too much privilege had been conceded. Smith, the Secretary of the
Services and General Department, viewed the package purely as a device
126to placate Muslim sentiment, and he feared that it would disrupt the
50:50 European-Indian I.C.S. recruitment ratio which had resulted from
the Lee Commission recommendations. As such he believed that it was
more important to abide rigidly to that ratio than "to concede one more
127place to the Muslims". Furthermore he questioned the wisdom of grant­
ing Muslims a further 8J% share of appointments in the event of there 
being no candidates from the other minorities, as he judged that the 
practice would lead to considerable resentment among non-Muslims.
Despite these misgivings, however, Smith offered his tacit agreement to 
the planned reforms on the condition that the Muslim quota should never 
exceed 25%, and should not be permitted to interfere with the balance of
128European-Indian recruitment. Similarly, Stewart, the Permanent Under­
secretary, disliked the changes. He believed that communal represen­
tation was essentially wrong, but he accepted that such a provision was 
necessary to correct the existing communal imbalance in the I.C.S. . 
Nevertheless he considered that it should not be made a permanent  ^
recruitment feature because of the disability it inflicted on the Hindus.
In spite of the obvious disquiet which existed amongst his senior
130colleagues the Secretary of State approved the scheme, because it was
feared that if the issue was not settled before the inauguration of the 
131new constitution, the subject of Muslim recruitment to the I.C.S.
could result in serious political repercussions to the detriment of the
132planned constitutional advance.
The recruitment procedure introduced in 1925 and amended in 1933
though it favoured the smaller minorities, in that they had been
guaranteed a proportion of reserved appointments in excess of their
population status, nevertheless led to a significant increase amongst
Muslim personnel in the I.C.S., largely as a consequence of the
nomination process (see Appendix L). Both competition and nomination
133
were employed to recruit Muslims, From 1925 onwards the Public
Service Commission was obliged to recommend all nominees from amongst
13^the candidates who had taken the examination in India. In practical 
terms this meant that if the number of Muslim candidates selected by
12*+
competition, was not sufficient to satisfy the Muslim reservation quota, 
then other Muslim candidates whose performance at the Delhi I.C.S. exam­
inations had not entitled them to direct entry, but whose academic 
standard was high, were nominated to the Service to complete the 25% 
quota reserved for their community. Two I.C.S. entrance examinations 
were held, one in London, the other in India. To begin with the Indian 
examinations were conducted at Allahabad, but from 1928 onwards they 
took place in Delhi. Recruitment in India was subsequent to that in 
London. At the London examination candidates were appointed in strict 
order of merit, and the number of appointments to be made on the results 
of the Delhi examination was decided by deducting the number of Indians
recruited in London from the number of Europeans recruited there, in
135order to maintain the 50*50 balance between Europeans and Indians.
At Delhi, however, selection did not always occur solely on the basis of 
merit, because in order to comply with the reservation rules for minor­
ities it was often necessary to pass over Hindu candidates with higher 
marks, in order to nominate less successful minority candidates. For
example, in 1930 five of the Muslims nominated to the I.C.S. had stood
13610th, 11th, l*fth, l6th and 20th respectively at the Delhi examination.
The result of this procedure was that the Indian examination 
provided a far more attractive option for Muslims than those held in 
London. The recruitment quotas, guaranteed to Muslims and other minority 
candidates, meant in effect that they did not have to compete with Hindu 
aspirants, as they were required only to achieve a standard of perfor­
mance sufficient to enable nomination to take place. Also Hindus,
because of the high level of success they attained through competition,
137were effectively barred from the nomination process. These consider­
ations were largely responsible for the large number of Muslim candi­
dates who sought appointments at the examinations in India. 1,063 
Muslims competed at Allahabad and Delhi in the years 192*f-*+0, represent­
ing 29*9% of the total candidate body. Of these Muslim candidates, *+3*+ 
were from the Punjab, accounting for 50% of all the Punjabi candidates 
(Muslim and non-Muslim), and *+1% of the total number of Muslim candidates 
from all the provinces and states (see Appendix L). This high level
of Punjabi Muslim participation also seems to have been encouraged by 
the fact that with the change of examination centre from Allahabad to 
Delhi in 1928, the examination became more accessible to them, as is 
suggested by the significant increase that occurred after this date 
amongst Punjabi Muslims taking the Indian examinations (see Appendix L).
On the basis of a survey encompassing the 192*+-*+0 period, it is
possible to draw three basic conclusions. In the first place, Punjabi
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Muslims did not perform as well in the competitive examinations as non- 
Muslims from their own province. Secondly, despite this failing,
Muslims from the Punjab exhibited superior academic qualities in com­
parison to Muslims from other parts of India. Finally, Punjabi Muslims 
were major beneficiaries through nomination. Between 192*+ and 19*+0,
13 Punjabi Muslims gained competitive appointments as compared to 27 non- 
Muslims from the Punjab. The majority of the non-Muslim successes (17) 
occurred in London, where only four Muslims were successful (see Appen­
dices L and M). There the competition, on account of the European
element, was far keener than in India. The performance of Punjabi 
Muslims at the Indian examinations, however, was more impressive, in 
that of the 19 candidates from the Province who were recruited as a 
result of competition, nine (*+7%) were Muslims. Even so when one con­
siders that 50% (*+3*+) of the total number of candidates from the Punjab 
who sat the Indian examination in the 192*t-*+0 period were Muslims and 
they gained *+7% of the competitive appointments secured by the Province, 
as compared to *+2% (eight) taken by Hindus, who represented only 
(298) of the candidate body from the Punjab (see Appendix M ) it is 
clear that the latter possessed a decided advantage in terms of academic 
ability. Nevertheless of the 36 Indian Muslim candidates who gained 
entry to the I.C.S. through competition 13(33%) were from the Punjab, as 
were 21 (*+3%) of the *+9 Muslims who were nominated for the Service (see 
Appendices L and M). Both these last two results reflected the
academic superiority of Punjabi Muslims as compared to Muslims from 
other parts of India.
Although competitive success at the examinations resulted from the 
highest academic achievement, nomination also depended on a high 
standard of ability on the nominee’s part. The Civil Service Commission 
traditionally recommended only those candidates who had achieved a high
mark at the 'viva voce' combined with a satisfactory performance in the
139written tests. x In practice this meant that when Muslim candidates 
were nominated, their nomination occurred as a result of their exam­
ination results, i.e. those Muslim candidates who had achieved the 
highest marks at Delhi in relation to other Muslim competitors were 
nominated. Solely in terms of Muslim academic standards the prowess of 
Punjabi Muslims was reflected in the examiners* report compiled in 19*+2.
It was a feature of the Indian examinations that the level of perform-
1*f0ance of the majority of candidates, from all communities, was poor.
Consequently in 19*+2 it was decided to conduct a preliminary selection
to eliminate the most unsuitable candidates in an attempt to raise the 
1*+1
general standard. The I.C.S. Selection Committee reported that with
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the single exeption of the Punjab "where the general standard of the
candidates was very good not only academically but also as regards
sports and UlT.C. record..." the quality of candidates on the whole was
disappointing. The majority of the candidates from every other province,
142according to the Commission, were unsuitable for the Service. This
report did not differentiate between the different communities in the
Punjab, which testifies to the fact that it embraced the potential of
Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Furthermore the advantage enjoyed by
Punjabi Muslim candidates was clear in that in the other Muslim majority
provinces - Sind, N.W.F.P. and Bengal - the number of applicants,
regardless of their suitability, had been so small that the Committee
143decided not to eliminate any of them.
Thus the high level of nominated appointments gained by Punjabi 
Muslims did not occur because the Punjab, as the premier Muslim province 
in British India, had been guaranteed the lion's share of the Muslim 
reservation. Such considerations did not influence the nomination 
process. In fact the Public Service Commission was not required to 
consider provincial factors when selecting nominees. Thus when Sir 
Horace Williamson (Indian Police— retired , appointed Adviser to Secret­
ary of State 1937)i out of consideration of the tremendous contribution 
the Punjab had made to the war effort, attempted to persuade the Govern­
ment of India to allow an extra nomination to be made in 194l to allow
for the appointment of a Punjabi Muslim, as none had been recruited in
145
that year, his action failed to elicit any official sympathy or support.
Whilst such a plea delivered on the Province's behalf did not result 
in a reciprocal gesture by the Central Government, it is apparent that 
neither the Government of India, nor the Provincial Government, were 
prepared to ignore the entreaties of powerful Indian families anxious to 
secure a nominated appointment for one of their members. Consequently 
both Governments were guilty at times of exerting unfair influence to 
procure the recruitment of candidates from the political alite, though 
such occurrences were rare. In the period 1924-40 two such attempts weie 
made on behalf of Muslim candidates from the Punjab, one of which met 
with success.
In December 1932 Sir Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State, drew the 
attention of the Viceroy to the fact that the son of the late Sir Muham­
mad Shafi (Punjab Muslim leader and Loyalist, nominated to the Provincial 
Legislative Council 1909 and 1912; Member of Imperial Legislative 
Council 1911, 191^1 1917; Vice-President Viceroy's Executive Council 
1922-25) had taken the London examination that year. Although he had 
not been within 80 places in the order of merit of the last candidate to
127
have gained a competitive appointment, and was young enough to compete 
the following year, the Secretary of State argued that he had a special 
claim to nomination on account of his father’s distinguished record of
146service. It was a consideration which the candidate's mother and
sister exploited to the full. Amin N. Shafi solicited the assistance of
147Hoare on her son's behalf, whilst Begum Shah Nawaz attempted
unsuccessfully to enrol the support of the Under-Secretary of State,
148R.A. Butler, to advance her brother's case. The Viceroy, for his 
part, agreed with Hoare that Shafi's son had "a somewhat special claim 
to nomination to the I.C.S...11-. He refused, however, to commit himself 
further, commenting that the Civil Service Commission, whose recommen­
dation the Government usually followed, would no doubt take into account
149the career of Shafi's father. The Commission, however, did not 
recommend Shafi Junior for nomination. Shafi's poor performance in 
London precluded such consideration, especially as it had been agreed in 
1925 that nominees were to be selected only from amongst those Delhi 
candidates who had exhibited a high level of ability. Also it had 
already been decided that only one nomination, and three competitive 
appointments, were to be made following the results of the 1933 Delhi
examination. Anis Ahmad Rushdie, who had stood fourth in order of merit
at Delhi clearly had the strongest claim to be nominated. The Govern­
ment of India, however, was clearly embarrassed by the situation, and in 
order to avoid giving offence to the Shafi family by nominating Rushdie 
in preference to Shafi, it decided not to make any nominations that year.
Instead it persuaded the India Office to increase the number of Delhi
150competitive places from three to four, thereby accommodating Anis 
Ahmad through direct recruitment. The India Office agreed to the 
stratagem, Anderson, the Principal of the Political Department (1.0.) 
caustically observing that the only advantage the manoeuvre possessed 
was that when Lady Shafi enquired why her son had not been chosen, the
Government of India could reply "Because there were'no nominations this
year."
The episode demonstrated the degree of influence which the political 
elite were capable of exerting, when, as in this case, they were able to 
petition the Secretary of State, the highest British Indian authority, 
and provoke a response which was not unsympathetic. Furthermore Hoare's 
reaction was reprehensible in view of the nomination rules. These 
stated that any attempt on the part of a candidate to enlist support for 
his application through persons of influence would lead to immediate dis­
qualification. Also recommendations on behalf of candidates were to be 
considered as invalid if presented by persons not associated with the
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152candidate's academic performance at school or university.
In the case of Ata Muhammad Khan Leghari, however, both the Central 
and the Provincial Governments connived to achieve his appointment in a 
most unscrupulous manner. The Provincial Government took advantage of 
the fact that the ill-health of one of the successful candidates, Ali 
Ashgar, necessitated a further Muslim nomination to be made in 1936.
The Punjab Government prevailed upon the Government of India to 
recommend Leghari, who had appeared at the London examination, a factor 
which usually precluded candidates from nomination. The Provincial 
Government reasoned that as the son of a leading Tumandar of Dera Ghazi 
Khan who had been recently knighted, and who represented Tuipandars in 
the Legislative Council, Leghari was by birth and social position suited
153
for nomination to the I.C.S. By acceding to the Punjab Government's
request the Government of India passed over another Punjabi Muslim,
Cheema, who had achieved the same marks in the 'viva voce1 as Leghari
but was 40 places higher in order of merit, and who had been recommended
154for nomination by the Civil Service Commission. In justifying this 
procedure the Central Government reasoned that Cheema, in spite of the 
fact that he had obtained higher marks than Leghari "seems to be a
155Punjabi Muhammadan of an ordinary type with merely Indian education."
Considering that 'a mere Indian education' had enabled Cheema to 
surpass by a considerable margin the efforts of Leghari, 'blessed* as he 
was with the educational advantages provided by Aitchison College,
156Lahore, and Christ Church, Oxford, it is obvious that the Central
Government had complied with the Punjab's request purely out of political
considerations. The Leghari family was one of the largest landholding
families in the Province. Sir Jemal Khan Leghari, a known supporter of 
157the Government, possessed 150,000 acres, and a jagir which yielded an 
income of Ps.50,500 annually. As Sir Jemal had considerable political
158influence in Dera Ghazi Khan, the Provincial Government clearly 
desired to associate the Leghari family with the Provincial adminis­
tration. Initially, however, despite the concurrence of the Central
Government, the endeavours of the Punjab Government on Leghari's behalf
159were frustrated temporarily by the recovery of Ali Ashgar, It was 
not until the following year that Leghari, who had stood l48th at the 
Delhi examination of 19371 an improvement of seven places on his efforts
160in London, was elevated to the ranks of the 'Heaven Born'I
The desire of the Punjab Government to employ the sons of powerful 
individuals was further demonstrated by its treatment of Muhamad Azim 
Husain. As the son of Fazl-i-Husain, the most influential Muslim leader 
in the Province, Azim Husain was regarded as a potential asset. In
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161securing his posting to the Punjab in 1956, however, neither the
Local nor Central Governments had been guilty of corrupt practice, for
Husain, a Muslim nominee, had stood fifth in order of merit at the 
162Delhi examination, thus he owed his appointment to personal effort 
rather than governmental intrigue.
But the vast majority of Punjabi candidates, successful or other­
wise, were not the scions of politically influential men. Though, all
enjoyed the necessary financial resources to enable them to acquire a
163university degree in order to compete at the I.C.S. examinations. A
survey of the socio-economic backgrounds of the Punjabi candidates who
16*fappeared at the Delhi I.C.S. examinations between 1930 and 19*+0 indi­
cates that most of the Muslim candidates, in common with those from the 
other main communities, belonged to four main economic groups - govern­
ment service, professional practice, agriculture, commerce and industry 
(the last two included as one category). The majority of Muslim candi­
dates (57%) in fact came from service families. Of the remainder 1&% 
had an agricultural heritage, and 9% belonged to commercial and 
industrial families (see Appendix N).
In considering the parental background of the candidates, the most 
striking factor to emerge is that more Muslim candidates came from a 
service tradition than was the case for Hindus and Sikhs, despite the 
fact that Muslims were in the minority as compared to non-Muslims in 
this sphere of employment. Allowing for the overall educational back­
wardness of the Muslim community, however, the fact that the majority of 
Muslim candidates were from service families was not such an extra­
ordinary development; in that that section of society, more than any 
other, reflected the height of Muslim academic achievement, limited 
though it was generally. The minority position of Muslim candidate’s 
from the professional classes (medicine, law, accounting, teaching), 
however, reflected in part the fact that in this sphere of employment 
the Muslim community was not well represented (see p. 16 ). Consider­
ing that the ’professions’ were in themselves an expression of a 
literate heritage, it is significant that all the communal groups drew 
relatively small numbers of candidates from this tradition. This in 
part was a reflection of hereditary professional preference on the part 
of youths whose fathers belonged to professional vocations. In addition
to which degree holders in professional and vocational subjects did not
165qualify for admission to the I.C.S, Finally, more Muslims came from 
agricultural, and less from a commercial and industrial tradition than 
was the case for Hindus. This was a trend which resulted to a large 
extent from the respective r^les which the two communities played in
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these spheres of provincial life, in that Muslims were more greatly- 
involved in agriculture than Hindus, whilst the Hindu community domi­
nated the industry and commerce of the Province (see pp. 31-354 44-49). Also 
agriculture, industry and commerce provided an hereditary source of 
income, which explains the comparatively low number of candidates from 
these backgrounds. The new generation from these groups were not as 
vulnerable to outside economic pressures as were their compeers whose 
sole income would be based on their profession rather than inheritance.
In the case of those Punjabi Muslims who were recruited in the 
1924-40 period it is not surprising that seven of the 13 examinees who 
gained competitive appointments emanated from a 'service* tradition, 
considering that contenders from that background dominated the field.
Of the remainder four were from 'business' and two from 'professional' 
families (see Appendices 0 and p). With regard to the 21 Muslim nominees 
from the Punjab, although those from a 'service' heritage were not in 
the majority, they did comprise the largest single group: seven origi­
nated from that class; five were agriculturists; four were from a pro­
fessional tradition; one was from a business family and one came from 
a mixed economic background, encompassing both 'service' and agriculture. 
There was no information available concerning the antecedents of the 
remaining three candidates (see Appendix Q).
Nomination had secured for Punjabi Muslims the majority of I.C.S. 
appointments from the Province in the post-1924 period. The numbers 
involved, however, were very small. The Provincial Services provided a 
far greater occupational outlet, and in that sphere, in spite of reser­
vation, Muslims remained a minority. By the early 1930's the public
166services provided employment for 0.4$ of the population of the Punjab,
which was not insignificant considering that only approximately 3% of
the population (representing the proportion of literate males - 20+) were
167eligible to seek appointments. Even so the Province was producing 
far more graduates than could be absorbed by the administration, and 
serious unemployment existed amongst this c l a s s . T h e  Muslim position 
in this respect could have been improved if the community had been 
granted proportional reservation on the basis of its population percent­
age (i.e. 56$), but that had not been possible because of political 
considerations and the composition of the Unionist Party.
The failure of the Muslims as a community to secure a larger share 
of service appointments because of their under-achievement in education, 
and in spite of a favourable recruitment procedure, contributed in part 
to the eventual failure of the Unionist Party to withstand the political 
challenge of the Muslim League. In essence it demonstrated that the
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Unionist Ministry, although dominated by Muslims, was unable to proceed 
beyond certain politically acceptable limits to promote Muslim advance­
ment. The situation was clearly ripe for exploitation, especially as 
communalism intensified in the pre-1946 election period. The Punjab 
Provincial Muslim League in its election manifesto, published in 1944,
undertook to secure the advancement of backward communities in the
169Provincial Services, which in effect meant improving Muslim prospects.
Such a development was irrevocably linked with the establishment of a 
170Muslim State, for as Hosain Imam (League leader, Bihar) bluntly
stated to the Council of State in April 1944, Muslims could only be
guaranteed their rightful share of service appointments by the division
171
of the country into Hindustan and Pakistan. The belief that the
creation of a Muslim homeland, in addition to safeguarding the integrity 
172of Islam, would provide a panacea for the socio-economic problems of
the Muslim community gained tremendous credence in the Punjab prior to 
173the election. Thus as the electoral contest approached the Unionist 
Government could offer no attractive alternative to the prospects 
promised by the realisation of Pakistan, as Unionist unity and philosophy 
had fallen victim to an expression of militant communalism, as epitomised 
in the demand for an independent Muslim State (see Chapter VI below). 
^Pakistan was yet to become a reality; it was untried and undefined, and 
as such it promised all things to all men. Conversely,the Unionist 
Ministry had administered the Punjab for nine years; its policies and 
limitations were known, and as a result open to criticism. Its limited 
achievement in respect of the composition of the services could offer no 
substitution to the prospects embodied in the creation of a Muslim 
nation, unencumbered by communal considerations.
In the final analysis, whilst it would be incorrect to suggest that 
'Pakistan'was conceived wholly with the purpose of providing 'jobs for the 
boys', it would be naive to ignore the attraction this proposition held 
for large numbers of Muslims, particularly those belonging to the 
educated elite. Unionist policies concerning service recruitment could 
only offer parity with the other communities, to be achieved gradually. 
Alternatively7Pakistan appeared to guarantee the prospect of total 
Muslim dominance of the 'loaves and fishes' of official patronage as 
Muslims were presented with the opportunity to control, and thereby to 
monopolise, the distribution of appointments.
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CHAPTER IV
MUSLIM POLITICS AND THE ELECTION OF 1937 - 
FACTIONALISM AND FEUDALISM
The political life of the Punjab and of the Muslim community had 
been dominated by the Unionist Party since the early 1920's. The 
absence of basic democratic practices, combined with a leadership 
representing the most powerful socio-economic faction in the Province 
guaranteed the party's victory in 1937. As the vehicle of the powerful 
landed feudal 'elite, its success reflected the ability of that social 
group to influence and control the electorate. Manifestoes, the hallmark 
of western electioneering practice, were employed, but they amounted to 
little more than a superfluous nicety, indulged in to create the atmos­
phere of a democratic contest, but in reality offering no real challenge 
to the traditional autocracy of the country areas. To the contesting
candidates in the rural constituencies which dominated the Provincial 
1
Assembly, it was the support of influential landlords, rather than the 
enunciation of party dogma which provided the key to success, and as 
such patrons and not policies largely decided the outcome. The fact 
that the majority of Punjabi Muslims constituted a backward section of 
society in many areas crucial to provincial life - e.g. education, the 
public services, commerce and industry - did not constitute a significant 
issue in the 1937 elections.
The actual electoral contest was influenced by two major pieces of
legislation - the Alienation of Land Act, 1900 and the Government of
India Act, 1933* The former had divided the Province's populace into
land-owning and non-land-owning tribes, creating an economic hegemony
based on land-owning traditions and not religious allegiance; the latter
as applied to the Punjab effectively prevented the dominant Muslim com-
2
munity from forming a workable majority in the Provincial Legislature. 
The creation of a coalition, therefore, was essential to enable any 
Muslim dominated party to form a stable government. Thus whilst the Act 
of 19CH (Alienation of Land) had helped to precipitate the emergence of 
non-religious based economic alliances, that of 1935 (Government of 
India) deemed such alliances to be a necessary prerequisite to enable 
any one political group to govern the Province. This political reality 
reaffirmed the traditional non-communal role of the rural'elite's 
Unionist Party (founded 1923). Because of the absence of any serious
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contender, its championship of rural interests and, most important of
all, its monopoly of landed gentry support, assured the Party's success
at the polls. Jinnah (President, All-India Muslim League), realising
the dominant role the Unionist Party played in the politics of the
Punjab, attempted unsuccessfully to persuade its Muslim membership to
accept League control, a failure which caused him to seek allies from
amongst the two Muslim urban parties (ittihad-i-Millat and Majlis-i-
Ahrar), neither of which were capable of challenging Unionist supremacy
in the rural tracts. The Unionist Party, though unimpeded by a strong
opposition, nevertheless possessed an 'Achilles heel' - factionalism.
Events in the pre-election period, however, prevented the development of
serious schism in the party, thereby denying Jinnah and other anti-
Unionists the opportunity to create a split amongst, or encourage
desertions by Muslim Unionists.
The political supremacy enjoyed by the landed elite resulted from
the economic power they exercised in the constituencies, and the feudal
ties of loyalty which bound the peasantry and tenantry to them. The
Punjab was predominantly a province of small owners and cultivators: by
the late 1930's, of the 3t^ 70,248 persons eligible to pay land revenue,
over half (1,759»260) paid only Rs.5 per annum or less, whilst those who
4could be termed 'large landlords' numbered just 6,277. The continual 
division of holdings, as a result of death and inheritance customs, had 
forced many small cultivators to seek additional land as tenants, therely 
placing them firmly under the control of the large landlords, whose 
dominance was exemplified by the fact that they could claim from between
5
a quarter and a half of the crop produced on the tenanted land as rent.
Professor Narain, in commenting in 1938 on landlord-tenant economic
relations, emphasised the exploitation inherent in the relationship:
"The ... landlord is able to exploit the tenant because 
of the constantly growing pressure of population on the 
soil. Land is scarce relatively to demand, and there 
are no alternative means of earning a livelihood for 
the tenant class. Under such conditions it is not 
surprising that the landlord's share should contain a 
a large element of loot."6
Also the small cultivator and landowner had no means to protect himself 
from existing feudal exploitation. In the western Punjab where the 
majority of the great landed estates, and the overwhelming bulk of the 
Muslim population were situated, the cultivating class was thinly 
scattered throughout the rural tracts and therefore highly vulnerable; 
large settlements were few and far between, thereby denying most 
individuals the opportunity to present a united front to counter land­
lord oppression.^
1^3
Crude economic exploitation alone, however, did not solely account 
for the political supremacy of the agrarian'elite, for it was bolstered 
by strong feelings of feudal loyalty on the part of the smaller culti­
vators for the local gentry, often emanating from their membership of 
the same clan group or biraderi. This was clearly demonstrated in the 
case of a water dispute which occurred in the village of Durrana Langana 
(Multan District) in 1923* Despite the construction of a tail-cluster 
in 1916 the distribution of water from the Kassi canal to owners in 
Durrana Langana and to the Sikhs and Bappis in Kirpalpur led to 
dangerous friction:
"The Dehars in Durrana Langana, and the Sikhs and Bappis 
in Kirpalpur are equally influential, and represent the 
typical "Squires" common in the District. The two sides 
had gathered a large number of followers who were ready to 
lay down even their lives for their masters. There can be 
no complaint of general injustice to the village in the 
distribution of the water of this Branch as all the land 
falling in the Chakbandi belongs to one family."
Thus the 'forces' of the conflicting landowners were not offended parties,
merely loyal devotees prepared to make the supreme sacrifice in the
cause of their feudal superiors (bloodshed was only avoided by the
g
timely intervention of the police).
The iron grip which the landed elite exercised over the political 
life of the Province is evident from a scrutiny of Muslim re presen tat ives 
who sat in the Provincial Legislative Council following the inauguration 
of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (1919)*^ In. the four elections held 
in 1920, 19231 1926 and 1930, only 31 different persons had been elected 
to the Legislative Council, from the 21 Muslim seats situated in the 
Muslim majority districts of the western Punjab. All of them belonged 
to the landed gentry, 13 were listed as Punjabi chiefs and many were 
provincial and divisional durbaris. As Craig Baxter has observed, "The 
names form a listing of the squirearchy of Punjab." Of the successful 
candidates many were returned more than once: Nawab Choudhry Fazl Ali
of Gujrat, Malik Sir Muhammad Firoz Khan Noon of Shahpur, Syed Raza Shah 
Gilani of Multan and Nawab Sir Muhammad Jamal Khan Leghari of Dera Ghazi 
Khan were successful in each of the four elections, seven were returned 
three times, and a further 13 were elected twice. The measure of 
influence which this 'squirearchy' wielded is further exemplified by the 
fact that in the 21 constituencies referred to above, only two of the 
seats (Lyallpur South and Gujranwala) were captured by different can­
didates at each election, though in Gujranwala two of the representatives
10belonged to the same family.
The importance of the landed elite in the politics of the Province
1M+
was fully appreciated by Fazl-i-Husain who by 1918, as a result of his
ability and force of personality, had emerged as the most important
11
Muslim leader in the Province, Husain himself did not belong to the
large landlord class; by profession he was a lawyer, whose father and
forbears had sought government service, both under the Sikhs and the
British, their family having lost its ancestral estate in Gurdaspur with
12the collapse of Mughal power. With the Government of India Act of 
1919i and the granting of limited responsibility to elected Indian repre­
sentatives, the growth of political parties, which previously had not
13existed in the Punjab, became inevitable: "Fazl-i-Husain was the
first to grasp the fact that ultimately political power in the new Council
must rest mainly with rural Muslim members, and he, therefore, iramedi-
14ately set himself to weld them into a united party." In order to
identify himself fully with the interests of the landed 'felite he con-
15tested and won a landholders' seat in the election of 1920.
Also the Muslim community though numerically in a majority in the 
Province had been denied a similar status in the Legislature, as they 
were allowed only ^5*5$ of the total membership, elected and nominated. 
Fazl-i-Husain accepted, therefore, that if the Muslims were to play a 
major role in the reformed Council they could do so only with non- 
Muslim support. It was this realism prompted by a perceptive under­
standing of the political situation in the Province which led him to 
form a broad-based party to attract non-Muslim adherents. The party he 
formed was known as the Rural Party, and by promoting agrarian interests, 
it gained the co-operation of non-Muslim agriculturist Council members, 
whose participation was essential for Fazl-i-Husain's aims to sustain a 
majority in the Legislature. Having gained a pre-eminent position, the 
Rural Party attempted to emphasise its non-communal rural appeal by 
adopting and proclaiming a strong pro-rural, anti-urban philosophy:
"The basic principle was to assist and encourage backward 
areas, backward classes, and backward communities. This 
principle included protection of the peasantry, particu­
larly against the hated Hindu moneylender, and the 
extension of beneficent activities by Government to 
hitherto neglected rural areas...it means the multipli­
cation of rural dispensaries, primary schools, high 
schools, intermediate colleges, co-operative societies 
Qand][] rural veterinary dispensaries,.."^
In 1923 the Rural Party was transformed by Fazl-i-Husain into the 
Punjab National Unionist Party. The use of the word 'Unionist' was 
clearly intended to signify the multi-communal character of the organi­
sation, the importance of which needed special emphasis in the post-1923 
election Council, in that a new party had emerged, opposed to the rural
1^5
grouping. This was the Punjab Swaraj Party, which was a decidedly 
communal (pro-Hindu) consortium reflecting professional and commercial 
interests. The combination of this urban faction, however, with the 
other non-Unionist elements in the Legislature (Khilafists, Hindus and 
Sikhs) was insufficient to challenge the dominance of the Unionist Party, 
which had captured all the Muslim seats with the exception of three 
taken by Khilafists, and had been joined by seven rural Hindus and Sikhs, 
giving it 39 seats out of a total of 71• Throughout the pre-1937 period 
the Unionists maintained control over provincial politics, although at 
the last election held under the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms in 1930 its
combined strength had decreased to 36, of whom only three were non-
Muslims, thereby depriving the Party of much of its non-communal
17character.
With the passage of the 1933 Government of India Act, the Punjab, 
in common with the other provinces of British India, began to prepare 
for the provincial elections scheduled for the opening months of 1937. 
Fazl-i-Husain, who had been absent from the Punjab for five years (April 
1930 - April 1935) serving as a member of the Viceroy's Council, 
returned to the Province to reorganise the Unionist camp in preparation 
for the polling. In view of the fact that the new legislation (1935
Act) had followed the precedent of the Act of 1919 in denying Muslims a
statutory majority, Fazl-i-Husain laid the greatest possible emphasis on 
attracting multi-communal support. At a press conference, which marked 
the public launching of his campaign in January 1936, the Unionist 
leader appealed for communal harmony. In an attempt to further promote 
communal unity Husain convened a meeting of the All-India Muslim Confer­
ence (February 1936) which was addressed by the Aga Khan, whose speech 
clearly identified with Unionist philosophy as conceived by Fazl-i- 
Husain, in that whilst it recognised the backwardness of the Muslims, it 
stressed that they belonged to the larger Indian community, and as such 
should work in unison with non-Muslims to achieve common political 
objectives and to alleviate social ills:
"India is now entering a new phase of political life.
Indian Muslims are ready to take their due share in 
developing political life in the best interests of 
the country. Their political goal is dominion status 
... At home Indians must have economic reorganization 
- there is a wide gulf between different sections of 
Indians - extreme poverty, hunger and nakedness, 
emaciated enfeebled bodies and ignorance is the lot 
of a vast majority of them... The whole economic, 
social and religious fabric calls for immediate 
relief - uplift of the weak - economically, intellect­
ually and culturally - so that there may be no one 
left to be called depressed..."
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The Conference further summarised these sentiments in resolution form,
stressing the desire of the Muslim community to play its part in Indian
life: "the Conference should make a declaration that the Muslims put
India first, being as much their motherland as of other races who 
18
inhabit India."
As far as the landed aristocracy of the Punjab was concerned, the 
Conference's statements contained useful but empty rhetoric. Power was 
what mattered, not the social upliftment of the masses, nevertheless the 
sentiments provided a bridge for inter-communal co-operation, as Fazl-i- 
Husain intended. It is evident that the Unionist leader initially 
directed the message primarily at 'Congress ears', for he remained pre­
occupied with the realisation that Muslims in the Punjab would be unable
19to form a ministry without non-Muslim support, and consequently he was 
anxious to secure a pre-election agreement with the Congress. Negoti­
ations, which were opened with the Congress Party immediately following 
the conclusion of the Muslim Conference, were destined to achieve 
nothing. Despite the heady sentiments expressed at the Conference, 
Fazl-i-Husain had long been regarded as a communalist in Hindu circles, 
particularly in the Punjab, where his actions as Provincial Education 
Minister had been interpreted as an infringement on Hindu rights
(see p.84 above). Consequently the Hindu press in the Punjab denounced 
20him; the Tribune accusing him of desiring to trick non-Muslims into
21acquiescing in the Muslim domination of the Province, whilst the Daily
Herald declared that "Muslim leaders propose to administer the cup of
22poison with sweet mantras of unity...."
Also Fazl-i-Husain's championing of communal co-operation, in spite
of the political necessity which inspired it, was not universally
accepted within Muslim Unionist ranks. In August 1935 Firoz Khan Noon
(Minister of Education, Punjab) had urged that the Party should assume a
positive communal complexion, whilst retaining its agrarian appeal,
believing that only by such means could it capture the imagination and
support of the Muslim masses. In so doing he proposed that a Muslim
23Zamindara Party should be constituted to contest the elections. ^ Fazl-
i-Husain, however, refused to abandon his non-communal stance, realising
that to have done so would have seriously jeopardised Unionist prospects
of forming a majority, which could not be achieved without non-Muslim 
24
support.
Forces outside of the Unionist Party had been anxious also to 
encourage Fazl-i-Husain to adopt a communal stance in respect of the 
elections. M.A. Jinnah, the President of the All-India Muslim League, 
fully realised that his organisation, solely dependent on the support of
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a section of the urban intelligentsia, was totally incapable of 
challenging and defeating the Unionist forces. He knew that the 
Unionist Party controlled the rural Muslim constituencies, and he hoped 
to be able to establish the League in the Province by persuading Fazl-i- 
Husain to contest the election in concert with, and not in opposition to 
the League. His confidence in the Unionist Party's ability to emerge 
victorious from the elections was revealed in a denouncement of the Parly 
made only after he had failed to reach agreement with it: "I fear that
there is a caucus that is likely to be effective because it depends on 
pocket boroughs.of this caucus the spear-head is the Unionist party.^ 
In an attempt to utilise the influence of the 'caucus', he was 
later to condemn,Jinnah invited Fazl-i-Husain in January 1936 to preside 
over the forthcoming session of the All-India Muslim League, in a 
message which betrayed the depth of his recognition that Husain's 
support was desperately necessary for the League to succeed in the 
Punjab:
"I along with many others feel that at this moment no 
one can give a better lead to the Mussalmans of India 
than yourself... it will be a great honour to the League 
to have you to preside over our deliberations... I 
trust that you will accept the call at this moment. I 
think that you can render the greatest service at this 
moment and add to your laurels... We want a man of your 
calibre and experience, and nobody can well, at this 
critical moment as far as I can see, perform that duty 
and render that service to the community as you would 
be able to...your presence is necessary mainly and 
solely in the interests of the community... Your 
refusal will be the greatest misfortune and a terrible 
disappointment to me personally," °
This flattering invitation failed to achieve its objective; Fazl-
i-Husain refused to associate either himself or his party with the
League. The latter was a purely communal body, which under Jinnah's
direction sought to attract and control non-League provincial Muslim
parties by persuading them to contest the forthcoming elections under
the aegis of the League's Central Parliamentary Board. The Unionist
leader reasoned that such a political marriage between the Unionists and
the League would be impractical. In an attempt to dissuade other Muslim
parties, outside the Punjab, from aligning themselves with the League,
Fazl-i-Husain in a letter published in the Civil and Military Gazette of
7 June 1936 publicly rejected Jinnah's Parliamentary Board proposal.
Fazl-i-Husain pointed out that provincial autonomy as conceived by the
1935 Act was synonymous with decentralisation, and as such it would be
wrong to centralise provincial elections. Also as conditions varied in
each province, especially in Muslim minority as compared to Muslim
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majority provinces, it would be impossible to devise a uniform principle
applicable to all. Furthermore Fazl-i-Husain emphasised that in many
provinces Muslims, out of necessity, needed to promote non-communal
organisations, because as was the case in the Punjab, the Muslim majority
was nominal, and it would be "almost impossible to secure a Muslim
majority through a separate control of elections." Fazl-i-Husain
concluded that in the circumstances a communal central Muslim agency was
ill-suited to conduct provincial Muslim elections. In addition he
attempted to undermine the League initiative by suggesting that its
primary objective was not to further Muslim interests, so much as
Jinnah’s ambitions: "The initiative and elasticity needed for such
purpose J^ the need for non-communal organisations to secure Muslim
coalition ministries]] for each province should not be sacrificed for the
27sake of an All-India leader’s aspirations."
There were other considerations which had contributed to fashion
Fazl-i-Husain's reaction. He feared that Jinnah*s move would damage
Muslim solidarity in the Punjab to the detriment of the Unionist Party,
as well as in the other Muslim majority provinces where he had already
encouraged the growth of political organisations similar to the Unionist 
28Party. In adopting this tactic he had been supported by the Aga Khan
who approved of the move, and was prepared to offer financial assistance
to the tune of Hs. 20,000 to popularise it through the press, and
29facilitate its success. There seems little doubt that Husain desired
the growth of 'quasi Unionist' political bodies in all the Muslim
majority provinces and the U.P., to provide the platform of a national
organisation willing to promote Muslim interests through economic and
political co-operation with non-Muslims, and thereby bypass the League
which he believed would harm, rather than benefit Muslim prospects by
30its prosecution of a communal approach. It is evident therefore that
Fazl-i-Husain regarded Jinnah as an adversary in both the provincial and
national spheres, as is evident from the sentiments he expressed to the
Aga Khan on 22 June 1936:
"Since last April the Unionist Party has been re­
organised and a Unionist political organisation of a 
non-communal type has been set going throughout the 
Punjab... Jinnah has blundered into this arena very 
much to our prejudice. He has not been able to obtain 
any support from any section of the Unionists... You 
know perfectly well that the Punjab is the key of the 
Indian Muslim politics because of the strong attitude 
we have taken. Sind is following in our footsteps,
North-West Frontier Province is doing the same and to 
a minor extent Bengal and U.P. are also coming into 
line. Thus Jinnah's Parliamentary Board is already 
broken up."-^
1^9
Considering the 'national' ambitions which Fazl-i-Husain nurtured, it is 
clear that by July 1936 he believed that they were in the process of 
attaining fruition: "N.W.F. Province and Sind have definitely decided
to constitute Unionist Parties after the pattern of the Punjab Unionist 
Party and Bengal, specially [jsicJ Eastern Bengal, has also decided to 
follow them."^
In the event, however, Fazl-i-Husain's hopes failed to reach 
fruition. His death in July 1936 removed the main inspiration for, and 
driving force whereby such a development might have been achieved. Even 
had he lived, however, such a development was unlikely. His assessment 
concerning the growth of Unionist-type parties in the provinces 
mentioned above was incorrect. Muslim politics at the provincial level 
were dominated by fierce personal rivalries, whilst communalism 
militated against co-operation with non-Muslim organisations. Conse­
quently Muslim leaders such as Fazlul Huq in Bengal and the Nawab of 
Chhatari in U.P. were more concerned with maintaining their respective 
positions in the provincial spheres, rather than working in unison in 
pursuit of a non-communal national strategy. In fact Abdoola Haroon in 
Sind was the only influential Muslim to organise a party along Unionist 
lines - the Sind United Party. It failed to command a united Muslim 
following, however, being opposed by the Azad Party of Sheikh Abdul 
Majid Sindhi, and Ghulam Hussain's Muslim Political Party.
In opposing Jinnah in the Punjab, Fazl-i-Husain had been aided by
the attitude of his troublesome lieutenant, and eventual successor, Sir
Sikander Hyat Khan, who was equally determined to prevent the League
leader from intruding into the Unionist preserve, or undermining
provincial autonomy. Consequently he supported Fazl-i-Husain's
rejection of the Parliamentary Board, having informed the Unionist
leader in May 1936 that
"I have...asked Ahmad Yar Q)aultana[] to strongly press 
on him QrinnabT] the advisability of keeping his finger 
out of the Punjab pie. If he meddles he would only be 
encouraging fissiparous tendencies already palpably 
discernible in a section of Punjab Muslims, & might 
burn his fingers; & in any case we cannot possibly allow 
•provincial autonomy' to be tampered with...by anybody, 
be he a nominee of the powers who have given us this 
autonomy or a President of the Muslim League..."^
Thus Jinnah, as a result of Sikander*s stand, was unable to manipulate
to his advantage the rivalry which existed between Fazl-i-Husain and
Sikander in the pre-election period.
Whilst Jinnah's proposal regarding a Parliamentary Board failed to 
precipitate disunity amongst Muslim Unionists, factionalism continued to 
pose the gravest threat which the Party had to face in 1936. It was a
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35condition which had bedevilled the Party from its earliest days,
resulting to a great extent from the presence of three powerful cliques,
the continued affiliation of each being essential to party unity. These
three groups centred around Sir Sikander Hyat Khan representing the
Hyats of Wah, Sir Firoz Khan Noon of the Noon-Tiwana family group of
Sargodha, and a loose alliance between Choudhury Sir Shahab-ud-Din of
Sialkot and his more influential brother-in-law Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana
of Mailsi in Multan District. As a result of the antipathy which
existed between the Daultanas and Noons, Daultana supported Sikander in
opposition to Firoz Khan Noon, whom Sikander regarded as his main 
36political rival. The British were not unaware of the existence of
these opposing factions, which could have undermined their own political
standing. Under ’Dyarchy' the provincial British Government had
constantly relied on the loyalist Unionist bloc to maintain its majority 
37m  the Legislature and it is apparent that it was clearly in British 
interests that a united pro-British organisation should administer the 
Punjab following the 1937 elections. There can be little doubt, 
therefore, that the Vir Bharat and Daily Herald (Lahore based news­
papers) were in part correct in cynically suggesting in May 1936 that 
both Firoz Khan Noon and Sikander Hyat Khan had been found employment 
outside the Province, as High Commissioner in London (1936) and Deputy 
Governor of the Reserve Bank of India in Bombay (1933) respectively, to 
prevent either of them challenging Fazl-i-Husain's leadership of the
■2 Q
Unionists; a tactic which helped to preserve the stability of the 
Unionist Party.
Initially Sikander had not been averse to accepting the appointment. 
Although he belonged to a substantial land-owning family, heavy
financial liabilities had encouraged his involvement with commerical
39 40enterprises, whilst a salary of Rs. 3»500 per mensem, provided an added
inducement for him to join the Reserve Bank. Events soon proved, how­
ever, that Sikander was not to be content with a non-political career, 
particularly as Fazl-i-Husain's ill-health brought the leadership 
question to the fore. Also Sikander's supporters in the Punjab, notably 
Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, Nawab Muzaffar Khan, and Mir Maqbul Mahmud were 
not prepared to allow Sikander's claim to lead the Unionist Party to 
perish by default, particularly as it was evident by the Autumn of 1935 
that Fazl-i-Husain's poor health would ultimately force his withdrawal 
from political life. This particular factor was to prove critical in 
causing Sikander to decide whether or not he should challenge Husain in 
the immediate pre-election period, as is evident from the fact that 
Nawab Muzaffar Khan, Sikander*s brother-in-law and cousin, attempted to
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discover from Fazl-i-Husain's physician (Col. Harper-Nelson) how long
his patient was expected to live. Although Sikander denied having
41initiated the distasteful enquiry, and whilst he repeatedly assured
42Husain of his personal loyalty and support, his actions belied his 
words.
Sikander in fact set out on a tortuous and confused path aimed at
securing recognition for himself as the leader designate, and although
he conducted negotiations with possible non-Muslim allies, causing
Husain to suspect that he was endeavouring to supplant him, he never
directly challenged the incumbent. In April 1936 the Tribune reported
that Sikander had "expressed his readiness to his non-Muslim friends to
take a leading part in the formation of the future provincial cabinet,"
though when confronted by Fazl-i-Husain, Sikander had publicly pledged
him his support. Implicit in this declaration, which was issued by
Husain on Sikander's behalf, was the assertion that the move had been
orchestrated by Hindu and Sikh leaders, and not Sikander:
"Leading Hindu and Sikh politicians approached Sir 
Sikander Hyat with £anj offer of full and strong 
support in case he decided to offer himself for 
Chief Ministership under the Reforms. Sir Sikander 
Hyat is said to have expressed his thanks and grati­
tude to the Hindu-Sikh leaders...but jjSikander_J 
expressed his inability to accede to their request 
as he was now of the same views which he entertained 
before...that the nature of the new reforms and 
condition of the existing atmosphere were such that 
the experience and knowledge and the political gifts 
of the leader of the Unionists, Mian Fazl-i-Husain, 
should be utilized..,"^
Despite this conciliatory statement, however, Sikander continued to hold
discussions with leading non-Muslim politicians, in particular Raja
Narendra Nath, the leader of the urban Hindus, with whom he maintained
constant contact. It was an association which Sikander refused to
abandon, in spite of Fazl-i-Husain*s protest that he alone should
45conduct talks concerning possible political alliances. On 23 June 
1936 the pro-Unionist Civil and Military Gazette reported that talks 
between the Raja and Sikander had been re-opened in respect of "the 
formation of a new political party which would rally the various elements 
in the province that would keep in check the communal activities of 
certain Muslim leaders...."^ The inference clearly constituted an 
attack on Husain's position, obliquely referring to his communalist 
tendencies, but Sikander again retreated, refusing to identify himself 
with so apparent a challenge, and through Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana a 
denial was published to the effect that no such plans had been discussed 
and that there had only been social, and not political, contact between
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47the two men.
His refusal to confront Fazl-i-Husain openly was consistent with 
his desire to secure the succession, without having to risk the dangers 
inherent in any overt leadership confrontation. If he had openly 
contested for it, he would have risked splitting the Muslim Unionist 
supporters, thereby jeopardising the prospects for the formation of a 
future Unionist ministry, and his own position as its possible leader 
and future Premier of the Province. His determination not to pre­
cipitate such a split, and his anxiety to succeed to the leadership of a
united party, are apparent from correspondence he conducted with Fazl-i-
Husain in May 1936, at a time when he had made his ambitions perfectly
clear. On 1 May he had guilefully enquired,
"Do you apprehend that the defections from Muslims for 
personal motives - I do not anticipate many desertions 
on questions of principle or policy - would be on such 
a scale as to endanger the solidarity of the party & 
geopardise [[sic]] the almost certain prospect (at present) 
of it being the majority party? If the answer is in the
affirmative would it be worth-while for you to tax your
already scanty physical resources, & for me to sacrifice 
my prospects & a comfortable & if I may say so, from the 
wider point of view, a useful & important post for what? 
a mess of pottage?" °
Whilst on 13 May he hed attempted to assure Husain that he would not campaign
to oust him and lead the Party, for fear of destroying Muslim unity, and
out of his personal regard for the present leader:
"I can assure you that my not resorting to any of these 
alternatives [[claiming the leadership from Husain, or 
forming his own partyj was deliberate, and was due to 
my earnest desire to serve the best interests of the 
Province, to avoid split among muslim [[sic]] and others 
and to my personal regard for you."^9
The last assurance could have offered small comfort to Fazl-i-
Husain. From early February 1936, Sikander constantly disregarded his
leader's feelings in pursuit of his goal to manoeuvre Husain into
publicly acknowledging his position in terms which would demonstrate
that Sikander was deputy leader, and heir apparent. In pursuit of this
aim in February 1936 Sikander had attempted unsuccessfully to induce
Husain to issue a statement asserting
"It has been stated...that I [Fazl-i-Husain]] was 
instrumental in arranging for translation of Sikander 
Hyat from provincial politics to the Reserve Bank.
This is a palpably false allegation. Equally incorrect 
is the assertion that I am opposed to his return to the 
Punjab. I shall be only too glad to have him back, and 
if I find that my health does not permit me to undertake 
the task £of re-organising and leading the Unionist 
Party]] single-handed, I could have no better helper to 
assist me. I will, in that event, do my best to persuade
him, in the interests of the province, to relinquish 
his present important and lucrative job... There has 
never been any question of rivalry between us and I 
can speak both for Sikander and myself that there 
can be none in future either."^
Fazl-i-Husain refused to accommodate Sikander: "I have never claimed to
be in the exalted position of the leader who has any wonderful claim to
51
the allegiance of all those associated with his work." This expla­
nation was a mere subterfuge, however, for in reality Husain did not 
wish to commit himself positively to Sikander at this stage for to have 
done so would have compromised his own standing within the Party, had 
the statement, suggested and composed by Sikander, been interpreted as a 
surrender on Husain's part in the face of pressure from his ambitious 
lieutenant. Sikander persisted in his endeavour, however, and in May he 
confronted Fazl-i-Husain with a strongly worded communique on the 
pretext that he intended to release it to the press. Ostensibly this 
exercise was to secure Husain's approval for its publication, in reality 
it was meant to convey the definite warning that if his position was not 
recognised, Sikander, supported by some Muslim and non-Muslim allies, 
would force Fazl-i-Husain to accept a subordinate position:
"His Q>ikander’s]j friends however continued to press 
him; Sikh, Hindu and some Muslim friends on the ground 
that communal tension, mistrust and bitterness was 
likely to be accentuated with the approach and advent 
of the new Reforms and would seriously hamper the smooth 
working of the new constitutional machinery, unless 
somebody who enjoyed the confidence of all communities 
and interests was forthcoming to bridge the gulf and to 
restore harmony and re-establish mutual confidence."
Furthermore
"It was suggested that Sir Sikander should come back to 
assist in, and if necessary to undertake the whole 
responsibility for, organising the party - which was to 
be non-communal and free from sectarian or class 
restrictions or prejudices - and that pending his 
return Sir Fazli should start and carry on the work 
with the assistance of Sir Sikander's friends."52
Husain's reaction was swift, and calculated to undermine Sikander's
53stance. On 15 May 1936 he offered to resign the leadership, thereby 
confronting Sikander with an open breach with the creator of the Unionist 
Party, caused by his enforced retirement, and the possibility of a 
bitter and uncertain campaign for the leadership, likely to damage the 
solidarity of the organisation, and thereby frustrate Sikander’s 
manoeuvre to succeed to a united, strong party. Once again Sikander 
withdrew, pretending that he neither wished to lead the Unionist Party 
nor return to the political life of the Punjab, though he offered his 
continued support for Husain if the latter desired it:
15**
"you are at liberty to utilise my name again if it 
will help you, and on my part I can assure that I 
will, as before, not say a word against it. I would, 
however, request you to make it clear that I never 
had nor evinced any ambition or pretentions to assum­
ing the leadership of the party and (in view of what 
has transpired during the past fortnight) I have no 
intention of returning to the province."5
Subsequent events were to demonstrate the falsity of Sikander's
assertions. The intriguing continued. In June 1936 Sikander returned
55to the Province and held meetings with Narendra Nath, which he
informed Fazl-i-Husain were intended to gain support of the Hindu
leader and his followers, numbering between 30 &nd 35i for the Unionist
56cause, and were not in pursuit of his own personal political ends. It 
was a ludicrous and false explanation considering Sikander*s obvious
ambition, the antagonism which the Punjab*s Hindu press had confronted
57Husain, emphasising his communalist tendencies, and the fact that
Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana revealed unintentionally that a conspiracy was
in progress, by dismissing the Sikander-Narendra Nath meeting as being
of a purely social nature, whilst Sikander had provided Husain with a
totally different interpretation (see above).
Thus by June 1936 the stage had been reached in the relationship
between Sikander and Fazl-i-Husain which parodied Shakespeare’s
impatient Prince Hal trying the Crown whilst the resentful King Henry
IV lay on his death-bed - a parody made all the more poignant by the
fact that Fazl-i-Husain was a dying man. From 20 June 1936 Husain's
health, which had never been robust, deteriorated rapidly, and on 9 July 
58he died. The death of this veteran Muslim politician, combined with 
the absence of Firoz Khan Noon in London, preserved the Unionist Party, 
in the vital period immediately prior to the election, from an inter­
necine scramble for power. Had Fazl-i-Husain lived, Sikander and his 
supporters would have continued to intrigue against him, and should Noon 
have still been actively involved in Punjab affairs, he would certainly 
have challenged Sikander's claim to lead the Party.
Even so it was not the removal of these powerful contenders, 
important though this factor was, which was primarily responsible for 
Sikander*s succession to the leadership which he was offered and accepted 
the day following Husain's demise.59 His appeal lay largely in the fact 
that he was acceptable to the major participants in the Punjab political 
scene - the Muslim leadership, powerful Hindu and Sikh elements,^0 and 
not least the British. As a result of ties of blood and marriage, 
Sikander was related to a large number of extremely influential Punjabi 
Muslim political figures. These included amongst others Sardar Barkat
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Hayat Khan, Nawab Sir Liaquat Hayat Khan (brothers), Nawab Muzaffar
Khan (cousin and brother-in-law), Ahmad Bakhsh Khan, Sheikh Muhammad
Sadiq, Sheikh Sadiq Hassan, Mir Maqbool Mahmud, Murid Hussain, Pir Ashiq
Hussain, Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz, Begum Jahanara Shah Nawaz and Mian
Iftikhar-ud-Din. In addition, the strong personal tie which existed
between himself and Ahmad Yar Khan Daultajja assured him the support of a
61man whose family connections were as extensive as his own.
Complementing the Muslim support which these relationships assured
him, Sikander was a popular figure amongst the non-Muslims in the Punjab,
largely because he was widely regarded as being far less communal than 
62
Fazl-i-Husain. Of all the Muslim leaders it was believed that he was
65the most likely to command Hindu and Sikh confidence, ^ which was 
essential if a Muslim majority Ministry was to function in the Province. 
In considering his standing both with the Muslim and non-Muslim commu­
nities, The People correctly assessed that his popularity and succession
to the Unionist leadership reflected his social contacts with all groups 
6^and communities. Though this newspaper clearly referred to Indian
associations, his succession to Fazl-i-Husain was clearly welcome to the
British, and it was essential for any leader aspiring to the premiership
to have their sanction and continuing support, as it was the prerogative
of the British Governor to invite that person to form a ministry who
commanded not only a majority in the Legislature, but who also enjoyed
65the confidence of the minority communities. There was no doubt that
Sikander would enjoy British support, for he was considered to be "a
66pillar of strength" to the British Haj. His loyalty had been publicly 
and dramatically acknowledged on two occasions: when he had been
invited to officiate as Governor during the illness of Sir Geoffrey de 
Montmorency in 1932, and the absence of Sir Herbert Emerson in England 
in 1935.67
The fact that the succession of Sikander Hyat Khan did not disrupt 
the stability of the Unionist Party, or lead to the development of 
embittered feuding factions, assured its victory in the majority of the 
Muslim constituencies in 1937* because as a united force, none of the 
other Muslim parties possessed either the means or membership to success­
fully challenge it. These organisations - the Majlis-i-Ahrar, the
68Ittihad-i-Millat, and the Muslim League - were urban based, and there
was no real common ground between them, the Ahrar and Ittihad-i-Millat
69groups being fierce rivals, and although the League having been 
rebuffed by Fazl-i-Husain, attempted to induce both to join it as an 
anti-Unionist alliance, the move was unsuccessful.
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Where the Muslim League had failed in part to gain the support of
the Unionists because of its rigidity concerning communal politics, and
central control, it failed to reach an understanding with the Ittihad-i-
Millat because it was not sufficiently sectarian. Jinnah, in an attempt
to reach a compromise with the Unionists, had declared that despite the
fact that the League would contest the elections as a purely Muslim body
it would be free to form non-communal coalitions following the electioZ?
This statement was bound to alienate the extremely communally orientated
Ittihad-i-Millat, whilst Jinnah's role as a peacemaker in the Muslim-
Sikh controversy over ownership of the Shahidganj mosque in the opening 
71
months of 1936, was totally opposed to the violent methods advocated 
by the Ittihad-i-Millat, which was bereft of any political aim or
72
programme, other than securing the return of Shahidganj to Muslim hands.
It decided to contest the election on that platform independent of the 
73League.
Although an entente between the Muslim League and the Ahrar Party
did occur it was short-lived. The alliance did not result from a
genuine desire for political co-operation, but necessity. The Ahrars
needed financial support which they believed the League could provide, as
nl+
by January 1936 they were bereft of funds, whilst the Muslim League
was desperately in need of allies to enable it to constitute a realistic
political force in the Province. Despite a refusal by the Majlis-i-
Ahrar in May 1936 to accommodate the League because it anticipated that
75the latter would not include anti-Ahmadi propaganda in its programme,
the inclusion by the League of a pledge to separate the Ahmadis from the 
76
Muslim community, led to a temporary alliance.
This political honeymoon, however, was destined to failure. The 
Ahrars, despite their financial insecurity attempted to exploit the weak­
ness of the League and dominate it by putting up their own members in
77practically every constituency to be contested, a move which nearly 
precipitated the resignation of the Provincial League President, Sir 
Muhammad Iqbal. The Provincial League attempted to counter the Ahrar
manoeuvre; a sub-committee consisting of six members was appointed,
78
including two Ahrars, to formulate a pledge which the Parliamentary 
Board's candidates would be required to take, and to recommend conditions 
governing the choice of candidates and the dissemination of propaganda. 
Despite the fact that the sub-committee was unanimous concerning the 
draft pledge requiring all candidates to follow in the Legislative 
Assembly the directions of the Muslim League, disagreement arose over 
the amount an adopted candidate should donate to the Parliamentary 
Board's funds. The Ahrar members favoured a payment of Rs.100, while
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the rest of the committee insisted on a donation of Rs.500. In reality 
the provincial Muslim League had manoeuvred to prevent Ahrar domination. 
Whilst it had been successful in ensuring that League policy would be 
carried out in the Assembly, its attempt to restrict and control the 
Ahrar membership, was recognised by that body as a ploy to prevent it 
dominating the provincial League. In consequence the Majlis-i-Ahrar 
broke its alliance with the Muslim League on 30 August 1936, and estab-
Solished an independent Ahrar Election Board.
By the autumn of 1936, therefore, Muslim opposition to the Unionist
Party was fragmented and weak. Although all the parties produced
remarkably similar manifestoes promising social and economic recon- 
81struction, in reality the appeal of the Majlis-i-Ahrar and Ittihad-i-
Millat was directed solely to extreme religious urban elements, the
Ahrars being fanatically anti-Ahmadi, and the Ittihad-i-Millat being
totally obsessed with the return of the Shahidganj mosque to the Muslim 
82community. Neither possessed the resources necessary to launch a 
province-wide campaign to either popularise, or capitalise on their 
respective brands of fanaticism. Furthermore the Muslim League, which 
both Fazl-i-Husain and Sikander Hyat Khan had believed posed the greatest
83threat to Muslim solidarity and thereby the unity of the Unionist Party, 
had been rejected by all the existing Muslim parties, including the 
exceedingly influential Unionist group. In addition it failed miserably 
to capture the imagination of the Muslim people. This was reflected in 
the reaction of the Muslim media to Jinnah*s negotiations with Fazl-i- 
Husain, and his subsequent attitude to the Unionist Party. Two of the 
most influential Muslim daily newspapers in the Province, the Eastern 
Times (English language) and Inqilab (Urdu), with a daily circulation of 
4,000 and 7f000 respectively, opposed Jinnah*s Parliamentary Board, and 
deprecated his attacks on the Unionist leadership, and what they con­
sidered to be the League's determination to subjugate the provincial 
sphere to its will.
Throughout the latter half of 1936 the Eastern Times criticised the
League leader, claiming that his communal strategy was misplaced in the
85Punjab, and injurious to Muslims, provincially and nationally. It
deplored the League's reference to the domination of provincial politics
"by reactionary conservative elements in combination with a clique of
men whose sole aim is to secure offices and places for themselves",
claiming that the real issue was whether provincial politics should be
subject to the arbitrary control of a central caucus, organised on com- 
86munal lines. The Inqilab issued similar criticisms, emphasising that 
in contrast to the Muslim League the Unionist Party was a non-communal
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organisation, which the League wished to manipulate to enable it to
87enter the Legislative Assembly. The stand taken by these two large
newspapers was also reflected by the much smaller Siyasat (Urdu daily,
88   .
circulation 1,600), which warned its readers that Jinnah had been
unable to attract the united confidence of Punjabi Muslims, and as a
result he was determined to destroy the Unionist Party, on the false
pretext that it consisted of henchmen of the Government.^
In answer to these damning attacks, Jinnah and the League were 
supported by a less influential section of the press. The Ihsan and 
Nairang Urdu dailies (circulation 3*000 and 1,000 respectively) 
advised their subscribers to support League membership; the Nairang 
interpreted Jinnah*s Parliamentary Board as an attempt to establish 
Muslim League parties in all of the provinces, to promote the protection 
of the political and religious rights of Indian Muslims.^1 This argument 
was repeated by the Ihsan, which cautioned that if Muslims desired the 
continued existence of their community, they should support the League, 
and shun Unionist politicians whose main interests were geared to secur­
ing Ministries, and appointments for themselves and their friends.^2 
The reference to nepotism revealed a pro-urban and anti-rural stance on 
the part of the Ihsan, explaining in part this newspaper's opposition to 
the Unionist Party, and its support for the League, in that it accused 
Unionist politicians of being responsible for crushing the intelligentsia
so as to enable the employment by Government of less able and poorly
93educated zamindars.
Championing the cause of urban as opposed to rural interests, or 
attempting to raise the issue of the future political security of the 
Muslim community, or the survival of Islam, had no real appeal to the 
vast majority of Punjabi Muslims. As such these themes failed to win 
sympathy for the League. The overwhelming majority of Muslims were 
rural dwellers, and their natural sympathies were rural biased. Out of 
a total Muslim electorate of 1,536,311* 1*152,^-87 (86$) voted in the 
Muslim rural constituencies. Also the Muslim community constituted a 
majority in the Punjab, and the Unionist Party was dominated by Muslims, 
thus arguments maintaining that Muslim political and religious life was 
threatened, appeared as unreal and irrelevant. Just as the premises of 
the pro-Jinnah press failed to excite support for the League, its 
provincial leadership was equally unable to inspire or influence the 
electorate. With the exception of Khan Bahadur Zaman Mehdi Khan and 
Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, the only two influential landlords to support 
the League, its membership was drawn from the urban ‘elite^ and it 
possessed no influence in the crucial rural constituencies. Consequently
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the bulk of the Muslim seats were closed to the League, which because it
had failed to gain Unionist co-operation, could field only seven candi-
96dates in the provincial election. As a party therefore, it had con­
ceded the election before it was fought.
The absence of a vigorous and united Muslim opposition assured the
97Unionist Party victory in the forthcoming provincial elections, 
particularly as the Congress Party had failed to win either the confi­
dence or support of the Muslim masses or voters. In the Punjab the 
Congress was an urban capitalist and largely communal organisation. It 
consistently adopted a neutral stance in the Legislature with reference 
to measures designed to benefit agriculturists, for fear of alienating 
its urban following. Also Nehru's denouncement of the Communal Awar§? 
during a tour of the Punjab in June 1936, further prejudiced Congress 
chances of attracting Muslim support: the Eastern Times, whilst it
appreciated the National Congress' socio-political aims to relieve the 
masses from poverty and debt as outlined in its manifesto, accused the
Congress of descending to the extremist level of the Hindu Mahasabha in
100regard to its attitude to the'Award', a view which was reiterated by 
101the Inqilab. The Zamindar was the only important Muslim organ (Urdu
102daily, circulation 6,700) to plead the National Congress cause, and
103advocate Muslim support for it, but its efforts were in vain, as was 
demonstrated by the fact that the Congress captured only two of the
1Qlf
reserved Muslim seats (rural constituencies of Ludhiana and Kasur).
In essence, however, the Unionist Party was strong, and the other
Muslim political groups and the Congress were weak because the Unionists
105enjoyed the monopoly of landlord support. ^ It effectively preserved
the advantage during the electioneering by curbing personal rivalries
and thereby ensuring that faction would be contained to prevent it
prejudicing Unionist prospects of forming a majority Ministry in combi-
106nation with non-Muslim allies. To this end no official list of
adopted Unionist candidates was published, and in the majority of cases
the successful contender was declared to be the official Unionist candi-
107date only after the contest had been decided. Thus the elections were
largely personal combats, and not party conflicts which could have
reduced the Unionist majority, consequently the outcome of the election
in the rural areas was decided before the polls were conducted, the
victors acceding to the Unionist camp. This practice however, on
occasion, gave rise to farcical confusion, as in the case of the elected
member for Ludhiana (Muhammad Hassan), who was variously described as a
108Congressite, Independent and Unionist.
The Unionist's electoral tactic made a farce of electioneering
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through manifestoes, as did the fact that all the parties, including the 
Unionist, the League and the Congress, issued very similar socio­
economic propaganda, promising in the main to improve the condition of 
the rural masses. Though unlike the Unionist Party and the League, the 
Congress did propose a re-structuring of society, in that the zamindari
system was to be abolished, and the feudal power of the princes 
109restricted, these pledges made little impact in the Punjab. The
Unionist Party promised that if elected it would give relief to the
masses and poorest sections amongst taxpayers by cutting the cost of the
administration. It claimed that industry, particularly cottage industries,
would be developed, and that measures would be implemented to protect^^
the agricultural and labouring classes from the crushing burden of debt.
This declaration was meant to epitomise in the minds of rural voters a
party determined to protect them from the urban credit machine, and to
demonstrate that the Unionists were as concerned as the Congress with
the pursuit of social reform. In the event, however, the manifesto's
import in securing votes was secondary to the advantage it enjoyed
through its landed membership. David Taylor has asserted that the
eventual success of the Unionists resulted from the exploitation of the
111
rural "elite of feudal loyalty. Despite the undoubted existence of such 
loyalty, however, it would be more realistic to describe the electoral 
triumph which the Party experienced in 1937 resulting from the ex­
ploitation of the large-small zamindar relationship, i.e. a combination 
of loyalty and feudal economic power and pressure.
In reality, the Unionist pledges were merely a 'window dressing', and 
were unlikely to convince any but the most gullible. Though the Unionist 
Party wished to pose as the protector of the poor agriculturists, it had 
forcibly demonstrated where its true interests lay. In the pre-election 
Legislative Council 23 of the 31 Unionist supporters had bften large land­
lords, and whilst it was true that the Unionists had initially sponsored 
two resolutions to aid poor agriculturists - one for the exemption of 
uneconomic agricultural holdings from taxation, and the other recommend­
ing that land revenue should be charged on a sliding scale on the same 
basis as income tax - both had been defeated because the Revenue Member, 
the founder of the Unionist Party, did not favour them. Similarly, 
debt legislation initiated and supported by the Unionist group, ostens­
ibly to safeguard the interests of the masses had been designed in fact 
to benefit large zamindars, who received benefits as debtors, and as 
creditors continued to enjoy the freedom to exploit, as the disabilities
which attached to non-agriculturists did not apply to agriculturist 
112moneylenders. Thus the Mujahid had solid grounds in asserting that
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despite its proclaimed economic programme, the Unionist Party would 
only protect the peasants* rights, so long as they did not encroach
11"5upon the interests of the large zamindars who controlled the Party. ^ 
Finally in considering the impact of Unionist electoral propaganda, 
it must be borne in mind that the electorate was chiefly confined to 
the landed and property-owning groups, with the rural bloc predominat­
ing. They were not as susceptible to the Unionist economic package, as 
the unenfranchised and depressed tenantry and labouring classes would 
have been. Universal adult suffrage did not exist in British India.
In the Punjab only persons who fulfilled the following requirements had 
the right to vote under the terms of the Government of India Act, 1935: 
anyone who owned, or was an occupancy tenant of land assessed at not 
less than Rs. 5 per annum; any holder of a muafi, assessed at not less 
than Rs.10 per ahnura; any tenant of agricultural land encompassing not 
less than six acres of irrigated, or 12 acres of unirrigated land. In 
the case of landholders' constituencies, voters were restricted to 
those paying a minimum of Rs.500 per annum in land revenue. In 
addition any owner or tenant of immovable property, which included a 
building valued at not less than Rs. 2,000 or which had a rental value 
in excess of Rs.60 per annum, was entitled to vote. This privilege was 
also extended to any person who during the preceding financial year 
had been assessed for any direct municipal or direct cantonment tax of 
not less than Rs.50, or paid income tax, or any other direct tax levied 
by the District Boards. Also certain office-holders - Zaildar, Inamdar, 
Setfed-fio^ lj, Lambardar (but not Naib or Sarbrah), and retired, pensioned 
and discharged officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers and men of 
the regular army, the British Indian Police Force, the Auxiliary Force, 
and the Indian Territorial Forces - were qualified to vote, provided 
they had accomplished a minimum of four years service. The vote was 
also extended to those persons who had passed the primary, or any 
equivalent or higher standard of education. In respect of women voters 
who were not qualified in their own right as property owners, tenants, 
etc., the franchise was restricted to the widows or wives of landed or 
property men, and of those office holders who were eligible to vote.
Where a voter had more than one wife, only the senior wife was en- 
11^franchised.
The result was that the entire provincial electorate was restric-
115
ted to 2 ,686,09*+ persons, 80% of whom voted in the rural constituencies.
116It was predominantly male in composition, thus although in the
Province as a whole only 11.*+% of the entire population was enfranchi-
117
sed, approximately 3*+^  of all men over the age of 20 enjoyed the vote.
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Within these two categories economic qualifications prevailed (see 
above), thus in comparison to their fellow Punjabis, 66% of whom in 
the over 20 age group were unenfranchised, the vast majority of voters 
represented an economically privileged class. Of these the more pros­
perous landowners, better off tenants and urban capitalists were not 
conspicuous for philanthropy, thus they were not as susceptible to the 
Unionist socio-economic manifesto package, as the unenfranchised 
depressed tenantry, landless labourers, and labouring classes would 
have been. Also within the electoral elite there were vast differences 
between the personal wealth and influence of each voter. Small land­
owners, regardless of the fact that they had the power to vote, could 
not afford to ignore the views and wishes of their wealthier brethren. 
This was a political fact of life, unimpeded by manifesto promises.
The feudal response to demonstrating and perpetuating existing 
power through an alien semi-democratic machinery, was further exempli­
fied in the irregularities which occurred, especially as in some cases 
the votes of influential sections of the electorate could be secured 
more effectively by offering immediate cash gains or preferment, rather 
than pledging future reform programmes. Complaints, alleging corrup­
tion of this nature were reported to the Election Commission in the 
case of the Muslim rural constituencies of Dera Ghazi Khan North,
Bhalwal, Sheikhargarh and Karnal (all captured by Unionist adherents),
118amongst others. Such allegations, however, were exceedingly
difficult to substantiate. Nevertheless, in the case of Dera Ghazi
Khan North, the Election Commission was satisfied that Khwaja Ghulam
Murtaza (successful candidate - respondent) had gained the support of
an exceedingly influential bloc - the Chiefs of the Khetran tribe - and
119of important individuals in the constituency by offering bribes. ' As
a result a by-election was ordered.
The only force in the Punjab which could have seriously undermined
the landlords1 political control, were the Pirs, the Province’s
spiritual elite, but in 1937i in contrast to 19*+6, the Unionist Party
did not face any dangerous religious opposition. The Pirs, many of
120whom were large landlords themselves and had spiritual and family
«" 121ties with the landed elite, were content that a Unionist Ministry
should govern. Because of its defence of the Alienation of Land Act,
and the fact that the Unionist Party was an expression of the existing
power structure in the rural areas to which many of the religious elite
belonged, it was not opposed by any powerful, dynamic or fanatically
122orientated religious party.
Fazl-i-Husain, appreciating the influence which the Pirs possessed,
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was anxious to induce the more important Pirs in the Punjab to issue a
statement supporting the Unionist Party.125 Other elements in the
Unionist organisation, however, were wary of actively involving Pirs in
the election campaign and thereby exciting religious sentiment in the
countryside, fearing that it could prove counter-productive if some of
the religious leaders chose to oppose, rather than support, the Party:
"The Ahrars have begun with an awfully vigorous
propaganda... Still we don’t fear if they do not begin
with the villages. Villagers, you know, follow these
’Pirs* blindly... Take care of the ’Pirs’. Ask them
only to keep silent on the matter of the elections.
We don't require their help but they should not oppose 
us...”12++
In the event, although the Pir class undoubtedly favoured the Unionist
Party, the exploitation of religion did not occur on the vast scale as 
125
witnessed in 19*+6 (see Chapter VII below) and it was not a decisive 
factor in influencing the outcome of the 1937 election. Talbot has 
argued, however, that ”The unionist victory in the 1937 elections owed 
much to the support it had gained from the leading pirs of the province
,.126 pp. . . .
• •• • This is a misconception, which confuses the understanding of
the nature of the method whereby the Party conducted its electoral cam­
paign. In the rural areas, where admittedly the influence of the Pirs 
was enormous (as demonstrated in 19*+6), there was no viable opposition 
to the Unionist Party. By and large candidates fought each other on 
clan or family considerations, claiming Unionist membership only after 
the contest had been decided. Thus the active allegiance of the Pirs 
was not as significant as it would have been had the Unionist Party 
faced a serious threat to its position, as it was ’Pir support’ merely 
bolstered the already impressive and decisive Unionist landed armoury. 
This hypothesis does not detract from the control which the Pirs were 
capable of wielding but it is apparent that when these religious leaders 
did intervene, it was on the side of personality, rather than party.
This was dramatically demonstrated in the case of the Muslim constitu­
ency of Pind Dadan Khan. It was one of the only five rural Muslim 
seats which the Unionist Party failed to gain and the successful 
candidate, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, who stood on the Muslim League
ticket, though he joined the Unionist Party almost immediately after 
12?
the elections, owed his success in a large measure to the support he 
received from his nephew, Pir Fazl Shah of Jalalpur.12^
Finally in analysing the Unionist success, the role of government 
officials as unofficial canvassers for the Party, should not be over­
looked. The official class in the rural areas enjoyed wide powers of 
persuasion, as assessors of land revenue, dispensers of justice,
16*t
arbitrators in property disputes, and advocates of official recognition
for individual merit, through coveted honours. Sikander Hyat Khan
blatantly and unashamedly conceded that Mthe Unionists believe that the
officials of the Government £are’] working for them in the districts and 
129villages", though the Ihsan was guilty of exaggeration when it attri­
buted the Unionist success solely to the manipulation of official 
130influence. In reality ♦official1 backing merely strengthened the
appeal which the Unionist Party commanded as a result of its monopoly
of zamindar support, reinforced by the absence of any serious and
popular religious opposition. The combination of such vital assets
resulted in a Unionist landslide in the Muslim constituencies, and the
acquisition of a majority of seats in the Province as a whole. Of the
Muslim seats in the Province the Unionist Party captured 72, 70 of
which were rural constituencies. The other Muslim parties - the Muslim
League, the Ittihad-i-Millat, and the Majlis-i-Ahrar - secured only two
seats each, the Muslim League losing one of these when Raja Ghazanfar
Ali Khan defected to the Unionists, lured by a Party secretaryship. In
the Punjab as a whole the Unionist Party gained 93 of the 173 seats in
the Provincial Legislature, 71 of which (including Ghazanfar Ali's seat)
were Muslim rural, two Muslim urban, 13 General rural and nine Special
Interest seats, of which three were landholders' constituencies (the
remainder representing Anglo-Indian, European, Indian Christian - two
131seats - and University interests).
A survey of the Unionist elected membership following the 1937
election, however, emphasised that this decisive victory would not have
been possible had the Party not been the vehicle of large Zamindar
interests. Forty-eight of the Muslim Unionist M.L.A.s were big land- 
132lords. Moreover all the most important landed factions were repre­
sented on the Government (Unionist) benches, including the Hayats of 
Wah - Sikander Hyat Khan (Premier, West Punjab Landholders), Nawab 
Muzaffar Khan (Mianwali South); the Noon-Tiwana family group of 
Sargodha - Nawabzada Major Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana (Minister of Public 
Works, Khushab), Nawab Sir Allah Baksh Khan (Shahpur), Nawabzada Malik 
Muhammad Habibullah Khan (Sargodha), Nawab Malik Sir Muhammad Hayat Khan 
Noon (North Punjab Landholders); the Daultanas of Multan District - 
Nawab Mian Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana (Pari. Secretary, Mailsi), Mir 
Maqbool Mahmood (Amritsar); the Pirs of Shah Jiwana - Syed Mubarik Ali 
Shah (Jhang Central); the Qizilbash clan of Lahore District - Muzaffar 
Ali Khan Qizilbash (Lahore); the Kot Ghebas of Attock - Muhammad Shah 
Nawaz Khan (Attock Central); the Mians of Baghbanpura - Mian Iftikhar- 
ud-Din (Kasur), Begum Jahanara Shah Nawaz (Outer Lahore - Women); the
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Qureshis of Multan - Captain Pir Ashiq Hussain (Multan); the Legharis
of Muzaffargarh - Nawab Sir Muhammad Jamal Khan Leghari (Tumandars);
the Khokhars of Attock - Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan (Pind Dadan Khan); the
Wanbachran family of Mianwali - Captain Malik Muzaffar Khan (Mianwali
South); the Gurmanis of Muzaffargarh - Mian Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani
(Muzaffargarh North); the Chathas of Gujranwala - Chaudhri Nasir-ud-Din
(Gujranwala North), the Gilanis of Multan - Makhdumzada Haji Sayed
Muhammad Raza Shah Gilani (Shusabad) and the Mamdots of Ferozepore -
1^3Nawab Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot (Ferozepore Central). >'-y As such 
Peter Hardy's contention that in 1937 "Both in the general and in 
Muslim constituencies, the day of the old conservative and oligarchic
13^
landlord politics was, except in the new province of Sind, nearly done," 
is incorrect. In the Punjab landed oligarchic power remained as viable 
as ever, and retained the capacity to bend the Province to its political 
will.
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CHAPTER V
SIKANDER HYAT KHAN, JINNAH AND THE MUSLIM LEAGUE - 
THE UNEASY ALLIANCE, 1937-19^2
The elections of 1937 had placed the Unionist Party in power in the 
Punjab and secured the Premiership for Sikander Hyat Khan the Unionist 
leader. Sikander realised, however, that in order to maintain his own 
position and Unionist control over provincial affairs, the Party had to 
be safeguarded against factionalism, a condition which was ever present 
amongst Muslim Unionists. Accordingly he sought to bolster the stability 
of his Ministry through the distribution of offices and honours, and to 
strengthen its following in the Assembly by creating a coalition embrac­
ing other political parties. In pursuit of this objective Sikander in 
October 1937 concluded a pact with Jinnah, the President of the A.I.M.L.
Despite the humiliating defeat which the League had experienced at the 
1
all-India polls and in the Punjab, Sikander believed, that if it was
permitted to function unchecked in the Punjab, Jinnah would eventually
seek to enhance League prospects by exploiting any differences which
2
existed amongst Muslim Unionists to the detriment of party unity. His 
agreement with Jinnah effectively thwarted this possibility as it placed 
the Punjab Muslim League firmly under Unionist control. The national 
League, however, remained independent of Unionist direction, and in 
order to restrain it from pursuing policies detrimental to Unionism 
Sikander sought a national role to limit Jinnah's influence, and to 
effect a dominant measure of control over all-India Muslim politics.
This quest inevitably brought him into conflict with the League Presi­
dent, and though Sikander remained the undisputed master of the Punjab 
until his death in December 19*+2, he did not achieve any measure of 
success in respect of his national ambitions. In attempting to under­
mine Jinnah's leadership he opposed a man whose political dexterity and 
tactical skills far outshone his own, and he was further handicapped by 
the fact that the Viceroy, Linlithgow, was committed for strategical 
reasons to Jinnah's continued domination of the A.I.M.L., and who as a 
result refused to countenance Sikander's intrusions in the national 
sphere.
In fact the Unionist election victory was not sufficient in itself 
to maintain the Unionists in power. The Muslim wing of the Party consti­
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tuted a loose structure of family and landed alliances rather than a 
dynamic political force, united by a strong ideology. Nor was there a 
tradition of collective responsibility and strict adherence to party 
discipline. Its history had been marked by factionalism even in the pre 
-election period, when Sikander and his associates had challenged Fazl- 
i-Husain. Sikander, who was only too aware of such rivalries,^ feared 
that they could precipitate a ministerial crisis, or even cost the Party 
its majority in the Legislature.
That Sikander was determined to reduce this danger, and weld the 
existing rival factions, such as the Noon-Tiwana clan of Sargodha and 
the Daultanas of Mailsi, into a moderately cohesive whole is apparent 
from his judicious distribution of cabinet and parliamentary posts.
They were clearly intended to achieve a balance between the Muslim 
groups in his party, and to secure a commitment from the most influ­
ential politicians in each, and thereby their followers, to the survival 
of his administrations; hence the appointments of Khizar Hayat Khan 
Tiwana as Minister of Public Works and Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana as the 
liiionist Chief Whip (Ffeb. 1957). Sikander a]so supported and secured the election 
of Chaudhri Sir Shahab-ud-Din, a former rival^ as Speaker of the Punjab 
Assembly, Similarly Parliamentary Secretaryships were conferred on 
Sheikh Faiz Muhammad, Begum Shah Nawaz and Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, 
whilst Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani, Syed Amjad Ali Shah and Nawabzada Muhammad 
Faiyaz Ali Khan were installed as Parliamentary Private Secretaries.*^ By 
these means Sikander secured the co-operation of a cross-section of the 
most influential Muslim political factions including the Noons and 
Tiwanas, the Daultanas, the Arain Mians of Baghbanpura, the Gurmanis of 
Muzaffargarh and the Khokars of Jhelum, In addition the appointment 
given to Ghazanfar Ali, who abandoned the Muslim League as a result, 
deprived that organisation of the only landed support it possessed in 
the Assembly.^
Also in selecting office bearers Sikander shrewdly rewarded his 
non-Muslim supporters. Thus whilst the appointments of Chhotu Ram as 
Minister for Development, and of Tikka Ram and Sardar Gopal Singh as 
Parliamentary Secretary and Parliamentary Private Secretary^ emphasised 
the non-communal character of the Ministry, they also acknowledged the 
substantial contribution which the Hindu Jat contingent led by Chhotu 
Ram had made to the initial Unionist majority of 15 seats, in that they 
had captured 13 constituencies for the Unionist Party.10
Despite the presence of these Hindu Jats, and of four Unionist rep­
resentatives from the minor communities (one Anglo-Indian, one European,
11
two Indian Christians), the Party was dominated by the Muslim element,
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as 78 of the original 95 Unionist M.L.As. were Muslims. Consequently 
it remained highly vulnerable to the possible development of factional­
ism. In order to combat this the Premier sought to increase the strength 
of the Ministry in the Legislature through the inclusion of non-Muslim, 
non-Unionist parties, to reduce the risk of the Party losing its majority 
should a split occur in the Muslim wing. In pursuing this objective 
Sikander was aided by the fact that two influential minority leaders -
Sir Sunder Singh Majithia and Raja Narendra Nath - were anxious to reach
!
an understanding with the Unionists. Majithia, the leader of the Sikh
Khalsa National Board Party, had been instructed by his followers to take
whatever action he considered necessary to ensure that their party shared
13in the formation of the Ministry. It was a natural desire considering
that the Khalsa in common with the Unionist Party was rural based, and
therefore anxious to pursue in partnership with the Unionist Government
an economic programme reflecting the interests of the majority of its
members. Sikander welcomed this development for not only were the Sikhs
the only important minority community which remained unrepresented on
the Unionist benches, but the Khalsa Party was the major Sikh organisat-
15ion in the Assembly, and it was considered to be far less communal
than its main political contender, the Sikh Akali Party. Accordingly on
1 March 1937 Khalsa support for the Unionist Government was assured by
16the appointment of Majithia as Minister of Revenue and the accommo­
dation of two of his Khalsa associates, Sardar Ujjal Singh and Sardar
Jagjit Singh as Parliamentary Secretary and Parliamentary Private Secret- 
17ary respectively. (
The resulting coalition represented, apart from the Premier's 
tactical motives an alliance of rural economic interests. The merger 
which took place between the Unionists and Raja Narendra Nath's support­
ers,however, occurred for completely different reasons. Although the
18Raja was a wealthy landlord, he controlled a contingent of ten urban 
Hindu politicians who had formed themselves into the Punjab Nationalist 
Progressive Party (P.N.P.P.) in February 1937.1^ This group desired to 
work with the Unionist majority in the hope that it would be able to 
exercise a restraining influence over future Unionist legislation, which 
was generally expected to favour rural at the expense of urban interests. 
Sikander for his part was anxious to placate Narendra Nath as he had 
previously threatened to invoke the special responsibilities of the 
Governor to protect minority affairs if the Ministry exhibited any anti- 
urban bias.^ Thus this political marriage between the pro-rural 
Unionist-Khalsa coalition and the P.N.P.P., resulting as it did from 
conflicting motives, was doomed to failure. Although an alliance was
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concluded in April 1937 it was short-lived. The eventual rupture was
precipitated in October 1938 by the Government's Registration of Money- 
22lenders Bill. In spite of an appeal by Narendra Nath to the Governor 
the bill became law, consequently the P.N.P.P. joined the opposition 
benches.^
Despite the fact that the association of the P.N.P.P. with the 
Administration proved to be an uneasy alliance, the inclusion of that 
Party and the Khalsa group in the Unionist coalition was an achievement 
on Sikander's part, in that it increased the initial Unionist majority 
of 15 to 65, as by April 1937'the Premier commanded the allegiance of 
120 M.L.As. in a House of 175* Thus the Ministry had been substantially 
bolstered against the possibility of it losing its over-all majority 
should any Muslim defections occur. The eventual withdrawal of the 
P.N.P.P. did nothing to damage this stability, because by the time it 
occurred, the Premier had neutralised the Muslim League in the Province, 
preventing it from becoming a serious focus for Muslim opposition to the 
Ministry, or the vehicle for disaffected Muslim Unionists.
Sikander had acted at the Lucknow session of the A.I.M.L. held in 
October 1937 to contain any future League threat, by concluding a formal 
agreement with Jinnah, known as the Sikander-Jinnah Pact. Under the 
terms of the 'Pact* Sikander undertook to advise all the Muslim Unionists 
to join the A.I.M.L.; the Provincial League Parliamentary Board was to 
be reconstituted to function under Unionist control; Muslim Unionist can­
didates were to contest all future elections on the A.I.M.L. ticket, on
the understanding that following such elections they would remain
2kmembers of the Unionist Party. The most important commitment, however,
from the point of view of Sikander's League strategy, concerned his
pledge that Muslim Unionists would support Jinnah in all-India politics,
in return for which the A.I.M.L. would refrain from interfering in the
provincial sphere - there the position and ascendancy of the Unionist
25Party would remain unchanged.
Penderel Moon, a former I.G.S. officer in the Punjab cadre, has
attributed another motive for Sikander seeking a pact with Jinnah.
Though he recognised correctly that the Premier was concerned to prevent
the A.I.M.L. from fermenting factionalism and resultant fragmentation
amongst Muslim Unionists, he has suggested that there already existed a
strong desire on the part of the Muslim membership of the Party for a
political accommodation with the League which pressurised the Premier
26into coming to terms with Jinnah. This interpretation, however, 
suggests that both Jinnah and the A.I.M.L. enjoyed a much greater degree 
of support in 1937 amongst Muslim Unionist M.L.As. than was actually the
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case. This is apparent from the fact that by December 1937 no Muslim
27
Unionist had formally joined the League in protest over the Provincial
League*s claim that as a consequence of Sikander*s agreement with Jinnah
28the Unionist Party was subordinate to the A.I.M.L. Even those Muslim
Unionists who eventually signed League membership forms in February 1938
added the proviso that their affiliation was to remain subject to the
29
terms of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact. Thus it was Sikander and not 
Jinnah who commanded the loyalty of the Muslim Unionists. In fact 
Jinnah did not possess any real power in the Punjab, his supporters were 
limited to a small group of urban Muslim politicians, only one of whom - 
Barkat Ali - held a seat in the Legislature. Consequently Sikander had 
not been forced to accommodate Jinnah, rather he had exploited the weak­
ness of the A.I.M.L. in the Punjab to ensure that he could dictate the 
course Unionist - League relations would follow rather than leave 
the process to the arbitration of time.
Even so other considerations had shaped Sikander*s League policy.
He was opposed to the idea of Federation as envisaged by the 1935 Act 
because he believed that it would lead to the complete domination of the 
Subcontinent and thereby the Muslims by the Hindu-controlled Congress^ 
the Act had guaranteed to Muslims only 33 ^  of the seats in the Council 
of State and the Federal Assembly, relegating the community to the 
position of a permanent minority. The Premier's conviction had been
shaped to a great extent by the Congress's treatment of the A.I.M.L. in
31the immediate post-election period. No Congress - League electoral 
pact had existed, but the A.M.I.L. leaders had produced a manifesto which 
was in broad accord with the Congress programme. Through this tactic the 
League leadership hoped to share in government in the Hindu majority 
provinces, but the Congress Party which enjoyed overwhelming majorities 
in seven of the 11 provinces in British India was under no political 
pressure to accommodate Muslim Leaguers, and as such it was prepared to
32
include in its administrations only those Muslims who were Congressites.
The Premier's apprehension, concerning Congress, was further aggravated
by Nehru's (Congress President, 1936-37) attitude during his visit to the
Punjab during the autumn of 1937* Emerson, the Governor of the Punjab,
noted that the outstanding impression created by Nehru had been one of
domination and arrogance:
"It is this domineering and arrogant spirit which is 
causing most bitter resentment and which affected the 
Muslims most at Lucknow. I think it strongly influenced 
Sikander in taking the step which he has taken."53
Sikander re-affirmed this view when he informed Craik, Emerson's successcr,
in October 19^ -0 that one of the reasons he and his Muslim supporters
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joined the A.I.M.L. was to consolidate Muslim opinion vis-a-vis the Con­
gress, and to impress upon the British that Muslim claims could not be
■5 If
ignored in the framing of any new constitution for India.
M.A.H.Ispahani (M.L.A.Bengal; Member,A.I.M.L.Working Committee,
 ^19kl-k7) an ardent Jinnliite, though aware of Sikander*s national concern 
regarding the Congress,has attempted to interpret the Sikarder-Jinrah E&ct 
in the most favourable light for the A.I.M.L.,which according to Ispa­
hani had attracted a wide following in the Punjab by October 1937-In fact 
Ispahani has claimed that Sikander urgently needed League support to
counter the mass-contact programme which the Congress had launched in all 
33the provinces. Such an explanation,however,is naive and inaccurate; in
fact it was Jinnah who was extremely anxious to gain the support of the
36Muslim Unionist group. The 1937 elections had emphasised that the Mus­
lim League was *all-Indian* in name only. Neither Jinnah nor his organi­
sation enjoyed any substantial popularity nor could they seriously claim
to represent the Indian Muslims in future negotiations of a national 
37character. Its poor performance at the polls clearly revealed that it 
possessed no real power to challenge the Congress at the all-India level, 
while in the provincial sphere the Unionist Party had already established 
its ascendancy over the Congress which had captured only 15 of the seats
7(J
in the Provincial Assembly. Moreover following the election the Congress
did not pose any threat to the Unionists as it remained firmly identified
39with minority urban interests, and had failed to wean any non-Muslim,
pro-Unionist leaders such as Chhotu Ram or Sunder Singh Majithia to its
side. Consequently Sikander did not need the A.I.M.L. to shore up the
Unionist political fortress.
In reality the Pact gave substance to the A.I.M.L.’s claim to be a
national organisation; thus the League,and not the Unionist Party,was the
main beneficiary. As Choudhry Khaliquzzaman(M.L.A.,U.P.1936-^5,Member of
A.I.M.L.,Working Committee) has conceded. "No one can deny that without
this action on the part of Sir Sikander the Muslim League fight would have
ifO
been confined to minority provinces alone...". The Punjab Premier*s
support, for the League precipitated similar declarations by the Muslim Premiers
of Bengal and Assam (Fazlul Huq and Sadullah Khan) and as Professor
Coupland recorded "The League had thus suddenly acquired a prestige among
A-1Moslems throughout India such as it had never enjoyed before...".
Sikander had been central to the process of rejuvenating the League
at the national level, and as such this gave him tremendous power over
the organisation in the Punjab, which helps to explain why his rapproch-
ment with Jinnah did not unduly alarm his non-Muslim supporters, whom he
i+2had prepared for the move through discussions with Chhotu Ram, and
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through the columns of the Civil and Military Gazette. ^  Having con­
cluded the understanding with Jinnah,Sikander used the tremendous advan­
tage he had gained by being instrumental in repairing the fortunes of 
the A.I.M.L. to achieve his objective of preventing the League from be­
coming a focus of Muslim anti-Unionist opposition. Jinnah seems to have 
appreciated and accepted Sikander's strategy, and the provincial impli­
cations for the League as a result of the Pact. Subsequent events prcved 
that he was prepared to sacrifice the existing loyal local League, and 
abdicate control over it in favour of Sikander, in order to sustain the 
illusion of a united, national Muslim League, the presence of which was 
essential to substantiate his claims to be the leader of the Indian 
Muslims. When for instance Barkat Ali, the Secretary of the Punjab 
Muslim League, issued a statement in October 1937 to the effect that the
•Pact' represented a complete surrender on the part of the Unionist
kk
Party to the A.I.M.L., Jinnah was not prepared to substantiate the
claim. Sikander, in a letter of protest over Barkat Ali's assertion,
seized the opportunity to impress on Jinnah and thereby the local League,
the total dominance of the Unionist party over League affairs:
"I hope you would kindly inform Sir Mohammad Iqbal 
[^President, Punjab Muslim League] that one of the con­
ditions on which I agreed to advise the Muslim Unionists 
to join the League was that we should have a controlling 
voice in the provincial League organisations. Another 
thing which you might mention ... is that the present 
Unionist Party will continue and function as at present 
and that the only change contemplated by us was that the 
Muslim Unionist members will become members of the Muslim 
League and Malik Barkat Ali will join the Unionist Party.
Jinnah's failure to refute Sikander's claim, or offer any support 
to Barkat Ali caused Ghulam Rasul (Financial Secretary, Provincial 
Muslim League) to complain bitterly to the A.I.M.L. President that the 
’pact' was tantamount to a sell-out of his loyal supporters in the 
Punjab. He criticised the fact that seven of the 11 seats reserved for 
Punjab Leaguers on the Central Parliamentary Board had been allotted to 
Unionists, whilst only three had been given to members of the Provincial 
League. Neither K.B. Malik Zaman Mehdi Khan, the Deputy President of
Lf.
the Punjab Muslim League, nor Rasul himself figured in the list. Iqbal 
also wrote to Jinnah in similar vein, stressing that if the 'Pact' was 
allowed to proceed it would place the local League completely at the 
mercy of the Unionists. Whilst Iqbal was not unduly concerned by the 
fact that the 'Pact' had permitted the establishment of Unionist control 
over the Provincial League's Parliamentary Board, he thoroughly depre­
cated Sikander's desire to orchestrate "a complete change in the office 
holders of the League..." and to place "the finances of the League..."
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under the control of "his men”:
"All this to my mind amounts to capturing the League
and then killing it ..... I cannot take the respons­
ibility of handing over the League to Sir Sikandar
and his friends." '
Iqbal, however, had no choice in the matter; his pleas failed to
move Jinnah, or persuade him to protect the 'Old Guard' of the Provincial
Muslim League. Jinnah was not in a strong enough position to challenge
the Unionists, nor was he prepared to sacrifice his alliance with them.
In replying to Iqbal's and Ghulam Rasul's complaints, whilst Jinnah
avoided any detailed discussion of the terms of the Pact, he made it
perfectly clear that he was prepared to accept Unionist dominance of
League affairs in the Punjab, and he virtually ordered Iqbal and his
colleagues to resign themselves to it:
"once the Muslim members of the Unionist Party or any 
Mussalman who becomes a leagure jjsic]]] and pledges him­
self to the creed, Policy and Programme, he is no longer 
any thing else but a leaguer ... After that there is no 
such thing as this group or that group, or that party or ,„ 
this party, because then it really means various cliques." °
Abandoned by Jinnah,the Punjab League was isolated, and completely 
at the mercy of Sikander. One gesture of defiance remained to it but 
that proved ineffective. In order to re-organise the Provincial Leagues, 
and to affiliate them with the central body the A.I.M.L. asked the Local 
Leagues to furnish by 15 March 1938 the names of all office-bearers and 
details of their various branches to a sub-committee consisting of 
Ismail Khan (prominent Muslim Leaguer from U.P.) and Liaquat Ali Khan 
(Secretary, A.I.M.L.). The Provincial Leagues were also asked to nomi­
nate representatives for the Council of the A.I.M.L.. Accordingly the
Punjab Muslim League recommended 19 nominees, none of whom were Unionists,
z+9
as none of the latter had so far accepted League membership. In by­
passing the Unionists in this way the Punjab League had hoped to out­
manoeuvre Sikander and establish its independence by placing its own 
stalwarts on the A.I.M.L. Council. Jinnah, however, could not permit 
the ruse to succeed, and the local League's recommendations were re­
jected on the grounds that its constitution was not in accord with that
50of the Central League. Furthermore in April 1938 the A.I.M.L. refused 
affiliation to the existing Punjab Muslim League, and a committee of 30
members, 22 of whom were to be appointed by Sikander, was empowered by
51
Jinnah to organise a new Provincial League.
Batalwi in recalling these events in his work 'Iqbal ke Akiri do
sal' has claimed that Liaquat Ali Khan, who was very sympathetic to
52Sikander, was instrumental in engineering this rebuttal, but it could
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not have been executed without Jinnah's approval. It is certainly true 
that as a large landholder in the U.P. and the Karnal District of the 
Eastern Punjab, and the brother of a Unionist M.L.A., Liaquat did possess 
a vested interest in the Unionist Party, but Jinnah had a greater invest­
ment ; his credibility as an all-India leader would have suffered immeas­
urably if he had supported the 'Old Guard' in the Punjab, and thereby 
forfeited the Unionist alliance. Consequently the Punjab Muslim League 
ultimately fell victim to Jinnah's ambition and appreciation of political 
necessities and realities, and Sikander's determination to manipulate 
the hold he had over Jinnah to thwart Muslim League interference in the 
Punjab.
Sikander's ascendancy over the Punjab League was established. Dedi­
cated 'old leaguers' were removed from office to be replaced by Unionist 
sympathisers; Iqbal had been superseded in March 1938 by Nawab Shahnawaz 
Khan of Mamdot, an extremely influential Unionist landlord. The removal 
of Iqbal, who at the time was critically ill, was reputedly achieved by 
Mamdot's promise to Barkat Ali of fiscal support for the Provincial 
League, the finances of which were exhausted.^ By June 1939 Unionist 
adherents had also been appointed to the posts of Secretary (Mian Ramzan 
Ali), Organising Secretary (Mahammad Ali Jaafari) and Financial Secret­
ary (Mian Amir-ud-Din). Under Sikander's 'patronage' the local League 
was allowed to stagnate to the point of disintegration; nearly two years 
after the conclusion of the Sikander - Jinnah Pact there were only six 
district and city Muslim Leagues in the Province, as compared to 27 
district Leagues, and 10^ primary branches which had functioned pre­
viously.
Despite Sikander*s victory Barkat Ali continued to strive to free 
the League from the Unionist morass. His criticisms of Sikander's neg­
lect of League affairs helped to give birth, in June 1939i to the Punjab 
Muslim League Radical Party. This organisation publicly declared its 
intent to "combat the rising influence of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan with 
the Punjab Muslim League", insisting that
"Neither the Congress nor British Imperialism is the 
real enemy of the Muslim League movement in the Punjab.
The real danger ... is from those who are now dominating 
it ... under the cloak of friendship."33
The emergence of this group, combined with Barkat Ali's continued 
voluble dissatisfaction, compelled the A.I.M.L. to take note of the un­
satisfactory state of the Punjab League, but its impotence in the Prov­
ince dictated that it adopt a cautious, reconciliatory, and in the final 
analysis, ineffectual approach to the problem. Especially as urban 
politicians and movements, as epitomised by Barkat Ali and the 'Radicals'
183
could not intimidate Sikander, because the rural areas, the power-base 
of provincial politics, remained firmly in the Unionists' grip. Thus 
although in August 1939 the A.I.M.L. Council considered a resolution 
calling for the dissolution of the Unionist controlled Punjab League 
Organising Committee on account of its incompetence, Liaquat Ali Khan 
ensured that it would not be carried. He was determined to prevent any 
action which would cost the A.I.M.L. its Unionist support, consequently 
at his suggestion Sikander was given until 15 November 1939 to establish 
a viable League in the Punjab, after which time a sub-committee consist­
ing of the Raja of Mahmudabad (M.L.A., U.P., Member Working Committee, 
A.I.M.L.), Nawab Ismail Khan and Khaliquzzaman would decide whether the 
new provincial body would be affiliated to the Central League.^ The 
Punjab Premier, confident that Jinnah was unable to act against him, did 
nothing to repair the fortunes of the Provincial League, an omission 
which caused Barkat Ali to attempt to launch an organisation independent 
of Unionist control, which he hoped would be recognised by the A.I.M.L. 
as the official League in the Punjab, Sikander, however, defeated Barkat 
Ali's manoeuvre; he informed Khaliquzzaman that he had no intention of 
recognising Barkat Ali's association, and he alleged that the majority 
of the branches which the latter had claimed to have founded did not 
exist. The investigations of the Mahmudabad Committee corroborated the 
Premier's allegation, as it was discovered that many of the branches 
cited by Barkat Ali were "totally bogus".^ The Committee had no option, 
therefore, but to accept and endorse Sikander's continuing control over 
the Punjab Muslim League. The result was the strangulation of that body; 
no wonder that it was not until November 19*f2 that the first annual 
session of the Provincial League was convened,^ and that almost two 
years after Sikander's death it remained an ineffective body, Mumtaz 
Daultana (General Secretary, Punjab Muslim League) ruefully admitting in 
July 19*f*+ that most of the district leagues in the Province "had exis­
tence only on paper."59
Jinnah was totally unable to reverse this trend. The power which 
Sikander enjoyed over the League President in the provincial sphere was 
further demonstrated in March 19*K). League opinion had been outraged by
Sikander's harsh treatment of the Khaksar movement in the Pwnab: in March 19*40 
the
IChaksars ('humble ones') - a militant Muslim organisation founded by 
Allama Mashriqi in 1931 ~ had been banned on Sikander's orders following 
clashes with the police which had resulted in the deaths of 36 Khaksars.^0 
No less than six resolutions condemning the Punjab Premier's action had 
been tabled for discussion by the annual session of the A.I.M.L. sched­
uled to convene in Lahore at the end of March. Consequently Sikander
I8*f
warned Jinnah that if as a result any steps were taken to censure either
his Government or himself then he and his Muslim followers would resign
from the League. Jinnah bowed to Sikander's threat. At the Lahore
session of the A.I.M.L. he directed the delegates to accept Sikander's
statement, in which the latter claimed that malign forces had attempted
to exploit the Khaksar incident in order to discredit him and disrupt
League unity, after which Jinnah ruled that no further discussion was
necessary on the subject.^ Jinnah's compliance in the matter caused the
Punjab Governor to observe correctly,
"His [[jinnah's]J primary objective was, of course, to 
preserve unity in the League, and I do not suppose 
that he was actuated by any particular consideration 
for Sikander or his Ministry."62
By the end of 1939 and the beginning of 19*K), therefore, Sikander
had expanded the strength of his Ministry in the Assembly, subjugated the
Provincial Muslim League and compromised Jinnah. In order to maintain
his own pre-eminence, however, he had been careful also to appeal to and
satisfy the personal vanities of many of his Unionist supporters; by the
time the New Year's Honours List was announced in January 1939, over
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one-third of the Unionist M.L.As. had been 'rewarded' with titles.
The importance which Sikander attached to this exercise can be gauged 
from the fact that two years after first taking office he was forced to 
work a fourteen-hour day because, as Craik revealed, in addition to con­
ducting the administration, he was obliged to consider requests for 
patronage from M.L.As. who regarded the acquisition of honours and honor-
ary appointments as legitimate recompense for the expenses they had
6k
incurred m  contesting the elections.
In spite of the undoubted ascendancy which Sikander enjoyed in the 
Punjab as a consequence of his policies and actions, some British commen­
tators have propagated the erroneous view that he exhibited a degree of 
weakness in his relationship with Jinnah, tantamount to surrender.^ In 
reality Sikander conducted a concerted, though largely unsuccessful cam­
paign against Jinnah at the national level, concurrent with his provin­
cial strategy. Essentially he sought to diminish the A.I.M.L, Presi­
dent's influence to further safeguard his own standing in the Punjab by 
promoting his own prospects as a contender for the mantle of national 
Muslim leadership. Broadly speaking the battle Sikander and Jinnah waged 
centred around two issues - the attitude which the Muslim League should 
adopt regarding the assistance, if any, it should offer to the British 
during the Second World War, and their respective concepts of a national 
policy to protect and promote Muslim interests regarding future consti­
tutional developments. Their views on these matters were irreconcilably
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opposed, as both advanced conflicting programmes which each believed 
would strengthen their respective position against the other. Also to 
begin with Sikander was encouraged in pursuing this quest by the belief 
that Jinnah's control within the A.I.M.L. was diminishing.^ Jinnah, 
however, was far from being a spent force, and whilst political necessity- 
dictated that he should resign himself for the time being to a subser­
vient r£>le in the Punjab, he could not, and did not, permit Sikander to 
erode his dominance or damage his prestige in the national sphere.
In resisting Sikander*s intrusion at the all-India level Jinnah 
possessed the tremendous advantage of having concluded a secret under­
standing with the Viceroy, Linlithgow, a factor which dissuaded the 
latter from encouraging Sikander's extra-Punjab ambitions at Jinnah's 
expense. In fact the Viceroy and League President were collaborators, 
united by their common fear of the Indian National Congress. From the 
latter half of 1939 Jinnah and the Viceroy sought to protect their res­
pective positions. Linlithgow wished to deny mounting Congress pressure 
for radical political reforms, which crystalised in October 1939 in a 
demand for immediate independence for India as the basis for securing
Cn
the country's willing participation in the war. Conversely Jinnah 
needed to destroy the Congress claim to represent all the Indian commu­
nities, the Muslims included, in order to maintain an independent iden­
tity for the A.I.M.L. The League President was also motivated by his 
desire to reinforce his position against the intrigues of Sikander.
The foundations for his relationship with the Viceroy had been laid 
in August 1938 when Jinnah had secretly advocated British - League col­
laboration to prevent the Congress from embarrassing either party; he 
suggested to Brabourne (Governor of Bengal, acting Governor-General) 
that the British 'should make friends with the Muslims by "protecting" 
them in the Congress Provinces and that, if we did that the Muslims 
would "protect" us at the Centre.'68 In March 1939 in a further attempt 
to solicit the Viceroy's support Jinnah had confided to Linlithgow that 
he was not averse to the continuation of British rule. He stated that 
it was uncertain whether or not the British would leave India, and, in 
such circumstances, though the Muslims had to show themselves to be as 
nationalistic as any other community by abusing the rulers loudly and 
publicly, they might co-operate with the British behind the scenes as 
long as the latter did not abdicate power.^ This expressed preference 
for British, as opposed to Congress, rule was expanded by Jinnah in May 
1939, when he stressed to Linlithgow India's dependence on the British, 
and his conviction that those who had pressed for political reform had 
not considered the matter carefully, but had been swept along by a
186
"natural desire for home rule" and an "equally natural objection ... to 
government by aliens". Jinnah also intimated to the Viceroy his belief 
that India was not "competent to run a democracy...", and that he could 
see no solution to the problems facing the country "should the British 
depart." ^
When, therefore, in September 1939 Jinnah sought Linlithgow's aid
to contain Sikander, and prevent him from disrupting League unity over
the contentious issue of Muslim support for the war, the Viceroy already
regarded the League President as a potentially useful ally. Sikander in
fact had pledged that the Punjab would assist the war effort before the
A.I.M.L. had made its views known. Jinnah had hoped to use the issue to
exact concessions from the Government of India, having publicly declared
in September 1939 that A.I.M.L. assistance would only be forthcoming if
Britain took "Muslim India into its confidence through their accredited
organisation - the All-India Muslim League...", and would agree not to
71permit any constitutional advance without the consent of the League. '
Sikander*s pledge, therefore, threatened to undermine Jinnah's strategy.
In discussing this conflict with the Viceroy, however, Jinnah was careful
not to depreciate Sikander's loyalty, but he pointed out that whilst he
privately shared the Punjab leader's sentiments, as a public figure he
72could not emulate them/ It was a valid argument for if Jinnah had 
endorsed Sikander's pledge he would have exposed himself to an immediate 
Congress charge that he had betrayed the nationalist cause in support of 
an imperialistic war. ?3 jn Spite of the inconsistency between his 
private utterances and public declaration, Jinnah had attempted to re­
assure the Viceroy sufficiently to dissuade him from sponsoring Sikander 
as a rival spokesman for Muslim India - a role which Jinnah emphasised 
was beyond the Punjab Premier's capabilities:
"Sikander alone could not, he Qjinnah] assured me 
^Linlithgow], deliver the goods.... Mr..Jinnah again 
pressed me to help him with Sikander."^
Linlithgow's desire to cultivate a united League as a counter to
the Congress caused the Viceroy to meet Jinnah's request concerning
Sikander, and to sustain his contention that the A.I.M.L.should be solely
responsible for expressing the Muslim point of view. The degree of
understanding which as a result existed between the British and League
leaders was apparent from Linlithgow's report of a meeting he had with
Jinnah on 5 October 1939:
"he thanked me ... for what I had done to assist him 
in keeping his party [A.I.M.L,] together and expressed 
great gratitude for this. I said that it was clearly 
unsatisfactory that while one of the two great parties
18?
was well-organised and well-equipped to pursue its 
objectives ... that the other, equally of great im­
portance, should be masked ... by any failure to 
secure an adequate mouthpiece. It was in the public 
interest that the Muslim Point of view should be fully 
and completely expressed.”^
Political necessity had driven the Viceroy and Jinnah into each
others’ arms. Linlithgow was an ardent imperialist in spite of his
championing of the 1935 Act, whilst Jinnah despite his emergence as a
nationalist leader, preferred the continuation of British rule to the
prospect of an independent Hindu-dominated India. In urging Indian
leaders to accept Federation and Dominion status as the only possible
constitutional goal, Linlithgow sought to harness the deadlock which he
knew would persist from the Congress refusal to abandon its quest for
complete independence, and its failure to placate Muslim fears of future
subjugation. He believed that the inability of the two major nationalist
parties to settle their differences would thus ensure the future of the
76Raj ’’for many years”. This stratagem contained one flaw, however, the 
remote possibility that eventually the Congress might agree to the pro­
posed constitution (1935 Act). To prepare for that eventuality, and 
thereby prevent Congress from accelerating home rule, Linlithgow ensured 
that no political progress would be possible without the consent of the 
A.I.M.L. - a development virtually precluded by the latter’s opposition 
to majority rule. In order to secure this objective the Viceroy on 17 
October 1939 refused to consider the Congress demand for immediate inde­
pendence; he reiterated that Dominion Status remained the sole ambition 
of the British Government, and that that would only be considered follow­
ing the conclusion of the war, when full weight would be given to the 
opinions of the minorities.77 In inducing the British Government to 
approve the minority principle Linlithgow drew the attention of Zetland, 
the Secretary of State for India, to the political advantage it would 
confer by giving Britain considerable room to manoeuvre:
"I would see advantage in drawing pointed attention in 
debate to the assurances to the minorities ... that full 
weight would be given to their views and their interests 
... and to the fact that ... agreement between Indians 
themselves ... must be the precondition of constitutional 
. progress...78
Zetland, for his part, agreed to the Viceroy’s strategy because he
believed that any attempt to force a constitution on the Muslims without
79their consent would lead to civil war. Assured of the Secretary of 
State's support Linlithgow proceeded to present Jinnah with a veto on any 
future constitutional progress; on 1 November 1939 he informed Gandhi and 
Rajendra Prasad (Congress leader from Bihar) in Jinnah' s presence that the return
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to democratic government in the provinces, and any expansion of the 
Executive Council would only be contemplated if the Congress and the
81A.I.M.L. reached agreement.
Jinnah fully appreciated the tremendous service which the Viceroy
had rendered to him and the League and he proved amenable to repaying the
debt by refusing a request from Gandhi for the Congress and the A.I.M.L.
"to get together ... to present a joint claim for the declaration Tof
8 2immediate independence]] that Congress wanted..." . He effectively 
ensured that there would be no future co-operation between his organi­
sation and the Congress by insisting on a series of conditions to cement 
a rapprochement between the two parties which were totally unacceptable 
to Congress leaders: the establishment of coalition Ministries in the
provinces subject to the proviso that the respective Assemblies would 
refuse to sanction any legislation which provoked the disapproval of 
two-thirds of the Muslim M.L.As.; the singing of Bande Matram (the Con­
gress anthem) and the flying of Congress flags on public holidays was to 
be terminated, and the Congress mass-contact programme, in respect of 
Muslims, was to be suspended.^ This outcome clearly satisfied the Vice­
roy who candidly admitted to Zetland in November 1939 that Jinnah
"had given me very valuable help by standing firm against 
Congress claims and I was duly grateful. It was clear 
that if he ... had supported the Congress ... and con­
fronted me with a joint demand []for independence]]], the 
strain upon me and upon His Majesty's Government would 
have been very great i n d e e d . " ^
Linlithgow had good cause, therefore, to value his understanding with 
Jinnah: "it is ... of real value that at this moment a body represent­
ing some 90,000,000 people should offer us co-operation".^ For thus
assured of Jinnah1s help, in whose position he admitted to have "a vested
86interest" Linlithgow could brush aside Congress insistence for complete 
independence.
Sikander, unaware that Linlithgow's 'vested interest' in Jinnah had 
seriously prejudiced his hopes of success, determined to achieve a 
national r£le to resist the League President. In August 1939 in a step 
towards achieving this goal he published his recommendations for the 
creation of an Indian Federation. In launching this initiative he hoped 
to prevent the formulation of extreme demands by the A.I.M.L. As a mem­
ber of the League committee which had been appointed in March 1936 to 
consider the question of constitutional reform he was acutely aware of 
the growing support within the A.I.M.L. for the creation of one or more
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Muslim States in India. It was a development which Sikander was deter­
mined to thwart having confided to Penderel Moon (Secretary to Governor,
189
Punjab)
•'that unless positive proposals such as his were put 
forward for consideration other people would come out 
with 'something worse'. The 'something worse' to which 
he referred was the idea of Pakistan... •
Sikander was opposed to the concept of a Muslim State on two counts; he
89believed 'Pakistan' would precipitate a communal war in the Punjab, and
he knew that if created it would lead to the political ascendancy of
Jinnah at his own expense.
Nevertheless one other consideration had moulded his scheme - his
determination to protect his co-religionists, particularly those in the
majority Muslim provinces, from the prospect of Congress, and thereby 
90
Hindu domination. In order to guard against this eventuality he propos­
ed the creation of a federal structure in which the power of the Central 
Government would be limited to a few specific subjects - Defence, Exter­
nal Affairs, Communications, Customs - and in which the provinces would 
enjoy the maximum autonomy, having virtual control over their own 
finances. He argued that such a structure would ensure the co-operation 
of both the Muslim majority provinces and the Princely States, as their 
integrity and authority would not be diminished.
Though he had attempted to gain official approval for his propo­
sition by providing for the continuation, through Dominion status, of the
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British connection on "a firm and permanent footing" and by arguing that
his proposals would strengthen the British presence at the expense of the
nationalist parties by broadening the political spectrum, his ideas
failed to impress the British. The Government of India and the India
Office deprecated Sikander's blatant attempt to cripple central activi- 
93ties. ^ Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, condemned the pro­
posals as "a nightmare",^ whilst Linlithgow dismissed them because he 
believed that Sikander in striving "to prevent a Hindu majority in the 
all-India Legislature" really intended to "put off Federation",as con­
ceived by the 1935 Act, altogether.^  As such its purpose appeared to 
threaten the Viceroy's concept of the stratagem necessary to prolong 
British rule: "The moment we weaken in our resolution to push Feder­
ation through we shall find ourselves without a policy and without a 
future."9^
Similarly Sikander*s suggestions neither excited nor won Indian 
approval or support. Although Congress spokesmen refrained from publicly 
criticising them in the hope that they might provide a basis for negoti­
ation with moderate League leaders,9? they were clearly unacceptable to 
the Congress because they denied strong central authority. Conversely 
Muslim League opinion remained highly suspicious of any form of Feder­
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ation in concert with the Hindu majority. The A.I.M.L. fulfilling
Sikander’s fears was in fact moving rapidly towards a formal call for an
independent State. On l8 September 1939 it formally resolved to abandon
Federation as a political goal and review the situation, ^  and in the
following month Jinnah in an interview with the Manchester Guardian,
which was widely circulated in the Indian press, categorically stated
that Sikander*s proposition neither emanated from, nor had any binding
effect on the A.I.M.L. 99 jt was in March 19^0, however, that Jinnah by
demanding the division of India delivered the final coup de grace to
Sikander's federal plan thereby completely destroying his attempt to pose
as an architect of Muslim national policy: the A.I.M.L.at its Lahore
session (23 March) insisted that:
"no constitutional plan would be workable ... or 
acceptable to the Muslims unless ... the areas in 
which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as 
in the north-western and eastern zones of India ... 
be grouped to constitute 'independent States’ in 
which the constituent units shall be autonomous and 
sovereign....”  ^00
In proclaiming this programme the actions of the A.I.M.L., though 
not the content of the Lahore resolution, seem to have been strongly in­
fluenced by Linlithgow. Throughout January and February 19^0 the Viceroy 
had counselled Jinnah that it was essential for the A.I.M.L. to formulate
positive proposals to enable it to sustain its opposition to the Congress,
101and to appeal for public and parliamentary support in Britain. A point
of view which was shared by Zetland.102 Jinnah appreciated the force of
Linlithgow’s argument:
”1 [[Viceroy^ ] again put to him QjinnalTJ the familiar 
arguments for formulating and publishing a constructive 
policy: and in the light of our discussion he said that
he was disposed to think that it would probably be wise
for his friends and himself to make public ... the out­
lines of their position in good time."10^
Not only did Jinnah indicate that he would act on the Viceroy’s advice,
but according to Khaliquzzaman Jinnah, on 3 February 19^0,
"informed the Viceroy that the Muslim League in its 
open session at Lahore on 23 March was going to ask 
for the partition of the country...."^0^
Linlithgow who personally did not agree with the Lahore demand, 
nevertheless welcomed it as a further means of thwarting the Congress: 
*'There is much that could be said in criticism of Jinnah's partition 
ideas and we clearly could not accept or endorse them", but he refused to
condemn the Lahore resolution because "I think ... it preferable to quote
it as illustrating the extent to which the gulf has widened between the 
parties...".10^ His whole purpose in spurring Jinnah into defining a
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political goal had been engineered to undermine the Congress, and now
that he had achieved that end he refused to abandon the advantage he
believed it afforded him:
”1 think it important to bring out ... that with the 
best will in the world to reach Dominion Status as 
early as possible His Majesty’s Government cannot ... 
override the views ... of the minorities, particularly 
the Muslims ... these ... recent developments have 
brought out more clearly than ever the lack of any 
substance for the Congress claim to be ... the mouth­
piece of India....” 106
The Lahore development, though clearly welcome to the Viceroy, was
completely unacceptable to Sikander. The resolution had greatly added to
Jinnah’s prestige, increasing his standing as the accredited national 
107Muslim leader. Furthermore it had seriously compromised Sikander, not
only as a provincial Muslim leader whose political philosophy was firmly
108wedded to inter-communal co-operation, but as a contestant to Jinnah in
the national orbit. Evidently that had been one of Jinnah's intentions,
for he had been careful to associate Sikander with the drafting of the
Lahore resolution, though the latter’s suggestions which closely mirrored
109his federal scheme, had been drastically amended. Thus by association 
if not by deed Sikander had been seen to lend his support to the proceed­
ings, especially as he had not criticised the partition demand: he admit­
ted to Malcolm Darling (former Financial Commissioner, Punjab, retired 
1939) that had he done so he would have forfeited his Muslim following, 
if not in the Punjab Assembly, certainly outside it.^^
Ever sensible of the dangers of openly opposing the creation of a 
Muslim homeland, he attempted to resolve the issue by publicly calling 
on the leaders of the major political parties to meet and devise a conmon 
programme for constitutional advance. He urged Linlithgow to assist the 
process through the appointment of a small representative body, to meet 
under the chairmanship of the Viceroy; Sikander suggested that 30 people
representing all sections of Indian life and including all the provincial
111Premiers should serve on it. Sikander in fact had sought to broaden 
the political spectrum to enable him, in concert with his fellow Muslim 
Premiers, to formulate a solution to the constitutional impasse inde­
pendent of Jinnah and the A.I.M.L.. In an attempt to gain Congress 
acceptance of, and participation with the enterprise Sikander met with
the Congress President, Abul Kalam Azad, on 13 June 19^0 to discuss his 
112proposals. Jinnah, realising that Sikander was attempting to out­
manoeuvre him, acted decisively to frustrate the move. On 16 June 19^0, 
Jinnah censured the Punjab Premier for seeing Azad without his authority, 
and he ensured that no future discussions would occur between Sikander or
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any other prominent Leaguer and the Congress, without his sanction.
Accordingly the A.I.M.L. Working Committee resolved that in order to
avoid any misunderstanding
"no member of the Working Committee should enter into 
any negotiations ... with the Congress leaders regard­
ing the question of H  Hindu Muslim settlement 
... without the permission of the President.'*
It was also resolved that Jinnah alone was entitled to conduct negoti-
113ations with the Viceroy on behalf of the A.I.M.L.. By these actions 
Jinnah established and demonstrated his dominance over Muslim national 
politics; Sikander had been effectively isolated, and his political 
initiative disposed of.
In an attempt to retrieve the situation Sikander counter-attacked to 
erode Jinnah*s position from within the League, by fermenting unrest over 
the League President's attitude to the War. Jinnah had offered co­
operation with the war effort on condition that the British Government 
would not make any declaration concerning the constitutional future of 
India "without the previous approval of Muslim India"; that Muslims 
would be guaranteed "an equal share in the authority and control.. 
of any governments which were established in the provinces and at the
Centre, and that the A.I.M.L. would be invited to serve in such adminis-
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trations even if the Congress refused to. In order to ensure unan­
imity amongst Leaguers concerning these demands the A.I.M.L. Working 
Committee on 16 June 19^0 forbade any of its members to serve on the war 
committees which were being established in the p r o v i n c e s . T h i s  order 
was opposed by Sikander; he had already pledged the support of the Punjab 
for the war e f f o r t a n d  he would have suffered considerable loss of 
face had he obeyed the League's directive, especially as he was the 
leader of the major recruiting province in India.Consequently he 
deliberately misinterpreted the League's ruling, claiming that it had 
exempted Muslim Ministers from the Punjab and Bengal. It was a blatantly 
false proposition, for Jinnah had unequivocally stated both to Mamdot
and Nazimuddin (Bengal member A.I.M.L. Working Committee) that the ban
119included all Leaguers, Ministers included. Despite Jinnah*s denial 
Sikander refused to comply,confident that the overwhelming support he 
enjoyed in the Punjab on the issue would restrain Jinnah from moving 
against him: of the 38 Muslim Unionist M.L.As. who had formally joined
the Provincial War Board (established 18 June 19^ +0) only one - Mamdot -
1PGreluctantly resigned in response to the A.I.M.L.'s June resolution.
Having openly flouted Jinnah*s authority in the Punjab Sikander 
attempted to solicit similar defiance in Bengal. There he found a ready 
ally, in that the Premier, Fazlul Huq, was equally concerned to limit
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Jinnah's influence. A Unionist propagandist, Amjad Ali, was despatched 
to Bengal in July 19^0 to court support for Sikander's stance, and to 
gain acceptance of the principle that Muslim Ministers were free to serve 
on war committees. In spite of the fact that a section of Bengal 
Leaguers, led by Huq were "only too happy to join hands with Sikander..." 
the move failed, because Nazimuddin and Ispahani were able to convince 
the majority that it would have been suicidal for national Muslim inter­
ests if Bengal encouraged a rift between the Punjab and Central League 
121leadership.
122Angered by Sikander's revolt both Barkal Ali and Ispahani re­
quested Jinnah to bring Sikander to heel. The latter warning that "If a 
halt is not called ... it is best that Sikandar and his counterpart in 
Bengal are made the dictators of the Muslim League."^23 jinnah, however, 
could do nothing. Though Jinnah claimed Sikander and Huq had given him 
written undertakings to resign as Premier if requested to do so,^^ he 
doubted whether either would honour their promises, and thus he felt 
unable to use the resignations to compromise the two Premiers, and force 
them to acknowledge the validity of the League's June directive.
Also he was restrained from confronting Sikander by the knowledge that 
such action would cost him the affiliation of the Unionist controlled 
Punjab League: Sikander had threatened that Jinnah’s attitude, if not
modified, would precipitate such a split.
Secure in his knowledge that his opposition to Jinnah over the war 
committee issue would not endanger his standing in the Punjab, and aware 
of a core of dissatisfaction in Bengal, Sikander appealed to the Viceroy 
to assist him to overthrow Jinnah. Through the mediation of the Punjab 
Governor, Sikander informed Linlithgow on 6 August 19^ +0 that he was con­
fident of being able to attract an all-Indian Muslim following if the 
Viceroy broke off negotiations with Jinnah, and recognised him as "the 
representative of Muslim opinion generally". In return for viceregal 
recognition Sikander undertook to rally Muslim support for the war effort 
and to negotiate a Muslim settlement with the Viceroy on the basis that
Muslims would be invited to join governments at the Centre and in the
127provinces even if the Congress refused to participate. (
The Viceroy ignored this overture. Two days after receiving it he 
announced the 'August Offer', which further entrenched Jinnah in power by 
insisting that the A.I.M.L. had a de facto veto on any future constitu­
tional reform:
(jThe British Government^ "could not contemplate transfer 
of their present responsibilities ... to any system of 
government whose authority is directly denied by large
and powerful elements in India’s national life.
Nor could they JjH.M.G.^ ] be parties to the coercion 
of such elements into submission to such a Government.”
19*f 
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Linlithgow's continuing commitment to Jinnah was further revealed on 8
October 19^0 when he deliberately concealed from Araery (Zetland's
successor) that there were elements in the A.I.M.L. - notably Sikander
and Huq - who were dissatisfied with Jinnah's leadership. He informed
the Secretary of State that the solidarity of the League combined with
the unanimous loyalty which Jinnah enjoyed, precluded any split occurrirg
in League ranks which the Government of India could exploit. In addition
Linlithgow made it perfectly clear that even if it had been possible to
orchestrate such a rupture, to do so would have been prejudicial to
British interests as it was essential to continue to counter the Congress
by preserving
"some authoritative mouth-piece of general Muslim 
opinion ... particularly in view of possible post-war 
constitutional discussions. Nor do we at a time
when we may have to take the Congress on •*... to 
antagonise the main organisation of [thej second 
largest party and community in this c o u n t r y . "  3°
The 'August Offer' combined with the Viceroy's failure to respond
positively to Sikander*s advance led to a brief rapprochement between
the Punjab Premier and Jinnah. The primary object of the British
announcement (8 Aug.) had been to define future reforms: Dominion
Status was to be granted at the conclusion of the war subject to the
approval of the major Indian political parties; the composition of the
Viceroy's Executive Council was to be expanded to allow for greater
Indian participation, and a body was to be established to associate the
1 ~*AIndian public more closely with the conduct of the war. Thus a criti­
cal juncture had been reached in the constitutional history of India.
It was imperative, therefore, for the A.I.M.L. to present a united res­
ponse to the British proposals, especially as the Congress in rejecting 
them (22 Aug. 19^0) whilst deprecating the British refusal to grant 
immediate full independence, had laid special emphasis on the fact that 
the "issue of the minorities...” had been employed as "an insuperable 
barrier to India's progress...."^32 To ensure League solidarity, there­
fore, the League Working Committee on 31 August 19^ +0 bowed to Sikander's 
demand concerning the war effort by reversing its decision of 16 June 
and allowing "those Musalmans who might think that they could serve any 
useful purpose by associating themselves with the War Committees free to 
do so.” 133
Having thus fortified the A.I.M.L, Jinnah proceeded on 28 Sept.19^0 
to denounce the 'August Offer', because it had failed to meet his claim
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for an equal share of power for Muslims at the Centre and in the 
provinces, and had not offered them a position of parity on the War Ad­
visory Committee which the Viceroy hoped to o r g an is e. Ji nn ah  judici­
ously associated Sikander with this action, thus ensuring that he could 
not capitalise from it by attempting to reach a compromise with the Con­
gress or the British independent of the League. A sub-committee includ­
ing Jinnah, Sikander, Nazimuddin, Nawab Ismail Khan, Khaliquzzaman and 
Barkat Ali was authorised to draft the formal r e j e c t i o n . 1 ^  To ensure 
Sikander's collaboration Jinnah privately assured him that the action 
would not prohibit Leaguers from assisting the war e f f o r t . I n  accept­
ing this undertaking Sikander was guilty of considerable naivete^ , 
especially considering Jinnah's refusal to co-operate with the proposed 
War Advisory Council. Later events proved that he had been duped.
Initially the Punjab Premier failed to grasp this fact. The extent 
of his error was soon realised. In February 19^1, despite the fact that 
the A.I.M.L. had supposedly revised its position concerning War Committee 
membership, it expelled three prominent Unionist supporters - Nawab 
Muzaffar Khan (Sikander's cousin), Nawabzada Khurshid Khan and Sir Muham­
mad Nawaz of Kot - for disobeying its mandate of June 19^0 forbidding 
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such association. In the same month Jinnah requested Sikander to deny 
reports that had appeared in the Bombay Chronicle and the Times of India 
that he was opposed to the Lahore resolution,"*38 in a moVe to commit 
the Punjab League to the 'Pakistan' ideal, the A.I.M.L. resolved that 23 
March would be observed annually by all local Leagues to canvass the 
support of the Muslim masses. In addition a 'Muslim League Week* was to 
be organised at three-monthly intervals to disseminate League propaganda, 
and to enrol new members.^ 9
Realising the enormity of his mistake by being a party to the 
League's rejection of the 'August Offer*, which appeared to infer his 
commitment to an independent Muslim State, Sikander acted decisively to 
restore the situation, and to frustrate any further attempts by Jinnah 
to impose his authority in the Punjab. In a speech to the Punjab Legis­
lative Assembly on 11 March 19^ -1 Sikander stated that no Pakistan scheme 
had been passed at Lahore, in that the term had not been used, but that 
politicians, Jinnah included, realising the appeal it had for the Muslim 
masses had adopted the "catch-phrase". In spite of that development, how­
ever, Sikander declared in unequivocal terms "If Pakistan means unalloyed 
Muslim Raj in the Punjab, then I will have nothing to do with it." He 
re-affirmed his own commitment to the creation of a loose Federation in 
which the provinces would enjoy the maximum autonomy as the surest means 
of protecting all the communities in the Punjab. In developing this
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theme Sikander demonstrated considerable skill, for he claimed that if 
his ideas were given substance whilst the Muslim community would enjoy a 
predominant position in provincial affairs free from the dictates of a 
powerful Congress-dominated central government, the Hindus and Sikhs 
would continue to receive a fair share in government independent of 
communal disabilities, or the authority of a Muslim State. In this res­
pect he made a special appeal to the Sikhs, reminding them that as a 
small all-Indian minority they could not expect to achieve any more than 
a two per cent, representation at the Centre, whilst in the Punjab they 
would continue to possess "a 20 per cent, share as equal partners in a
purely Punjabi concern". In order to gain support and approval for his
stance Sikander concluded his speech with a powerful exhortation for 
provincial loyalty and communal unity:
"I visualise for the Punjab - freedom for Muslims,
Hindus and Sikhs, Christians and others as Punjabis
... let us ... show the rest of India that we in the
Punjab stand united and will not brook any interference
from whatever quarter ... Then and then only will we be 
able to tell meddling busybodies from outside; 'Hands 
off the Punjab».»1^0
Despite these strong words Sikander knew that he could only prevent 
Jinnah from exploiting the 'Pakistan' theme to gain Muslim support in the 
Punjab, if he could induce the British, the Congress and moderate 
Leaguers to lend their support to a national settlement which would lay 
to rest Muslim fears of Hindu domination, and thereby obviate the demand 
for a separate Muslim State. Thus in May 1941 he attempted to launch a 
fresh initiative to solve the constitutional deadlock. He urged the 
Viceroy to adopt a bold programme of reform, and in order to attract 
Congress co-operation with it, he suggested that the Viceroy's Executive 
Council should be radically reconstructed to allow all portfolios to be 
held by Indians, the British presence being limited to that of the Vice­
roy and one other official to allow for the continuity of the adminis­
tration. This Executive would then be treated as an independent 
Dominion Government, responsible solely to the Legislature. Also 
coalition Ministries would be established in the provinces, whereupon
the Viceroy would invite the Provincial Premiers and Executive members
1 1to 30m  a committee to formulate a new constitution. In an attempt
to attract Muslim acceptance of his ideas, he counselled Congress
leaders to pledge that maximum autonomy would be granted to the
142provinces, compatible with the country's defence needs.
Sikander's recommendations, which were endorsed by Fazlul Huq, posed 
a grave embarrassment to Jinnah; in effect the leaders of the two major 
Muslim majority provinces had rejected the League's demand for partition
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as the only solution to the constitutional deadlock.1^  It was the 
intervention of Linlithgow, however, which prevented any serious repur- 
cussions developing in the League: he refused to consider Sikander's
proposals on the grounds that they envisaged changes in the character of
' t h . L
the Executive beyond those contemplated by the 'August Offer'. There 
can be little doubt that his action was also intended to frustrate any 
possibility of a rapprochement between the Congress and moderate Leaguers 
and to ensure the continuing unity of the A.I.M.L. having previously in­
formed Craik in March 19^1 that although
"I have myself strong views as to the arguments against 
Pakistan ..• there seems a good deal to be said against 
any unavoidable split in the Muslim League ... any such 
split would be a great encouragement to the Congress. . . " ?
It was for this very reason that in May 19^1 he declined Amery's advice
to invite Sikander to join his Executive Council.
In spite of Sikander*s lack of success his sortie into the all-
India sphere had seriously compromised Jinnah. The latter had candidly
admitted in March 19^1 the key importance of the Punjab for the reali-
1^7sation of the Lahore resolution, thus he could not permit Sikander to
continue to deviate unchecked from the Lahore principle, especially as
in April 19^1 the demand for a Muslim State had been formally incorpor-
148ated into the A.I.M.L.'s constitution. Jinnah awaited an appropriate
occasion to publicly discipline Sikander and demonstrate his authority over
him. The formation of a National Defence Council (N.D.C.) by Linlithgow
gave Jinnah the opportunity he sought.
In July 19^1 Linlithgow, as a consequence of the 'August Offer’,
had enlarged his Executive Council to include eight Indians, but he had
failed to recruit any active members from the Congress and the A.I.M.L..
In an attempt to offset this disability, Linlithgow proposed to employ
the N.D.C. as a ploy to involve some important leaders, including the
Muslim Premiers of the Punjab, Bengal (Fazlul Huq), Sind (Allah Baksh
Muhammad Umar Soomro) and Assam (Muhammad Saadulla), in a demi-official
capacity with the war effort; it was a propaganda exercise to demonstrate
India's support for the war.^9 gu-t the Secretary of State approved of
the manoeuvre principally because he hoped that it would provide a means
150of undermining the two main nationalist parties. Linlithgow, however,
did not share this ambition in respect of the A.I.M.L.:
"I made it clear ... that one must ... avoid starting a 
campaign against Jinnah, or allowing it to be thought 
that we were taking sides in the internal political 
affairs of the League." "*51
The Viceroy wanted the presence of the Muslim Premiers on the N.D.C.
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mainly to illustrate that Muslims were aiding the prosecution of the War, 
and hence he calculated that Jinnah would be forced to accept the 
situation: ’’there seems a general feeling that if we can get these four
to play they would represent something too substantial for Jinnah to 
take on."152 Furthermore Linlithgow hoped that once Jinnah was con­
fronted with the fact that the Premiers were willing to serve, he would 
be tempted to officially nominate League representatives to the body. 153 
Sikander was the 'main piece1 in Linlithgow’s game. The Viceroy 
believed that once Sikander agreed to serve the other Muslim Premiers 
would follow his example.^ In July 19^1 Sikander accepted the Vice­
roy's invitation, thereby fulfilling his expectations. In taking this 
step Sikander was probably influenced by a number of motives. As a 
constant advocate for Muslim co-operation with the war effort, and as 
the head of the premier recruiting province in India (see note 118), the
N.D.C. gave him the opportunity to publicly associate himself at the
Centre with the conduct of the War. Membership of the body also allowed 
him to pursue the role which he continued to court in the national 
sphere. But he hoped to achieve the last objective without a clash with 
Jinnah. In order to minimise the possibility of such an occurrence he 
counselled the Viceroy to invite the Premiers to participate in their 
capacity as heads of government, rather than as Muslim leaders.155
Linlithgow raised no objection to this proposal,1^  assuring Sikan­
der that he would be asked to co-operate as Premier of the Punjab,
but in order to pressurise Jinnah he caused the latter to believe that
the Premiers' presence on the N.D.C. would be as Muslims, and not pro­
vincial representatives. Accordingly he instructed Lumley (Governor of 
Bombay) to inform Jinnah that the Viceroy "regarded it as essential that 
the great Muslim community should be represented on that council by per­
sons of the highest prominence and c a p a c i t y ."158 Luraiey conveyed this 
message to Jinnah in writing on 20 July 19^ +1, and in accordance with Lin­
lithgow's instructions he advised Jinnah that the Viceroy would have 
asked him to offer suggestions as to possible Muslim personnel for the 
Council, if Jinnah's unsympathetic attitude had prevented such action.^59 
Even so this communication implied that if Jinnah changed his mind, any 
suggestions he made would be sympathetically received.
Jinnah, however, refused to be complaisant. The episode gave him 
the opportunity to confront Sikander and crush his national ambitions, 
and he exploited it to the full. He accused the Viceroy of attempting 
to destroy the unity of the A.I.M.L. by ignoring its ruling of 16 June 
19^0 forbidding participation with war committees. Although he
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stated his opposition to the scheme, however,he did nothing to dissuade 
the Premiers from joining the N.D.C.. He waited until the third week of 
July, by which time all of the Premiers had accepted nomination to the 
Council before he acted; he publicly announced that the A.I.M.L. Working 
Committee would convene at Bombay on Zh August to take disciplinary 
action against those Muslim Leaguers who had joined the N.D.C.?61 By 
allowing a month to elapse before Sikander and company were to be brought 
to book, Jinnah had hoped that during the interval Muslim opinion through­
out India would crystalise in condemning the Premiers' action.162 He was 
not to be disappointed. Abdoola Haroon, the President of the Sind Muslim 
League,noted a growing antipathy throughout India towards the Premiers163
An observation which was corroborated by Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim (prom- 
• « *1
inent Muslim Leaguer) in Bombay. Even Mamdot ruefully conceded that 
Muslim opinion was divided over the activities of Sikander and the other 
Premiers, and he feared that if the issue was not resolved it would 
jeopardise Muslim solidarity.163
In order to avoid such an eventuality Mamdot secured the assistance 
of Haroon to attempt to settle the matter amicably. Haroon in effect be­
came an intermediary between the Punjab Muslim leadership and Jinnah,though 
he faithfully reflected the stance of the A.I.M.L.President. Haroon's atti­
tude , therefore, was uncompromising and in order to avoid a confrontation te 
insisted that Sikander and the other Premiers should publicly announce that 
they had joined the N.D.C. as a result of "a bonafide mistake in the inter­
pretation of the Bombay Resolution Q l  Aug. 19W ] . . which allowed individ­
ual co-operation in the war effort. Also the Premiers were required to 
issue a statement to the effect that their action did not reflect any dis­
satisfaction with the A.I.M.L,'s policy regarding the War, or with "the 
latest Creed of the League...or...Pakistan". Once these conditions had 
been met they were to inform the Viceroy that they would resign from the 
N.D.C. if Jinnah ordered them to and "that he [Linlithgow] must enter in­
to negotiation with Mr. Jinnah and come to some...settlement with him."166
Haroon in effect had demanded the total surrender of Sikander, and 
at the time it appeared that his harsh mediation would not succeed. In 
fact Sikander's position in the Punjab seemed to be unassailable in that 
60 of the 7 6 .Muslim Unionists had given the Premier their written 
pledges to resign from the A.I.M.L. if Jinnah forced a confrontation, and 
as a sign of their approval for Sikander's continued presence on the 
N.D.C.. Outside the Province Sikander's principal ally, Fazlul Huq, 
remained similarly defiant. On 8 August 19^ +1 he informed Haroon that he 
did not even intend attending the scheduled meeting of the Working Com­
mittee, and he denied that he and the other Premiers had flouted the
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authority of the League.
The stage seemed set for a disastrous rupture of League unity, but 
in the event Sikander capitulated, and the other Premiers followed suit. 
Khaliquzzaman who witnessed the proceedings, has provided, to an extent, 
an understanding of the debacle. He has recalled that when Sikander was 
told either to resign from the N.D.C. or face expulsion from the A.I.M.L. 
he (Khaliquzzaman) attempted to assist the Punjab Premier by reminding 
the Working Committee that as a result of the A.I.M.L.'s resolution of 
31 August 19^0 Leaguers had been granted the freedom to serve on war 
committees. Before any discussion could ensue, however, Jinnah inter­
vened stating "Let us hear what Sir Sikander has to say...", whereupon 
Sikander replied "1 am in the hands of this Committee and will abide by 
its decision...". As a result when ordered by the Working Committee to 
resign from the N.D.C. he agreed to comply.1^9
It seems evident that Jinnah had prevailed upon Sikander to abandon 
the N.D.C. before the Working Committee met on 2^+ August, hence his 
invitation to Sikander to explain his position, thereby preventing 
Khaliquzzaman's relevant observation from being discussed. It is also 
significant that Sikander declined to use the August Q l9^ -0] compromise 
as a basis for his defence. Jinnah, always a superb tactician, would 
only have invited Sikander to state his case at such a juncture had he 
been assured of a reconciliatory response. In explaining his climb-down 
to Glancy, Governor of the Punjab, Sikander claimed that he had been 
forced to submit to Jinnah on account of Lumley's letter which referred 
to his presence on the N.D.C. as a Muslim representative,1?^ Despite the 
fact that Fazlul Huq corroborated this exposition,1?1 it is not convinc­
ing. Sikander had known in advance that at Bombay Jinnah would challenge 
his association with the N.D.C. on the grounds that he had been nomi­
nated as a Muslim and not a provincial representative. It was to frus­
trate such a move that Sikander had obtained written resignations from 
his Muslim supporters, believing that they would dissuade Jinnah from 
threatening to expel him. In fact by the time of the A.I.M.L. meeting 
convened at Bombay Sikander had collected 73 such undertakings.^?^ It 
is apparent, therefore, that when he failed to intimidate Jinnah by 
threatening to end the association of his Unionist followers with the 
A.I.M.L. Sikander lost his nerve. Though he continued to enjoy the 
unquestioned support of the vast majority of Muslim M.L.As. in the 
Province, when faced with the stark choice of an open break with Jinnah 
and the League, he capitulated because he appreciated that, in demanding 
Pakistan*,a movement had been conceived which in time would overwhelm all
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Muslim opposition to it. Hence his admission to Penderel Moon in August 
19^1 that
’’unless he [sikander]] walked warily and kept on the 
right side of Jinnah he would be swept away by a wave 
of fanaticism and, wherever he went, would be greeted 
by the Muslims with black flags."175
Sikander’s surrender over the N.D.C. issue effectively and publicly 
proclaimed Jinnah's dominance in the national orbit, but it did not 
herald a League take-over in the Punjab. There the large Unionist land­
lords, who controlled the Muslim politics of the Province, remained loyal 
to Sikander, many of them deeply resenting Jinnah’s victory, and the 
publicity campaign which they believed the League had orchestrated 
against the Punjab P r e m i e r . T h e  latter as a realist, however, feared 
that despite the fidelity which he continued to enjoy in the Assembly 
Jinnah’s championing of Pakistan* could eventually cost him the allegiance 
of his Muslim colleagues and the Muslim populace in the Punjab. In order 
to insure against either eventuality he sought to broaden still further 
the non-communal appeal of the Unionist Party and to discredit 'Pakistan'. 
The first objective was achieved in June 19^2 when he concluded an 
alliance with the Sikh Akali Party. Under the terms of the agreement, 
known as the Sikander - Baldev Singh Pact, Baldev Singh was admitted to 
the Cabinet as Minister for Development in succession to Sunder Singh 
Majithia who had died in April 19^1, and the Akalis undertook to support 
the M i n i s t r y .^75 Though both the Premier and the new Minister issued 
press statements to the effect that their agreement emanated from a 
mutual desire to promote communal harmony, and present a united front in 
support of the war e f f o r t i n reality both had acted to strengthen 
their respective position against Jinnah.^7? Sikander remained deter­
mined to resist Jinnah, whilst the Akali Party, which had emerged as the
1?8
dominant Sikh organisation in the Province, was eager to bolster the 
Premier against Jinnah; they in common with their fellow Sikhs were 
vehemently opposed to Jinnah's demand for a Muslim State which threatened 
to engulf the whole of the Punjab - viewed by the Sikhs as their homeland, 
and which encompassed their lands, properties and religious shrines."*79
Having expanded his Ministry, Sikander sought to limit the appeal of 
'Pakistan' amongst his fellow Punjabi Muslims. 'Pakistan' remained 
undefined, and as such it augured all things to all shades of Muslim 
opinion: to the pious it promised an Islamic State, to the entrepreneur,
civil servant and professional classes the curtailment of Hindu and Sikh 
competition, to the rampant communalist the opportunity to humiliate, if 
not brutalise non-Muslims, and to the Muslim masses the allure of belong- 
ing to the ruling race. u In an effort to confront Punjabi Muslims with
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reality, therefore, Sikander determined to impress upon them that'Paki­
stan' would certainly result in the partition of their Province. In 
order that Muslims should be left in no doubt of this fact he requested 
the Viceroy to establish a convention whereby if no less than 75# of the 
membership of the Punjab Legislative Assembly passed a resolution in 
favour or against joining the Indian Union, the Muslim and non-Muslim 
populations would not be forced into submission to any State - Hindu or 
Muslim - against their will. In short he asked that both groups should 
be assured that ultimately they would be free to express their views 
through separate plebiscites. If the results determined that non- 
Muslims were not prepared to accept Pakistani rule or the Muslims Indian 
rule, then the Province would be divided to accommodate their wishes.
Sikander, who was as opposed to the possibility of partition as he 
was to the idea of Pakistan, hoped that his proposal would not result in 
the division of the Punjab. On the contrary he calculated that by ack­
nowledging the fact that failure to reconcile Muslim and non-Muslim 
views on the question of a Muslim State would precipitate the break-up of 
the Province, and by making constitutional provision for it, that the
'Pakistan' idea would lose its attraction for Muslims. Linlithgow who had
1 82been appraised of Sikander's real intentions, refused to sanction the
Premier’s formula. He rejected it on the grounds that it closely
resembled the Cripps offer which had failed to appease the Indian 
18^parties, ^ and because he was "profoundly sceptical as to the proba­
bility of its showing up effectively the impossibility of Pakistan".
Also though Linlithgow continued to refuse to discredit the Lahore reso­
lution for tactical reasons, when Stafford Cripps (Leader of the House of 
Commons, leader of Cripps' Mission) revealed in March 19^2 that the 
British Government accepted the right of any province to stand out of 
the constitution to be framed after the war Linlithgow was horrified.
The Viceroy was opposed to the provincial option clause because it rep­
resented a tacit acceptance of 'Pakistan' with regard to the Muslim majority 
provinces, and as such he feared that it would have had a disruptive
effect in the Punjab, particularly amongst the Sikhs, thereby disrupting 
185the war effort. Therefore Linlithgow who had been greatly relieved 
when the Cripps initiative failed, had no intention of helping Sikander 
to resuscitate it by pleading the right of a province not only to decide 
its future national status, but also to agree on partition if a con­
sensus did not exist concerning the matter.
Sikander's formula also failed to engender the response he had hoped 
for in the Punjab. On 9 November 19^2 the partition proposal was rejec­
ted by a joint meeting of the non-Muslim M.L.As.1^  Thus for the time
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being the spectre of the division of the Punjab was buried, consequently
the Punjabi Muslims were not confronted with the immediate threat of
their Province's division. Even so non-Muslim opinion remained firmly
opposed to the creation of Pakistan* and Sikander had made it perfectly
clear that he would not be a party to imposing a Muslim State on the
whole of the Punjab against their will. Also, as Glancy*informed the
Viceroy, Sikander had demonstrated the weakness of the Lahore resolution
in that in demanding self-determination for the Muslims in India, Jinnah
could not logically deny that right to the non-Muslim majority areas in
the Punjab. Consequently the Premier had issued a challenge to the
League President which the latter could not afford to deny.1^  Glancy's
appreciation proved correct. During a tour of the Punjab in mid-November
1942 Jinnah attempted to dispose of Sikander's partition ideas by pouring
ridicule on them; he avoided any discussion concerning the effect which
the creation of Pakistan'would have on the future unity of the Province,
merely insisting that its realisation remained the A.I.M.L.*s principal
objective, and that therefore Sikander's proposed formula was irrelevant:
"Who is the author of this formula?... Either it is 
colossal ignorance or a case of those who see it, know 
it and understand it, but will not see it and don't want 
to understand it. All these slogans about dividing 
mother India and the scheme being against the interests 
of the Mussalmans themselves have now ceased to have any 
value for us. If the Pakistan scheme is against our 
interests, let us stew our own juice, but this
nonsensical propaganda must cease."^08
Sikander, however, refused to abandon the premise that ultimately
non-Muslim Punjabis would have to decide their own f u t u r e , b u t  further
resistance to Jinnah was prevented by the Premier's sudden death from a
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heart-attack on 26 December 1942. He had died attempting to develop 
a theme which possessed the potential to seriously compromise the League 
President. Also, although Jinnah had up until that time decisively out­
manoeuvred him in the national sphere, Sikander had remained the undis­
puted master of the Punjab, in spite of his fears for the future as a 
result of the effect he believed 'Pakistan' would have in winning the 
allegiance of the Muslim masses for the A.I.M.L.. Jinnah could only have 
engineered Sikander's total destruction if he had been able to destabil­
ise his provincial power-base. That posed an impossible task, and 
though Jinnah had been compelled to gamble the unity of the League in 
order to force Sikander to comply with the League's mandate concerning 
the N.D.C., and to establish his own unquestioned ascendancy in national 
Muslim affairs, once he had achieved those aims he was unable to press
home his advantage because he lacked the necessary support in the Punjab. 
♦Governor of the Punjab, 1941-46.
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As Ispahani has conceded Jinnah was unwilling to further risk the solid­
arity of the A.I.M.L. by seeking total domination over the Punjab 
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Premier. Thus when confronted by angry Muslim Unionists concerning
his disparaging remarks concerning Sikander's views on the possible
partition of the Province Jinnah, out of deference to the unquestioned
loyalty Sikander continued to command, denied that he had been referring 
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to him* The battle for the Punjab was to be fought with the new
Premier, Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana, and it took Jinnah four years to 
achieve a successful outcome - such was the legacy which Sikander 
bequeathed to his Unionist successor1
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CHAPTER VI
THE PREMIERSHIP OF KHIZAR HAYAT KHAN TIWANA AND THE MUSLIM LEAGUE:
THE YEARS OF CONFRONTATION, DECEMBER 19^2 TO DECEMBER 19^5
The demise of Sikander Hyat Khan ushered in a new phase in the
politics of the Punjab. The late Premier's passing, combined with the
deaths of Fazl-i-Husain (July 1936), Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana (August
19^0), Sunder Singh Majithi^. (April 19^1) and Nawab Shahnawaz Khan of
Mamdot (March 19^2), had deprived the Unionist Party of an extremely
influential section of its senior members, and the Ministerial coalition
of an important non-Muslim ally (Majithi$.). Also a second generation of
Muslim Unionists had emerged including Shaukat Hyat, Nawab Iftikhar
2Husain of Mamdot and Mumtaz Daultana, who were young, untried, and 
hungry for power. Consequently they were determined to use the Muslim 
League, the political potential of which had increased dramatically as a 
consequence of the Lahore Resolution (March 19^0), as a vehicle to 
achieve their provincial ambitions. Fate appeared to have presented them 
with an excellent opportunity for Sikander, a seasoned and experienced 
champion of the Unionist cause, had been succeeded by a comparatively in­
experienced politician - Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana - as a result of which 
Jinnah and his provincial allies believed that they were in a much
stronger position to establish the League as the repository of Muslim po-
. . . 3litical power m  the Punjab. In conducting their campaign to subject the
Unionist Ministry to League control, they underestimated the tenacity of
the new Premier, and the degree of support which he would receive from
the majority of his Muslim Unionist Colleagues. As a result the League
failed to achieve its principal objective, but it did entice a number of
very powerful landlord-politicians from the Unionist benches, which gave
it access to the rural constituencies, thereby enabling it to court the
support of the Muslim voters in the countryside. The Tiwana Ministry,
therefore, was engaged in a continual rearguard action to resist the
Leaguefe attempts to undermine it, and destroy its majority in the Assembly.
Although Jinnah had outmanoeuvred Sikander in the national orbit, 
the latter had prevented him from establishing an effective Muslim League 
organisation in the Punjab. Furthermore British determination not to 
permit elections to be held in India for the duration of the War had 
deprived him of the opportunity to appeal to the Muslim electorate on
213
the issue of Pakistan1, and to attempt to defeat the Unionist Government 
through the ballot-box. Jinnah*s national ambitions, however, could not 
tolerate the continuation of a Muslim dominated Ministry in the Punjab 
independent of League control. He desperately needed to gain ascendancy 
over the Provincial Government to enable him to execute the plan he had 
conceived to resuscitate the League at the provincial level, and to 
strengthen his national position in order to extract the maximum con­
cessions from the British. Jinnah confidentially outlined the tactics
if
he hoped to adopt to his Working Committee, which included Mamdot, in 
April 19^3 . Jinnah's stratagem envisaged the A.I.M.L. confronting the 
British Government with the Pakistan demand immediately the War ended.
He calculated that then would be the most opportune time; he had a vision 
of a post-war Britain, exhausted by the conflict, whose imperial presence 
would be challenged throughout the Islamic world, particularly in Pales­
tine, Iran, Egypt and Iraq, and who as a result would be unable to ignore 
Indian Muslim aspirations. But for the A.I.M.L. to secure the advantage 
he envisaged he emphasised that it was vital that it should establish its 
authority over the Ministries in the Muslim-majority provinces (Punjab, 
Bengal, Sind, and the N.W.F.P.), so that they could be used as platforms
to disseminate League propaganda and to popularise the organisation and
its creed. Also Jinnah calculated that once the A.I.M.L. had realised 
its provincial goals, he would hold the destinies of the local governments 
in his hands, giving him the means to compromise the Government of India, 
and to dramatically demonstrate the power of the A.I.M.L., in that he 
would be able to order the Ministries to resign, or cause them to fall by 
withdrawing League support. Hence his exhortation to his Working Committee coLeagies:
"Let us use this opportunity to consolidate our position 
in the Provinces. Let the Ministries function in such a
manner that...they popularise the League among the masses
... Collect funds. Consolidate the National GuardsV..
Let us exploit these Ministries so that when we attack, 
the very fact that we are giving up our seats in the 
Government.to launch such an attack will add to our 
prestige... In December [jL9*0] we meet in Sind. In April 
Q 19W ]  we meet in the Punjab. There we decide when to 
strike, where to strike and how to strike.
Thus it was essential for Jinnah that the Unionist Ministry should be 
under League domination before April 19^i especially as control of the 
Punjab, the premier recruiting province in India, would greatly increase 
his bargaining powers whilst the War lasted, in that any threat to dis­
rupt the Government there would have posed a serious problem for the 
Central Government, preoccupied as it was with maintaining recruitment 
and the war effort in general.
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There is evidence to suggest that Jinnah had already attempted to 
prepare the ground for a League take-over in the Punjab, Within days of 
Sikander's death, Mamdot, the President of the Punjab Muslim League, 
sought "an urgent interview" with Glancy, the Governor of the Province, 
to discuss the succession to the Premiership. Glancy, convinced that the 
request had been made on Jinnah's orders, suspected the existence of a 
plot to engineer a pro-League successor to Sikander. As a result he 
delayed seeing Mamdot until after 30 December 1942, the day on which 
Khizar was formally invited, and accepted, to serve as Premier, fearing 
that "the solidarity of the Qjnionist[[J party might have been seriously 
undermined if any suggestion of the necessity for Muslim League approval
7
had been allowed to come to the fore."
It was the prerogative of the Governor to invite the person he
believed would be capable of commanding the confidence of the Ministry to 
8lead it. In Glancy's opinion there was only one suitable candidate -
Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana. Khizar's claim was strengthened by the fact
that all his Cabinet colleagues were willing to serve under him. Also he
did not face any serious opposition from Muslim contendors. The only
politician who could seriously challenge him - Firoz Khan Noon - had
declined to seek the office, as he already held a responsible position as
Defence Member on the Viceroy's Executive Council, and because he realised
that it would have been impracticable for a Noon and a Tiwana to serve in
o
the same Cabinet as the two families were closely connected, without dis­
rupting the balance between the various Muslim factions. Also although 
the influential Hayats of Wah were anxious to retain the Premiership for
one of their number, having campaigned for the appointment of either
Liaqat Hyat Khan or Nawab Muzaffar Khan (Sikander's brother and cousin), 
Glancy considered both to be unsuitable: Liaqat had been absent from the
Punjab for twenty years and was not an M.L.A., whilst Muzaffar Khan was
10not acceptable to many Unionists.
There can be little doubt that Glancy had other reasons for wishing
Khizar to succeed Sikander, The Empire was still at war, Rangoon had
fallen to the Japanese on 8 March 1942 and India was threatened with 
11
invasion. It was imperative, therefore, that the Punjab should be 
entrusted to a leader whose loyalty was beyond question, and who would 
endeavour to ensure that the Unionist Ministry remained committed to total 
and unconditional support for the war effort, and who commanded the neces­
sary following in the Provincial Assembly to prevent the Government from 
being deviated from that objective. Events proved that Khizar satisfied 
these requirements. He was personally determined to aid the prosecution
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12of the War, and his succession as Premier was supported by an over­
whelming majority of Unionist M.L.As: on 23 January 19^3 69 Muslim
Unionists passed a vote of confidence in his leadership, which was 
endorsed by the Unionist controlled Provincial Muslim League, and on the 
same day 86 Unionist M.L.As., including Muslims and non-Muslims, recorded 
their approval of the new Premier.
Confident that he possessed united Unionist allegiance, and that the
local League remained nothing more than a Unionist mouthpiece, Khizar
seized the initiative to attempt to ensure that the A.I.M.L. President
would continue to honour the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, and would refrain from
interfering in the internal affairs of the Province. In March 19^3
Khizar met Jiiinah at the A.I.M.L. Council meeting at Delhi to discuss
future Unionist-League relations. Jinnah sensible of the fact that
Khizar*s position was secure in the Punjab for the moment, agreed to
ratify the 'Pact* on the condition that the Punjab Premier undertook to
re-organise the League in the Province. This was no compromise on
Jinnah's part, however, for although he opposed Maulana Abdul Hamid
Badauni’s resolution calling on Punjabi Muslim M.L.As. to form a League
Assembly Party independent of the Unionists, he impressed upon Khizar
that he was no longer prepared to endure the mismanagement of League
affairs in the Punjab as had occurred in Sikander's time:
"The main object of the resolution ]j3adauni' s[] is that a 
Muslim League party in the Punjab Legislature should be 
set up. As explained by Malik Khizar Hayat Khan, a party 
already exists. It is a different question whether it has 
been functioning efficiently or not. But now a definite 
assurance has been given that efforts will be made to make 
the party worthy of the prestige and honour of the...Muslim 
League. Therefore, might we not wait and see what efforts 
are really made?"^
In effect Jinnah had issued Khizar with a guarded ultimatum - the
Punjab Muslim League had to be transformed into a viable organisation.
Khizar who was anxious to avoid an open breach with Jinnah and prevent
him from manipulating factionalism in the Unionist structure,^ attempted
to placate him by promising reforms, whilst at the same time ensuring
that the Provincial League would remain in reality an impotent appendage
of the Unionist Party. Accordingly following his return from Delhi the
Premier convened a meeting of the Punjab Muslim League Assembly Party,
which in reality meant the Muslim membership of the Unionist Ministry.
They undertook to improve the efficiency of the local League, but by a
majority of 51 votes to seven they adopted the Sikander-Jinnah Pact as
16their guiding principle, proclaiming thereby the doctrine of non-
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interference on the part of Jinnah and the A.I.M.L. in the internal 
political affairs of the Province.
The enunciation of the Pact, and the support which it engendered in 
Unionist ranks did not deflect Jinnah from his aim of gaining control of 
the Ministry, though it caused him initially to employ caution rather 
than confrontation. Also to begin with Jinnah was content to allow the 
situation to develop and to observe the outcome. This relatively passive 
attitude was encouraged by the fact that for the first time there existed 
a small nucleus of important Unionist M.L.As., centred around Mamdot and 
Daultana, who were anxious to promote the interests of the League, and 
to harness its political potential to challenge Khizar’s leadership.17 
In addition the ’old Guard’ of the pre-Pact Punjab League, personified 
by Barkat Ali remained equally determined to frustrate the Premier, and 
destroy the Unionist hegemony. The pro-Jinnah elements in the local 
League, under the direction of Mamdot, seized the opportunity afforded to 
them by the holding of a ’League Week* from 12 to 18 April 1943, to try 
to extricate the organisation from the political morass of Unionist domi­
nation. A campaign was launched in the provincial press advocating the 
creation of an independent Muslim League Party in the Assembly. Also 
League propagandists sought to embarrass the Ministry and enlist public 
support by focussing attention on the socio-economic backwardness of the 
Muslim community in general, and the trading classes in particular;
special reference being made to the low number of Muslims engaged in the
18sugar and ata (wholemeal flour) trade, which were subject to Government 
licence. The inference being that the Unionist Ministry should actively 
protect and promote Muslim interests in these areas; it was a programme 
which the multi—communal coalition could not undertake and survive.
In the same month Jinnah, encouraged by these developments, added to 
the Unionists' discomfiture. During a speech to the A.I.M.L. Working 
Committee he referred to the Punjab Government as a Muslim League Ministry. 
He based the observation on the fact that under the terms of his pact with 
Sikander the Muslim majority in the administration had joined the A.I.M.L. 
Though the claim elicited a strong denial from Chhotu Ram, devout 
Leaguers, including Sheikh Karamat Ali (Punjabi delegate to A.I.M.L. Work­
ing Committee) and Barkat Ali applauded the A.I.M.L. President's stand.
The latter going so far as to state that if Khizar opposed Jinnah's inter­
pretation he would be committing political suicide: "No Muslim Premier
can ever dream of having a clash with the Quaid-i-Azam.1^ Mr. Huq's end
21
is a clear lesson," This inference was not lost on Khizar, 
who fully appreciated that the battle for League control had begun.
Lin Bengal*]
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The opening shots, however, had been muted. Jinnah, cheered by the 
knowledge that a pro-League faction had emerged on the Unionist benches, 
had succoured their disaffection to test the political temperature in the 
Province, in order to engineer a take-over from within the Ministry, 
rather than launching an outright assault against it.
In pursuit of these tactics Jinnah had acquired the covert alleg­
iance of a member of the Unionist Cabinet, in that he had extracted a
secret undertaking from Shaukat Hyat Khan, who had replaced Khizar as
22Minister for Public Works on 13 February 1943, to the effect that he
2^would resign his office whenever Jinnah ordered him to. Thus Jinnah
possessed the means to promote League interests at Ministerial level, or
even to disrupt the Cabinet, and seriously compromise the Premier if he
chose to. Ironically Khizar had unwittingly assisted Jinnah's designs,
in that he had supported Shaukat Hyat's appointment. Khizar's elevation
to the Premiership had necessitated the appointment of a further Muslim
Minister, political considerations dictated that the appointment should
come either from the Multan Division or the late Premier's family in order
to maintain the balance between the various powerful Muslim factions on
24
the Unionist benches. Three contenders had put themselves forward for 
consideration - Muhammad Jamal Khan Leghari, an extremely wealthy Tumandar 
(tribal chief) from Dera Ghazi Khan, Major Ashiq Hussain, a Pir and scion 
of the influential Quershi family of Multan, and Shaukat Hyat, the eldest 
son of the late Premier. Khizar strongly favoured the last candidate, 
and he was able to achieve Glancy's compliance in the matter. Although 
the Governor acknowledged that Shaukat's appointment would be open to 
criticism in that he was a serving army officer and was neither on the 
electoral roll nor an M.L.A., he believed it would be politically advan­
tageous to acquire his services in that it would ensure the allegiance of 
the Hayats of Wah, and Sikander's former supporters (the Khattar faction) 
for the Ministry. Also Glancy reasoned that Shaukat's war record would 
prove useful in promoting the Punjab's war effort. Having committed him­
self to the Premier's choice Glancy dismissed the other candidates as un­
suitable: Leghari on account of the fact that he enjoyed only an insig­
nificant following amongst Muslim M.L.As., and had been disloyal to 
Sikander, and Ashiq Hussain because the support he commanded in the 
Assembly had been effectively neutralised by party faction.^
Unknown to either the Premier or the Governor, their preference had 
established a 'viper' in the Unionist 'bosom'. As Shaukat was not an
M.L.A. he had to seek election to the Assembly within six months of being 
26
appointed. Under the terms of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact he was
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required to contest the election as a Muslim League candidate. Jinnah 
used this condition to gain control over the new Minister; he stipulated 
that Shaukat would only be awarded the League ticket if he placed his 
written resignation from the Unionist Government in his (Jinnah*s) hands. 
Shaukat agreed to the demand, but on account of his late father's associ­
ation with the British and his own with the army he asked to be released
from the obligation if the A.I.M.L. engaged in open rebellion against
27the Government of India. In complying with Jinnah's terms Shaukat had 
not been motivated by the fact that he was a convinced 'Jinnhite',
'Leaguer' or 'Pakistanist', or considering his request regarding the 
British, a true nationalist. Rather Shaukat appreciated that Jinnah's 
ascendancy over Muslim national politics had been established - his 
father's experience bore testimony to that - and he sought to secure his 
own political future against the day when the A.I.M.L. should finally 
emerge as one of the principal successors to the Raj.
Khizar at the time was ignorant of Shaukat's duplicity; the latter
had been able to mislead the Governor, and thereby the Premier, into
believing that Jinnah had opposed his secondment to the Cabinet, and had
28been reluctant to offer him League support. Nevertheless Khizar appre­
ciated that the A.I.M.L. President's claim concerning the status of his 
Ministry combined with the actions and statements of Mamdot and Barkat 
Ali (see above) proclaimed the determination of the Central League to 
seize control over the Unionist Government. Also despite the fact that 
Jinnah possessed only a small number of committed supporters, the Premier 
realised that he faced a dangerous adversary, whose real power lay in the 
popular appeal generated by the Pakistan demand. In an effort, therefore, 
to prevent Jinnah using the slogan to encroach into the provincial sphere, 
and in order to destroy the attraction 'Pakistan' held for the Muslim 
masses, Khizar appealed to the Viceroy for assistance. He asked Linlith­
gow to use his influence to persuade the British Government to compel 
Jinnah to define exactly what the Pakistan scheme entailed so that if it 
proved unacceptable, as Khizar clearly hoped it would, it could be formally 
rejected. In making this request the Premier warned that if such steps 
were not take to contain the enthusiasm which the Muslim populace felt for 
'Pakistan', he feared that he would be unable to maintain his position in 
the Punjab. The Viceroy, however, though he appreciated "that Pakistan, 
that simple slogan which the meanest intelligence can understand, is 
taking very deep root among Muslims", refused Khizar's supplication. 
Linlithgow remained preoccupied with the need to counter the Congress 
through the presence of a united A.I.M.L., and as such he remained
219
committed to preserving the doctrine that the British should remain aloof 
from the Pakistan controversy, insisting that it was a matter for the 
League and the Congress to settle between themselves.2^
Denied British assistance to debunk the Pakistan idea, Khizar's only 
line of defence lay in promoting the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, and maintain­
ing a pretence of support for the A.I.M.L., which he did by pledging a 
donation of Rs. 7»000 to the League funds, on condition that his gift was 
not publicised.^ The Premier's stance and largesse failed to satisfy 
either Jinnah or his lieutenants in the Province. At the beginning of 
June 19^ +5 Mamdot announced that the Pact had ceased to have any signifi­
cance, in that it had achieved its purpose - the formation of a Muslim 
League Party in the Assembly. Furthermore, the Nawab pronounced that the 
League Party consisted of all the Muslim Unionists, and was subject to 
the discipline and control of the Punjab League Parliamentary Board, of 
which he was the President. This statement drew immediate objections 
and denials from staunch Muslim Unionists. Shaikh Faiz Mahomed (parlia­
mentary Secretary) pointed out that if the Pact had indeed ceased to 
exist, then those Muslim M.L.As. who had become Leaguers as a result of 
it would cease to belong to the A.I.M.L.?1 'Muhhaqqaq', a Unionist 
propagandist, writing to the Civil and Military Gazette on 20 June I9V3, 
further reasoned that Mamdot's assertions, which amounted to a claim that 
the Muslim League enjoyed the dominant position in the Unionist coalition, 
could not be substantiated:
"The simple fact is that the only primary creed of a 
ministerial party is the creed which commands the confi­
dence of the House... It goes without saying that till 
now such a creed in the Punjab Assembly is the Unionist
creed and not the creed of the League. Hence if any
parliamentary party can claim to be primary it is the 
Unionist Party and not the Muslim League group."
xp
Also 'Muhhaqqaq* refuted Dawn * s allegation that Khizar had been invited 
as the leader of the Muslim League Assembly Party to form a Ministry, by 
testifying correctly that the Governor had asked him to serve as Premier
in the knowledge that he commanded the support and confidence of his
Cabinet colleagues and the Unionist Party.^
Throughout the acrimonious debate which followed, the validity of 
'Muhhaqqaq's' observations could not be denied. Mamdot, however, was not 
concerned with constitutional niceties but with the acquisition of power. 
As a member of the A.I.M.L. Working Committee he was aware of Jinnah's 
stratagem to establish the authority of the Muslim League in all the 
Muslim majority provinces, and as such he determined to further those 
ends. Nevertheless Imran Ali, in his work Punjab Politics In The Decade
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Before Partition, has suggested that it was Mamdot who orchestrated the
conflict concerning the status of the Ministry in the Punjab in order to
use the A.I.M.L. as a "vehicle in what was essentially a factional
34struggle within the Unionist Party...." This interpretation, however, 
is too limited, for it was Jinnah who had urged such action on his con­
federates in the Province, and who had declared in April 1943» prior to 
Mamdot's campaign, that the Unionist Government constituted a League Min­
istry (see p. 216). Hiere can be little doubt, therefore, that Jinnah 
had inspired Mamdot's actions. Even so during June 1943 Jinnah refused 
to be drawn on the issue, and he refrained from endorsing Mamdot's 
assertion, which led 'Critic', in his column in the Civil and Military 
Gazette, to shrewdly comment that the Pact controversy would continue to 
rage until there was "an edict from the League President [jinnah]] one way
or the other...", and that Jinnah would not commit himself openly to
35opposing the Unionists until he was certain of success. ^
Subsequent events proved the validity of 'Critic’s' judgement.
Mamdot, embarrassed by the absence of any public encouragement from
Jinnah, had been forced to issue a press statement on 15 June 1943 to
the effect that it resulted because the A.I.M.L. President "did not find
it necessary to correct me in my interpretation of the situation" and
36not because Jinnah disagreed with him. This claim, though just, did 
not reveal the reality of the situation. In fact Jinnah's silence 
occurred for tactical reasons; he was merely waiting for the most pro­
pitious moment to strike. Jinnah knew that the Punjab League remained 
largely under Unionist domination; that even his own followers in the 
Province were divided, and that the influence of the League in the 
Assembly was minimal. From the opening months of 19^3 the Provincial 
League had been subjected to an internal power contest. The League 'Old 
Guard' resenting the influence of Mamdot, Daultana and their adherents, 
had attempted to oust the new League leadership in the Punjab. On 24 
January 1943 a Muslim League Workers Board had been established in Lahore 
with Maulana Zafar Ali Khan as President, and Barkat Ali and Rashid Ali 
as Vice-President and General Secretary respectively. Mamdot who had not
been consulted about its formation, and recognising that the move consti-
37tuted an attempt to isolate and bypass him, opposed the development. 
Jinnah, not wishing to forfeit the allegiance of such influential land­
lords as Mamdot and Daultana, blocked the attempted coup by refusing to 
recognise the Muslim League Workers Board; on 15 May 1943t in a strongly
worded letter to Rashid Ali, he censured the latter for interfering in
38
Mamdot's sphere of work, and advised him to change his attitude.
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Mamdot, anxious to justify Jinnah's confidence in his leadership of the
local League assured the A.I.M.L. President on 19 May 19^3 that "nobody
has the guts to say anything against the League", and he insinuated that
the Muslim Ministers in the Unionist Cabinet would not oppose League
policies: "none of them will £sic] the courage to say 'no'."^
It was an exaggerated assessment which did not fool Jinnah, the
latter observing on 23 June 19^3 "that the position of the Muslim League
L+q
in the Punjab is very sad indeed". Consequently Jinnah, who by nature 
was a cautious man, and in the knowledge that the Punjab League could 
not effect the takeover of the Unionist Ministry which he desired, bided 
his time so that he could judge the reaction of the Muslim public con­
cerning the Unionist - League controversy. Only when it had been estab­
lished that Muslim public opinion, and important sections of the Muslim 
media were rallying to the League’s standard did he openly declare his 
support for Mamdot. Two inter-connected events influenced Jinnah in this 
respect. On 13 July 19^3 Shaukat Hyat, who was anxious to fortify the 
position of the League within the Unionist Party, and because he believed
that "complete subservience to Jinnah" would guarantee "him the best
1^chance of a successful career", stated in a speech to the Sheikhupura
District Muslim League that there could be no conflict between the
League and the Unionist Ministry. He claimed that all those Muslim
M.L.As. who owed allegiance to the A.I.M.L., were required to obey its
mandate, and support the call for'Pakistan'even if it meant withdrawing
1+2
from office and boycotting the Legislature. Mamdot naturally applauded 
the Minister's stand, and in an interview to the press on 19 July he 
claimed quite erroneously that all the Muslim Ministers agreed with
i+3
Shaukat*s interpretation. Khizar, driven by the necessity to disprove
1+L+
this claim, forced Shaukat to capitulate. The latter, fearing no doubt
that resistance to the Premier would cost him his Cabinet appointment,
issued a retraction in the press on 20 July 19^+3i be emphasised his
support f°r the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, and the provincial policy pursued
by his late father, claiming that his Sheikhupura speech had been mis- 
*f5interpreted.
The damage, however, had been done. Whilst the Hindu press delighted 
in the Minister's apparent confusion, the Milap observing "The young 
Minister in his enthusiasm for the League went up like a rocket but came 
down like a stone", pro-League Muslim newspapers eagerly sought to 
exploit the situation. The Zamindar called for the rejection of the 
'Pact' "lock, stock and barrel". It was an important development, the 
significance of which would not have been lost on Jinnah, for this Muslim
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daily had traditionally been opposed to him and Mamdot. The deliber­
ations of the Shahbaz, however, posed a far more ominous sign for the 
Unionists, considering that it was owned by Syed Amjad Ali, the Premier1s 
Parliamentary Secretary. The Shahbaz had reported that Muslim public 
opinion was rallying around Mamdot's demand for giving the 'Pact' a 
decent burial, a development which it welcomed, believing that it would 
lead to the abandonment of the Unionist nomenclature, and thereby remove
any misunderstanding which existed concerning the true complexion of the
46Ministry, which in its opinion was Muslim League and not Unionist.
These events appear to have convinced Jinnah, who avidly followed 
47
the provincial press, of the existence of disenchanted elements within 
the Unionist Party, and of the sympathy and support of influential 
sections of the Muslim media. The situation was clearly ripe for ex­
ploitation, and on 27 July 194? Jinnah sanctioned Mamdot*s stand, in the 
full realisation that confrontation was required to bend the Unionist 
Party to the League's will. In an open letter to Sir Muhammad Nawaz Khan 
(Unionist M.L.A., Attock Central Muhammadan Rural) dated 27 July 19^3*
Jinnah declared "There is not the slightest doubt that immediately after
48
the Sikander - Jinnah Pact the Unionist Party in the Punjab was no more."
49Weak though the Punjab League undoubtedly was in the Assembly 
Jinnah's intrusion disturbed Khizar. In order to dissuade the A.I.M.L. 
President from intensifying his efforts to subvert the Ministry, the 
Premier determined to publicly demonstrate that the majority of Muslim 
Unionists would not tolerate the abandonment of the 'Pact' or the loss of 
Unionist independence to the League. In pursuit of this objective Khizar 
on 8 November 1943 convened and chaired a full meeting of the Unionist 
controlled Muslim League Assembly Party, including Mamdot, which unani­
mously ratified the Sikander-Jinnah Pact. It was also decided by a 
majority vote to incorporate the 'Pact' in the constitution of the League 
Party. Having thus ensured recognition for, and acceptance of Sikander's 
original agreement with Jinnah, the League Party unanimously accepted an 
amendment proposed by Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, whereby the League
Assembly Party was to be subject to the control and discipline of the
50
Central and Provincial Muslim League Parliamentary Boards. Khizar's 
acquiescence in the matter was clearly intended to pacify Jinnah, but it 
was a ludicrous compromise, as the 'Pact' motion and the Raja's amendment 
were diametrically opposed. Nevertheless the fact that the 'Pact' had 
been re-adopted underlined the impotency of the 'Jinnahites' in the 
Unionist - League consortium.
The proceedings did not satisfy Jinnah, they merely stiffened his
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resolve to destroy the hold which the Unionist Party continued to exer­
cise over Muslim politics in the Province. Until the Autumn of 1943 
Jinnah, in keeping with the tactics he had outlined to his Working Com­
mittee the previous April (see p.213), had hoped to capture the Provincial. 
Government from within, and use it as a tool to further the policy of the 
A.I.M.L. in the Punjab. Once it became clear that Khizar would not 
accommodate his wishes, Jinnah modified his tactics. He still hoped to 
be able to engineer a takeover by wooing Muslim M.L.As. to his side, but 
if that proved to be impossible he had ordered Mamdot in September 1943 
to create an independent Muslim League Party in the Legislature, inde­
pendent of the Unionists:
"I hope that a satisfactory solution may be found by 
agreement between you [Mamdot and Khizar]]. But one thing 
is certain that the Muslim League Party in the Assembly 
must be established on a sound and proper footing...
Jinnah appreciated that the creation of a genuine League Assembly 
Party committed to the programme of the A.I.M.L. would deprive him of the 
pretence of a united Muslim following in the Punjab Legislature, as it 
would force the League into opposition. Even so he calculated that in 
the long run such an occurrence could work to his advantage, for if the 
League Party attracted sufficient Muslim adherents from the Unionist 
benches it would cause the fall of the Ministry and precipitate a consti­
tutional crisis, in that it was unlikely that any other Party or coalition 
would be able to command a stable majority, particularly as the Sikh and 
Hindu groups in the Assembly, because of their opposition to ’Pakistan' and 
distrust of the A.I.M.L.'s interference in the Punjab's affairs, had
rejected League overtures in May and June 1943 which had aimed at secur-
52ing their co-operation to oust the Unionists. Also it was improbable 
that the Congress would lend its support to a Unionist rump. The result 
would be the imposition of Governor's rule, which in Jinnah's opinion 
would rally Punjabi Muslims to the A.I.M.L., as it would no longer be
restricted by the presence of a Muslim dominated Government in the
53Province.
In considering such a course of action and its possible repercussions
Jinnah was probably encouraged by the cracks which had appeared in the
Muslim wing of the Unionist Party. Mamdot and Daultana had openly
declared in his favour; Shaukat Hyat had also pledged his allegiance,
though by somewhat tortuous means, and for dubious reasons. Also a
further influential Unionist landed politician, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan,
54had joined the Jinnah camp in August 1943,^ The support which the Raja 
gave to the A.I.M.L., however, was suspect. Elected on the League ticket
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in 1937, the allure of a Parliamentary Secretaryship had been sufficient
to attract him to the Unionist benches (see p. 164). Having abandoned
the Muslim League he posed as a staunch supporter of Sikander, stoutly
proclaiming the supremacy of the Unionist Party in provincial matters
following the inception of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact:
"There is no doubt that the position of the parties in 
the Legislature remains entirely unaffected. The alliance 
with the League will not influence in any way the under­
standing which exists between the Unionist Party and the 
other groups which...from £sic^ the Ministerial Party".^3
Six years later he had again changed his position, claiming for the 
League the primary position in the Unionist coalition. Like all 
'political weather-vanes * Ghazanfar Ali had judged the way the prevail­
ing 'winds of power' were blowing.
Despite the questionable personal motives which had caused these 
members of the landed elite to offer their allegiance to Jinnah, the 
latter had gained powerful allies, who in time would spearhead the des­
truction of the Unionist Party. As early as July 19*0 the Government of 
India appreciated that the 'writing was on the wall' for the Unionist 
Government, in that it predicted that if Khizar continued "to insist that
has is a Unionist Ministry opposition from Moslem Leaguers in Punjab
57(?will) in course of time overwhelm him." Khizar shared this apprehen­
sion, and consequently he was reluctant to continue to oppose Jinnah.
Thus in September 1943 he had bluntly asked the Viceroy to reveal to him 
what course future British policy was likely to follow, so that he could 
act accordingly. In short he wanted to know if'Pakistan'was likely to be 
conceded. Linlithgow, however, dismissed the Premier's request as naive, 
observing to Amery that for a Provincial Premier to imagine that he would 
be privy to such confidential information was "rather a depressing re­
flection on the political capacity and on the imagination of even the
58best meaning of these people." Had Linlithgow not been so condescend­
ing he might have recognised that such a question revealed the terrible
plight of the Punjab Premier, for the latter was obstinately resisting
59Jinnah out of a sense of duty to the British, at a time when it was 
recognised that the A.I.M.L. would eventually dominate Muslim politics 
in the Province.
Refused the advice he sought, Khizar informed Glancy in April 1944 
that he was seriously considering capitulating to Jinnah. He pointed out 
that the Unionist Party existed in name only, it possessed no finances 
and little organisation in the Province, and that its disappearance would 
cause little regret. Also he explained that though he did not believe
225
in 'Pakistan', he knew that the slogan would gain momentum and would 
prove to be a decisive factor in the next elections, particularly as he 
expected Jinnah to employ Maulvis and Mullahs to harness Muslim fanatic­
ism. In view of the significance of the religious factor Khizar con­
cluded that many of his Muslim allies would be drawn into the A.I.M.L. 
camp. Finally Khizar opined to the Governor that he believed that there 
would only be two parties of any importance in the near future, the 
A.I.M.L. and the Congress, and that
"if he defies Jinnah and persuades his staunch adherents 
to adopt this course, he fears that in a comparatively 
short time they will all be relegated to political oblivion.
He anticipates that the landlord class or "loyalists", as 
he often calls them, though in any case ultimately doomed, 
may be sacrificed before their time if he decides to hold 
out."°°
Unable to reconcile his fears for the future, Khizar, who by his own
admission was an Empire loyalist, agreed to maintain his opposition to
Jinnah if the Governor gave him an informal order to do so as "his duty
as a loyal subject...". Although Glancy was anxious to manipulate
Khizar's undoubted loyalty, he balked at ordering it, informing Wavell
(succeeded Linlithgow as Viceroy, October 19^3)i that
"I have told Khizr that I am not in a position to give 
him any kind of an order in this regard. I can only tell 
him as a friend what I would do in his place and it is 
my considered opinion that he will have no peace here­
after, nor will he be serving the interests of the 
Province or of India or of Muslims or of the Empire if ^  
he gives way to Jinnah and places himself in his power."
This argument convinced Khizar of the need to frustrate Jinnah's Punjab 
designs. In proffering his counsel, Glancy*s main aim was to prevent the 
disruption of the Unionist Ministry, which he believed would weaken the 
solidarity of the Province, and thereby undermine its war effort.
Wavell, who shared Glancy's concern in this respect, applauded the Gov­
ernor's action, informing the latter that,
"It is of the greatest importance that until the end of 
the war against Japan there should be stable administration 
in the Punjab, and the dissolution of the Unionist Ministry 
and the substitution for it of a Muslim League Ministry,
such as Jinnah wants, would be a disaster."^
Jinnah's initial attempted coup in the Punjab, therefore, very 
nearly succeeded. That it failed ultimately was not the result of a weak 
Punjab League, or because the Punjab Premier was ardently anti-League or 
anti-Pakistan, or possessed any hope of ultimate success in opposing 
Jinnah, but because in safeguarding British interests Glancy, with vice­
regal approval, was able to exploit the Premier's imperial sentiments
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and sense of duty. Jinnah had already put Khizarfs fidelity to the test. 
On 18 March 19^ Jinnah had arrived in the Punjab to continue his anti- 
Unionist campaign in person; two days later he claimed that the Sikander 
-Jinnah Pact was a misnomer, that neither the A.I.M.L. nor himself had 
been a party to it, and that Sikander had conceived it purely to demon-
Crr
strate Punjab support for the League. Though it was an untruthful 
exposition,Khizar, in an attempt to contain the situation, responded by 
posing as a determined 'Pakistanist* and Unionist. Speaking for the 
first time from a Muslim League platform, the Premier declared on 23 
March 19H  that the Pakistan demand was just, and stood for the freedom 
of Muslims, but he judiciously added that the minority communities would 
be treated generously in the Muslim State, particularly in the Punjab.^ 
The fact that Khizar was opposed to the notion of'Pakistan,^  demon­
strates the unease he felt, and the lengths he was prepared to go to 
publicly to appease Jinnah and prevent him from isolating him by muster­
ing popular Muslim feeling against his Ministry, for it was becoming 
increasingly apparent that if Muslim Unionists persisted in their oppo­
sition to Jinnah they would be labelled as traitors to Islam.^
Jinnah, sensing Khizar*s dilemma and encouraged by his reconciliatory 
remarks concerning‘Pakistan, increased the pressure on the Premier to 
force him to submit his Government to League control. On k April 19^4 
Jinnah publicly announced that the Muslim League Assembly Party was now 
subject to the control of the A.I.M.L., and that Muslim M.L.As. owed no 
obligation to the Unionist Party, and were not bound by its programme.
Also he declared that as the League Party constituted the largest group
supporting the Ministry, in that all Unionist Muslims belonged to the
A.I.M.L., then the name of the Coalition Government would have to be 
changed to reflect that fact. He proposed, therefore, the adoption of 
the title Muslim League Coalition Party 1 "A change of label cannot, and 
does not, affect the continuance of the present coalition, so long as the 
parties concerned desire to maintain it."^ Khizar, however, refused to
comply; on 21 April 19^ the Premier during a meeting with Jinnah
insisted on the continuation of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, and the
68retention of the Unionist name. In explaining his motives to the 
Pakistani Foreign Minister almost twenty-five years later, Khizar claimed 
that two considerations had moulded his response. The first being that 
his non-Muslim colleagues refused to accept the change in the Ministry's 
title as advocated by Jinnah, and secondly that even if he had sanctioned 
it, the result would have been the collapse of the Government and the 
imposition of Governor's rule: "But for these reasons, I would have had
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no objection at all personally to calling the Ministry by whatever nomen-
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clature the Quaid-i-Azam wanted.” Though this explanation was valid to an
extent it concealed the Premier’s overriding consideration, which as he
admitted to Glancy was to sustain the British war effort in the Province:
"Khizr has told me many times that he would much prefer 
to resign rather than expose himself to attacks from 
his fellow-Muslims, and that he is only resisting Jinnah 
...because he is ready to carry on the war effort...”.
In fact Glancy had again been instrumental in harnessing Khizar’s pro-
British sentiments, thereby encouraging his continued resistance to
Jinnah, as is evident from the entry Wavell made in his journal on
10 June 19^:
”1 had a talk with Glancy this morning, he seemed a bit 
harassed, he had a very difficult time putting enough 
backbone into Khizar and his [^ Muslim]] Ministers to stand 
up to Jinnah. Although Jinnah is a most unorthodox Moslem 
(to say the least of it) he seems to be able to wave the 
banner of religion and frighten them all to heel with it.”
Not only did the Governor fire Khizar's recalcitrance, he also con-
72ceived the strategy with which the Premier finally confronted Jinnah.
On 2k April 19^, Glancy informed Wavell that it had been decided that 
Khizar should accommodate Jinnah’s insistence that he and his Muslim 
Unionist colleagues should owe direct allegiance to the A.I.M.L., but in 
return Jinnah would have to agree to the retention of the Unionist label 
by the Punjab Government, and give a written undertaking endorsing the 
compromise, and pledging not to interfere further with the working and 
programme of the Ministry. Glancy believed that this formula would be 
rejected by Jinnah, but he thought that it was essential that Khizar 
should pursue the tactic to prevent his followers from assuming that he 
had been intimidated by Jinnah’s demands, and thus dissuade them from 
defecting to what would appear to be the winning side: ’’Khizar has come
to realize that this effect is being brought about to an increasing
73extent and that the time has arrived for him to make a firm stand."
On 25 April 19^ Khizar put the proposal to Jinnah, and in an attempt 
to induce his acceptance of it he pointed out that it would be impossible 
to form a League coalition under any other circumstances as the rural 
Hindus, the Mahasabha, the Akali Party and the Congress would refuse to 
support it. He conceded that the League could engineer a small majority 
with the assistance of a few Sikh, Hindu and Depressed Class M.L.As, but 
he cautioned Jinnah that the Governor would probably refuse to sanction 
such a government as it would certainly prove to be unstable, and would 
thus adversely affect the war effort. If on the other hand Jinnah 
accepted the formula Khizar proposed, the Premier assured him that he
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would possess a united League Ministry, in all but name, offering full 
support for'Pakistan. Whilst, Khizar concluded, if the League went into 
opposition, it would function as a small minority, and the all-India
i i 7^
front for Pakistan would be broken.
Jinnah, however, was neither convincednor intimidated by Khizar's 
prognosis, and he rejected Khizar's offer. As stated previously Jinnah 
considered the creation of a genuine Muslim League Party accountable to 
himself and the A.I.M.L. preferable to the continuation of Unionist con­
trol over the Punjab League, and he was not averse to the imposition of 
Governor's rule. Also had Jinnah accepted the Premier's proposition he 
would in effect have submitted himself to an agreement far more binding 
than the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, which would have ensured that the Punjab 
Muslim League remained ineffectual as Khizar intended, his real purpose
being "to curb intrigues and factions maneuvering within the Muslim 
75League Party". ^ Also in refusing to meet Khizar*s conditions there is 
evidence to suggest that Jinnah had been persuaded to disregard the 
Premier’s claim that influential non-Muslim M.L.As. would refuse to co­
operate with a League Ministry. Whilst amassing biographical material in 
1967 Khizar recalled that "some of the clever men in the Party" had 
assured Jinnah that the non-Muslim Ministers in the Unionist coalition 
would, in order to retain their offices, agree to serve in a Muslim
League Government, and that the Premier had exaggerated their supposed
76reluctance as a ploy to frustrate the A.I.M.L. President's designs.
Though Khizar did not identify these ’’clever men" it is evident that he
was referring to the Mamdot-Daultana-Shaukat Hyat caucus whom Sheikh Faiz
Ahmed (Unionist Parliamentary Secretary) had openly criticised in May
19^ for misleading Jinnah regarding the true state of political affairs 
77in the Punjab.
Acting on the assurances of his cohorts Jinnah persisted in his
demands concerning the status and title of the Ministry, and on 26 April
19^ he met with Chhotu Ram and Baldev Singh to solicit their compliance
in the matter, having been promised by Khizar that if they agreed to the
78changes Jinnah wanted, then he would follow their example. The two 
non-Muslim Ministers, however, had no intention of accommodating Jinnah. 
They merely used the meeting to attempt to compromise him on the Pakistan 
issue. The Hindu Jat and Sikh leaders offered to consider co-operating 
with a Muslim League coalition if the creation of such an administration 
represented part of an all-Indian agreement, and on condition that the 
Pakistan idea was abandoned for the duration of the War. Also in order 
that the merits of*Pakistan could be judged, Chhotu Ram and Baldev Singh
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demanded from Jinnah a precise definition of its political, constitution­
al and geographical implications. In addition they insisted that the 
A.I.M.L. should pledge unconditional support for the war effort.*^ They 
were impossible demands; Jinnah could not reverse the attitude of the 
A.I.M.L. concerning the war without suffering considerable loss of face, 
and more importantly he could not risk subjecting his conception of a 
Muslim State to close public scrutiny, particularly if it became apparent 
that its territory in all probability would be limited solely to Muslim 
majority areas, and would not include the Punjab in its entirety. As a 
result he refused to meet the conditions sought by the two Ministers, 
though in doing so he judiciously avoided any discussion of'Pakistan!, 
rather he rejected them on the following grounds - the creation of a 
Muslim League Ministry in the Punjab could not be considered from a 
national point of view; ’Pakistan’was an all-Indian question, and as such 
irrelevant for the purpose of forming a coalition in the Punjab; the 
A.I.M.L. war policy had already been defined and was not a subject for 
discussion with groups in the Punjab Assembly, This summary dismissal 
ended any hope of a reconciliation, and on 27 April 19^ +^ + in a joint press 
communique Chhotu Ram and Baldev Singh criticised Jinnah's response, 
implying that his attitude concerning ’Pakistan' was totally unrealistic 
and irresponsible:
"Mr. Jinnah's comments can offer no comfort or satis­
faction to anybody. In fact they seem to be visibly 
evasive and suggest a complete reluctance to face the 
issues inherent in Pakistan."80
Jinnah refused to permit the Ministers' condemnation to deflect him 
from his course, and on 27 April i9^, he reiterated his objectives to 
Khizar in writing: the Muslim League Assembly Party was to declare sole
allegiance to the A.I.M.L., the Unionist nomenclature was to be abandoned 
whereupon the coalition would adopt the Muslim League t i t le.Khizar  
refused to acquiesce, claiming that Jinnah's repudiation of his 'Pact' 
with the late Premier was a breach of faith, and as such he was not pre­
pared to condone any action "involving interference in provincial affairs 
and the inner workings of the Ministerial Party formed under the Sikander 
-Jinnah Pact. This would be contrary to the accepted democratic prin- ^  
ciple that the wishes of the electorate and the legislature should prevail*' 
Jinnah, however, dismissed Khizar1s argument, by insisting that the 
A.I.M.L. had never given an assurance of non-interference in the pro­
vincial sphere.^
Thus deadlock reigned, but Jinnah possessed a ’trump card' of immense 
political value, which had he been able to play it would have intensified
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the pressure on Khizar.’ This concerned the commitment Jinnah had
extracted from Shaukat Hyat to resign from the Unionist Cabinet when
ordered to. The time was clearly ripe for such a development, for had
Shaukat relinquished his office at this time, ostensibly in support of
Jinnah, his action would have had a significant impact on the Muslim
public. Shaukat's secret promise to Jinnah, however, had been dis-
8^+covered by a secret service agent in May 19^31 and was thus known to
the Viceroy and the Punjab Governor. When it became apparent, therefore, 
that Jinnah was determined to capture the Unionist Ministry, Glancy acted 
decisively to prevent the A.I.M.L. President from manipulating Shaukat to 
make political capital at Khizar's expense. In the last week of April 
19^ the Governor decided to dismiss Shaukat for ministerial misconduct. 
In seeking the Viceroy's approval for such a course, Glancy frankly 
admitted that the Minister's disloyalty to Khizar necessitated his dis­
missal from office, and that Khizar and his staunch Unionist stalwarts 
believed that it would dissuade other Unionists, particularly the influ­
ential Khan of Kot, from deserting the Party and joining Jinnah. Never­
theless in Glancy's opinion it was imperative that in disposing of 
Shautkat "it would be better to avoid removing him on political grounds 
and there are other reasons which entitle him to dismissal." The "other 
reasons" concerned Shaukat's unfair treatment of Durga Parshad, an 
Indian-Christian Inspectress of Schools, who had been sacked on the
85Minister's orders in April 19^3 on an unproven charge of corruption.
Shaukat had in fact arranged the removal of Parshad to prevent her from
holding an enquiry into the conduct of Ruqiyah Begum, a teacher who had
been suspended by the Chief Officer of the Lahore Corporation for refus-
86ing to obey a transfer order. Even so, despite the undoubted illegal­
ity of the Minister’s action, the incident was used as an excuse for 
getting rid of Shaukat, and did not occasion it. Glancy, in commending 
the manoeuvre to the Viceroy, admitted the subterfuge, but he argued that 
it was necessary to employ such tactics to protect Khizar and his Govern­
ment as "larger issues are at stake - the tranquility of the Province and 
the continuance of the War effort". Also Glancy reminded the Viceroy 
that Khizar's continued resistance to Jinnah had been spawned out of his 
loyalty to the British, consequently the Governor considered that it was 
incumbent on him to protect the Premier in this instance:
"I shall come in for a certain amount of criticism in the 
Press... It will no doubt be represented that the reason 
for Shaukat's dismissal is his political activities and 
that the Governor has acted in an improper manner. All the 
same it seems to me that, unless Your Excellency sees any 
objection, I should be prepared to face this development.
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Khizr...is only resisting Jinnah.,.because he is ready 
to carry on the war-effort at the risk of his political 
extinction... I cannot deny that he is taking...risks.
This being so, it is not going to have a good effect if 
I decline to take any...risk myself." '
Wavell, who was as anxious as Glancy that Khizar should continue to 
thwart any encroachment by the A.I.M.L. in the Punjab, approved the 
Governor's plan.^
There is no doubt, however, that Shaukat Hyat was thoroughly cor­
rupt. In addition to the Durga Parshad affair it was later established 
that he had misused his position as the Minister responsible for the 
Lahore Improvement Trust to acquire land for himself by dubious means 
and at less than its full market value from Muslim agriculturists. He 
had borrowed money from a Hindu capitalist to finance the venture, in
appreciation for which he had conferred on his benefactor a commanding
89position in the formation and control of a transport combine in Lahore.
But his removal from the Cabinet had been engineered because his con­
tinued presence was unacceptable to the interests of the Unionist 
Ministry and the British - a fact which the Statesman pertinently 
appreciated:
"If Mr. Jinnah had not happened to be striving to subvert
the Ministry’s Party structure, would the alleged in­
justice ever have been righted? Alternatively, would 
Shaukat Hyat at this particular time have been brusquely 
deprived of office because of it?”90
Glancy, who had anticipated the exposure of his ploy, did not allow
such observations to dissuade him from rendering further assistance to
the Unionist Ministry. Having arranged the departure of Shaukat he
presented the Premier with a suggestion which he believed would strengthen
and stabilise the Government in the wake of the sacking. He reasoned
that the ex-Minister’s expulsion necessitated the appointment of two new
Muslim Ministers, as such a manoeuvre would secure the allegiance of their
91combined followings in the Assembly. Accordingly Sir Muhammad Jamal
Khan Leghari of Dera Ghazi Khan district and Nawab Ashiq Hussain from the
Multan district were duly elevated to cabinet rank in the second week of
May This exercise certainly achieved the Governor’s purpose, for
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until that time Leghari had been posing as an enthusiastic Jinnhite,
and Wavell estimated that his inclusion in the Cabinet, together with
that of Hussain had reduced the number of probable desertions from the
93Unionist benches from 30 to 18. Moreover both men were extremely 
wealthy landlords who exercised a considerable degree of power in the
gif.
Multan Division, which traditionally had been the Unionist stronghold. 
Whilst Ashiq Hussain possessed the additional advantage of being
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an influential Pir; as a descendant of the famous Muslim saint Ghaus
Bahawal Huq of Sind he commanded a very large number of murids
95(disciples) amongst the Muslim peasantry.
Mamdot and Daultana, alarmed that the Unionist Ministry had
retained the allegiance of these important Muslim leaders, sought to
neutralise the beneficial effect their support would have on Unionist
fortunes in the Multan Division by attempting to recruit other
important members of the landed aristocracy - Raza Shah, Wilayat Hussain
96and Mian Yar Daultana - for the League. They failed, however, either 
to destabilise the Ministry, or to achieve a crippling defection of 
Muslim M.L.As. from the Unionist fold. As a result the League leader­
ship, both at the provincial and national levels, concentrated their 
attacks on the Premier, determining to isolate him and to break his 
hold over the Muslim Unionist membership. The Punjab Muslim League 
had prepared the ground for such an assault at its second annual 
session held from 28 to 30 April 19*+^ . It had reiterated Jinnah*s
demands respecting the Ministry, and had censured Khizar for refusing
97to accommodate them. Subsequently in May 19*t*f Liaquat Ali Khan
(General Sec., A.I.M.L.) accused the Premier of betraying the aims and
objects of the A.I.M.L., in that the latter refused to acknowledge the
right of the League to involve itself in provincial affairs. The
Premier was given until 12 May 19*+^  either to explain his actions to
the A.I.M.L. Committee of Action, or face probable expulsion. Khizar
refused to be intimidated, replying that he had not violated the
League's mandate, as he had always acted in accordance with the terms
98of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact.
The Committee of Action refused to accept the relevance of the
Premier's response. On 27 May 19*+^  it ruled that the Pact was "nothing
more than a statement which the late Sir Sikander Hyat Khan made at a
meeting of the All India Muslim League Council at Lucknow in October
1937”, as such it was decided to expel Khizar from the A.I.M.L. as
he had "contravened the policy and programme of the Muslim League and
99violated its constitution, rules, aims and objects". In reaching 
this decision, the Committee had been influenced by the actions and 
declarations of Jinnah, rather than by the terms of the 'pact* which 
had clearly provided for "the continuance of the present Coalition 
Unionist Party". No objection had been raised to this clause at the 
1937 Lucknow meeting at which the agreement had been concluded between 
Sikander and Jinnah. Furthermore the Committee of Action in conducting 
its 'enquiry' did not reject the membership forms of those Unionist
233
Muslim M.L.As. who had joined the A.I.M.L. under the 'Pact* proviso
100
that their affiliation was to be "subject to the Sikander-Jinnah Pact".
Khizar in a rejoinder to his expulsion offered to refer the issue of
the 'Pact's' validity for arbitration by a Muslim judge of either the
Federal Court or any High Court in India, on condition that such an
101adjudicator was mutually acceptable to himself and the A.I.M.L. But
the A.I.M.L. declined, insisting that the issue had been adjudged
102already by the Muslim "nation". Evidently the League was not as 
confident concerning the decision an unbiased judge might have delivered.
The A.I.M.L.'s tactics, inspired by Jinnah, in arbitrarily re­
defining, and eventually denying the 'Pact's' existence was crude, and 
lacked conviction. Though the stratagem eventually proved effective, 
its immediate effect was not dramatic. Khizar's Muslim cabinet col­
leagues (Mian Abdul Haye, Mohammad Jamal Khan Leghari, and Ashiq
10"Z
Hussain) resigned from the A.I.M.L. in his support, and only eighteen
Muslim M.L.As. left the Unionist benches to join the Muslim League 
10*+Assembly Party. The vast majority of Muslim Unionists, therefore, 
continued to support the Ministry, thereby automatically, if not 
formally, abdicating from the A.I.M.L., as its creed prohibited member­
ship to any persons owing allegiance to political parties other than 
the League?0'5
Confronted by an undefeated and unrepentant Ministerial Party, 
the Punjab League under the direction of Mamdot, Daultana and Shaukat 
Hyat, changed the emphasis of its attack. Although the Provincial 
League leadership did not entirely abandon their objective of under­
mining Unionist Muslim solidarity, they decided to concentrate their 
efforts on revitalising the Muslim League outside of the Assembly, by
10 fi
appealing for the support of the Muslim populace at large - tactics 
which they believed would pave the way for their eventual acquisition 
of political power in the Province. In keeping with this strategy it 
was decided on 28 May 19*+*+ to appoint two Punjab League committees, one 
of which would continue to pressurise those Muslim M.L.As. who had 
failed to enter the A.I.M.L. fold, and the other to supervise the 
dissemination of the League's creed and policies. To facilitate the 
spread of such propaganda the Provincial League divided the Punjab into 
five zones, in each of which divisional Supervisors and Convenors were 
appointed to supervise the operation, which was to be executed by paid 
League workers, and a sum of Its. 60,000 was sanctioned to finance the 
operation. To augment the strength of the local organisation, all 
League branches in the Punjab were instructed to recruit five per cent
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of their members to serve as Muslim National Guards. The latter were
to be exempt from parading and wearing para-military uniforms, but
107were to engage in performing acts of social service.
On 17 June 1944 Mamdot revealed these intentions to the provincial 
press. It was a manoeuvre aimed at unsettling the Ministry, particu­
larly as Mamdot also disclosed that the A.I.M.L. Committee of Action 
had been invited to transfer its offices to Lahore for a six month 
period, and that in response to the preliminary efforts of the Provin­
cial League 90 Punjab Leaguers, including the l8 M.L.As. who consti­
tuted the Punjab League Assembly Party, had been elected to serve on 
the A.I.M.L. Council. In reality, however, the local League did not 
possess the resources to realise its grandiose programme, and as such 
it was anxious to draw on the aid and expertise of the parent body, 
which was requested to furnish Muslim leaders from other provinces to 
recruit and train Muslim League activists in the Punjab?0^ To begin 
with therefore the Punjab League’s campaign achieved few positive 
results. Although Daultana claimed that as a result of their en­
deavours public opinion was steadily uniting behind the League^ in 
that by the end of July its policies and aims had been conveyed to
over 1,000,000 Muslims during the course of 50 conferences held in 
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19 districts, Government reports for the June-July (1944) period
indicate a much lower level of activity. The Chief Secretary to the
Punjab Government observed that during June the Provincial League had
organised several propaganda tours; the meetings had not elicited any
great displays of enthusiasm and audiences had been comparatively small.
The most significant gathering, organised by the Muslim Students'
Federation in Rawalpindi, had failed to attract more than 1,500 persons
in spite of the fact that it had been attended by prominent Leaguers
111from the N.W.F.P., Baluchistan and Sind. In reality League activity 
had been confined largely to urban areas, where it had achieved some 
success in creating the impression amongst members of the Muslim 
intelligentsia that the rights of their co-religionists would be best 
protected by a Muslim League Government. By comparison League efforts 
to penetrate the villages were confined mainly to distorted tours by 
"peripatetic members of the Muslim Students’ Federation", who confined 
their energies to distributing pamphlets and contacting village 
officials. Their activities, however, in spite of the Islamic appeal 
behind them - in some places mosques were used to transmit the Pakistan 
slogan on the grounds that politics and religion according to Islam 
were indivisible - made little impact to begin with on the Muslim
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peasantry. For the most part Muslims in the rural areas were initi-
112ally more concerned with economic issues, whilst the fact that Khizar
had publicly pledged his support for 'Pakistan' the previous March (see
above, p.226), initially prevented League propagandists from exploiting
113the demand to the detriment of the Premier.
Daultana in spite of his exaggerated claim that "Big demonstrations,
1^  if
huge meetings and boundless enthusiasm have greeted us everywhere", 
was aware of the reality of the situation. In July 19^ he candidly 
admitted that in the rural districts the Muslim League was moribund.
He believed that in order to reverse this trend it was essential for 
the organisation to adopt and promote radical economic policies, to 
enable it to court Muslim allegiance in the Province, and to break 
the stranglehold which the landed politicians, who continued to 
sustain the Unionist Party, enjoyed in the rural constituencies: "It
is now becoming clear that in view of the determined Government oppo­
sition our basic strength must come not from the landlords or the 
115zaildar-lumberdar class but from the broad masses of the Muslim 
people." To achieve that objective Daultana stressed that "Apart 
from the appeal of Pakistan, the League must formulate a more concrete 
and immediate programme which is suited to the local needs of the 
Province.. .'0^
Jinnah responded positively to this advice. Up until this time, 
although he had acknowledged in vague terms that Punjabi Muslims 
should organise themselves in every sphere of provincial life - 
social, economic, educational and political - his main argument had 
been gauged to religious sentiment. Thus in June 19^ he had empha­
sised that the Punjab was the "cornerstone" of Pakistan, and as such 
the future of Muslim India lay in the hands of Punjabi Muslims "who
117are the custodians of the honour, prestige and reputation of Islam."
During a visit to the Punjab in August, however, he advocated far
more forcibly the socio-economic uplift of the Muslim community, par-
118ticularly in the rural areas. Later in November 19^ Jinnah pro­
claimed that the purpose of the A.I.M.L. was to raise the general 
standard of living enjoyed by the Muslim masses, rather than encouraging 
the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few privileged individuals. 
The League's ideal, he stated, was not to be capitalistic but Islamic,
in that it sought to serve the interests and welfare of the Muslim 
119
people. Thus whilst Jinnah had projected an economic appeal, he 
shrewdly explained it in a religious context.
Daultana and Mamdot heartened by Jinnah's stance, circulated at
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the beginning of November 19^ a list of the reforms which the Pro­
vincial League proposed to augment when 'Pakistan' was realised.
Broadly speaking these contemplated the nationalisation of key 
industries, banks and all utility services. Private enterprise, 
subjectto State supervision, would be encouraged to develop the wealth 
of the Province, and to provide for the progressive employment of the 
surplus population. Unemployment would be reduced; agriculture was to 
be improved to benefit the small zamindars in particular, and debt 
eliminated through the provision of cheap credit facilities financed 
by the State. The Punjab Alienation of Land Act was to be further 
amended to prevent the acquisition of land by rural moneylenders. 
Medical facilities were to be extended to the rural areas, and the 
burden of taxation was to be transferred from the poorer to the wealth­
ier sections of society. The entire educational system was to be over­
hauled, to facilitate the introduction of compulsory religious learning, 
though the rights of the minority communities were to be safeguarded 
to allow for their own religio-cultural traditions. The Punjab League 
also undertook to abolish forced labour and to provide for security 
of tenure, the levying of fair rents, and decent housing conditions. 
Minimum wages, shorter working hours for industrial labourers, the 
strict enforcement of factory legislation, the right of collective bar­
gaining through trade unionist activity, and unemployment and sickness
120benefits through insurance, were also promised.
In essence this package consisted of a conglomeration of ambitious
and deliberately inflated promises, the realization of which was beyond
the capacity of any future government. An empty sham, directed at a
largely ignorant and unsophisticated populace, conceived by two members
of the landed gentry, the privileges of which it supposedly sought to
curtail. Its sole purpose was to secure eventual power for its authors.
Also the emphasis which Mamdot and Daultana had placed on social and
economic reform did not eradicate the cruder religious appeal of the
League, nor was it intended to. Despite the fact that both men had
publicly pledged that the customs of the minorities would be respected 
121in a Muslim State, during the latter half of 19^^ League spokesmen,
including Daultana, continued to exploit religious fears and prejudices
122through the slogan 'Islam in Danger'. Similarly towards the close 
of the year, Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi, the leader of a group of 
Muslim zealots, toured the western Punjab on behalf of the A.I.M.L. 
inciting Muslim fanaticism against the Unionist Ministry. He placed 
no reliance on economic indoctrination, his favourite theme being the
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revival of the Caliphate, which possessed a special appeal for the 
conservative Muslim peasantry in the rural areasSignificantly 
the Muslim response to League propaganda, whilst appreciating the 
promised economic advantages, constituted a typical communal reaction, 
as was noted by the Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government in 
August 1944:
"Ordinary Muslims believe that with Pakistan they will 
get the best jobs, the best houses, most of which are 
owned by rich Hindus, and most of the business now in 
the hands of the Hindus. This anti-Hindu feeling is 
probably partly responsible for the unexpressed but 
undoubted sympathy felt by a majority of Muslim officials 
for the League.11 ^24
Of all the League's propaganda - social, economic and religious - 
Khizar realized correctly, as later events were to prove, that its 
religious appeal was the most potent, and therefore posed the greatest 
threat to the Unionist position. Thus in June 1944 he had asked the 
Viceroy to bar maulvis (religious teachers) from the U.P. from enter­
ing the Punjab. The latter were doing so under Jinnah's direction to 
agitate against the Ministry. Wavell, however, refused the request, 
on the grounds that the Provincial Government "have all the powers 
they need but...Khizar does not feel strong enough to use them,"*^^
This evaluation, however, was not entirely correct. The Punjab Premier, 
despite the fact that he retained the support of the majority of the 
Muslim M.L.As., knew that he was fighting a losing battle against 
Jinnah. In spite of this realisation he had grimly consented to 
frustrate Jinnah's Punjab ambitions out of regard for the British war 
effort. For him to have restricted the entry of the maulvis on his own 
authority would have given rise to the charge that he was anti-Muslim, 
thereby further strengthening Jinnah's position. Also such action 
would probably have undermined the resolve of his followers in the 
Assembly to continue to resist League advances. Wavell's assessment 
of the situation was further limited by his failure to appreciate fully 
the change which was occurring in the Punjab. Though feudal landlord 
politics were destined to survive in the post-independence Punjab 
the 19^0's witnessed the re-emergence of an ever more potent force - 
religion - against which the landed gentry who opposed the A.I.M.L. 
could not stand fast. Provincial politics no longer constituted in 
the main a series of contests between influential personalities, with 
the landed elite commanding the arena as Wavell imagined: "Odd that
these big Punjab landlords should be so dominated by a down—country
127lawyer like Jinnah."
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Refused viceregal assistance to combat religious propagandists, 
and unable to employ similar tactics because of the multi-communal 
composition of the Ministry, the Premier's opposition to the League 
was restricted to socio-economic issues. In the Autumn of 1944 Khizar, 
in a move to emphasize that the Unionist Party was as socially 
conscious as the Punjab Muslim League, committed the Ministry to a 
programme of reconstruction. The various schemes, which it was
/I p O
calculated would cost Rs. 130 crores, included the expansion of
public health and educational facilities, the construction of roads
in rural areas, the electrification of the villages, and the increased
129industrialisation of the Province. Furthermore, the Government under­
took to sink 3*000 additional tube-wells, and to reserve 70,000 acres 
of agricultural land, and practically all the permanent vacancies which 
occurred in the Government service for ex-servicemen?-^0 In order to 
promote this propaganda, and check League activities in the rural 
areas, Khizar also resurrected the Zamindara Leagued Its new creed 
was designed to appeal to all sections of the population, in that non- 
zamindars were not precluded from membership?*^ Although it claimed 
to stand for complete independence and strong provincial autonomy, on
the basis of inter-communal co-operation to be achieved through the
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pursuit of common economic goals, it lacked a constructive programme
to combat communalism. Zamindara League members remained free to
join any other political or communal organisation, with the right to
support such bodies whenever the communal rights and interests of
134their communities were involved. As Wavell noted, it was an im­
practicable compromise, as Muslim and non-Muslim interests concerning 
'Pakistan' were diametrically opposed?^ As such the Zamindara League 
could never constitute a realistic ideological alternative to the 
A.I.M.L., being nothing more, with the exception of the independence 
clause, than a re-affirmation of Unionism.
As 1944 drew to a close, therefore, the battle for the control of
the Punjab had been carried from the confines of the Legislative 
Assembly to the districts of the Province. The reins of government, 
however, remained firmly in Khizar's hands, though the number of Muslim 
M.L.As. supporting the Muslim League Assembly Party had increased from 
18 to 22. But with the death of Chhotu. Ram in January 1943 the 
Unionist cause sustained a severe blow which in the long run proved to
be a disaster. The veteran politician had held the eastern Jat
dominated districts of the Punjab against Congress incursions for many 
137years. His successor, Tikka Ram, whose selection as leader had
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deeply divided the Jat community, was unable to continue the task as he 
enjoyed neither the confidence nor the loyalty which his predecessor
i
had inspired. Thus as the 19^6 election approached he failed to
sustain either Jat solidarity, or their united support for the Unionist
Party. The Congress exploited the situation, eventually capturing 20
of the 26 eastern contituencies, including the late leader’s former 
139seat of Jhajjar. The loss of Chhotu Ram, however, was by itself not 
solely responsible for this outcome. The elections of 19^6 witnessed 
a polarisation of communal sentiment on the part of all the communities 
which worked to the advantage of the principal all-India parties.
Even so there can be little doubt that had Chhotu Ram lived, consider­
ing the widespread popularity he enjoyed, the Congress would have faced 
a more daunting task in the eastern Punjab, and the Unionist Party 
would have been served by a sounder champion.
In the short term, however, the Unionist Party appeared to have 
suffered no ill-effects, in that it maintained its supremacy in the
Legislature by a comfortable majority during the March (19*+5) Assembly
1 kosession, and it suffered no further defections to the Muslim League.
One reason for the Ministry's stability was the inability of the Punjab 
League to function effectively as an opposition party in the Assembly, 
largely because it had been severely weakened by the development of 
factionalism. In November 19^ the ever ambitious Shaukat Hyat had 
attempted to seize the leadership of the League Assembly Party from 
Mamdot. The latter together with Daultana had been alarmed and intimi­
dated by the challenge, because Shaukat's supporters, led by Abu Saeed
Anwar, had threatened to disrupt the League Party if Shaukat*s aim was 
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not realised. Consequently on 27 November Daultana had informed
Jinnah of the necessity for a change of leadership, a recommendation
he repeated on 1 December 19^. Jinnah, in respose, refused to permit
if 2
such a move, because he did not trust Shaukat. The ex-Minister*s
ambitions, however, were not to be easily thwarted, and in February
19^5 despite Jinnah's continued disapproval, he secured the leadership
of the Assembly Party through blackmail, in that he stated that if his
wishes were not accommodated he would withdraw his support from the 
1^3
League. In order to consolidate his victory, however, it was essen- 
tial for him and his followers, who included Ghazanfar Ali Khan, to 
capture the Punjab Muslim League Council. This proved to be an impos­
sible task for them, for at the Council elections conducted in May 19^3 
both Mamdot and Daultana retained their positions as President and 
General Secretary respectively. Shaukat's failure in this area
2k0
resulted from a number of causes. It was known that he did not enjoy 
Jinnah1s confidence. Whilst in March 19^5 the Premier had publicly 
humiliated him in the Assembly by furnishing details of his misdeeds 
as a Minister, thereby exposing him as a man devoid of integrity and
1 5
honesty, a factor which made a significant contribution in prevent­
ing him from mobilising support in his favour in the district League
-1
organisations to unseat Mamdot and Daultana. The Provincial League
thus plagued by internal divisions was unable to pose any real threat
to the Ministry during the first half of 19^ +5. This combined with the
fact that the Premier, deprived of the allegiance and counsel of
Chhotu Ram, had proved equal to the task of leading the Government 
1^7
alone, had had an adverse effect on the morale of League supporters
in the Assembly, three of whom (Rai Faiz Khan, Talib Hussain, Rai
Shahadat Khan) returned to the Unionist benches?**^
The disruptive effect of the Provincial League's internecine
struggle, combined with the majority which the Ministry continued to
command in the Legislature, did not cause Khizar to be either complacent
or over-confident. The Premier, in common with Firoz Khan Noon and
Baldev Singh, appreciated that the political situation in the Province
remained extremely fluid. Consequently they each sought to impress
upon Wavell that if any national agreement was concluded which resulted
in the A.I.M.L. sharing power at the centre, such a development would
place the Unionist Ministry in jeopardy, in that it would encourage
Muslim Unionists to switch their allegiance to the League in the belief
that by so doing they would be protecting their future interests?^
Wavell, convinced that Glancy had inspired their collective nervousness,
rejected their prognosis in the mistaken belief that "a strong common
feeling..." existed amongst all Punjabis, and that given strong leadership,
the Unionist Government would survive irrespective of political events
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at the all-India level. Thus in attempting to promote a national 
settlement in the summer of 19^5 to encourage co-operation between the 
A.I.M.L. and the Congress, Wavell in effect confronted Khizar with the 
possibility of political ruin.
The Viceroy considered that it was essential for Britain to achieve 
an understanding with the major political parties before the end of 
hostilities with Japan, in order to contain extremist nationalist ele­
ments, and to retain India in the British Commonwealth: "if we want
India as a Dominion after the war, we must begin treating her much more
151
like a Dominion now." As a step towards achieving this Wavell
launched an initiative on l4 June 19^5 to solicit the participation of
2*f1
the Congress and the A.I.M.L. in a provisional national government, in
which Muslims and Caste Hindus would enjoy parity, and which would
include some minority representatives drawn from the Sikh and
Scheduled Caste communities. This administration was to he created
through the re-organisation and Xndianisation of the Viceroy's
Executive Council. All portfolios, including 'Defence', 'Home',
'Finance' and 'Foreign Affairs' were to be held by Indians, only the
posts of Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief being reserved for British
personnel. Once inaugurated the provisional government was to commit
itself to promote the war effort, and to devising a new and permanent
152constitution for India. To facilitate the creation of such a govern­
ment the Viceroy invited nominees of the A.I.M.L. and the Congress, and
153other prominent Indian leaders to attend a conference to convene in 
Simla in June 19^5 to discuss his proposals, in the hope that they 
would prove acceptable to the major nationalist organisations.
Wavell's ideas, however, had offended the imperialistic sentiments of 
the British Prime Minister, and it was only after protracted negoti­
ations with the British Cabinet in April and May 19^51 that the Viceroy 
had secured Churchill's reluctant permission to proceed, which the
latter gave only because he had been assured by his Cabinet's India
15*tCommittee that the Viceroy's initiative would not succeed.
In the event the prediction proved to be correct. The Simla Con­
ference failed to achieve a positive result, largely because Jinnah and 
the Congress failed to agree on the question of Muslim representation 
in the provisional government. Jinnah demanded that all the Muslim 
members should be appointees of the A.I.M.L*. Conversely the Congress
155claimed the right to nominate two Muslims out of the Muslim quota (5).
The situation was further complicated by Khizar*s insistence that the
provisional government should also include a Unionist Muslim out of
deference to the traditional loyalty of the Punjab, and the fact that
there had been a Punjabi Muslim on the Viceroy's Executive Council
since 1919- The Premier's arguments, however, belied the true motive
behind them, this was revealed by Glancy who strongly supported Khizar
in the matter. The Governor bluntly told the Viceroy that if a Unionis^
Muslim was not offered a seat then the Ministry in the Punjab would fall.
The Viceroy, however, in agreeing to such an inclusion was not swayed by
Glancy's prediction; Wavell believed that the enormous contribution the
Province made to the agricultural production and defence of India 
157
merited it. Despite Wavell*s compliance in the matter, Jinnah 
refused to concede Khizar's claim on the grounds that the "Unionist
242
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Party were traitors to the interests of the Muslims... ”, and did not truly
represent Muslim opinion in the Punjab which, according to him, was
159
firmly behind the A.I.M.L.* In opposing the involvement of non- 
League Muslims, whether Unionist or Congressite, Jinnah had other more 
urgent motives. He believed that unless all the Muslim nominees were 
Leaguers it would undermine the A.I.M.L.’s claim to be the only legiti­
mate representative organisation of the Indian Muslims. So anxious was 
he to prevent such an occurrence, that on 9 July 1945 he had implored 
the Viceroy not to disrupt League unity over the issue with the words
160"I ask you not to wreck the League.’1 Also the A.I.M.L. President
realised that even though Muslims had been offered parity with Caste
Hindus in the proposed government, because of the presence of Sikh and
Scheduled Caste representatives they would be relegated to the position
of a permanent minority and that for the League to make any impact it
161was essential that it should control all the Muslim votes. In order 
to further offset the disadvantages Muslims would experience, Jinnah 
also stipulated that any measure which the Muslim group in the govern­
ment opposed should be rejected if it failed to secure a two-thirds 
majority. This condition was totally unacceptable to the Viceroy, but 
in an attempt to placate Jinnah's fears to an extent Wavell on 11 July 
offered to permit a Muslim quota consisting of four Leaguers and one 
Unionist. Jinnah, however, rejected the compromise, refusing to
abandon his original stance. As a consequence Wavell realised that the
162Simla effort to negotiate a meaningful settlement had failed.
Considering Jinnah's strong objection to a place being given to a 
Unionist Muslim it could be argued that Khizar, in making the claim, 
had played a major part in wrecking the talks, and that that had been 
his main purpose, for he had opposed the Conference from the outset, 
having accused the Viceroy on 23 June of ’’handing over power to the
enemy...”, statirg that his "approach to QtheT Congress and the League was
1 (v5a slap in the face for all co-operators.” It is certainly true that
the Punjab Premier concerned that the presence of the A.I.M.L. at the
Centre would place h'is government in jeopardy, had been openly relieved
164when the Conference failed, but he was not the cause of the break­
down. Also, although Jinnah's attitude had contributed in large measure 
to the negative outcome, it was not solely responsible for it. Even*if 
he had been content to accept Wavell*s formula for Muslim representation 
(see above), the Viceroy knew that the Congress would have been unlikely
to agree to it, as that organisation had determined to achieve complete
165domination at the Centre. In the final analysis, therefore, the
2^3
Simla Conference fell victim to the diametrically opposed philosophies 
of the A.I.M.L. and the Congress, neither of which totally reflected 
reality; the former insisting that it had the sole right to speak for 
the Indian Muslim community, the latter posing as the political arbi­
trator of all India’s peoples.
Jinnah, however, had no intention of admitting this fact. He was
«i cc
anxious to avoid any condemnation for the Conference's collapse, and 
he shrewdly turned the episode to his own advantage by publicly berating 
Khizar for torpedoing the Viceroy's initiative, and by portraying his 
stance on the Unionist Muslim issue as being detrimental to Muslim
interests. Whilst at the same time he successfully cultivated his
168own image as the champion of Islam. Jinnah's propaganda, despite the
inaccurate nature of the allegations, had an adverse effect on the 
fortunes of the Unionist Party, The previous June the Provincial Muslim 
League had penetrated the Premier's home district of Sargodha, A meet­
ing of the District Muslim League had been convened presided over by 
the Sajjadanashin Sahib of the 1gadi' of Sial Sharif, and attended by 
Nawabzada Azizullah Khan, the son of the largest Tiwana landowner,
Nawab Major Mumtaz Khan. The proceedings, patronized by two such 
influential members of the district's religio-social order, had been a 
great success in that it had attracted crowds of between 12,000 and 
20,000 at each of its three sittings. The theme of the meetings had 
been set by Shaukat Hyat who had raised the emotive slogan of 'Islam in
Danger* and had pledged himself "to shed his last drop of blood in the 
169defence of Islam". The emotional appeal of the League portrayed so
visibly on the Premier's 'back door' had an unsettling effect on the
senior Tiwanas. To begin with Khizar had been able to contain the
situation and retain the allegiance of his kinsmen by assuring the
leading members of his tribe that he would formulate future policy
170towards the A.I.M.L. in consultation with them. In the wake of the
Simla Conference, however, Khizar's efforts faltered. Viewed by many
as a traitor to the Muslim cause, he could no longer command the
united loyalty of the Tiwana tribe. At the beginning of October 19^5,
Nawab Mumtaz Khan, a former pillar of the Unionists, announced his
decision to quit the Party and support the League, claiming that the
attitude of the Premier and the Congress at Simla had demonstrated that
the Hindus were committed to keep the Muslims in perpetual servitude,
171and that the Unionists were aiding their design.
During the Autumn of 19^5 other influential Muslim leaders had 
also joined the A.I.M.L. at the expense of the Unionist Party, although
2kk
it was the surrender of Japan on 1*t August 19^5 coupled with the Vice­
roy's policy statement of 19 September 19^5 which made the most sig­
nificant contribution in encouraging their actions. In his announce­
ment Wavell re-affirmed the British Government's commitment to "full 
self-government in India", and he confirmed that the elections, 
delayed by the war, would be held during the coming cold weather 
(December 19^5 - February 19^ +6). Once the results were known, Wavell 
revealed that he would hold talks with representatives from the 
provinces, and invite members drawn from "the main Indian parties" to 
serve on the Viceroy's Executive Council, as preliminary steps to en­
couraging the Indian leaders to formulate an agreed constitution for 
India?72
It was evident therefore that the A.I.M.L. would play a major
role in deciding the future of India, and that the Pakistan issue would
173dictate the outcome of the electoral contest in the Punjab. The more
astute Muslim politicians in the Province sensing that the A.I.M.L.
would emerge victorious, sought to guarantee their own political
fortunes by aligning themselves with it. On 22 September 19^5 Chaudhry
Ata Ullah, the only elected member from the Punjab on the Council of
State embraced the League, declaring Pakistan to be the "sheet-anchor"
17^ -
of the Muslim nation. Two days later Major Mubarik Ali Shah, a 
member of the Pir family of Shah Jiwana (Jhang District) and Malik 
Sardar Khan Noon, who belonged to the extremely powerful Noon family, 
deserted the Unionist benches in the Punjab Assembly, the former stat­
ing that as the future constitution of India depended on the outcome of
the forthcoming elections no honest Muslim should withhold support from 
175the League. ^ The following month four more ex-Unionists followed their 
example?^
Also in August and October 19^5 Firoz Khan Noon (Khizar's cousin) 
and Begum Shah Nawaz, both former prominent Unionists, publicized
177their intentions of contending the elections on behalf of the A.I.M.L. 
This development was a severe setback for Khizar on account of the 
influence their respective families (the Noons of Shahpur and the Arain 
Mians of Baghbanpura) commanded in the Province. Ironically neither of 
these politicians had previously exhibited any great enthusiasm for 
Jinnah or his cause - political realities and necessities had driven 
them into the League camp. Until the prospect of an election forced 
his hand, Noon had carefully avoided offending either Jinnah or Khizar, 
as Wavell had observed: "Firoz Khan Noon...has really very few
political principles... He tries to trim between Jinnah and Khizar,
2*+5
178and is I think trusted by neither." ( Privately Noon actually dis­
agreed with the Pakistan demand, confiding to Glancy in October 19^5 
that he regretted that the term "Pakistan" had ever been invented?^
Yet driven by the desire to preserve his political future Noon in 
November 19^5 resigned from the Viceroy's Executive Council and 
publicly and enthusiastically championed the Pakistan caused0 His 
conversion to Muslim nationalism appeared all the more suspect in view 
of the fact that only the previous April he had assured the British
and Commonwealth Premiers that the peoples of India were united in
181their desire to remain in the Empire. Similarly the Begum's re­
alignment with the League occurred not from conviction but political 
motivation. She had been expelled from the A.I.M.L. in 19*U for
refusing to obey Jinnah and resign from the National Defence Council^2
Though she had resigned from the Unionist Party in May 19^4, she 
remained in the Provincial Assembly as an independent member 
significantly it was not until October 19^5 following the election 
announcement that she rehabilitated herself with Jinnah and the A.I.M.L.,
18*fby resigning from the Defence Council. Both Noon and the Begum had 
been creatures of the British, but their appreciation that the 'old 
order' was changing caused them to attach themselves to the 'rising 
star’ of Muslim nationalism, as personified by the A.I.M.L., abandoning 
British Imperialism and the Unionist Party both of which were clearly 
in the descent. Noon even admitted as much. In a press interview 
given in September 19^5 he claimed that the Unionist Party had outlived 
its usefulness, as at its conception the possibility of the end of 
British paramountcy had not existed, but as that process was now 
imminent the continuation of the Unionist Party independent of the 
A.I.M.L. was harmful to Muslim interests?^
The defections of these former stalwarts of the Unionist Party 
reinforced Glancy's conviction that the Ministry could not survive the 
forthcoming elections if the outcome was to be decided by the call for 
'Pakistan'. Previously the Governor had desired the survival of the 
Unionist Government to protect the British war effort in the Province, 
but even though the War had been won Glancy remained committed to 
Unionism, and he determined to use his influence to bolster it against 
the A.I.M.L., The Governor's motives in pursuing such a course arose 
from two main convictions. In the first place he feared that if the 
League emerged triumphant from the imminent electoral contest, it 
would be practically impossible for Britain to find a satisfactory 
solution to the constitutional problems, as the A.I.M.L. would be in
2k6
an even stronger position to demand 'Pakistan' - the very concept of 
which was an anathema to the Congress. Secondly he believed that once 
"Pakistan becomes an imminent reality" the Punjab would be submerged 
in civil war: 'we shall be heading straight for blood-shed on a wide
scale; non-Muslims, especially Sikhs, are not bluffing, they will not
186submit peacefully to a Government that is labelled "Muhammadan Raj".'
Thus Glancy considered that the Government of India should do all 
in its power to prevent the defeat of the Unionist Government in the 
Punjab not only to protect British interests but to save the Province 
from an internecine struggle. Aware that the Ministry was incapable 
of successfully contesting the League's demand for'Pakistan', and its
manipulation of religious sentiment, the Governor had already urged the
. 187Viceroy in August 19^5 to "deflate the theory of Pakistan...", by
impressing Muslim voters with the fact that if a Muslim homeland was
conceded it would involve the partition of the Punjab, resulting in
all probability in the loss of the Divisions of Jullundur and Ambala
and the District of Amritsar - all of which were non-Muslim majority
areas:
"Action on these lines would at least provide the 
Unionist Party with a rallying cry against Pakistan - 
something on which the elector could definitely bite.
No Punjabi, however uninformed, would contemplate with ^gg
equanimity so shattering a dismemberment of the Province..."
In confronting the Viceroy with this analysis Glancy failed to 
achieve his main objective, the destruction of the Pakistan appeal 
prior to the elections. There was much in the Governor's prognosis 
which Wavell agreed with, but he refused to jeopardise what he con­
sidered to be the principal British and all-Indian interests merely to 
attempt to resolve the Unionist dilemma. In forwarding Glancy's views 
to Pethick-Lawrence (Amery's successor as Secretary of State for India) 
the Viceroy recorded the following observations and recommendations. 
Whilst he accepted that "there is much to be said for the Governor's 
view that the crudity of Jinnah's ideas should be exposed..." and that
"it seems to follow that some enquiry into the possibilities of Pakistan
18<
is a necessary preliminary to any further constitutional discussion..." 
he insisted that it was imperative for the British Government to formu­
late concrete counter-proposals before taking such a step. He cautioned 
that the Muslim community was determined to resist Congress control, 
thus it was incumbent upon the British to present them with a plausible 
and acceptable alternative. He urged, therefore, that the Home Govern­
ment should consider either the creation of a loose form of Federation
2k7
consisting of all the provinces and Princely states "in which Central 
powers would be reduced to a minimum, and Muslims would be given 
equality with all other communities in the Central Executive", or 
"a Federation of a tighter kind...with provision for Provinces and 
States to come in or stay out...if they so desired."*1^ 0 The last 
suggestion, therefore, did not preclude Pakistan, but Wavell insisted 
that in order to avoid civil strife in the Punjab the British Govern­
ment should deny Jinnah's insistence that a solely Muslim plebiscite 
would decide the future of the Muslim majority provinces: "I am clear
...that the Punjab cannot be included in Pakistan as it stands...on a
Muslim plebiscite. Jinnah's plan is unjust...and its acceptance would
"191lead to something like civil war." Wavell realised, however, the 
grave dangers inherent in any attempt to modify the Pakistan demand 
on account of its "wide popularity.4..among Muslims" resting as it did 
on "its Islamic appeal" and "a genuine dread of Hindu domination...", 
and he impressed on the Secretary of State that Government action 
would, out of necessity, have to be cautionary and extremely well 
planned: "The Muslims are too numerous and too influential in India
as a whole to be disregarded, and our handling of them is vital to a 
settlement of the Indian problem."1^
Wavell's interpretation of the situation and the remedies 
necessary to resolve the constitutional deadlock precluded the immediate 
action prescribed by Glancy. Also the Viceroy did not share the Punjab 
Governor's fears of a Muslim League victory at the polls. Wavell was 
convinced that a League triumph was inevitable, and that if the Govern­
ment of India attempted to discredit 'Pakistan1 such action would 
strengthen rather than weaken Jinnah's appeal to the Muslim electorate. 
In addition the Viceroy considered that if the League was victorious in 
the Punjab it would eventually work to Jinnah's disadvantage as it would 
demonstrate the impracticability of 'Pakistan1, in that a Muslim League 
Government, bereft of non-Muslim support on account of its championing 
of a Muslim State, would be unable to sustain a stable administration 
in the Province:
"In the Punjab, successive Muslim leaders...have realised 
that stable government is possible only if there is a 
genuine partnership between considerable sections of the 
Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. The Muslims inevitably dominate 
the Cabinet, and have much to gain by such a partnership.
On the other hand, they have much, perhaps everything, to 
lose by advertising their strength, for a united Hindu- 
Sikh opposition aided by a few Muslim renegades could make 
orderly government impossible."
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Thus:
"educated Muslim opinion may gradually appreciate the 
impracticability of Pakistan in its crude form.... In 
this matter time is on the side of common sense, and if 
there is an interval during which the Muslim League are 
in office in the Punjab...I think the experience might 
be valuable.""92
In presenting this synopsis and proposals for the formulation of 
policy in respect of 'Pakistan' the Viceroy had attempted to persuade 
the British Government to adopt a constructive approach to the problem. 
His advice, however, fell on deaf ears. The British Cabinet, influ­
enced primarily by Stafford Cripps (President of the Board of Trade) 
refused to abandon or modify the Cripps Offer of 1942, despite Wavell»s 
warning that it would not satisfy either the Congress or the A.I.M.L.. 
Cripps, supported by Attlee (British Labour Prime Minister following 
Churchill's defeat in the General Election of July 1945) refused the 
Viceroy's counsel, claiming that he had been assured by Birla, G/vn<o(j4T's 
'unofficial spokesman', and Shiva Kao, the Delhi correspondent of the 
Hindu and the Manchester Guardian, that the Congress would agree to his
original offer, insisting that it remained the official policy of the 
19k
British Government. Muslim aspirations and the obstacles and dangers
they held for future constitutional advance were disregarded. Against
such opposition, Wavell made little headway, ruefully reflecting in his
journal that Cripps and Attlee, who were in constant communication with
Congress propagandists "are taking all they say as g o s p e l " , a n d  "are
obviously bent on handing over India to their Congress friends as soon 
196as possible".
Unable to initiate any positive planning in respect of the Pakistan 
issue Wavell attempted to persuade the Cabinet to combat the A.I.M.L.'s 
plebiscite claim. Here too he failed to obtain a satisfactory response. 
Although the Cabinet's India Committee agreed on 11 September 1945 that 
the decision of a province to vote itself out of any future Indian Union 
would not be based on the votes of a single community, but on the 
collective voting of all the communities, ^  no directive was issued 
in this regard. Wavell insisted that a statement to that effect should 
be announced on his own authority if misunderstanding persisted in India 
concerning the Muslim plebiscite?^ But as a result of the Cabinet's 
reluctance to face the issue, and Menon's (Reforms Commissioner, G.of I.) 
fears that such action by the Viceroy would give rise to allegations
that the British Government was attempting to exploit the communal
199wrangle, no pronouncement was made as to the r£le which the various
2*t9
communities would play in deciding the geographical boundaries of the 
proposed Muslim State. In defining British policy in a speech on 19 
September 19^5» Wavell merely reiterated that it was the intention of 
the British Government to convene a Constitution-making Body following 
the conclusion of the elections, and to encourage inter-party co­
operation in a new Executive Council, which was to be appointed to
govern India during the interval preceding the implementation of the
. . . . .  200 new constitution.
Glancy, frustrated that his original request had not been met,
repeated his plea in October 19^5 for an official statement indicating
that the Divisions of Ambala and Jullundur would not be forced to
accede to Pakistan against the will of the majority of their inhabitants:
"I still think very strongly that an authoritative 
statement of this kind would provide a most timely, 
and surely an entirely unexceptionable, corrective to 
the fanatical and highly dangerous doctrine of "Islam 
in danger" that is now being preached by advocates of 
the League...to prevent the coming elections being 
fought blindly on a false issue.
This request was supported by Evan Jenkins, the Viceroy's Private
Secretary. Jenkins, who did not regard the creation of a "Muslim home-
202land" to be a viable possibility, was as anxious as the Punjab Governor
to limit its appeal. As a result he drew Wavell's attention to the
fact that whilst
"The Muslim League assertion that Pakistan is to consist 
of certain Provinces as they.stand is not contrary to 
the terms of the £19^2 Cripps] Declaration.... On the 
other hand, the claim for a Muslim plebiscite is ridiculous, 
and...it is fairer to Jinnah to deny it now than let him 
assume its validity throughout the elections and tell him 
afterwards that we are quite unable to accept it. "^3
Influenced by Jenkins, Wavell once again advised the Secretary of State
of the necessity for the British Government to dismiss the idea that
provinces would be permitted to enter any new constitution on the vote
of a single community. He suggested that such an announcement could
take the form of an answer to "an arranged question in Parliament", as
"A reply of this kind does not commit us...to any definition of the
boundaries of Pakistan. It merely states that we do not intend that the
constitutional future of any Province should be determined by any one
of the communities."^*
Pethick-Lawrence refused totally to concede the Viceroy's point.
He was concerned that if a question and answer syndrome was initiated
in Parliament, it would lead to embarrassing questions being posed
which were beyond the control of the Government. He was also of the
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opinion that Jinnah would be unable to legitimately accuse the British 
of permitting him to propagate a false assertion regarding the plebis­
cite issue, as the Cripps Offer had not provided for a solely Muslim 
referendum, an omission which had caused Jinnah to reject it. Further­
more the Secretary of State claimed that it would be a fundamental 
mistake for the British Government, having made provision for future 
discussions to ascertain how the 19^2 proposals could be modified to 
produce an agreed constitution, to make any pronouncement on the 
plebiscite provision of that offer which would further alienate the
In addition Pethick-Lawrence believed that any announcement 
which implied that the provincial option remained a British intention, 
despite the fact that the Cripps formula guaranteed it "will greatly 
increase the difficulties of discussing any alternative to it which 
might be more acceptable to the Congress, such as an option exercisable 
by smaller areas.
Pethick-Lawrence’s response epitomised the total confusion of the 
Attlee Government in respect of future Indian policy. The Cripps Offer 
remained the basis for future talks, therefore nothing could be said 
to increase League prejudice against it. At the same time no action 
was permissible which would bind the British Government to realising 
the terms of the Offer in respect of the provinces’ option clause, 
for fear of offending the Congress. What is ironic, in view of Glancy's 
wishes, was the fact that the Westminster Government had clearly 
decided that if* Pakistan was to be sanctioned, its frontiers were to 
be determined to placate Congress objections, and not to meet League 
aspirations, but the Secretary of State refused to admit this publicly!
Wavell realised that further discussion on the subject was futile, 
and events in India caused him to drop the matter. In November 19^5 
Jinnah officially defined his conception of'Pakistan1, laying claim to 
all the Muslim majority provinces and Assam. Up until that time the
or\f.
Congress had been reticent in its handling of the Pakistan demand.
Once Jinnah had broadcast his objective, however, Nehru and Patel 
(Chairman of Congress parliamentary sub-committee appointed to conduct 
the 19^6 election campaign) formally denounced it. This caused Menon 
to persuade the Viceroy to refrain from pursuing the plebiscite issue 
on the grounds that the stance adopted by the Congress leaders had re­
assured the Sikh minority in the Punjab, and that in view of the con­
tinued intransigence of the Congress towards Britain, it would have
been foolhardy for the Viceroy to persist in a course which would also
207turn the A.I.M.L. against the British. In accepting this advice,
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Wavell was also influenced by his own assessment that the Government 
of India would face serious difficulties in conducting any future 
discussions with the Congress and the A.I.M.L. if it now became a 
party to the dispute by attempting to delimit*Pakistan. He sensed 
that such action could precipitate civil strife, particularly as it 
was apparent that the Congress would only accept a demarcation which 
would render partition worthless to the A.I.M.L., whilst Jinnah would
reject any proposition which detracted from the existing provincial
, , . 208 boundaries.
In spite of Wavell*s change of heart, in the final analysis it was 
the unrealistic attitude of the Attlee Government, and its virtual 
abdication of responsibility which caused the 19^6 elections in the 
Punjab being contested in part on a totally erroneous issue, thereby 
reducing still further the already tentative appeal of the Unionist 
Ministry. 'Pakistan* as epitomised by League propagandists, constituted 
a powerful exhortation to Muslim provincial and communal pride, as 
well as provoking their religious fears and prejudices. The Muslim 
electorate was presented with a vision of the Punjab in which they 
would be the masters, not only of their own destiny, but also of that 
of the non-Muslims. They were led to believe that in future all
209Punjabis, irrespective of their faith, would be subject to Islamic law, 
thereby symbolising the promised Muslim supremacy. It was a total 
rejection of the Unionist philosophy dedicated to its destruction. The 
fact the A.I.M.L. refused to consider or admit the likelihood of the 
partition of the Province, increased its popular appeal. Jinnah and 
the League, sensing victory, presented a vision of a united Punjab as 
the 'cornerstone* of Pakistan, in which Muslims would dominate, whilst 
the indolence of the British Government fostered rather than discouraged 
the hallucinatory socio-political intoxication of Punjabi Muslims, and 
in so doing contributed to the subsequent political annihilation of the 
Unionist Party.
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CHAPTER VII
PUNJABI MUSLIMS AND THE ELECTIONS OF 1946 
- A TRIUMPH FOR FEUDALISM AND THE PIRS
The elections of 1946 witnessed a resounding win for the Muslim 
League in the Punjab. This result, however, was not solely a victory 
for the League and thereby’Pakistan’, but it also reflected the triumph 
of the Muslim landed and religious elites in the Province. The majority 
of the most influential Muslim zamindari families, and an overwhelming 
number of the Pirs had allied themselves with the League and the Pakistan 
demand, though in many cases such action had not occurred for ideological 
reasons, but had been dictated by the desire to protect and enhance their 
political and economic interests. Thus by 1946 the Muslim League had 
replaced the Unionist Party as the repository of feudal power and privi­
lege; it was a significant development for it contributed greatly to 
ensuring that the League would enjoy the support of the mass of the rural 
dominated Muslim electorate (75 of the 84 Muslim constituencies were in 
rural areas), whose actions were greatly influenced, if not determined, 
by the large landlords and Pirs. Even so other factors also helped to 
shape the response of the Muslim voters - the communally charged atmos­
phere which had enveloped both Punjabi and national politics in the pre­
election period; widespread corruption and bribery which were employed 
by Unionists and Leaguers alike to enhance their respective prospects; 
the prevailing economic depression which caused widespread dissatis­
faction with the Unionist Ministry, and the propagandising activities 
of student activists on behalf of the League. In the final analysis, 
however, the decisive victory which the League gained resulted primarily 
from the fact that it commanded the allegiance of the extremely powerful 
religio-feudal elite who controlled the political life of the Province.
The composition of the electorate in the Punjab in 1946 was governed
"1
by the same rules which had been in force in 1937 (see pp.1.61-162). 
though the number of those entitled to vote had increased from 2,686,094 
in 1937 to 3»514,749 by 1946.^ Thus approximately 12.6% of the entire 
population was enfranchised. As at the previous election males accounted 
for the majority of voters (see p.l6D; approximately 46% of all men 
over the age of twenty enjoyed the vote. In respect of the communal
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franchise there were 1*619)691 voters in the Muslim constituencies, 
848,744 in the General (Hindu) and 659,396 in the Sikh; the remaining 
voters belonging to the special constituencies (Women, Anglo-Indian, 
Labour, University, European, Indian Christian, Commerce and Industry 
Landholders). In terms of male voters over the age of twenty, 
approximately 38# of adult Muslim males, 4C$ of adult Hindu males, and 
63% of adult Sikh males were enfranchised (see Appendix S).
Thus a relatively small electorate was involved in the election. 
That factor, however, did not detract from the League's performance.
Out of a total of 84 seats reserved for Muslims, the League gained 72, 
in addition to which it captured three special constituencies - two 
Women and one Labour. By contrast the Unionist Party forfeited its 
commanding position. It retained only 12 Muslim^, five General, three 
Landholders and one Indian Christian seat. Its majority had been 
decimated, as it commanded only 21 seats in an Assembly of 175. Con­
versely the Congress, though it failed to take any Muslim seats, 
emerged as the second largest party in the Legislature as a result of 
successes in 51 constituencies - 36 General (including six Scheduled 
Caste), nine Sikh, two Women (one Hindu and one Sikh), one Commerce 
and Industry, one Landholder, one Labour and one University. Of the 
remainder the Panthic Sikhs gained 23 seats (22 Sikh and one Landholder), 
and five (one Scheduled Caste, one Indian Christian, one Labour, one 
Anglo-Indian and one European) were captured by independent candidates.^ 
The majority of the 18 special constituencies in theory had joint 
electorates, but the four seats allotted to women were divided between 
the communities - two Muslim, one General and one Sikh. Also the five 
landholders constituencies were in practice communal seats, in that 
Muslim voters predominated in three of them (N. Punjab, W. Punjab and 
Tumandars), and Hindus and Sikhs respectively in the remaining two 
(E. Punjab and Central Punjab). Similarly Muslim voters were in a 
majority in one of the Labour seats (N. Punjab) and non-Muslims in the 
other two (Trade Union and E. Punjab).^ These communal divisions had 
been clearly evident in the voting pattern. Also the Congress capture 
of the Commerce and Industry and University seats reflected the fact 
that Hindus controlled both these spheres of Provincial life. Conversely 
the retention by the Unionist Party of three of the four landholders 
constituencies resulted from the fact that the successful Unionist 
candidates - Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana and Jamal Khan Leghari (Unionist 
Minister) - were able to use their personal influence, and in Khizar's 
case official interference, to ensure that they did not forfeit the
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support of the relatively small number of votes included. Khizar
captured both the North Punjab and West Punjab Landholders seats,
possessing electorates of 886 and 1,066 respectively, whilst the
7Turaandar seat held by Leghari consisted of only nine voters.
Personal influences aside, the vital issues confronting the Punjab 
at the time of the elections regarding its future role in the post­
independence period resulted in the manifestation of a greater degree 
of political awareness than had been the case in 1937* There were 
no contests in only 14 constituencies with an aggregate electorate of 
348,8l6. The effective voters therefore numbered 3,165,933 whom
g
2,076,207 exercised their franchise. A relatively larger proportion 
of Hindus voted (69%) than was the case for either Muslims (64.5%) or
Q
Sikhs (64%). Whilst it could be argued that this demonstrated a
greater degree of political consciousness on the part of the Hindu
electorate, it probably occurred because a larger proportion of Hindu
voters were located in urban areas than was the case for either Muslims 
10or Sikhs, which made the franchise marginally more accessible to Hindu
voters. Most significant of all, however, the Hindus were under tremendous
psychological pressure to register their votes. As a minority community
dominating the professional and commercial spheres of provincial life,
and possessing a vast investment in the Province, they stood to bear the
greatest loss from a League victory heralding •'Pakistan*. Similarly the
Sikh land holdings in the central Punjab were also threatened, which
suggests that the comparatively low Sikh turnout at the polls in contrast
to that of the Hindus, resulted from the fact that all but two of the
Sikh constituencies were in the more inaccessible rural areas.
In respect of Muslim voters, of the 1,044,158 who exercised their
vote, 6791796 (65*10%) voted for the League, though this in reality
meant that only 42% of all enfranchised Muslims (i.e. all who were
entitled to vote, irrespective of whether they voted or not) had in fact
supported the League. Even so this did not detract from the League
victory, because the Unionist Party, which had posed the greatest threat
to the Muslim League in the Punjab secured only 26.81% (2791967) the
Muslim votes cast, representing only 17*28% of the entire Muslim electorate.
An analysis of the total Muslim vote is given in Table I below:
Table I - Total Votes Polled in the Muslim Constituencies
League 679,796 (65*10%) Congress 6,480 (0.62%)
Unionist 279,967 (26.81%) Independent 30,180 (2.89%)
Ahrar 41,608 ( 3*99%) Invalid 6,127 (0.59%)
(From information contained in the Times of India, 13 March 1946)
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In the rural areas the League gained 30% and more of the votes
polled in 55 constituencies, but it is interesting to note that it
received the support of 50%,and over, of the entire Muslim electorate
in only 8 constituencies (Karnal, Ambala and Simla, Chunian, Gurdaspur
East, Shahdara, Montgomery, Okara and Jhang Central - see Appendix T).
Three of these seats — Karnal, Ambala and Simla, and Gurdaspur East -
were situated in the eastern part of the Province where Muslims were in
a minority. The high polls, and large measure of League support,
recorded in each, were symptomatic of the unease and vulnerability the
Muslim community experienced in Hindu majority areas. A similar phenomenon
was evident in respect of the eastern urban constituencies. The heaviest
polling, and the League's most convincing urban victories occurred in
the North East Towns and South East Towns seats (see Appendix T). With
regard to those constituencies where the League experienced its greatest
successes - Chunian, Shahdara, Montgomery, Okara, and Jhang Central -
all were in majority Muslim areas. The fact that each of them contained
canal colony lands influenced the high turnout and the eventual result.
There was a widespread belief amongst Muslim voters that a League victory
would materially benefit their community at the expense of the non- 
11
Muslims. Student propagandists acting on behalf of the Muslim League 
fostered the belief that colony lands held by Hindus and Sikhs would be 
redistributed amongst Muslim tenants and demobilised soldiers.1^ Three 
of the constituencies (Montgomery, Okara and Jhang Central) were situated 
in the Multan Division, which had traditionally been the Unionists' most 
important stronghold. The Unionist monopoly had been destroyed, however, 
by the defection to the League of the powerful Multan based Hayat and 
Daultana families, and the power which these groups commanded in the 
Division was reflected in.the degree of success the League experienced 
there.
It had been essential for the League to achieve a convincing victory 
in the Province as a whole, however, in order to establish the credibility 
of its Pakistan claim. This it had done. The inclusion of the Punjab 
was vital to the concept of an independent Muslim State. The provincial 
elections therefore assumed national significance. Woodrow Wyatt (M.P., 
Aston Division, Birmingham, Member, Parliamentary Delegation to India,
19^ +6) emphasised this when he declared to the House of Commons on 
6 December 19*+5>,
*'It is in the Punjab that the issue of whether or not the 
Moslem League can press their claim to Pakistan is to be 
decided. If the Moslem League can obtain the greater
z6k
majority of the Moslem seats, they have got a clear 
case to go forward in India... It is in that Province 
that we will have the issue of whether there are to be 
one or two Indias."^5
It was understandable therefore that the League leaders had sought
to impress the Punjabi Muslim electorate with the fact that 'Pakistan'
constituted the most vital issue in the elections. In January 19^6
Jinnah had emphasised
"We must realise the stakes for which we are fighting.
This is a question of life and death for Mussalmans.
Failure to achieve Pakistan would mean our national 
extinction.
It was a theme which Provincial League leaders had exploited to the full.
On 9 November 19^5i at an election rally at Jhelum Firoz Khan Noon had
warned his audience that
"No religion can survive without State protection and 
patronage. If you want to follow freely the true 
creed of Islam, you shall have to struggle for an inde­
pendent State of your own, otherwise under Hindu domi­
nation Islam will be finished as a religious force in
India."^5
The championing of Muslim nationalism and Islam by the League leader­
ship gave them an immediate advantage over the Unionist Party. This was 
enhanced by the fact that to many Muslims 'Pakistan1 appeared as a 
panacea to their worldly problems, in addition to preserving and assert­
ing their religious rights. As early as August 19^, it had been 
evident to Glancy that the promise of a Muslim state was proving to be 
a highly attractive inducement to Punjabi Muslims:
"the attraction of Pakistan to the uninformed Muslim 
lies largely in the belief that within a given area 
it will place him at an advantage as against his non- 
Muslim neighbour in the matter of personal preferment 
and material wealth."^
The Muslim League, aware of the potency of its Pakistan creed, was
careful not to commit itself to any definition of it which could have
detracted from its appeal. Consequently League leaders purposely
17projected 'Pakistan1 in a vague and nebulous form. The hesitancy of 
Jinnah and the League to define ’Pakistan* could have provided the 
Unionist Party with an opportunity to neutralise the popularity of the 
scheme by forcing the Muslim electorate to consider all the practicalities 
involved in augmenting a Muslim State, including the partition of the 
Province. The British Government, however, by refusing to grasp the 
nettle,and issue any authoritative statement on the Muslim League’s 
objective for a sovereign state, deprived the Unionist Ministry of the 
opportunity to discredit the Pakistan demand (see pp. ). As a
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result the Unionists, realising the potency of'Pakistan'as an election
issue, strove to reassure the Muslim electorate that if they were
successful at the polls they too would support the demand for a Muslim
homeland. Khizar in April 19^» following the breakdown of his talks
with Jinnah, had emphasised that the Lahore Resolution of 19^0,
popularly known as the Pakistan Resolution, is the sheet anchor of
Muslims in the Punjab as elsewhere," and he claimed that "I have on
countless occasions declared my faith in it and I propose to stand by
it." As the 19^6 elections approached, Khizar continued to emphasise
Unionist support for Pakistan. He appealed to the electorate on the
basis that there was no difference between the Unionist Party and the
League on constitutional matters. He constantly reiterated Unionist
approval for Pakistan, but he cautioned the Muslim electorate to
remember that it was unfeasible to imagine that a purely Muslim
Government could hold power in the Punjab,19 therefore inter-communal
co-operation would continue to be essential to allow for the pursuit
20of common economic interests.
Khizar*s strategy in supporting the 'Pakistan' idea proved to be a 
grave political blunder. By following such a course he destroyed the 
credibility of the Unionist Party as a non-communal organization, whilst 
at the same time his plea for inter-communal co-operation alienated 
Muslim opinion which viewed'Pakistan' as a symbol of Muslim supremacy, 
and not as a venture to be launched in equal partnership with non- 
Muslims. Furthermore the Premier's stance was totally unrealistic given 
the political climate of the time, and the Muslim League had no difficulty 
in discrediting it. Ghazanfar Ali, through the medium of the press, 
questioned in October 19*+5 whether the Premier and his Muslim followers 
in the Assembly would, in view of their approval of'Pakistan', vote in 
accordance with the decisions of the A.I.M.L. when questions arose in 
the Legislature concerning the framing of the new constitution. Also 
he queried how the Premier and his fellow Muslim Unionists, if they 
decided to obey the League mandate, would retain the allegiance of the 
non-Muslim members of the Unionist Party, for the latter had constantly 
repeated that they were opposed to the creation of 'Pakistan'.^1
In fact Ghazanfar Ali had demonstrated succinctly the awkwardness 
of Khizar's position by pointing out that it was inconceivable for Muslim 
Unionists to support 'Pakistari in an alliance with non-Muslim Unionists 
who were opposed to it. Glancy, however, believed that Unionist support 
for Pakistan would not disturb its Hindu and Sikh adherents, as it was 
widely accepted that the Unionist view of 'Pakistan' was not the crude
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22variety advocated by the League, but the Governor's confidence was 
misplaced. Tika Ram, the Unionist Hindu leader, in an election speech 
at Sanipat in November 19^5* refuted the suggestion that'Pakistan* 
Constituted an electoral issue at all. He stated that the question did 
not arise so far as the Punjab was concerned, as the Divisions of Ambala 
and Jullundur, and half of the Lahore Division, had Hindu and Sikh 
majorities, which meant that it would be impossible to constrain such 
a large population in a State based on a purely communal concept.25 
The incident revealed the invidious position of the Unionists; in order 
to placate the Muslims the Premier had given lip service to the concept 
of Pakistan, whilst at the same time a senior Hindu cabinet colleague 
had declared that the development of an independent Muslim State includ­
ing the Punjab in its entirety was not feasible.
A clash of this nature, underlining the inevitable incompatibility 
of communal interests within the Unionist ranks exemplified the unreal­
istic course which the Premier had adopted. Khizar's naivety was 
further exemplified when he publicly acknowledged the divergence of 
opinion which existed between Muslims and non-Muslims in his ministerial 
coalition, claiming that it would not disrupt the sound administration 
of the Province, as each group was to be permitted to support the 
communal organisation of their choice at the national level.2i+ Such a 
compromise was untenable, particularly as the League's concept of an 
independent Muslim homeland was irreconcilable with the Congress's 
determination to achieve an independent and united India. By attempting 
to accommodate the Pakistan ideal to retain Muslim support, the Premier 
adopted a course of action which was doomed to fail. 'Pakistan' was the 
political creation of the Muslim League, which conducted an unabashed 
communal and fanatical campaign to achieve its objective. In contrast 
Khizar's somewhat confused stance of support for the same cause, con­
strained as it was by the complexities of maintaining and promoting an 
inter-communal coalition, appeared as lukewarm and unrealistic. Whilst 
the adoption by the Unionist Party of a banner identical to that of the 
Muslim League - green, bearing the Muslim legend of a crescent - which 
was flown at Unionist election rallies,25 failed to benefit the party, 
or convince the Muslim electorate that it was as 'Islamic' as its 
Muslim League rivals'.
The adoption of Islamic symbolism by the Muslim parties, and in 
particular by the Muslim League, together with the Congress exploitation 
of Hindu values and signs intensified communal feeling in the Punjab 
and throughout India. Yet the utilization of religion for political
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ends was as much a symptom of, as a cause for the communal orientation
of the electoral struggle, for the reaction of the entire Indian
electorate demonstrated a near total communal polarization. In the
Central Legislative Assembly all of the 30 Muslim seats went to the
League, which had attracted 86.6% of the votes cast in Muslim constitu- 
26
encies. The Punjab clearly identified with this national pattern. The
Province's response to the election had been inevitable, almost in spite
of the politicians' manipulation of religious sentiment, for by 1900
communalism was clearly recognised to be the dominant form of identity
in the Province, commanding greater loyalty than any form of secular
27social stratification. The elections proved to be an extension of the
existing communal conflict. In August 19^ +7 the retiring British Governor,
Evan Jenkins (succeeded Glancy 8 April 19^6) reflected:
"the General Election of 19^5-^6 ... was fought on the 
most bitter communal lines ... in which practically all 
Muslims were on one side of the fence and practically 
all non-Muslims on the other ... A country with thirty 
million inhabitants was sucked into the vortex of all- 
India politics; Punjabis ceased to be Punjabis and 
became Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs."2°
Thus the elections merely provided the opportunity for the Province's
ingrained communalism to reach its ultimate and most conclusive climax,
thereby suggesting that the different religious groups could never be
totally compatible. British officials, Jenkins and Moon amongst them,
have judged this to be a regrettable and retrograde occurrence, born out
29of the collapse of the Unionist Party. Once the British had decided 
to leave India, however, this outcome became unavoidable. The severing 
of the imperial connection linked with the demand for 'Pakistan', forced 
the majority community in the Punjab to assert its political dominance 
in its own right, unencumbered by those communal considerations which 
had restricted the Unionist Party. In turn this Muslim assertion, which 
assumed an aggressive and fanatical form, triggered a counter-reaction, 
which was equally determined on the part of the minority communities, 
and the actions of each drew support from and depended on the existing 
communal sensibilities of the religious groups. The success of the 
Unionist Party at the polls in 1937 had occurred in spite of communalism, 
and did not mark its demise. The Assembly remained divided on largely 
communal lines, though a ministerial majority, including Hindus and Sikhs, 
had been secured through the pursuit of a pro-rural economic programme 
at the expense of urban interests. Despite its long years in office, 
however, the Unionist Ministry proved to be a fragile structure, because 
crude communalism exercised a far greater influence on politician and
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peasant alike, than contrived economic alliances.
The intense communal atmosphere in which the election was conducted
in the Punjab, although it did not result in outbreaks of communal 
30
violence, was bound to favour a communally orientated party such as the
Muslim League. The Unionist Party in an effort to strengthen its
campaign, and neutralise the religious appeal of the League, attempted
to enhance its election prospects through the unconstitutional use of
Government officials. The strategy was a failure, however, because the
League attracted far more support from this class than the Ministry.
Nevertheless, the adoption of these tactics by the Unionist Party
initially alarmed Provincial League leaders, because they were aware of
the tremendous influence Government servants possessed, particularly in 
31the rural areas. Both Ghazanfar Ali and Feroz Khan Noon condemned the 
32practice, and the accusation that the Unionists were promoting their
electoral chances through the manipulation of Government servants had
emerged by the close of 19^5 as a major issue in the League's campaign.^
In December 19^5 League leaders in the Province contacted Woodrow Wyatt
in order that their complaints should be aired in the British Parliament,
and ostensibly to achieve an impartial enquiry into Unionist malpractices
3*+and parliamentary supervision of the elections. Wyatt, who was
sympathetic to the League, raised the matter in the House of Commons,
and suggested that in order to combat official interference, instructions
should be issued to the effect that provincial officials should refrain
from taking sides. Also he asked the India Office to consider importing
Government servants into the Punjab from other Indian provinces to super- 
35vise the election. In pressing these demands the M.P. received 
unsolicited support from two British army officers serving in India, 
who, on learning of his efforts through the press, sought to confirm 
that the League's accusations were sound. On 12 December 19^5 Captain 
Banning Richardson, residing in New Delhi (he had stood as a Labour candidate
in Britain, was on the staff of the Weekly Commentary pending his demob-
36ilisation from the Army) alleged in a letter to Wyatt that
"Glancy, the Governor is actively participating to try 
and defeat the Muslim League and Government officials 
throughout the province are being made use of for the 
same purpose.’1
He claimed that his information was common knowledge, referring to it as 
37"an open secret.... Similarly Major E.C.F. Stocker (serving with 23/2
Punjab Regiment stationed at Allahabad) had informed Wyatt that
"A friend of mine had a letter from his brother stating 
that Khiyar ]jsic]] Hyat Khan (Unionist P.M.) had asked
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him to stand asQG Unionist candidate and had offered 
him (a) as much money as he needed (is there no 
legal limit?) (b) the co-operation of the police, 
district magistrate and deputy commissioner!"
Stocker concluded,
"If the results in the Punjab go against the 
League we can be quite certain that it will have 
been due to unionist malpractices."3”
Both the India Office and the Under Secretary for State, Henderson,
in spite of thse corroborative statements, refused to sanction Wyatt's
suggestions, or treat the Muslim League's complaints seriously. The
India Office took refuge behind the Punjab Premier's statement to the
effect that it would be improper for Government officials to involve
themselves in the electioneering. Also, it refused to consider the
deployment of Government servants from other provinces on the grounds
that it would dislocate the administration of the provinces concerned,
and would cause strong resentment in the Punjab.^ With regard to the
allegation levelled by Richardson concerning the conduct of the Governor,
Henderson dismissed it on the grounds that it was unthinkable that Glancy
would involve himself improperly in the electioneering.^ In essence the
India Office was convinced that the complaints in reality represented an
intricate part of the Muslim League's campaign strategy against the
Unionists, and as such did not merit serious investigation.^ The
dismissal by the India Office of these complaints was unmerited as a
serious accusation had been made by a serving British army officer, against
the most senior servant of the Crown in the Punjab, and it deserved further
examination. Glancy was certainly pro-Unionist, in that he had a very
close personal relationship with the Premier, but in the light of available
evidence it appears that his friendship with Khizar did not cause him to
commit unconstitutional acts as suggested by Richardson. Even so, Glancy
adopted a dubious attitude towards the question of official preferment,
42
which was known to occur, and he certainly turned a 'blind eye' to it. 
When questioned by the Viceroy on the seriousness of the League's alle­
gations in October 1945, he replied by arguing that as the elections were 
not due to begin until January 1946 any accusations made before that date
could be discounted as nothing more than threats, or as preparations to 
43excuse defeats. It was a totally unsatisfactory response, because 
electioneering was in progress and officials were involved. Also he 
refused to agree to the Provincial League's request to issue a communique 
assuring voters that the elections would be free from official inter­
ference, on the grounds that his own non-partisan attitude was already 
44
well known. In reality Glancy was determined to avoid making any
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statement which could have been construed as a recognition of the League*s 
complaints. Finally in January 1946 Glancy categorically refused to dis­
cuss the matter further with the Provincial League, even though such a 
meeting had been advised by Professor Richards, the leader of the Parlia­
mentary Delegation which visited the Punjab in that month.^
Despite the denials of the Premier and his Muslim supporters, the 
recalcitrant attitude of the Governor, and the refusal of the India 
Office to involve itself in the controversy, there can be no doubt that 
many officials were deeply involved in the campaigning, both on behalf 
of the Unionist Party and the Muslim League. It had already been recog­
nised in the highest British Indian quarters that official interference 
would be a feature of the electoral contest. In a letter to Pethick- 
Lawrence, written in September 1945, the Viceroy had informed the Sec­
retary of State that the attitude of the average Indian politician to the 
elections was similar to that which had prevailed in Britain in the eight­
eenth century. It was generally accepted that the Government in power 
possessed influence, and would exploit it. Whilst Wavell believed that 
the majority of officials were honest, he acknowledged that Ministers 
would undoubtedly put pressure on their subordinates which would result 
in corrupt practices, as it was much more difficult for Indian than for 
British officials to remain unaffected by such advances. Also the Vice­
roy confirmed that the employment of officials for electioneering 
purposes was not confined solely to the Ministerial party, as the oppo­
sition was equally guilty of the practice. He admitted that the Unionist 
Government had attempted to combat the League manipulation of officials 
by arranging postings so as to keep officers with known Muslim League 
affinities out of the key districts. The Unionist Government, the Vice­
roy reasoned, could defend its actions by claiming that such moves in 
personnel occurred as a matter of routine, and that if the League 
objected, then they would risk the allegation that their interest in
46particular officials was improper. Also at least one I.C.S. officer who 
served in the Punjab has admitted that some Government servants were 
involved in the campaign. Azim Husain, the son of Fazl-i-Husain, has 
recalled,
"Though I avoided political topics, nevertheless, I found 
myself making speeches all over the province in support 
of the Government...".
Husain asserted, however, that although some individuals acted differently,
generally British and Indian I.C.S. officers did not involve themselves
with politics, and they made strenuous efforts to act impartially between
the different parties and communities.*
* Azim Husain, I.C.S.Papers, p.21. Mss.EUR.F.180/68, IOR.
2?1
Though the corrupt involvement of I.C.S. officials in the 19^6 
campaign was, according to Husain, negligible, the same could not be 
said of Muslim officers serving in the Provincial Civil Service, and 
their activities were directed chiefly against the Unionist Party, and 
in support of the Muslim League. The Punjab administration had sus­
pected as early as August 19^ that most Muslim officials supported the 
h7
League. As the election campaign drew to its climax many Muslim
officials openly demonstrated pro-League sympathies. The Muslim Deputy
Commissioner for Lyallpur in an appreciation of the situation in his
district written towards the close of 19^5 reported:
"nearly 80 per cent, of the subordinate Muslim staff, 
both revenue and District Board, has active League 
sympathies and a large number of them have been used 
as instruments by the League for submitting false and 
forged applications [[for voting rights[[|.... It may truly 
be said that official support in spite of Government 
instructions regarding neutrality on the matter is largely 
on the side of the League rather than of the Unionist 
Party.I,i+8
The Deputy Commissioner's assessment was certainly applicable in respect 
of the degree of official support which the League received in the 
majority of Muslim districts and constituencies in the Province. This 
is evident from the findings of a survey encompassing 56 Muslim seats: 
preferment on the part of officials, often resulting in illicit voting, 
was reported to the Election Commission in 39 of these constituencies, 
and the League was the principal beneficiary, as the respondent in 29 of 
the cases was the Muslim League candidate (see Appendix U),
A number of factors had contributed to ensure that the Muslim League 
should be the major beneficiary from corrupt communal preferment. In 
essence the actions of those Government officials, who used their in­
fluence in support of the League represented a response to the Islamic
appeal of that organisation, coupled with the fear that failure to support
k9
it would court social ostracism and divine retribution. Also Muslim 
civil servants faced the prospect of serving under a Muslim League Govern­
ment in the near future, and any official who backed the Unionist Party
50
would be in an unenviable position once the elections were over. Firoz
Khan Noon had made it clear that the Muslim League would deal severely
with those who had used their positions in support of Unionist candidates.
5
threatening to "bring them to book when we come into power in the Punjab." 
Though this threat was couched as a warning to all officials to avoid 
interfering in the elections on the side of any party, its real message 
was clear - those who opposed the League would have to be prepared to
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face the consequences, for no one could have taken Noon’s non-partisan
posture seriously. It was common knowledge amongst those who subscribed
to the Press that the League was making extensive use of Government
servants: the civil service in Sind was deeply involved in canvassing
for the Muslim League, whilst when the Governor of Bengal had ordered
all officials to refrain from party politics, Sir Khawaja Nazimuddin,
the ex-Premier and leader of the League Party in the Province had
52criticised the Governor's action. Also when in October 19^ +5 Noon had
been confronted with the accusation that the League was employing
officials in its campaign, he had not disputed it, but had merely res-
53ponded rather unconvincingly that two wrongs did not make a right!
In addition in analysing the causes for official corruption preceding
and during the 19^6 elections, it is evident that some officials were
influenced by their personal relationships with the candidate. This was
the case in Muzaffargarh North, where Nawab Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani
(Director of Resettlement, Govt, of India) and Captain Mahboob Ali Gurmani
(Asst. Recruiting Officer, Multan) were accused of using their official
positions to aid their nephew, Mian Muhammad Ghulam Gilani , the Muslim 
5k
League candidate. Finally, bribery also featured as a strong inducement
for official corruption. The Muslim League claimed that Sardar Mohammad
Ibrahim Burq, who was returned as the Unionist member for Alipur owed his
success to the fact that he had misused his position as an Honorary
Magistrate, and had won the support of local officials, including the
returning officers, members of the police force, zaildars and lumbardars,
by promising that the Unionist Government would reward them with land in
55
return for their services.
The involvement of Government officials, primarily as supporters of 
the League, was a feature of the elections. The question arises, there­
fore, as to the motives of the Provincial League in turning the subject 
of official interference into an election issue in the Punjab, and by 
confronting the British authorities (both in India and Great Britain) 
with complaints of preferment by Government servants. These tactics 
appear to have resulted from two distinct strategies. Initially the League, 
which had been consistently suspicious of the influence exercised by 
Government officials, and the support which they would proffer to the5£
Ministry, genuinely regarded pro-Unionist activity on their part as 
being likely to prejudice the prospects of the League in the rural con­
stituencies. Later, as the campaign advanced, and the true strength of 
the League became apparent, continued criticism of Unionist malpractice 
regarding civil servants, provided a crude, but nevertheless useful, smoke-
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screen for similar indiscretions by pro-League officers.
In fact corruption, both on the part of officials and non-officials, 
including candidates and party workers, was one of the dominant charac­
teristics of the election in the Punjab. It was a 'dirty1, and most un­
democratic contest from which few successful League or Unionist candidates 
emerged with 'clean hands1. In addition to the interference by officials, 
candidates and their party workers resorted to bribery, violent intimi­
dation and coercion to secure votes. In an article which began "Mammon 
apparently smiles his golden smile at electors to the Punjab Legislative 
Assembly11, the Civil and Military Gazette revealed that in some constitu­
encies voters were richer by practically half a year's income for having 
exercised their franchise in favour of the highest bidder. It reported 
that during the first week of polling the price of a vote in a number of 
seats (not named) had risen twenty times, whilst in some cases entire 
villages had bartered their aggregate vote through their headmen, such 
communities receiving Rs. 1,000 or Rs. 2,000 according to the number of
votes each commanded. Votes were also pledged in return for gifts of
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food and medical supplies. The Provincial. Muslim League Working 
Committee, in October 19^51 had alleged that the Unionist Ministry was 
preparing to distribute 20,000 acres of land in return for support at
r Q
the polls, but the League more than countered the threat which this 
posed by resorting to similar malpractices. In 2k of the 56 constituen­
cies previously surveyed (see Appendix U) complaints relating to bribery 
were brought to the attention of the Election Commission, 19 of which 
implicated Muslim League candidates and their supporters, and in the 
remaining five Unionist were accused.(see Appendix V).
Amongst those who were incriminated was M. Ghulam Muhammad, who had 
been elected unopposed on the Muslim League ticket for the East Jhang 
Muslim constituency. It was reported that Ghulam Muhammad had procured 
the withdrawal of the three opposing candidates - M. Ghulam Abbas, M. 
Allahyar Khan and N. Nawazish Ali - by offering them financial and other 
inducements. Ghulam Muhammad and his father were accused of having 
promised to withdraw a Civil appeal - K.B. Sarad Hussain Shah versus 
Roshnai Bibi and M. Ghulam Abbas - pending in the Lahore High Court.
The dispute involved immovable property of very great value; M. Ghulam 
Abbas was the Defendant Respondant in the case; whilst A. Allahyar 
Khan was the second Defendant Respondant, and Ghulam Muhammad's father 
was the Appellant. As the result of the withdrawal both M. Ghulam Abbas 
and M. Allahyar Khan agreed not to contest the election. Similarly N. 
Nawazish Ali had been persuaded to 'retire' from the hustings in return
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59for a grant of land. '
Coercion and intimidation also proved to be valuable assets in 
gaining success at the polls. Out of the 56 constituencies examined 
(listed in Appendix U), forceful persuasion of this nature occurred in 
18 of them; of these the League was cited in 11 instances and the Union­
ist Party in the remaining seven (see Appendix W). Coercion and intimi­
dation had long been two of the most potent weapons in the landlords’ 
political armoury, and it was no coincidence that two of the Punjab's 
leading Zamindars, Ashaq Hussain (Unionist Minister) and the Nawab of Mam- 
dot (president of the Punjab Muslim League) were numbered amongst the 
offenders. One zamindar, Sayed Ghulam Qasim Shah of Sher Shah, who had 
refused to support the Unionist cause in Ashaq Hussain's constituency 
(Multan), was removed from the Debt Conciliation Board as a result.^
No doubt this served as a poignant example to others who might have 
considered resisting ministerial advances. In Mamdot's case, the treat­
ment afforded opponents was even cruder, for in Ferozepore Central, the 
Nawab's seat, the politics of the 'big stick' truly prevailed. The
Election Commission was informed that the Nawab had threatened important
61supporters of the Unionist candidate (M. Mohammad Sarwar) , who were his
lessees with eviction, and that he had served notices of ejection on six 
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of them - S.Wali Muhammad (Chak Hameed Saideke), Bagh Ali (Chak Rumwala),
Muhammad Shafee (Chak Sotaria), Julal Din (Bhodipura-Jalalabad),
Muhammad Hussain (Chak Pannawali) and Bader-ud-Din Khan (Jalalabad) - all
of whom were from the Muktsar Tahsil. It was also reported that beatings
were inflicted on electors to ensure their support. In fact so much
terror and panic was caused in Basti Tankanwali by Mamdot's agents that
the District Magistrate, in an attempt to restore order, placed the area 
c-z
under section 144. Also complaints of assault were lodged against
Mamdot's agents at the Ferozepore cantonment Police Station. Even the
Premier was not above resorting to coercion. Abdul Ghafur Khan, a member
of the Tiwana tribe, complained that Muslim League agents and supporters
were forcibly prevented from canvassing, and that officials played a
leading role in inciting mobs to disrupt, and prevent League meetings 
65from being held.
The reason that intimdation, either through direct acts of violence, 
threats of the same, eviction or official pressure, was rife and practic­
able in the Punjab, was largely the result of the method of voting 
employed there which was unique in British India, and which afforded the 
elector no protection. An official sat behind a table in the voting 
booth, surrounded by representatives of the various parties. The voter,
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often illiterate, entered the booth, and an official indicated the names 
of the candidates on the voting-paper before him. Thus both the 
returning officer and the party workers witnessed the choice the voter 
made, which placed the latter in an exceedingly vulnerable position, 
and meant in effect that a free election was impossible. In all other 
provinces each party was represented by differently coloured ballot-
boxes; the voter cast his vote behind a screen, and could not be viewed
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by anyone. Woodrow Wyatt, fearful that the method of voting practised 
in the Punjab would invite widespread intimidation attempted unsuccess­
fully to persuade the British Parliament of the necessity for making the 
system in the Punjab more private. The Punjab Government, however, was 
opposed to any change, ostensibly because the existing practice had 
operated satisfactorily in 19371 and for earlier elections to the 
Legislative Council (voting by these means had been used in the Punjab 
for fifteen years), and was understood and appreciated by the electorate? 
Consequently Henderson (Under Sec. of State, India) refused to challenge 
the Provincial Government's stance, or support Wyatt, claiming that it 
would be impractical to alter the existing system.^
The refusal of the Provincial Government to contemplate operating a 
secret ballot certainly arose from the belief that the existing indiscreet 
and public practice would favour the Ministry. The League clearly shared 
this opinion, for it was anxious to eliminate the supposed Unionist 
advantage, through the inauguration of a more discreet procedure incor­
porating coloured ballot boxes, which would reduce the risk of corrupt 
official interference and intimidation.^ Despite its fears, however, 
the retention of the old system, far from prejudicing its prospects, 
clearly benefited the League far more than the Unionist Party.
In addition to the widespread corruption and intimidation which
occurred, the prevailing economic depression which had gripped the
Province following the outbreak of war, contributed to the Unionist
Party's loss of support. It had caused deep dissatisfaction with the
Ministry, which was increasingly portrayed by its opponents as being
devoid of any feeling of responsibility towards the Province's poor. It
was a charge which the Unionist Party's record supported rather than
refuted. It had never possessed the inclination to introduce a programme
for social welfare based on a planned economy.^ 'Critic' in commenting
on these failings in the Civil and Military Gazette in July 19^3, observed
that the Party had never been over-burdened with "constructive vision"
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or "reformist zeal". He further condemned Unionism over its neglect 
of the urban poor and the peasantry: except for two pieces of legis-
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72lation - the Rent Act and the Trade Employees Act - the Unionist 
Government had done practically nothing for the urban poor, whose wages 
and standard of living had not improved during Unionist rule, and who 
had experienced tremendous hardships, as a result of the Government's 
refusal to introduce price controls and rationing to combat the effects 
of the War upon the economic life of the Province. In similar vein, 
'Critic' exposed as a "travesty" the Unionists' claim to be a peasant 
party: it had ignored the needs of that group; neither land-revenue
nor water-rates had been reduced, and all that Unionist agrarian legis­
lation had achieved was the deliverance of the peasants from the clutches 
of the bania and to put them at the mercy of the large landlords. The 
Unionist Party, 'Critic* concluded, thrived on professional antagonism.
It had showed feverish legislative activity as long as the urban rich 
had constituted its target, but it had done nothing to restrict the
power and privileges of the rural rich, or protect the small exploited
73tenants and farmers. 'Critic's' description of the Party was accurate.
When in December 1938 there had been an attempt to afford some protection
to the tenantry of the Province through legislation to establish their
right to hold land for a minimum of four years, Ghazanfar Ali (a faithful
Unionist at the time) had secured the rejection of the measure, claiming
7kthat it was "obnoxious", "thoroughly bad" and "highly unfair". Thus
in the words of Sardar Sohan Singh Josh (Communist M.L.A.), the Punjab
possessed "a Government of the landlord, by the landlord and for the 
75landlord". It was an observation, the validity of which was beyond 
dispute.
The Provincial Muslim League added its voice to the chorus of dis­
content. In November 19^^ it issued its election manifesto in which it
accused the Unionist Ministry of blatantly neglecting the rural peasantry:
"It is in the poverty and degradation of the peasantry 
that we see the most poignant failure of the present 
administration and a criminal betrayal of the grandiose 
promise £to protect the peasants]] which had to come to 
nought because it emanated from a party which had nothing 
in common with the people and which flourished on their 
exploitation,"
Also whilst the manifesto embraced the national campaign of the A.I.M.L. 
and pledged itself to establish "free Muslim States in a free and fully 
independent India", in which the "legitimate claims" of non-Muslims would 
be respected, it sought to project the League as being dedicated to the 
material betterment of the Muslims. It undertook to transport the
community from "poverty, degradation and darkness into a new world of
plenty..."inthat it pledged "that the relative backwardness and poverty
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of our own nation [jthe Muslims]] shall form the foremost concern of all 
our efforts. 11 To these ends the administration was to be reformed into 
na genuine instrument of service to the people...M;the salaries of the 
lower paid government servants would be increased; backward areas and 
communities would be developed; industries would be encouraged; indus­
trial labour was to be protected, and the welfare and standard of living 
of the rural populace enhanced. To achieve the latter, the Muslim 
League promised to eliminate debt and its causes; the Land Alienation 
Act was to be further amended to protect rural debtors from the rapacity 
of large-landlords and agriculturist money-lenders; maternity centres 
were to be provided within easy access of all villages; drinking-water 
supplies and irrigation were to be improved; roads and communal granaries 
would be constructed; a large proportion of Crown lands would be set aside 
for the use of small cultivators and demobilised soldiers, and not leased 
to the highest bidder; and waste land would be distributed free of charge 
to the ?,poorest peasants11. Taxation was to be "progressively placed” on 
those most able to bear it, and opportunities in industry, "nationalised” 
transport and on State collective farms would be created to secure em­
ployment for demobilised soldiers.
The signatories of the manifesto, Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot
and Mumtaz Daultana (respectively the President and Secretary of the Punjab
Muslim League) claimed that the schemes outlined in it amounted to a
76
"radical national reconstruction...". In reality it consisted of
extravagant, largely impossible, promises, which could only have been
construed as truly radical had they envisaged a dramatic reconstruction
of society. The large landlord, and all the economic and social powers,
he commanded, was to remain inviolate. Ghazanfar Ali had been careful
to reassure the Province^ landed, political elite on this issue; in
June 19^ whilst he had emphasised the Muslim League1s commitment to the
peasants of the Punjab, he had been careful to emphasise that the League
77had no intention to abolish landlordism. The post-independence period, 
during which the League landlords ruled West Punjab, exposed the hollow­
ness of the manifesto^ claims, as the peasantry remained an exploited 
and disregarded section of Pakistan society.
Future failings, however, had no relevance in the three years 
immediately preceding the election, and the criticisms which had been 
current in those years, combined with the publication of the Leagued 
promised reforms constituted an unpleasant embarrassment for the Ministry. 
Prior to the circulation of the Muslim Leagued manifesto, however,
Chhotu Ram had initiated a propaganda campaign in the press to refute the
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damaging charges. He had focussed attention on the fact that in 1937
a land revenue committee had been appointed to examine various methods
of providing relief to poor farmers. On the advice of the committee
Rs. 55 lakhs had been set aside in every normal year to provide for a
'Peasant's-Welfare Fund', which by the close of 19^3 was expected to
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have amassed Rs. 150 lakhs. It was planned, the Minister claimed, 
to use the Fund to finance cheap credit, promote cottage industries, 
co-operative marketing, land reclamation and improve village communi­
cations, with the view of improving the living conditions of the small
79farmers and peasants. x Unfortunately a capital of Rs. 150 lakhs was
insufficient to finance Chhotu Ram's schemes, or provide any lasting
80solution to the problems facing the peasants. By November 19^ +5 the
81Fund had grown to Rs. 210 lakhs, but the sum remained pitifully 
inadequate in respect of the grandiose schemes it was expected to 
achieve. In reality Muslim League leaders, to enhance their leadership 
claims and prospects at the forthcoming elections, had adopted a false 
and hypocritical concern for peasant welfare, which the Unionist Party 
attempted to counter with equally questionable sentiments, and redundant 
policies. To the poor of the Province, however, promises, regardless of 
whether they were to prove genuine or not, were far more appealing at 
the time than a programme which had been seen to fail.
Concurrent with the pretence of anxiety which both Leaguers and 
Unionists exhibited for the peasantry, the Province, particularly from 
19^  onwards, began to experience the full rigours of the economic 
/ depression. Up until 19^ +3 a succession of good harvests, the receipt of 
v a large income from military service, and the increases in the price of 
grain had afforded agricultural proprietors and tenants adequate pro­
tection from the rise in the cost of consumer goods. The relative 
prosperity of the rural population was reflected in the fact that there 
had been a large increase in the number of mortgages which had been 
redeemed, and that many agriculturists were engaged in the purchase of 
bullion. Initially, therefore, it was the urban poor and persons on
fixed incomes (e.g. Government servants) who were the hardest hit by the 
82price rises. Instead of implementing measures to alleviate their 
deprivation the Government appeared to aggravate the problem. In a 
speech, which epitomised the motivating force behind the Unionist 
political philosophy, the Minister of Revenue (Chhotu Ram), during a 
tour of the Province in December 19^2, had exhorted wheat producers 
to withhold their produce from the markets to enable them to capitalise 
on further price increases. This irresponsible and partisan behaviour
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directly contributed to "the tendency to blame Government for failure 
to check inflation and profiteering".
Resentment against the Ministry was aggravated rather than mollified,
particularly ^ as prices at the end of 19*f2 had risen even further as a
consequence of the shortages of goods which the Province was subjected
to. There was a scarcity of salt in four districts, sugar in six, fuel
in ten and foodgrains in thirteen, and the chief sufferers were the poor?"5
Inflation was rampant: by January 19^3 rice had risen from Rs.6 a maund
8*fin 1939 to Rs.15 a maund, and from a pre-war index of 100, by 19^t
ghee had risen to 329, bajra to 262, gram to 281, maize to 273 and
85
wheat to 368. Furthermore as from September 19^ cereal producers and 
agriculturists in general were no longer cushioned against inflation 
because the value of agriculture produce fell, and as a consequence was 
unable to keep pace with prices demanded for consumer goods.^ The 
situation in the rural areas, by the opening months of 19^6, had deteri­
orated even further as a result of the poor quality of the Rabi crop, 
which Anderson (Financial Commissioner, Revenue) described as the worst 
which he had encountered in thirty-five years of service in the Punjab?'7
The inevitable outcome of the hardships and suffering caused by the 
recession, aggravated as it was by high.prices and shortages, was a 
feeling of resentment and disillusionment with the Government, particu­
larly amongst the most deprived sections of society. This in itself, 
however, did not cause the Unionist Government to lose valuable support. 
The setbacks which the Ministry suffered as a consequence of the economic 
situation, resulted not from its failure to safeguard the poor from the 
recession, but because it was unable to maintain the high prices which 
the comparatively rich zamindars and tenants had been able to demand for 
their stocks until the end of 19^3- The vast majority of the urban and 
rural poor possessed no means whereby they could register their dissatis­
faction with Government through the ballot-box, for they were not 
enfranchised. The vote was restricted primarily to the property-owners 
and in particular the landed classes ( see p. 158 ) who were far less
vulnerable to the austerity caused by the economic depression than the 
landless. It was only when the Unionist Party was forced'to abdicate 
its traditional r8le of safeguarding the interests of the exploiting, 
land-owning, grain selling class that it suffered a serious decline in 
popularity, which could be translated in vote form, and which in turn 
enhanced the election prospects of the League.
In response to the terrible suffering in Bengal caused by the 
famine of 19^3, the Government of India decided that it was essential
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to control the supply and price of wheat from the Punjab, the 'granary
of India', to prevent it reaching more profitable markets, notably in
the U.P., at the expense of the starving Bengalis. The move was fiercely
resisted by the Zamindari Ministry in the Punjab. It was denounced by 
88Chhotu Ram who had not only encouraged hoarding but who had also 
assured the zamindars in June 19^3 that it was unlikely that wheat
89would be subjected to any form of price control. In October 19^3 
fifty members of the Ministerial Party moved a resolution in the Legis­
lative Assembly expressing the deep resentment of the Province's cereal
producers at the Government of India's proposal to impose price res-
90trictions on grain. It was carried without a division. The oppo­
sition parties in the Assembly, in spite of previous League and 
Congress pretensions of sympathy for the poor, and pledges to support
them, in recognition of the importance of the 'landed vote', joined the
91Government in opposing the Central Government. The Unionist Ministry 
was placed in the most unenviable position, for it was clear that the 
Government of India would force it to concur with its wishes, at a time
when Unionist supporters were demanding that the Provincial Government
92should resist Imperial pressure. The Viceroy (Linlithgow), however,
was adamant that the Punjab's desire for profit would not increase the
suffering in Bengal. Despite the fact that Glancy had pointed out that
95the Unionist Ministry would lose valuable agriculturist support, ^ and 
that it would probably resign if the price control measures were
Qif
enforced, Linlithgow refused to relinquish the position which he had
adopted in August 19^3* He had informed the Governor then that
"the procurement of the necessary surplus wheat from 
the Punjab is more important than any political con­
siderations, any interests of the Ministers, and even, 
in the last resort, the continuance of Provincial Autonomy 
in the Punjab."95
The following month he emphasised in the strongest terms that it would 
be impossible for him to defend the Punjabi cultivators from the inevit­
able charge that would be levelled at them, that they were prepared to
96blackmail starving Bengalis in order to maintain their profits.
Consequently in December 19^ +3 the Government of India imposed 
restrictions on the price of wheat in the Punjab, to be followed by
similar controls on .other grains, rice, bajra, etc., and the intro-
1 1 97duction of rationing by 1 March 19^4. The failure of the Unionist 
Government to save the zamindars from the consequences of the Government 
of India's actions, led the former to take matters into their own hands, 
by resorting to the 'black market', where high prices could be demanded.
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This in turn caused further friction between the Ministry and its
traditional supporters, as it fought to combat the illegal marketeering.
By the end of 19^5 food grains, including wheat, maize and gram, had as
a result of the growers’ actions, all but disappeared from the open 
98market. The Provincial Government responded by seizing and requisition 
ing stocks whenever it could locate them. More than any other action, 
this marked the complete reversal of all previous Unionist policies and 
sentiments. The once munificent Unionist Party, the 'bulwark* of landed 
privilege and vested interest had been forced to turn on the 'exploiters' 
the very class it had represented, and which had guaranteed it power.
In February 19^6, at the very time Unionism 'was fighting for its 
political survival, anti-Government resentment spilled over, and agi­
tation against its requisitioning tactics broke out in the districts of
99Ludhiana, Ferozepore and Hoshiarpur.
The prevailing economic climate and the unpopular measures which
the Ministry had been forced to adopt, provided the Muslim League with
the opportunity to capitalise on the situation. In opposing the fixing
of price control for grain (see above) the League had avoided offering
any offence to the most important section of the electorate, whilst by
distributing medical supplies and cloth in rural areas, and by champion-
100ing the need to increase ration allowances to the villagers, the
League was able to project the image of a humanitarian and caring party
eager to serve the poor and needy of the Province. In analysing the
League victory in the Punjab, Talbot has drawn the conclusion that it
resulted primarily from its manipulation of the economic grievances of
the peasantry, and the promise of solutions to solve the crisis:
"The League's ability to provide answers to the economic 
dislocation of the countryside caused by the War was the 
key to its success in winning over the Punjabi villagers.
Votes were traded off for immediate material benefits 
and for the promise that Pakistan's creation would solve 
their social and economic difficulties,"
He has concluded,
"The League's demand for Pakistan was certainly legiti­
mized in the minds of the Muslim voters by its religious 
appeal ... But its potency lay in the fact that it was 
a systematic expression of the Muslim peasants' interests."
In support of this hypothesis, that the importance of interests out­
weighed ideas in mobilising peasant societies in Asia, he has used as an 
example Jeffrey Race's argument that the Communist Party's successful 
takeover of Long An Province in Vietnam was not the outcome of the 
Communists* ideological appeal but the pragmatic way in which it 
developed bonds of loyalty between the individual and itself on the
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basis of its ability to realise concrete local issues of importance in 
the peasants' lives.
There can be no doubt that the recession and the shortages current
in the Province made the peasant and villager alike very susceptible to
the League's arguments and pledges, but the evidence does not support
Talbot's sweeping conclusions. To begin with only a very few
individuals, comparatively speaking, could have benefitted from the
League’s distribution of commodities tactics. The Punjab League was
virtually bankrupt by 19^6 , and had been forced to borrow heavily in
order to conduct its campaign. In January 19^6 alone it sought and
102received a loan of Rs. 550,000 from the All-India body. It was in 
no position to finance action on a scale sufficient to offer "immediate 
material benefits" to even a small proportion of the electorate. Also 
economic factors, though important, could only be truly decisive, in the 
way suggested by Talbot, in an election based on adult suffrage, encom­
passing all economic strata of society, and which had been conducted 
along free democratic lines. The elections of 19^ +6, as held in the 
Punjab, fulfilled none of these requirements. Even so Talbot's argument 
that Punjabi villagers and peasants were attracted to the League on 
account of the material benefits it promised them is sound, but it was 
not the decisive factor in ensuring a League victory, because the 
villagers and peasants in toto did not decide the election. As pointed 
out previously, only 38% of all Muslim adult males, representing the 
bulk of the enfranchised Muslim populace, possessed the vote. The 
resulting electorate was principally confined to those who had a vested 
property interest in the Province. Thus it was not the vision of a 
'welfare State' to be established principally to serve the needs of the 
peasantry, which swung the landed proprietors and tenantry to the 
League, but the fact that the Unionist Party had failed, over the issue 
of price controls and rationing, to safeguard their economic interests. 
Furthermore there was the knowledge that the landlord £lite who controlled 
the League would do nothing to prejudice those interests, as its oppo­
sition to the imposition of a price ceiling on grain had proved.
The League's election victory was not primarily the result of its 
economic appeal; it was achieved because the League had the support of 
the majority of the Province's Muslim feudal and religious leaders. The 
rural Punjab in 19^6 constituted a reactionary, paternalistic and feudal 
world, in which 81% of the land was owned by only 19% of the population?^ 
The monopolisation of the land resources of the Province by this rela­
tively small group, combined with the almost slavish obedience which the
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Muslim peasantry offered their religious leaders, meant that the 
squirearchy and the Pirs reigned supreme. Consequently the electoral 
contest between the Muslim League and the Unionist Party was a thinly 
disguised battle for power between feudal forces, conducted in an 
imposed, totally unrealistic, and broken 'democratic' arena. The rural 
voters were little more than pawns in a game which was decided by their 
masters, as votes were, more often than not, cast in accordance with the 
wishes of the landed and religious Elites. The great majority of the 
Muslim seats were situated in the rural areas of the western Punjab, 
where the landlord and Pir enjoyed tremendous power. In describing the 
authority which these two groups exercised Malcolm Darling included in 
his study on the Punjab Peasant a description of feudalism in the Alipur 
Tahsil of Muzaffargarh, which was applicable to the majority of the 
western districts of the Punjab, and also those areas of the eastern
10^Punjab where large estates, such as those enjoyed by the Mamdot family, 
existed:
"Every five miles or so is the house of a tribal or 
religious leader, who maintains a band of retainers 
to enforce his influence on his poorer neighbours, and 
to conduct his feuds with his equals. The poor roan 
pays blackmail for his cattle to these local chieftains 
and for his soul to his pir, who may or may not live in 
the neighbourhood, but visits his followers yearly to 
receive his dues. As would be expected, the bulk of 
the land is held by the rich men, who are increasing 
their possessions. Peasant proprietors exist on the 
outskirts of the small towns: elsewhere the small
lordless man cannot hold his own. If he attempted to 
do so, his cattle would be driven, his women folk 
carried off, himself chalan-ed (prosecuted) before an 
honorary magistrate on a charge of cattle theft, and
in a short time he would be glad to hand over his land
and secure protection on any terms. Society then in
the main consists of the land-holding squires, whose
local authority is only limited by their mutual jealousies, 
and of their retainers and tenants, who, holding no share 
in the land which they till, and knowing that an appearance 
of wealth will lead to exaction from their feudal or 
spiritual masters, are content to lead a hand-to-mouth 
existence."105
Whilst Darling has provided an excellent account of the means land­
lords employed to maintain their hold over the peasantry and the impotence
of the latter in resisting exploitation, the passage is misleading in 
one respect. The Punjab in spite of the prominent position of the 
large landlords, was a Province where the small peasant proprietor
predominated. The holdings of this group, however, were very small,
1 of*
the majority (58%) being under five acres. Many of these cultivators
284
were obliged to acquire additional land as tenants in order to supple­
ment their incomes. Also in the western part of the Province, the 
small proprietors were scattered, there were few large communities, and 
this factor, together with the small acreage, and consequent lack of 
viability of the average holding, afforded this group no real protection 
from the rapacity of the large, powerful landholders. Even in the 
prosperous canal colonies the power of the landlord class was evident, 
as the Government had effectively protected its interests. This resulted 
from the implementation of a policy designed to create a socio-political 
elite in the colony areas, on the model of the western Punjab; in order 
to achieve its object the Provincial Government had ensured that the 
landlord class was well represented in colony areas.
The grip which the leading Muslim feudal families, particularly of 
the western Punjab, had on the politics of the province, and their 
ability to maintain their dominance has been effectively demonstrated 
by Craig Baxter. He has revealed that from the inception of the Montagu 
-Chelmsford Reforms (1919) up to Partition (1947) the Muslim politics 
of the Punjab was controlled by approximately 34 landed families, five 
of whom enjoyed additional *Pir’ status. In the period 1919 to 1947 
these families held no fewer than half the seats allotted to all the 
communities in the Legislative Council (84 seats) and over 30 in the 
Legislative Assembly (116 seats) at each election. Following the 1937 
election, and until 1944-45 the political affiliation of this elitist 
party was Unionist. By the time of the 1946 elections, however, their 
corporate allegiance to the Unionist Party had been shattered. This was 
reflected by the number of Muslim M.L.As.who withdrew from politics in 
1946, or campaigned for the League. Of the 79 Muslim Unionists who had 
been elected in 1937 (or those who had been elected at subsequent bye- 
elections) only 45 contested the elections - 17 for the League, 26 as 
Unionists and two as Independents. Whereas all the League candidates 
were successful, as were the two Independents, only eight of the original 
Muslim Unionists were returned.
The single major contributory factor in causing the desertion of 
Muslim M.L.As. from the Unionist ranks, and the change of allegiance 
from the Unionist Party to the Muslim League on the part of the rural 
aristocracy and landed £lite was the decision of the British to leave 
India. In effect that development rendered the Unionist Party redundant 
as the effective means of guaranteeing political authority to the Muslim 
elite in the Punjab; individuals from that class, Firoz Khan Noon amongst 
them realised that with British withdrawal and the likelihood of Pakistan
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inter-communal co-operation, as personified by Unionism, was no longer 
a prerequisite for power in the Province (see p. 2^5). Similarly with 
the termination of British rule the Unionist party would cease to be 
the repository of patronage, and the guardian of the rural Elite's 
economic interest. Muslim leaders had to decide therefore how best to 
protect those political and economic areas vital to ensure their con­
tinuing dominance. The Muslim League proved the most attractive alter­
native, for it was evident that in the post-independence era that Party 
would assume the r8le previously held by the Unionist Party. These 
considerations, together with the desire to further personal ambitions 
had led to the defection of members of the most important feudal 
families, in political terms - Mamdot, Daultana, Shaukat Hyat, Firoz 
Khan Noon - to the League in the pre-election period. These families 
had traditionally provided the Muslim leadership of the Unionist cause, 
and their exodus precipitated similar action on the part of their 
personal adherents and political followers, many of whom had blood ties 
with them. For example those M.L.As. who belonged to the Khattar clan - 
Mian Nurullah, Allah Yar Khan Daultana, Sheikh Mohammad Amin Khan, Mian
Abdul Aziz, Sheikh Sadiq Hassan and Mian Amir-ud-Din followed Shaukat
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Hyat to embrace the League.
The change of allegiance which occurred at this elitist level was
not as a consequence of current economic factors, though as has been
argued they were in part responsible for the decline in popularity which
the Unionist Party suffered amongst the rural proprietors and tenantry
generally. The Unionist hold over the Muslim leadership of the western
Punjab had begun to disintegrate prior to the rural areas being badly
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affected by the economic depression. By December 19^ approximately
30 Muslim M.L.As. had left the Unionist benches to sit. with the Muslim
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League Assembly Party. The real significance of this development was
not that it gave the League opposition a voice in the Legislature, but
that it guaranteed it access, via these leaders and their followers, into
the rural areas of the Punjab. Whilst the Unionist Party had remained
united it had effectively prevented the League from penetrating the
countryside. Up until June 19^ most District Leagues had existed on 
113
paper only. The capacity of the rural gentry to effectively prevent 
the establishment of Muslim League centres outside of the urban areas 
was, ironically enough, demonstrated by Mamdot. Although he was Presi­
dent of the Provincial League he refused to permit primary League
114branches to function on his Ferozepore estates. Once the Unionist 
monopoly on the loyalties of the land-owning elite had been broken,
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however, and a significant number of Muslim League leaders had entered 
the League’s ranks the countryside was thrown open to Muslim League 
overtures, and even Sargodha, as a result of the change of political 
allegiance on the part of senior members of the Tiwana clan, did not 
remain immune from such advances (see p. 243). in this
context, whilst Muslim students, particularly from Aligarh, played an 
important role in conducting propaganda on behalf of the League,11^ 
their activities would have been seriously impaired if they had not had 
the consent and protection of the large landlords in whose districts 
they operated. Thus it is evident that the support which the feudal 
aristocracy gave to the League was of the greatest significance in secur­
ing for it the landslide victory of 1946. If the rural elite had opposed 
the League in large numbers there is no doubt that it would not have 
achieved the spectacular result which their support had guaranteed it, 
for as the Civil and Military Gazette had predicted in September 19V?:
"The party which chooses a better set of candidates, 
keeping in view the local alliances and clannish feelings, 
will, of course, have a tremendous advantage^6
The local alliances’ and ’clannish feelings' referred to in the 
article, were symptoms of the landed Elite's power to manipulate their 
followers, dependents and the local peasantry. The League, in addition 
to the advantage it possessed through the allegiance of this class had 
the support of the religious leaders of the Province. The combination of 
landlord and Pir amounted to an irresistible force, against which it was 
totally impossible for Unionism to succeed, or even survive as a major 
political entity * Whilst the landlords possessed the resources to 
influence the electorate through physical and economic intimidation, and 
by exploiting the loyalties of their clan members and tenants, the Pirs 
held a potentially more potent weapon - jurisdiction over their followers' 
souls. Almost all Punjabi Muslims, aristocrat and peasant, particularly 
in the western Muslim majority areas of the Province, were the murids 
(disciples) of a pir, the Multan District Gazetteer, 1923-24, recording 
that "Practically every Muhammadan in the district has his pir". The 
murids made their devotions at the tombs or shrines of the original 
saints, whose religious leadership was provided by a Sajjada Nashin, the 
saint’s successor. The Pirs and Sajjada Nashins owed their awesome 
authority to the belief that as the descendants of Muslim saints - the 
Sufi divines whose endeavours from the eleventh century had made a major 
contribution to the proliferation of Islam in the Punjab - they had 
inherited baraka (religious charisma) from their holy ancestors, and were 
intermediaries who could intercede on behalf of the 'faithful' for God's
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favour. The bend which existed between Pir and murid did not require 
the latter to adhere to any rigid spiritual discipline, but merely to
acknowledge the authority of the Pir, and to seek baraka in return for
1 1 8 "
payments or offerings. In practical terms, the sanctity with which
the Pirs were supposed to be blessed was often debased, but their power 
to command the obedience of their murids remained undiminished. In re­
calling the Pirs (not named) who had influence in Dera Ghazi Khan, Slater 
(I.C.S., Punjab Commission 1938-V?) ^as written:
"As a wilderness the district had in the past attracted 
holy men intent on mortifying the flesh, and though their 
successors were mostly scoundrels, an aura of Islamic 
purity remained. This, coupled with the gullibility of 
a generally backward people, made the district a worth­
while target." °
Irrespective of the personal failings or attributes of the individual
Pirs, the hereditary devotion and respect which they attracted made them
figures of great influence in the political as well as the religious
sphere of provincial life. Both the Mughals and the British, as well as
the Unionist and League Parties, recognised that it was essential to
accommodate and reconcile the religious leadership of the Province with
their administrations and political ambitions. The Gilani Syeds of
Multan had been appointed as Governors of Multan during the Mughal 
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period. The British also were careful to associate Pirs with their
rule. Sajjada Nashins were given appointments as honorary magistrates,
zaildars, and members of District Boards, whilst the custodians of the
shrine of Baba Farid Shakarganj at Pakpattan (Montgomery District) were
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honoured as dabaris. In order to bolster their electoral prospects
in 1937 the Unionist Party had contemplated seeking the support of the
122
Province's leading Pirs, but as the 19^ +6 elections approached, however, 
it was the Muslim League which captured and capitalised from the alle­
giance of the Punjab's religious leaders.
The Provincial Muslim League's determination to utilise the influence 
of the Pirs and Sajjada Nashins emerged as one of the dominant and most 
rewarding tactics of the election. In November 19^3 the Chief Secretary's 
Report to the Viceroy commented on the continuing success which the 
League was experiencing in attracting religious leaders to its ranks.
In fact by September of that year practically all the important Pirs in 
the Province, including the Sajjada Nashins of the famous shrines of Tonsa,
Golra, Alipur, Sialsharif and Jalalpur, had allied themselves with the 
12^League, and were actively involved in conducting propaganda in favour 
of Pakistan'. A number of contributory factors had combined to ensure 
the almost total support of the Punjab's religious leadership for the
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League. Some Pirs were large landholders, and as a consequence were
already involved in the political sphere - the Pirs of Jahanian Shah 
*126
(Shahpur), Jalalpur (Jhelum), Rajoa (Jhang), Shah Jiwana (Jhang) 
and Taunsa Sharif belonged to this category. There were others also 
who, on account of the substantial grants of land which had been awarded 
to their shrines by the Government, enjoyed the status of powerful land­
lords. The shrine of Baba Farid Shakarganj (Pakpattan) possessed an
127estate comprising *+3»000 acres, whilst that of Sheikh Baha-ud-Din
Zakariya in Multan enjoyed a jagir of nine villages wcrth Bs. 1,780 annually,
128eight wells and a garden worth Rs. 150 per annum. Similarly the
Sajjada Nashins of the shrines at Hassu Bale, Sultan Bahu and Sharkot
(Makdum Nazar Husain, Mian Habib Sultan, Mian Ghulam Jilani and Faqir
"129Ghulam Yasdn), in Jhang District, were all large landlords. As with 
the landed elite in general, the imminence of the British departure, 
heralding as it did a redistribution of the power balance, acted as a 
decisive incentive to cause many of the Pirs controlling large estates 
to seek a continuance of the patronage and privileges they enjoyed by 
openly aligning themselves with the party which appeared to be the most 
likely successor to the British - the Muslim League. Also some of the 
Pirs were doubtless encouraged to adopt a similar course out of family 
considerations. In this respect, Hazrat pir Fazal Shah of Jalalpur, the 
nephew of Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, was extremely active in furthering 
his uncle's campaign in the Pind Dadan Khan constituency.^^0
So far as the mainstream of the Chisti revivalist Pirs were con­
cerned, Talbot has argued that their pro-League activity was a direct 
result of the fact that during the 19^ +0's the shrine of India's premier 
Sufi saint - the Dargafi^of Hazrat. Khwaja Moinuddin Chisti of Ajmer - 
had become closely connected with the Muslim League. Mirza Abdul 
Qadir Beg, the Vice-President of the Dargarh Committee, which adminis­
tered the shrine's affairs, was President of the Ajmer Muslim League. 
Unfortunately Talbot-has not revealed the motives which induced Mirza 
Abdul Qadir Beg to promote the cause of the L e a g u e . S u r e l y  it is 
evident that in addition to wishing to secure the landed grants and 
possessions which many Pirs held in the Punjab, the religious leaders 
of the Province, of all orders, were excited by, and attracted to the 
prospect of an Islamic State in which they expected to exercise 
influence and power, and that provided the principal motivating cause 
for their support for the League. The Provincial Muslim League, through 
such spokesmen as Firoz Khan Noon, had pledged that a League victory 
and the birth of'Pakistan'would achieve such a state, which would be
289
132organised according to the tenets of the Quran and the Shariat. The 
creation of a nation based on these principles was the unique vision of 
the Muslim League. The Unionist party despite its ’lip service’ to 
•Pakistan’ remained wedded to an inter-communal philosophy, and it was 
thus unable to counter the League's 'hot gospelling*. The mythology of 
an Islamic State presented the Pirs and Sajjada Nashins with practically 
unlimited scope for the extension of their religious and secular author­
ity, and this guaranteed to the League an almost total commitment from 
the Province’s religious hierarchy. This phenomenon was recognised by 
Doctor Mahommed Alam, the defeated Unionist candidate who had contested 
the Rawalpindi Division Towns constituency (urban) in opposition to 
Feroz Khan Noon:
"The Pirs, Sajjada Nishins and Mushaikhs and Ulemas of 
Islam in the Punjab and outside Punjab seeing in the 
achievement of their goal by the Muslim League, an oppor­
tunity of the revival of their temprol [jsic] power besides 
the extension of their spiritual or sharai power upon an 
unprecented scale, were exhorted by the All-India
Jamiat-ul-ulema-i-Islam ... to mobilize all the forces of 
Islam in support of the muslim (jsic]] League." ^ 33
It would be extremely cynical, however, to interpret the collective 
actions of those Pirs, who were sympathetic to the League, solely in 
terms of the desire to protect their existing vested interests, or to 
increase their religious and political authority. As Gilmartin has 
commented in respect of the Chisti Pirs of Taunsa, Sial, GoIra and 
Jalalpur,
"The thrust of their concern had always been to influence 
the political leaders and their followers to regulate 
their lives according to religious injunctions... The idea 
of a state in the hands of such leaders was for them 
perfectly natural, for in the establishment of such a state 
based on the Shariat, they could see the projection of 
their local religious work into a larger political arena."
Also there were religious leaders who were inspired by the concept of 
Muslim nationalism, as epitomised by the Muslim League, and who con­
sidered it to be their patriotic duty to campaign for 'Pakistan'. Maulana 
Shabir Ahmad Usmani, the President of the Jamiat-ul-ulema-i-Islam, 
interpreted his pro-League sentiments as an extension of his personal 
patriotism:
"I shall prefer to be called a communalist, but it shall 
be tragic for me in this world and the life hereafter if 
my own nation calls me a traitor."
Irrespective of the various motives and impulses which led the Pirs 
of the Punjab to support the League, the outcome of their action was 
the massive, unprecedented and almost total involvement of the religious
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hierarchy as propagandists for the Muslim League. Out of 37 constitu­
encies which have been surveyed (see Appendix U ), pro-League Pirs were 
active in 36 of them (see Appendix X). By comparison the Unionist Party 
could claim the co-operation of religious leaders in only two of the 
seats. In Shahpur, which the Unionists retained, Sultan Ali Mian 
(successful Unionist candidate) was able to gain the support of Pir 
Ghulam Qasim, the Rais of the Multan District. This Pir's family posses­
sed a great deal of land in the Shahpur Tahsil, and he had numerous 
murids there. In the pre-election period Ghulam Qasim had supported the 
League, but on the eve of the elections his step-mother died, and he 
became involved in a mutation dispute. It was alleged on behalf of the 
defeated League candidate, Nur Hussain, that Sultan Ali Mian had secured 
the Pir's collaboration as a consequence of Manzoor Ali, the Tahsildar 
of Shahpur, exerting his influence on the Pir’s behalf in the pending
inheritance case, and that the intervention of the religious leader had
136been deeisive in realising a Unionist victory. Similarly in the Attock 
South ward, it was reported by Miran Bakhsh, a League supporter, that the 
prospects of that Party had been adversely affected by the fraudulent 
claims of the successful Unionist candidate, M. Mohi-u-Din Lai Badshah 
Mukhad, that he was the official League candidate, and that his candidacy 
had been sanctioned by influential spiritual leaders. A publication, 
allegedly written by Faqir Maulvi Abdullah, the Sajjada Nashin of Maira 
Sharif, had been circulated to this effect, and despite the fact that the 
Faqir subsequently denied authorship of the pamphlet, the confusion caused 
amongst his numerous murids in the constituency, resulted in a Unionist 
vie tory.^  ^7
The overwhelming majority of Pirs who entered the political arena, 
however, did so as advocates for the Muslim League (see Appendix X).
They preached the politics of the 'Old Testament', and not of the new 
socialism. Men and women were exhorted to vote for the League, not to 
secure a better standard of living, but to escape damnation. They spoke 
a language which the Muslim electorate understood and feared, thereby 
transforming the election into a 'Holy Crescentade', a battle for Islam, 
waged by the true followers of the Prophet against the Unionist Kafirs.
It was the religious sentiments which the Pirs evoked, and the ignorant 
fears which they manipulated so effectively, which helped to secure the 
massive League electoral triumph, not the 'bread and butter' politics 
emphasised by Talbot. The Civil and Military Gazette correctly portrayed 
the true atmosphere of the election when it acknowledged in January 19^5 
that religion remained the League's most potent weapon, in spite of the
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efforts of 'leftists' within its ranks who stressed the socio-economic 
problems experienced by the masses.
Religious intimidation was widespread throughout the Province, and 
fatwas threatening excommunication from Islam were issued by, amongst
others, Pir Mohammad Fazal Shah of Jalalpur Sharif P 9 and Pir Jamaat Ali 
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Shah of Alipur. In the Muslim constituency of Jhang West the Sajjada 
Nashins of the shrines of Hassu Bale, Sultan Bahu and Shorkot informed 
their murids that whosoever amongst them voted against the League would 
by that act^acquire Kafir status, and that Divine wrath would descend 
upon them. Similarly in I^rallpur a convention of Maulvis under the 
presidentship of Ali Muhammad warned that,
"It is the commandment of God and the prophet that like 
the sepoys of Imam Hussain you should join the file of 
LtheJ Muslim League. If you do not vote for the League 
candidate you will be held Kafirs for all time. The 
wrath of God will i®-ll upon you and the curses of all 
saints and Pirs..."
Also Muslim voters were confronted with other awesome inducements. 
Towards the end of October 19A5 Pir Sayed Jamaat Ali Shah, who claimed 
to have over one million followers in the Punjab, instructed his murids 
and Muslims in general to withhold the right of Muslim burial from those 
who did not support the League.
"If a Muslim does not vote for the Muslim League do not 
say his funeral prayer and do not bury him in the grave­
yard of the Muslims." ^
By comparison the Sajjada Nashin of Darbar Ghausia, Japranwali cautioned 
that any of his disciples who failed to vote for the League would cease 
to be his murids. Whilst Muslim electors in I^yallpur and the Rawal­
pindi Division Towns wards were told that if they abdicated their res­
ponsibility towards the League their marriages would no longer be 
considered as sanctioned or valid.
The Zamindar, in reporting warnings and threats of this nature, 
emphasised that failure to respond positively to them would render the
l46offenders liable to social and religious ostracism. The Pirs, however,
exceeded mere threats of social boycott in their fervour to support the
Muslim League. They vowed that refusal to adopt the League's cause in
this world, would lead to the culprits' eternal damnation in the next.
Again Pir Jamaat Ali Shah was prominent in spreading this particular
'incentive'. Khizar Hayat, as the chief villain opposed to the Muslim
League, was singled out for particular condemnation. Jamaat Ali Shah
predicted that Khizar's opposition to the League would be punished by his
descent into Hell, and he counselled the Unionist leader to seek sal-
1vation through reconciliation with the League.
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Religious leaders outside of the mainstream of Islam, also induced 
their followers in the name of religion to assist the League. His 
Holiness the Khalifa of Qadian ordered the Ahmadia community to vote 
for the League, and Ahmadia spiritual leaders in the constituency of 
S.W. Gujrat, where there was a large concentration of their co-religion- 
ists, proclaimed that those who failed to obey tte order would becare Kafirs!**9 
This sect was regarded by orthodox Muslim opinion as heretical. The 
Ahmadia leadership in championing the League had attempted to ensure 
the sect's future by joining rather than opposing the demand for 
'Pakistan'for not only would opposition to the movement teve been futile, it 
could have proved fatal for so small and vulnerable a minority.150
Not all the Pirs, however, were content merely to rely on their 
own authority in directing the orthodox Muslims to embrace the League.
At least one, Pir Walayat Shah, the Sajjada Nashin of Darbar Sharif 
(Pind Dadan Khan) claimed to have received instruction on the matter 
through mystical communion with the Prophet:
My followers from the Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan, etc., 
have been inquiring about which of the present Political 
Parties is on the right path, so as to deserve their 
support. I took to meditation for a considerable time, 
during which I experienced visitations of the Prophet.
He told me that only the Muslim League was on the right 
path, and was a Muslim party in the real sense. He also 
said that whoever did not want Pakistan, was not a Muslim.
I am ready to say all this before a crowd of millions and 
under the oath of the Quran - about whatever I have seen and 
heard from the Prophet... I have arranged a deputation, 
which will tour the villages and inform them."
A similar supernatural experience, which favoured the League, was
widely circulated in the Southern Towns constituency. Syed Mahmud Shah,
who had stood unsuccessfully as an Independent candidate related to
the Election Commission that,
"At a meeting of the Muslim (^League] held at Kathal 
during the election days, a dream was related in which 
it was said, that Mr. Jinnah was seen sitting by the side 
of the Holy Prophet and the Holy Prophet said, pointing 
out to Mr. Jinnah 'be []sic^ J is my representative on earth 
now. Those who will not follow him will not be of me.'"152
The exploitation of Islam as an electioneering tactic, naturally 
aggravated communal divisions, enhancing still further the cause of the 
League,and its claim to be the sole protector of the Muslim faith. In 
Gujranwala North, the successful League candidate, Chaudhri Salah-ud-Din, 
described the Unionist Party not only as the enemy of Islam, but he
asserted that it had accepted Gandhi in the Prophet's place as its
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spiritual and religious guide. Similarly, Firoz Khan Noon through
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the auspices of the Zamindar declared;
"In the coming elections your vote is for the prophet 
Jjsic[[|.. • On one side are khiziri Muslims. Votes^ for 
Khizar are votes for Gandhi, they are not for Muhammad 
the Holy prophet jjsicl" ^  •
Whilst the Muslim voters of Muzaffargarh North were encouraged, by
League agents to believe that if the Unionists won the election the
155Quran would be re-written in Hindi.
Crude indoctrination along these lines, together with the fatwas 
and directives of the Pirs, was intended to alienate the Unionist Party 
completely, and there can be no doubt that the measure succeeded. The 
Nawa-i-Waqt, Ehsan and Zamindar newspapers each played a prominent role 
in ensuring that the Muslim electorate of the Punjab was acquainted with 
the religious aspect of the election, and the fate that would befall
156those who ignored their spiritual guides. In order that illiteracy
should not prove a barrier to the dissemination of this propaganda,
League agents were employed to read the respective fatwas and newspaper
157articles at League election rallies throughout the Province , (for an 
example of a typical League election poster see Appendix Y).
The Unionist Party, unable to muster any influential religious 
leaders to defend it, or to sanction its opposition to the Muslim League, 
attempted to combat the latter1s manipulation of religious sentiment 
by scurrilously hinting at improper and un-Islamic behaviour on the part 
of prominent Leaguers, and by attempting to ban religious appeals.
With regard to the first tactic, a two-leaf folder containing two photo­
graphs was widely circulated. One picture was of Jinnah, taking the 
salute from a squad of Muslim girl volunteers, and the other featured 
Lady Noon (the European wife of Firoz Khan Noon) watching a cricket match 
in the company of a number of Sikh chiefs. In view of the importance of 
purdah in Islam, the publication was intended as a rebuke for the League, 
which represented itself as the champion of Islamic tenets. The pamphlets
were sold by hawkers outside the election booths, to the cry of "Pakistan 
158for four annas". In respect of the Ministry^ attempt to prevent
religious orientated electioneering, the Premier, in a press statement.
issued in January 19^6, emphasised that it was a criminal offence to
159influence the electorate through threats of divine displeasure. Des­
pite this warning the Government had not been enthusiastic in accepting 
responsibility for a direct ban, and it suggested that the Governor 
should issue the necessary ordinance to achieve the objective. Glancy, 
however, realising that such action would inflame the situation refused • 
to meet the request. The Ministry, therefore, was forced to resort to 
its own resources, and orders were issued authorising sub-Divisional
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Magistrates to register all complaints relating to religious intimidation.
As Glancy had foreseen, the Unionist attempt to muzzle the Pirs, and 
prohibit the use of religion as an inducement for support, was a tactical 
mistake, for it reinforced, rather than reduced the religious appeal of 
the Muslim League. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam conference held in 
Lahore in January 19^6, which had attracted an attendance of 20,000, 
including Pirs and ulema from the Punjab, Delhi, U.P. and N.W.F.P., con­
demned the Unionist measure, and urged Muslims to oppose it by resorting 
to individual civil disobedience.1^1 pir and politician alike responded 
to the appeal for defiance. Chan Pir, the son of the leading Sajjada 
Nashin of Montgomery District, declared:
"If it is against the law to invoke divine displeasure 
for the Holy cause of Islam and Pakistan, I defy the law.
I asked my followers to vote only for the League Candidates and 
to defend Islam and Pakistan... Those voting for Unionists 
are blacksheep.and hypocrites. I give rpy^ fatwa and openly 
say that posterity will curse them.*.".
In similar vein Firoz Khan Noon condemned the Ministry:
"This action is mainly aimed at Muslim League workers 
including the Pirs, our spiritual leaders who have served 
selflessly in awakening ^the] Muslim masses.... The present 
Government make it a crime for us to mention the name of God 
and Islam to the electorate. How can we divorce the Muslim 
League from Islam. Islam is inherent in what we preach 
from the Muslim League platform.”
Begum Shah Nawaz also announced her intention to defy the bar on invoking* 
divine displeasure.
Thus the Ministry's manoeuvre was interpreted as an attack, not 
only upon the League, but on Islam, and the rights of the Pirs to 
direct the actions of their murids. Whilst it is evident that the 
Unionist Ministry had acted from desperation, the course it chose to 
follow did nothing to alleviate its difficulties, for it was represented 
to the Muslim community by the League as a sign of the Unionist Govern­
ment's contempt for their religion, and its intention to destroy it.
The Nawa-i-Waqt in particular fabricated and encouraged these miscon­
ceptions: "Under Malik Khizar Hayat's rule, it will be considered a
crime to mention the name of God and his Prophet".1^
Nevertheless, the futile attempt to neutralise the religious impact 
which the League had enjoyed emphasised the Unionist Party's recognition 
of the acute danger it posed to its continuing political survival. In 
fact as the defection of the landlords had foreshadowed the disintegration 
of the Party's majority, the condemnation heaped upon it by the Pirs, 
ensured its total destruction as a political force in the Province. Glancy 
had, in part, recognised the consequences for Unionism posed by
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the intrusion of religious fanaticism into the election campaign, when
he predicted to the Viceroy in February 19^6,
"•there seems little doubt that the Muslim Leaguers, 
thanks to the ruthless methods by which they have 
pursued their campaign of *Islam in danger*, will 
considerably increase the number of their seats 
and that Unionist representatives will corres­
pondingly decline." ^
The Governor's prediction proved to be correct, though its tone suggests
that Glancy had failed to realise fully the dramatic and sweeping results
which the exploitation of religion, particularly by the Pirs, would
achieve. The verdict, recorded by Dawn in March 19^ +6, however, fully
appreciated and formally recognised, the crucial impact which the
religious leadership had had in deciding the election in the Punjab:
"What are the factors that have brought about the 
Revolution in Pakistani Lands? What has made the 
great change possible? ...the greatest praise must 
be lavished as far as the Punjab is concerned on 
the Pirs and Mashaiks, who when they saw the Pakistani 
nation in mortal danger, emerged from their cells, 
and enjoined upon their followers the duty to resist 
evil and vote for the League and Pakistan... Among the 
Pirs the most creditable work has been done by the Pir 
of Siyal, the Pir of GoIra, Pir Jamat Ali Shah, the 
Gilani Pirs of Multan, Chan Pir of Montgomery and 
scores of others who deserve equal praise."
Dawn, in expressing its recognition of the rSle played by the 
spiritual leaders, attributed the massive victory the League had achieved 
in the Punjab to their intervention. There is no doubt that this appre­
ciation was sound, for had the religious leadership of the Punjab 
refrained from committing themselves to the contest with such intensity 
and in such strength, the election would have been decided largely by 
the feudal landed factions. The evidence suggests, because of the 
defections which had occurred from the Unionist to the League ranks by 
powerful elitist feudal groups that the Muslim League would have captured 
a majority of Muslim seats, but the combination of landlord and Pir gave 
it an almost total victory, resulting in the annihilation of the Unionist 
Party.
Peter Hardy, in commenting on the 19^ +6 elections, has concluded
that,
"In the Panjab ... the Muslim League gained its 
electoral victory by making a religious appeal over 
the heads of the professional politicians."^^
This analysis, though it has stressed the importance of the League's
manipulation of religion, is clearly open to question. Muslim politics
in the Punjab remained the almost exclusive reserve of a powerful landed
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oligarchy, and it was this class which furnished the Province's
'professional politicians', as personified by Mamdot, Daultana, Shaukat
Hyat and Noon. In reality these political representatives of landed
interest, in unison with the religious hierarchy of the Punjab, ensured
the continuation of landed dominance in the political sphere. In effect
they harnessed religious fears and fanaticism to ensure the victory of
their chosen vehicle, the Muslim League, which they had fashioned as a
repository of feudal power to challenge, and eventually to destroy, the
Unionist Party. Their successful manipulation of that potent force was
recognised and condemned by Khizar, when following the election he
bitterly declared,
"Call me whatever names you like. I can say that I
have not duped people in the name of religion nor
have I exploited the name of religion for my personal 
ends."16?
His inability to do so, in conjunction with the desertion of powerful
landed elements, had cost the Unionist Party the election, but the feudal
elite to which Tiwana belonged had been the beneficiaries, not the 
victims of the Unionist reversal. Intimidation, coercion, corruption 
and bribery, in themselves the hallmarks of feudal politics had each 
contributed to the eventual result, as had the prevailing economic 
situation, but essentially it was feudalism which had triumphed, 
ensuring that the League success represented a victory for the landlord 
and the Pir.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VII
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V P & W 4 72, I OR.
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4. Craig Baxter has claimed incorrectly that the Unionist Party 
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Following the election there was some initial confusion concerning 
the respective strengths of the Parties in the Punjab,as is apparent 
from the Table below, produced in the Times of India, 13 March 1946.
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12. The students' promises were recalled by villagers during a series
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CHAPTER VIII
A HOUSE DIVIDED - PUNJAB NEMESIS,
MARCH 19^6 to AUGUST 19^7
The election of 19^6 had conclusively endorsed the Muslim League's 
claim to represent Indian Muslims. Despite its capture of the majority 
of the Muslim constituencies, however (see pp.260-261), it was able to form 
ministries in only two provinces - Bengal and Sind. In the Punjab its 
attempts to create a government were frustrated. As in the pre-election 
period no single communal party, could control the Legislature, or hope to 
form a stable Ministry. Whilst the Muslim League had emerged as the 
largest single party following the election, its exploitation of religious 
fanaticism, and its determination to realise its national goal had alien­
ated the minority parties, who consequently refused to coalesce with it 
in the Assembly. Their opposition to the League was aided by the 
continued alienation of Khizar and the Muslim Unionist 'rump', and the 
unwillingness of the British Governors (Glancy and Jenkins) to commit the 
administration of the Province to the League. Unable to assume power in 
the Punjab, the Provincial Muslim League initiated a campaign of civil 
disobedience to dverthrow the Congress-Sikh-Unionist Government which was 
formed under the premiership of Khizar Hayat in March 19^6. As a direct 
consequence of the League's strategy communal tension in the Province 
mushroomed, forcing the Punjab to the precipice of internecine warfare, 
and precipitating the imposition of Governor's rule. The suspension of 
provincial autonomy, and the failure of the political parties, and the 
British, to resolve the situation, combined with the acceptance of the 
major national leaders, including Jinnah, that Pakistan could only emerge 
as a consequence of territorial division, made the partition of the Punjab 
inevitable.
The attempt of the Provincial Muslim League to form a Ministry 
following its election victory was doomed to failure as it was unable to 
endorse any compromise over the vital issues of'Pakistan', its claim to 
be the sole representative of the Muslim community, and the Sikh demand 
for an independent State. The inability of the League to make vital 
concessions was a direct consequence of the election campaign it had 
conducted, and the expectations it had nourished amongst the Muslim
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electorate. Wavell, in an appreciation of the situation recorded on 
3 December 19^6, referred to this dilemma:
"The Muslim League leaders raised the cries of Pakistan 
and Islam in danger originally to enhance their prestige 
and power and thus their bargaining values as a political 
party. They have now so inflamed their ignorant and 
impressionable followers with the idea of Pakistan as a 
new Prophet's Paradise on earth and as their only means 
of protection against Hindu domination, that it will be 
very difficult to satisfy them with anything else."
The League, however, was not only constrained by the necessity of not
appearing to betray the expectations of its supporters, but also by the
fears which its religiously orientated electioneering, especially its
pledge to found a Quranic State, had aroused amongst the non-Muslim
minorities. An unnamed 'Unionist' gleefully portrayed the invidious
position of the League in an article published in the Civil and Military
Gazette, commenting that, "by resorting to Hitlerian and Fascist methods
and by invoking the threat of divine displeasure..."the League having once
worked up communal hatred and contempt, was unable to create a coalition 
Ministry.^
This was particularly true in the case of the Sikhs, whom the League 
approached in February 19^6 in an attempt to gain their support. Although 
the Provincial Muslim League leadership had agreed to the Panthic Sikh 
group's demand of a 25 per cent share of all Ministerial and Service 
appointments, negotiations had collapsed over the Provincial League's 
blunt refusal to define the position which Sikhs would occupy in a Muslim 
State. Denied Sikh co-operation the League approached the Congress 
Party, through Azad (Congress President) and Bhim Sen Sachar (Congress 
Provincial leader) on 2 March 19^6. Azad tacitly agreed to permit the 
Provincial Congress Party to form an alliance with the League, and the 
Akali Party, subject to the League's acceptance of three conditions. 
Firstly, a programme acceptable to the three parties in the proposed 
coalition had to be formulated; secondly, the scope of the coalition 
would be limited to administration, and not involve itself with all-India 
issues; thirdly, there would have to be parity in the Cabinet between the 
Muslim^League on one side, and the Congress and Akali parties on the 
other. Although the second condition was completely unrealistic, as the 
Punjab could not be divorced from a national settlement, the Congress- 
League talks were disrupted over the issue of Cabinet appointments. Azad 
refused to undertake not to nominate a Congress Muslim for a Ministerial 
post, and Jinnah fearing that such an appointment would disrupt Muslim 
solidarity in the Punjab Legislature and would endorse Congress claims to 
represent all communities, rejected Azad's terms.®
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In view of Azad*s insistence on having the right to include a 
nationalist Muslim (i.e. Congress Muslim) Minister, when the issue had 
previously caused the breakdown of Wavell*s Simla initiative (see pp?42 
-2^3) it is evident that the Congress had no genuine desire to accom­
modate the League for the purpose of forming a provincial Ministry. In 
fact the Congress had been exploring the possibilition for the formation 
of a combined opposition to the League from the beginning of January 
19^6;^ the failure of the nationalist Muslim and Ahrar candidates, and
the virtual elimination of the Unionist party, had intensified rather than
10lessened its resolve in this respect. The attitude of Khizar was vital
to Congress ambitions, especially as following the election, and the
failure of the League to coalesce with either of the other major parties
(Congress and Akali), the Unionist 'rump* held the balance of power in
11the Assembly between the Muslim and non-Muslim groups. The Congress
Party, through Azad, had contacted the Premier in February 19*+6 to seek
his support. By mid-February Khizar had informed the Governor that he
was considering a political alliance with the Congress to oppose the 
12
League, and despite the denial of Gopichand Bhargava (leading Congress-
ite in Punjab, M.L.A., and Member of Partition Committee), in response to
a Civil and Military Gazette article (2k Feb. 19^ +6) which named him as
the Premier*s intermediary with the Congress High Command, that he had
played such a role, Khizar admitted at the end of the month that he had
been holding talks with Azad. Khizar maintained, however, that he had
sought the Maulana's influence to restrain students sympathetic to the
13Congress from committing disturbances. ^ This explanation, however, was
completely erroneous, the real reason for the discussions had been to
prevent the Muslim League from taking office.
In his report to the Punjab Boundary Commission, Mr. Justice Muhammad
Munir claimed that Khizar had been tempted by Azad to join forces with the
"]kCongress on being assured the Premiership. This assessment, however, 
born out of the utter contempt with which the Muslim community in general 
regarded Khizar*s actions, was incorrect. It was not the love of office 
which had secured the Premier's continued opposition to the League, but 
his determination to continue Fazl-i-Husain's policy of inter-communal
15
co-operation; "I had the foolishness or die-hardness not to have
16changed colour. I was a Unionist and I am a Unionist." Also it is 
evident that Khizar hoped that 'Unionism*, despite the crushing defeat 
it had suffered at the polls, would still have a part to play in Punjabi 
affairs, and that in spite of the League victory'Pakistan1 might not 
materialise. In November 19^ +6 he told Wavell that he believed that the
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17British would be compelled to remain in India, and that,
,fin fact he did not see how they could leave, that 
Pakistan was nonsense ... that Jinnah's policy was all 
wrong; and that the Punjab would get on perfectly well 
by itself if only it was left alone.
In this context he urged that the Province should be granted Dominion
19status under the Crown. Khizar's confidence that the Punjab could
survive independently of*Pakistan' had received encouragement from Attlee
in August 19^6, when the latter had assured him that he would not permit
the 'Balkanistan' of India, or the break-up of the Punjab. Following
the end of British rule and Partition, Khizar ruefully admitted that "I
believed as long as Attlee was there, there would be no partition of 
20Punjab or India."
Thus Khizar's continued opposition to the League, in concert with 
the Congress Party, reflected his complete inability to interpret or 
appreciate the course which Indian history was pursuing. In spite of the 
overwhelming League electoral victory in the Punjab, and in India generally, 
he stubbornly maintained a provincial, as opposed to a nationalistic out­
look, fired by the totally misplaced optimism that the British could 
ignore the verdict of the Muslim electorate, and that they retained the 
power to deny1 Pakistan'. Even so he had no illusions concerning the 
Congress Party, he regarded co-operation with it as a necessary evil,
21 X
bluntly informing the Cabinet Delegation that Britain should not ’
consider withdrawing from India until they could transfer power to
22something much better than the Congress.
The Unionist-Congress alliance, as such,was a 'political marriage 
of convenience', born of their mutual opposition to the League, but the 
manoeuvre could not have succeeded without Sikh aid. The failure of the 
League to reassure the Sikh leadership (see p. 306) propelled it to join 
the opposition which was forming around the Congress Party. Nevertheless 
the Sikh Akali leaders, particularly Master Tara Singh and Gilani Katar 
Singh, were suspicious of the Congress, which they regarded primarily as
23
a Hindu organisation which could not be trusted to safeguard Sikh interests. 
In March 19^6 Azad was able to gain their support, however,by virtually 
conceding the Panthic claim to be the sole representative of the Sikh 
community, in so far as the practical business of Cabinet-making was 
concerned. Out of a proposed Cabinet of six the Panthic Party was 
allotted the seat reserved for Sikhs, though the office of Deputy Speaker 
and two Parliamentary Secretaryships were awarded to nationalist (i.e. 
Congress) Sikhs. Azad's refusal to offer a similar concession to the 
League, concerning the composition of the Cabinet, emphasised the true
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purpose of the Congress strategy, which was to prevent the League 
assuming responsibility in the Punjab. The Unionist-Congress-Akali 
coalition, therefore, coalesced simply to deprive the Muslim League of 
Ministerial power, as was emphasised by the mutual undertaking to limit 
their co-operation solely to provincial administration, each group 
retaining its individual identity outside the Legislative Assembly.^ 
Despite the accord which existed amongst the coalitionists, Mamdot 
requested the Governor on 6 March 19^6 to invite him to form a Ministry, 
on the grounds that the Muslim League Party was the largest single party 
in the Legislature, in that he commanded the support of 87 Muslim and non- 
Muslim M.L.As.(78 Muslims, 2 Hindus, 4 Scheduled Caste, and 2 Indian 
Christians, 1 Sikh). The Governor, however, refuted his claim as intelli­
gence reports indicated that only one Scheduled Caste and one Indian 
Christian was prepared to support the League, giving it an Assembly 
strength of 80. By comparison Glancy estimated that the Coalition con­
trolled 90 M.L.As. (15 Unionist, 50 Congress, 25 Panthic, 1 Independent
26and 1 Indian-Christian), and whilst he recognised that it was an "ill-
assorted conglomeration and there is no saying how long it will last", the
fact that it commanded a majority compelled the Governor to request Khizar,
27as the leader of the group, to form a Ministry.
Glancy1s decision was bitterly resented by Provincial League leaders,
despite the fact that the Governor believed that Mamdot was not over anxious
to assume responsibility for the Ministry:
"I was left with the impression, though I cannot vouch for 
its correctness, that the Nawab was personally not particularly 
anxious to fo£fn a Ministry in the circumstances in which he 
was placed."^
Provincial League leaders interpreted the Governor^ reluctance as 
symptomatic of anti-League bias on his part; Mamdot alleged that as the 
leader of the largest Party commanding a majority in the Assembly, it had 
been incumbent upon Glancy to ask him to form a Ministry, but he had 
failed to do so because he was determined to installKhizar as Premier.^ 
There is no doubt that the Governor possessed a high personal regard 
for the Unionist leader, but there is no evidence to suggest that he had 
been a party to a Congress-Unionist-Akali intrigue to frustrate the 
League, or that he had acted unconstitutionally. In February 19^6, at a 
time when he believed that the League and the Congress would control 60 
and 50 seats respectively in a House of 1751 which made it imperative 
for either side to seek political allies, he had been opposed to the 
creation of a Unionist-Congress coalition, considering such a move to be 
unwise as it could have prevented the League from adopting a moderate
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approach.^ But once the tripartite alliance had assumed form, the
Governor could not ignore it, or deny it the right of assuming the
administration of the Province if it enjoyed a majority. In the original
talks which Mamdot had with Glancy on 6 March, the former had been
unable to substantiate his claim concerning the support he professed to
enjoy. In the course of the interview the Governor established to the
satisfaction of Mamdot that the two Hindu Unionists whose adherence he
31claimed had decided to remain in the Unionist Party, and Mamdot finally
admitted that he was confident of the support of only one of the two
Indian Christian M.L.As. he had listed. Also when questioned by Glancy
on the true political affiliation of the Scheduled Caste members Mamdot
had cited, the Nawab replied that it was impossible to verify their
support for the League "as the^had left Lahore either of their own
account or under persuasion...". Thus Mamdot*s allegation that the
Governor had blatantly disregarded his claim to possess a majority was
totally false. Also the Nawab*s contention that the Governor was required
to invite him as the leader of the largest single party to form a Ministry
was incorrect. The only statutory obligation imposed on a Governor was
"to appoint in consultation with the person who in his 
judgement is most likely to command a suitable majority 
in the Legislature those persons ... who will best be in 
a position collectively to command the confidence of the 
Legislature. tf23
The Provincial Muslim League, having failed to reach an agreement with
either the Congress or the Akali Party, or to provide concrete proof of
its ability to command a majority in the Legislature, was in no position
to enjoy such consideration.
The exclusion of the Muslim League and the installation of the
Coalition Government, relegated the Muslim community, as represented in
the Assembly, to a position of permanent opposition. The Unionist-Congress
-Akali alliance, in spite of the inclusion of the small number of Muslim 
34
Unionists (11) was a Government of the minority communities. This
development, following an election campaign which had been conducted on
fanatical religio-communal lines, was fraught with danger, and destined
to contribute to a further deterioration of the communal situation. In
an attempt to justify the existence of the Ministry, and demonstrate to
the Muslim public in particular, that its complexion was the result of
Muslim League intransigence, and that the only possible alternative to it
would be the imposition of Governor’s Rule (under section 93 of the
Government of India Act, 1933)i Khizar publicly invited Mamdot to join
35the coalition on 8 March 19^6. The Premier knew that it would be
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impossible for the Punjab Ie^ue leader to accept the invitation, for the
issues which had prevented co-operation between the Muslim League and
the Hindu and Sikh parties remained unresolved. Also Jinnah, in a
speech in Calcutta on 8 March had decreed that he would brook no
compromise with the Punjab Coalition, declaring,
"we have already won the battle of Pakistan in the ...
Punjab by carrying away 90 per cent, of the Muslim 
seats ... If the Congress wishes to work the Consti­
tutions of 1919 and 1935* it is welcome to do so. We 
want to put a speedy end to the present Constitution and 
establish Pakistan.”36
Nevertheless in pursuing the propaganda exercise, Khizar attempted to 
project the sincerity of the offer by stressing that it was essential 
for all the political parties in the Punjab to work together to combat 
the grave economic problems facing the Province, and in order to facili­
tate the political rehabilitation of the League the Premier offered to 
retire from public life:
"I should like to make it clear that if the offer I am 
making to you is accepted, I would personally be prepared 
to stand aside and to seek no office. I trust that this 
will clear the way for you to recommend to your Party the 
acceptance of the invitation...”37
This gesture, however, was insincere and intended purely for public
consumption. Khizar had no intention of relinquishing the influence he
enjoyed at this juncture, as the proposed settlement with the League was
subject to certain secret conditions: in the event of the Premier’s
resignation and the formation of a Muslim League Government, the latter
would include a nominee of Khizar*s in the Cabinet, whereupon the Unionist
38leader would advise his Muslim followers to join the League. Had
Khizar intended honouring this undertaking it would have represented a
total volte-face on his part. It represented nothing more than a measure
of insurance to protect his position in the unlikely event of the Muslim
League agreeing to join the Coalition, and as the largest single party,
consequently gaining control of the Government.
Having attempted to establish the legitimacy of the Coalition, Khizar
planned to popularise it through the inauguration of a socio-economic
reform programme. In June 19^6 the Government committed itself to
achieving an extension of the electricity supply, the introduction of
industrial planning, the improvement of village life, and urban working
39conditions, and to combatting corruption amongst officials. As a 
public relations exercise, however, it was a failure as the Government 
did not possess the resources to finance the various schemes, in addition 
to which materialism was no substitute for the religious euphoria which
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had seized the mind of the Muslim masses. Also the failure of the
Ministry to meet the expectations of demobilised soldiers in respect
of land grants, completely negated any advantage which the Coalition
might have enjoyed through the dispensation of largesse. The Unionist
Party, in an attempt to gain the service men's votes during the election,
had promised that as a class they would be amongst the major beneficiaries
40of post-war economic reconstruction. The result was that of the 
600,000 Punjabis who had seen war service, the majority who were agri­
culturists, expected to be rewarded with land. The Coalition Ministry, 
however, possessed the resources to satisfy no more than 8 ,000 men.
The almost total Muslim resentment against the Coalition, however, 
was the result of its communal composition, rather than its economic 
policy. It was regarded as a highly artificial structure, which through 
the 'Quisling'-like behaviour of an unrepresentative minority of Muslims, 
had usurped the rightful position of the Muslim League to govern the 
Province. As a Government, it was a total disaster, its only raison 
d'etre being the mutual detestation each of the coalition groupings felt 
for the League. Bereft of any social ideology or policy, it was con­
trolled by a cabinet of largely incompetent, and incompatible elements.
The Premier's influence on the Muslim community did not extend beyond the
43
boundaries of his estates, whilst the years of confrontation with the
44League had taken their toll, leaving him mentally exhausted. Quizilbash
45(Muslim Minister of Revenue) although experienced in local administration^ 
was a person of low reputation who lived in constant fear of assassination,
46relying on constant police protection. Muhammad Ibrahim Burq (Muslim
Minister of Education) originated from the remote district of Muzaffargat4i,
and he possessed little worthwhile experience. Bhim Sen Sachar (Minister
of Finance) and Chaudhri Lahri Singh (Minister of Public Works), the
Congress contingent retained a deep-seated dislike for Unionism, and both
4?lacked any administrative knowledge. Baldev Singh (Minister of Develop­
ment), the Akali nominee, had been brought up largely outside of the 
Punjab, and as an industrialist with large investments in Bihar he had
very little in common with his rural co-religionists, and practically no
48influence over them. In addition, the Congress, which was the largest
single party in the Coalition could not claim to represent any substantial 
49Muslim opinion, and it was split by internal divisions. Overlapping 
the orthodox Congress Party was the Congress Socialist Party, which was 
closely connected with the Congress High Command. Its leaders, notably 
Jai Parkash Narain, were political extremists, committed to a programme ^  
of violent revolution - Narain toured the Punjab advocating the seizure
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and burning of police stations and public buildings, and the murder of
50government officials. In the face of such blatant provocation,
Congress coalitionists refused to act responsibly or prosecute the
offenders to the chagrin of the Muslim community and the Governor:
"if they fail to deal with Congressmen who defy the law, 
they cannot decently treat members of the Opposition 
differently. Muslims in the Rawalpindi district are 
already saying that if having tolerated Jai Parkash 
Narain and his like, the Ministers prosecute the more 
violent Muslim speakers, it will quite clear that 
their motives are communal. " '5
The Congress Party, however, consistently refused to support the
introduction of firm and impartial measures necessary to maintain law and 
52order, and their coalition partners were unable and unwilling to imple­
ment strong government. Congress intransigence, however, was a symptom 
of, as much as a cause for the inherent weakness of the Ministry. The 
three parties formed an uneasy alliance, co-existing in the knowledge
that any political re-alignment on the part of any one of the coalition
53partners would cause the fall of the Government, ^ and their mutual '
timidity to control excesses resulted from a collective desire to retain
power, even at the cost of abdicating responsibility. By August 19^6,
as a result of Ministerial inertia, the provincial press was openly and
bitterly communal, private armies existed free from restriction, and the
administration of the Province had all but collapsed. The Governor,
highly alarmed by the existing state of affairs, informed the Viceroy
5I4.
that "Authority in the Punjab has never been at a lower ebb.""^  The 
total decay of Government incentive was reflected in the fact that 
Ministers lacked either the confidence or the will to combat the inevit­
able corruption which flourished in the absence of firm central control. 
Despite irrefutable evidence that Abdur Rahim (I.C.S.), the Deputy 
Commissioner of Lyallpur had misappropriated large sums of money from the
cc
Pachotra of village headman, ^ Qizilbash refused to agree to the
Governor's demand that the officer should be suspended pending a formal
56departmental enquiry.
The most dangerous failing the Ministry was guilty of, however,
concerned its refusal to face the Muslim League in the Legislature, for
57it caused the practical suspension of the constitutional process, 
eventually forcing its League protagonists to adopt unconstitutional 
methods to express their opposition to the Government. The Coalition's 
reluctance to allow Assembly debates reflected the insecurity of its 
Muslim membership which had started to diminish once the Unionist 'rump' 
entered the Government. In April 19^6 two Unionist Muslim Ministers -
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Jamal Khan Leghari and Nawab Ashiq Hussain, joined the League; Leghari's
defection having been prompted by Azad's refusal to admit his claim to 
58the Premiership. By July 1946 only five Unionist Muslims, including
59Khizar and Qizilbash, remained in the Coalition, the others having 
fallen victim to the Muslim League’s far from subtle coercion and victim­
isation tactics: March had witnessed the celebration of 'traitors' day'
60
in Lahore during which the mock funeral of the Premier had been conducted.
Veiled threats of this nature eroded the resolve of those Muslim M.L.As.
who remained outside the League, but it was the awareness that Unionism
as a political force was dead, and that no real alternative existed to
the Muslim League as the arbitrator for Muslim interests, which caused the
61final disintegration of the Unionist Muslim element. Under the circum­
stances, the Government was reluctant to expose its dwindling Muslim 
supporters to the vitriolic attacks which the League mounted against 
them in the Assembly. In commenting on the Ministry's failure to 
accomodate the League in the Legislature, whilst Jenkins (succeeded 
Glancy as Governor, 8 April 1946) stressed the timidity of the Ministers, 
he failed to give the underlying cause for it, but nevertheless he 
accurately described the effect which the Coalition's manouevre 
achieved:
"The Ministers were terrified of the Legislature, and 
when, in July 1946, a Session became inevitable for the 
elections to the Constituent Assembly, they used their 
small majority to secure the adjournment els soon as the 
obligatory business was over. They were most ingenious 
in avoiding legislation, thus depriving the Opposition 
of opportunities of constitutional combat •.• the tactics 
emd conduct of the Coalition Ministry were intensely 
annoying to the Muslim League, and with some reason.
The largest single party had been shut out of office, Etnd 
might have to wait indefinitely for its turn."82
The League, however, was not prepared to wait indefinitely, though
initially two factors combined to prevent it launching a programme of
agitation against the Unionist-Congress-Akali 'cabal*. In the first
place attempts to subvert the Muslim-controlled police force (70 per cent
63of cadre were Muslims) had failed, ^ and the majority of the Muslim
Elitist families were reluctant to adopt any course of action which
64could ultimately bring them into conflict with the British. Jenkins
firmly believed that, but for the stabilising effect of the traditional
Muslim rural leadership, the Punjab would have been subjected to serious
political disturbances:
"We must not forget that the Muslim leaders are on the 
whole people who for generations have been friendly with
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the Government of the day and with British officials.
If they had been professional agitators of the Con-^ 
gress type, we should have had trouble before now."
The reluctance of the landed class to endorse unconstitutional acti­
vity could offer only a temporary respite from the inevitable conflagra­
tion. The knowledge that the British were determined to relinquish their 
dual rSle of ruler and 1 fountain head * of patronage caused the largely
'loyalist1 landed elite to associate with the League, which remained the
66only viable successor to the Raj in the Punjab. Also the continued 
spectacle of a non-Muslim Government at the helm of provincial affairs 
exerted a greater influence on the Muslim masses in general, than the 
memories of old loyalties, and the League was quick to respond to and 
exploit the resulting Muslim resentment. In reporting this development 
to the Viceroy, the Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government noted:
"It has...come to notice that in certain rural areas the 
message is being passed from mouth to mouth that the Hindus 
are in power, that Muslims have been betrayed, that Islam 
is in danger and that Muslims must fight. The result of all 
this is an increase in Muslim determination and disregard 
of consequences."®?
League propagandists operating through newspapers (notably Dawn), public 
meetings and mosques sought to sanction the conflict it sought by pro­
claiming 'jehad1; that this was not an exercise in empty rhetoric was
emphasised by the fact that the League made strenuous efforts to recruit
68the services of Muslim army personnel who were on leave in the Punjab.
The Muslim League was not the only community preparing for an armed
struggle, for although the strength of the Muslim National Guards had
been estimated at over 10,000 in December 19^5* that of the militant
Hindu Rashtriya Swayyam Sewak Sangh had passed 28,000 by July 1946.^
The expansion of these organisations reflected the serious deterioration
which had occurred in communal relations in the Province, but it was
political activity at the national, rather than at the provincial, level
which led to a worsening of the situation, and the growth of a 'civil
70war' atmosphere in the Province. In August 1946, in spite of Jinnah's 
refusal to participate, the British inaugurated an Interim National 
Government, and installed the Congress in office. The Muslim community 
in the Punjab were alarmed and angered by the move, which they regarded as 
an unconditional surrender of power to the Hindus. Muslim resentment 
was further fired by the knowledge that when the situation had been 
reversed during the War, and Congress had proved unco-operative, the 
Muslim League had been refused the opportunity to govern. In many 
Muslim quarters, the apparent eagerness of the British to accommodate 
the Congress at this juncture was interpreted as proof of a plot
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between the two to frustrate the League. Such fears were intensified in 
the Punjab as a direct consequence of the impolitic and irresponsible 
attitude of Nehru and the provincial Congress leaders. The former, in 
answer to Jinnah's call for 'direct action' to demonstrate Muslim oppo­
sition to the Interim administration, had warned that such activity would 
be forcibly suppressed, whilst in the Punjab, as Jenkins reported to the 
Viceroy on 31 August 19^6, there was unconcealed Hindu jubilation at the 
exclusion of the League at the Centre:
"The Hindus are jubilant - they are bad winners, and 
will do all they can to taunt and humiliate the Muslims.
They are foolish enough to believe that here in the 
Punjab they will be able to suppress the Muslims once 
and for all with British aid, and loose talk to this 
effect is going on amongst Congress leaders ... nothing 
is more likely to bring about a physical conflict..."'
Furthermore Jenkins impressed upon the Viceroy his belief that such
conflict could not be avoided:
"We have here the material for a vast communal upheaval.
The hard core of the Muslim case - that the stage is set 
for the suppression of the Muslim community - is so 
nearly true that it cannot be answered with sincerity 
or conviction. The Muslims are ill-organised, but they 
will fight sooner than submit to dictations from the 
Congress High Command."'
In spite of the inflamatory conditions prevailing in the Province,
the manifestation of Muslim solidarity, organised by the Provincial
League as 'Direct Action Day* (16 August 19^6) was "conducted with
moderation and an apparent absence of mischievous intention to disturb
73the communal situation". ^ In deference to Jinnah*s instructions that
7 i+
the observations were to be peaceful, the Provincial League Committee
had appealed to its members "to avoid all unlawful activity and communal
incitement", but Muslims were left in no doubt that its purpose was to
75
prepare them for the coming struggle:
"In mosques, the righteousness of the Muslim League 
cause is undoubtedly being increasingly proclaimed 
and Muslims are being exhorted to be prepared, not 
for a political campaign, constitutional or otherwise, 
but for a Jehad."7°
Also although Jinnah had appealed for moderate behaviour, previous 
statements made by him and other League leaders had left the Muslim 
community throughout India in no doubt that if Congress rule was forced 
upon them they would resort to violence. At the Muslim League Legis­
lators Convention held in New Delhi from 7 to 9 April 19^6, Jinnah had 
declared that "Muslim India would never ... accept the constitution of 
an interim Government before the principle of Pakistan was accepted..."
31?
and that,
"If any attempt is made to force a decision against 
the wishes of Muslims, Muslim India will resist it 
by all means and at all costs. We are prepared to 
sacrifice anything and everything, but we shall not 
submit to any scheme of Government prepared without 
our consent."
Other speakers echoed Jinnah’s sentiments; Begum Shah Nawaz opining that
"Muslim women would call upon their husbands and sons to take up arms for
Pakistan, if the British tried to establish Akhand Hindustan...", and Shaukat
Hyat threatening that the Punjab Muslim martial class in its determination
to establish Pakistan would resort to rebellion if necessary:
"we shall show you a rehearsal now when the British 
army is still there [[in the Punjab]]. You will see 
the reactionary Government which is ... in the Punjab 
with the help of the Hindus and Muslim Quislings thrown 
overboard."
Whilst Khan Abdul Qayura Khan (Muslim League leader, N.W.F.P.) threatened
that if any attempt were made to frustrate the emergence of ’Pakistan*
"Muslims will have no other alternative but to take out the sword and 
77rebel..." Jinnah had made no effort to restrain his cohorts, and in
July 19^6 he endorsed their threats when he publicly cautioned the
British and the Congress that if ’Pakistan’ was denied the Muslims would
take up arms: "If you seek peace, we do not want war. If you want war
78we accept it unhesitatingly." This was the atmosphere in which Direct 
Action Day was held, and as such it was remarkable that no dangerous
disturbances erupted in the Punjab, but other parts of India were not so
79fortunate. In East Bengal and Bihar widespread slaughter resulted.
The decision of the A.I.M.L. to join the Interim Government in
October 19^6 did little to diffuse the situation in the Punjab, where
communal hatred had intensified greatly in response to the communal
butchery which had been unleashed in Bengal and Bihar in the wake of
Direct Action Day. Considering that Jinnah's purpose, despite his call
for peaceful observation, had been to establish once and for all that
Muslims in India were determined to achieve an independent homeland free
from Hindu domination, in the final analysis it is apparent that he could
not have failed to realise that such demonstrations would run the risk
of erupting into inter-communal warfare. Thus it would seem that
Jenkins was unduly harsh in principally condemning the Congress leaders
of the Punjab and the provincial Hindu press for the intensification of
ill-feeling between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities:
"The prominence given by the Hindu Press to what appears 
to be one-sided and exaggerated accounts of the dis­
turbances in East Bengal is wicked, and I am afraid that
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Congress and Mahasabha leaders are largely 
responsible for it. ”80
In reality spokesmen for both the Punjabi Hindus and Muslims gave vent to
their feelings by attempting to portray the opposite community in the
worst possible light. The Hindus accused the Muslims of Calcutta of
being entirely responsible for the killings which occurred there, whilst
Muslim opinion retaliated by attempting to implicate the Congress and the
Mahasabha in the massacre of Muslims in Bihar, claiming that it had been
organised by the Prime Minister of Bihar. The lesson, they declared, was
81clear - Muslims would be annihilated in a Hindu controlled India.
The prevailing atmosphere succoured both the Muslim League National
Guards and the Kashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh in the Punjab, the size of
each force had grown to 22,000 and ^6,000 respectively by the close of 
g2
19^6. As well as becoming stronger, both organisations increased in 
popularity, and they were more active and far more belligerent. A 
further symptom of the collapse of reason as an alternative to violence 
in the Province, was the increasingly militant student activity in the 
towns and cities, particularly Lahore, and the fact that their extreme 
behaviour was encouraged by their teachers "to whom age has given no 
wisdom". Student plans to organise 'Bihar Days' and 'NoakhqJLi Days' were £a  
made without restraint in the full knowledge that their execution would
D-Z
provoke excitement and possible violence. Only one spark was required 
to ignite the 'communal powder keg’. In his appreciation of the 
situation written in mid-November, Jenkins warned the Viceroy that the 
slightest incident would provoke serious disorders in the cities, and
8^that the grave danger existed of the trouble spreading to the villages.
As the religious communities in the Punjab approached the abyss of
internecine warfare the Governor determined to induce the Coalition
Government to face the situation responsibly. It proved a difficult
task, and was not accomplished without a certain amount of guile.
Jenkins was under no illusions that the Ministry was sorely inadequate
to face the challenge of communal violence. At the end of August he
wrote to the Viceroy that there was nothing in the Ministry's record to
suggest that it was capable of firmness,
"and unless it is determined (and appears) to be both 
firm and impartial, the administrative machine may well 
crumple up ... the Congress Ministers are still more 
interested in securing the release of law breakers of 
their own party ... and in sniping at officials generally, 
than in dealing with the very serious situation which now 
confronts them ... and my power to insist upon the action 
I believe to be necessary is limited."83
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Jenkins' concluding remark was borne out the following month when he
failed to persuade his Ministers to declare both the Muslim League
National Guards, and the Hashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh to be unlawful
associations, and to attempt to disperse them. His efforts were largely
frustrated by Qizilbash, who claimed that the two "private armies" were
too poorly organised to invite effective radical action being taken 
86against them. Faced with a weak and vacillating Cabinet, and anxious 
to prevent the Punjab's decline into chaos, Jenkins, without the knowledge 
of his Ministers, drafted the Punjab Public Safety Ordinance of 19^6.
Although he informed the Premier of his action, he refrained from dis-
87cussing it with him in detail.
By informing Khizar of the Ordinance's existence, Jenkins, by 
implication, revealed his intention to invoke it should the situation 
require it. It proved an astute manoeuvre, for as the prospect for 
communal disturbances increased, the Premier, supported by his minis­
terial colleagues, requested the Governor to promulgate the measure, in 
exercise of his special powers under the Government of India Act of 1935 
(sec. 89), in order to bypass the necessity of placing the measure 
before the Legislature. Jenkins was only too anxious to comply, as he 
believed that it would have been impossible to convert the Ordinance 
into an Act in the face of opposition from the Muslim League and extreme 
elements on the Government benches: "I had always intended to use
section 89» and it was fortunate that the Premier and his colleagues 
agreed with me.”^
The Ordinance, which came into force on 19 November 19^ -6, initially 
89had a sobering effect, in that it endowed the Ministry with drastic
powers to combat communal disturbances. In effect the Government could
order arrests without warrant, detain persons on suspicion, enforce its
control on educational institutions, control the press, prohibit drilling,
public meetings and processions, and order the banning of quasi-military
organisations, and the wearing, or display of military uniforms and
emblems. In relating the measure to the 'Press', MacDonald (Home Sec.,
Punjab Govt.) emphasised that all District Magistrates had been ordered
to use the special powers without hesitation or regard for the status of
90the offenders concerned. As if to emphasise that no one would be 
immune from the measure, the Governor personally interviewed Shaukat 
Hyat, and warned him to desist from making speeches which appeared to 
advocate the murder of the Premier. Jenkins cautioned the ex-Minister 
that the authorities would deal firmly with all leaders, Muslim and 
Hindu, who advocated violence, though he attempted to reassure him that
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91the Ordinance would not be used to suppress any political party.
In spite of the Governor’s assurance, and the insistence of the
Ministry voiced by Swaran Singh (succeeded Baldev Singh as Minister of
Development on the latter's appointment to the Interim Government) that
’’The emergency Ordinance is honestly meant to ensure 
civil liberties by maintaining peace and communal harmony, 
essential for [jthe[3 orderly national progress of the 
country at this critical juncture",
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and that it did not represent an anti-League manouevre, the Ministry 
foolishly used its new powers to intimidate League members. As a result 
a fresh wave of Muslim resentment was engendered against the Coalition,
and as Jenkins observed, allegations of unfairness, amounting at times to
93persecution, were common, "and I fear that some of them are true." One 
of the most glaring examples of the Ministry’s misuse of the Ordinance 
for purely political ends occurred in Dera Ghazi Khan in January 19^7• 
Both the Muslim League and the Unionist Party were contesting a by- 
election in the district (Dera Ghazi Khan North). Khizar, acting against 
the advice of the local Superintendent of Police and the District Magis­
trate, ordered a ban on all political meetings. The order was not, in
the opinion of the local officers, necessary for the maintenance of 
94
order, and was clearly intended to intimidate League supporters and
prevent visiting League speakers, including Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan,
95from appealing for Muslim support. ^ In addition local dignitaries, who
were known League supporters, were placed under arrest. Both the sons
of Nawab Jemal Khan Leghari (ex-Unionist Minister) were detained in this
manner, one of whom, Mohammad Khan, was an Honorary Magistrate. In
executing the Premier’s orders, Slater (District Officer, DGK) admitted
that the latter "may have been more active in the cause than was proper
for an Honorary Magistrate and a recipient, as his father's deputy, of
Government monies", but nevertheless he found the task distasteful,
particularly as he and the Nawab's son were on good terms:
"He was not surprised and may indeed have welcomed 
the opportunity to acquire political merit. We drank 
a glass of whisky together and off he went."9°
The interference and resultant intimidation ironically cost the Unionist
97candidate much support, and certainly contributed to the League
victory. The defeat of the Unionist Party incensed the Premier, and
caused him to further abuse his power, punishing his opponents through
the abolition of the jirga system and the withdrawal of magisterial
98powers from all the tumandars and their relatives.
It was totally unrealistic to expect honorary office holders, and 
recipients of Government grants to adopt a non-political posture,
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especially as that class had traditionally been involved in politics as
Unionist supporters, and as Khizar had refused to adopt a non-partisan
attitude in distributing land, jagirs and other rewards; the Premier
having consistently refused to award those who opposed him politically.^
Furthermore, the entire administrative sub-structure had been designed to
operate under an irremovable Government of the Imperial model. Below the
Legislature, the Ministry, and the Secretariat, there was no effective
organisation of independent local authorities which reflected broadly the
political opinion of the day. Local authorities, as such, were relatively
unimportant, and Government really operated at the district level through
permanent officials, and non-official assistants (e.g. members of the
National Home Front, Honorary Magistrates, Zaildars), many of whom held
honorary positions. This non-official element in particular had largely
failed to appreciate their position in light of the changed political
conditions wrought by democratisation, and they resented the interference
of the Premier that as a class they should refrain from criticising the
100Ministry, or supporting the Opposition.
The misuse of the Public Safety Ordinance, coupled with the refusal
of the Ministry to face the Assembly contributed to the widespread belief
amongst Muslims that the Ministry was determined to persecute Leaguers,
and deny them their democratic rights. When, therefore, the Government
ordered the banning of the Muslim League National Guards on 24 January
19^7, the Muslim leadership interpreted the action as proof of the
Coalition's intention to crush the Muslim League in the Province. The
ban, which also applied to the Hashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh, had long
101been urged by Jenkins, and the Government ostensibly took the action
because, in the light of the continued growth of communal tension which
had been intensified by the reports of Muslim brutality against Sikhs in
102the Hazara district of N.W.F.P., the existence of private armies posed 
a grave threat to the peace of the Province.10^
There is no doubt at all that both militant organisations were pre­
paring for armed conflict, intelligence reports revealed that they had 
both initiated training programmes for combat with knives and lathis,
and approximately 2,000 steel helmets were subsequently found in the
104
Muslim League National Guards headquarters in Lahore. The situation
clearly warranted firm handling, but the previous conduct of the Ministry
did not lend credence to the Premier's claim that it did not intend to
attack the Muslim League: "Nothing is further from the thought of my
Government ... and I wish to do everything I can to remove any such 
105misunderstanding." Whilst the evidence does suggest that the Premier 
had ordered the banning out of what he considered to be the Province's
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best interests, as both Jenkins and P.J. Patrick (Asst. Under-Secretary, 
India Office) at the India Office testified,1^  such firm resolve of 
following months of inactivity, and petty sniping at League supporters, 
failed to reassure, or appeal to the Muslim public. In addition the 
League leadership in the Province, determined to create the impression 
that the Government's real purpose was the destruction of the League, 
provoked the Ministry to take action against them. The issuing of the 
ban had been accompanied by a police search of the Muslim League National 
Guards' offices, which the provincial League leaders attempted to 
obstruct, thereby courting arrest.10*'7 Amongst those taken into custody 
were Feroz Khan Noon, Mian Iftikhar ud Din (former President of the 
Punjab Congress), Begum Shah Nawaz, the Nawab of Mamdot (President - 
Provincial Muslim League), Mumtaz Daultana (Sec., Provincial Muslim 
League), Syed Amir Hussain Shah (Provincial leader of the Muslim League 
National Guards) and Shaukat Hyat Khan. These detentions, though made 
unavoidable by the leaders' actions, appeared to substantiate the alle­
gation, voiced by Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar (Muslim League, Minister of 
Communications, Interim Government) and Amir Hussain Shah (man of private 
means, M.A. Punjab University, first general manager Pakistan Times), 
that the Coalition was determined to crush Muslim nationalism and con­
strain the civil liberties of the Muslim community.10^
In an effort to combat this propaganda, and to remove the impression 
amongst the Muslim community that the Ordinance was aimed specifically 
against the League, the Premier, following consultation with his cabinet 
colleagues, withdrew the declaration against the Muslim League National 
Guards and the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh, and ordered the release of 
the imprisoned Muslim Leaguers. In view of the prevailing communal 
tension, however, the Government declared its intention to retain the
powers guaranteed to it under the Ordinance, particularly with regard to
110public meetings and demonstrations. The withdrawal of the ban, how­
ever, was interpreted by the Provincial League leadership as a sign of 
Government weakness, and they determined to press their supposed 
advantage by demanding the cancellation of all restrictions, and the 
abrogation of the Ordinance, and by initiating a civil disobedience 
campaign to achieve these objectives, and thereby force a confrontation 
with the Government. Although the stance which the Provincial League 
leaders adopted was in keeping with the objectives of the All-India 
Muslim League Working Committee, passed in resolution form at Karachi on 
31 January 19^7* the decision to defy the Provincial Government had not 
occurred at Jinnah's instigation, though he approved of the action.111
325
The claims of Mamdot and Jinnah that the movement was not intended to
cause the fall of the Ministry by unconstitutional means, and was
112designed purely to defend Muslim civil liberties was a total fabri­
cation. Jinnah regarded it as an essential manoeuvre to deprive the
Coalition of the powers it received from the Ordinance, and to force it
113to seek alternative safeguards from the Legislature, thereby giving 
the Provincial League the opportunity to meet and possibly defeat the 
Government in the Assembly. The League clearly had abandoned, under 
extreme provocation, constitutional opposition in the Punjab, as Liaquat 
Ali Khan (General Sec., A.I. M.L., Finance Member - Interim Govt.) admitted in 
New Delhi on 13 March 19^7, when he observed that the civil disobedience 
campaign against the Punjab Ministry was "something new in India; the
1 1^ t
Muslim League has never done anything before by unconstitutional means."
The question of 'civil liberties' merely provided a convenient pretext to
rouse Muslim opinion against the Government. At the same time the
campaign represented the climax of Muslim resentment which had been
forming from the moment the Ministry took office. This was confirmed by
the admission of Nazim-ud-Din (ex-Premier, Bengal) to the Governor in
February 19^7» when he admitted that the 'civil liberties' issue was not
the real 'casus belli', the underlying grievance being the conduct of
115the Coalition Ministry since assuming power.
Even so, for the Ministry to have complied with the Provincial
League's demand would have amounted to its unconditional surrender, as
it would have deprived it of the power to act swiftly and effectively in
116an emergency, thereby increasing the danger for communal strife. The
intervention of the Governor, acting as an intermediary between Khizar
and Mamdot failed to persuade the Provincial League leadership to desist
from making the demand, or directing civil disobedience against the 
117Coalition. The Ministry correctly interpreted the refusal as marking
the beginning of a League campaign to secure its overthrow by exploiting
118the 'civil liberty' question, and by possible recourse to violence,
as was indicated by the anti-Government, pro-League agitation which broke
119out in Lahore on 28 January 19^7. Khizar, who had anticipated the 
challenge, delivered a 'premeditated' counter attack on the night of the 
28-29 January; all the important League leaders in Lahore, including 
Mamdot, Iftikar ud Din, Noon and Daultana, were seized and committed to 
detention centres outside the city, and a press stoppage was imposed on 
all news relating to the agitation. From the 29 to 31 January, wide­
spread disorders and demonstrations occurred, though there was no general 
recourse to violence, and no loss of control by the forces of Government.
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The removal of the Muslim League leaders and organisers, who had also
been arrested, combined with the concessions which had been granted in
respect of the Muslim League National Guards, acted initially to diffuse
120the situation and contain a possible widespread Muslim revolt. But in
the long run the Government’s tactics worked to its disadvantage, as they
appeared to confirm the claims of the Central League - which had been
widely circulated through the national press - that the Coalition was
121determined to smash the League organisation in the Punjab.
Thus the imprisonment of the League leaders did not mark the end of
the troubles, it heralded the beginning of a fairly widespread, though at
times despondent, Muslim movement. Although the great majority of the
Muslim middle class refrained from participating in the anti-government
demonstrations, the portrayal of the agitation by Congress Socialists as
"a suburban circus performance staged by ex-knights, their wives, sons 
122and nephews” was far from accurate. Even so the agitation was not as
successful as represented by the Muslim League, serious disturbances were
confined to only half-a-dozen districts - notably Lahore, Gujrat,
123Amritsar and Jullundur; ’’’Dawn”published a great many lies, and one 
American correspondent from Delhi was under the impression that at least 
half the police had mutinied and been arrested - a story which had no 
foundation at all!' In fact, in Jenkins’ opinion, it had been the ’’exemp­
lary conduct” of the police which had contributed to containing the 
12*fsituation.
The myth has persisted, however, that the movement by itself forced 
Khizar to meet the League's demands. Imran Ali has claimed, ’’The move­
ment succeeded in having the Public Safety Ordinance repealed to a large
125extent, and even in bringing down the Khizr Ministry." Neither of
these assertions is correct. Khizar's settlement with the League was
precipitated by the British decision (announced on 20 February, 19^7) to 
leave India in June 19^8 and not as a result of intimidation by the
League! In fact by mid-February 19^7 the Provincial League leadership
was divided over the question of maintaining the anti-government 
movement. Jenkins believed, with some justification, that they had over­
estimated their own strength, and underrated that of the Ministry, by 
assuming incorrectly that the British, and especially Muslim officials
and police, would not support a government which was opposed by the
126Muslim community. Noon and Mamdot, in particular, were anxious for a 
settlement on the terms offered by the Ministry. The latter had agreed 
to cancel certain of the bans in force relating to public meetings if 
the agitation were abandoned, though he had refused to consider the 
League’s request that he should submit the Ordinance for approval by the
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127Legislature. In an attempt to precipitate a League acceptance, Firoz
Khan Noon wrote to the Deputy Inspector General of Police (l4th or 15th
February) intimating that he and Mamdot were ready to accept the com- 
128promise. Acting on this correspondence Jenkins, in the role of inter­
mediary, visited the League leaders in Kasur gftfol, only to discover that 
Mamdot and Noon did not have the unanimous support of their Provincial 
League colleagues, and that they were powerless therefore to act without 
Jinnah*s sanction. It is apparent from Jenkins* account of the meeting 
that it was the intervention of Daultana which prevented Mamdot and Noon 
from committing themselves to an agreement. Daultana had demanded a 
meeting of the complete Council of Action, which had been formed in 
January 19^6 to direct the opposition to the Government, and following
the Premier's permission that it could meet at the gcibl, the Council had
129decided to seek the guidance of Jinnah. Mamdot, in pursuit of his
original intention, attempted to cajole the A.I.ML. leader into acquiescing
to a truce. On 22 February he informed Jinnah of Noon's approach to the
Deputy Inspector General of Police, stating that it had occurred without
his consent or knowledge. Whilst he half-heartedly assured Jinnah that
the Provincial League would continue the struggle should the latter order
it, he clearly wished Jinnah to agree to its suspension. Using Noon's
letter as a pretext, he argued that it had weakened the Provincial Leagjefe
position, and would certainly be used by the Premier to embarrass the
organisation should the negotiations fail: "We could carry on but for
this unfortunate incident." Also as a further inducement he opined to
Jinnah that the Premier would not agree to meet the Assembly, preferring
130a continuation of the confrontation.
Jinnah, however, was not moved by Mamdot*s arguments, which he sus­
pected arose from the sobering effects of detention:
"We must be firm and determined and take consequences, 
but we should not be a party to any compromise which is 
discreditable, in order to avoid further suffering, once 
having gone in for them."
He insisted, tactfully but firmly, that the Provincial League should
adhere to its original demands - the removal of the ban imposed on public
meetings and processions, the withdrawal of all restrictive measures on
political activities, the release of all detainees - supplemented with
the insistence that the Ordinance should be placed before the Legislative
Assembly:
"You and the prominent leaders of the Punjab started this 
movement and I think, rightly as it was becoming intolerable, 
especially when the Muslim National Guards organisation was 
declared unlawful ... it is for you now to come to a settlement
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which should be as honourable and as creditable not 
only so far as the Mussulmans of the Punjab are 
concerned but the All-India Muslim League ....
Honourable defeat, if it is to be, is bette?than a 
compromise which is discreditable...."
In addition Jinnah pointedly countered Mamdot's assertion that Khizar
would not agree to submit the Ordinance to the Legislature, stating,
"'it is a matter of very great principle and I cannot 
advise you to give it up because, now that you have 
raised this point, if you give it up, then it can only 
mean your acceptance on acquiescence in the present 
Ordinance rule continuing indefinitely ."‘13*1
This interchange of views between Mamdot and Jinnah which occurred
on 22 and 23 February 19^7, clearly demonstrated that neither expected
Khizar to submit. Their opinion was also shared by the Viceroy, who
only the day before the announcement of British intentions on 20 February
(see above) had informed the Secretary of State that: "I do not think
132the Punjab Government have any intention of capitulating." ^ Further­
more Jinnah had clearly decided to accept defeat in the matter, prefer­
ring it to compromise. In arriving at their personal estimations and 
conclusions, Jinnah, Mamdot and Wavell had been influenced by the 
situation prevailing in the Province, and had not allowed for the impact 
of the British declaration (to transfer power by June 19^ -8) on the Punjab
Premier. Even though the violence of the demonstrations had increased
133towards the end of February, the Provincial Government had never been 
in danger of losing control. The largely Muslim police force had 
remained loyal; the men, with very few exceptions, had stood up to the 
agitation, and as Jenkins recorded, they had never failed to obey orders, 
or to follow their officers when drastic action was required. The 
conduct of the force had never been in question, and the Inspector 
General of Police had assured the Premier that if he would sanction 
'drastic action' the agitation could be crushed within the space of 
approximately three weeks. It was the British announcement of 20 Feb­
ruary which restrained the Premier from acting on the advice of his Chief 
of Police. Initially Khizar had been inclined to regard the statement 
as nothing more than a "threat", but on being assured by Jenkins that it 
represented the British Government's firm intention, and that "it would
be most unsafe for him to act or plan on any assumption other than H.M.G.
13^ fmeant what they so clearly said", the Premier realised that further 
opposition to the League would be futile and dangerous. Even though he 
and the Governor believed that repressive measures could be successfully 
undertaken, though Jenkins personally favoured a negotiated settlemenl^ 
the Premier decided against repression, informing the Governor that it
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would not have facilitated the peaceful transfer of power at the end of
136the allotted sixteen month period. In essence the British had 
appeared to the 'loyalist* Premier as both a buffer and protector, as 
their presence had enabled him to resist and frustrate the League in the 
Punjab and to foster ambitions for an independent Punjabi Dominion, 
administered on the Unionist principle of multi-communal co-operation 
(see pp. 307-308). The prospect of imminent national independence, how­
ever, forced him to face reality, and accept the inevitable, that it was 
no longer practicable or wise to exclude the League from Provincial 
affairs. Having been thus persuaded to bring to an end the political 
isolation of the League, Khizar agreed to its terms, including the 
crucial demand that the Assembly should meet to consider the legislation
necessary to replace the Ordinance and to maintain the peace of the 
137Province.
The resignation of Khizar and the Coalition Ministry (3 March 19^7) 
followed the Premier's decision to end the confrontation with the League. 
Once again Khizar's action was a direct consequence of the 20 February 
announcement, and was not as a result of the Muslim agitation. The 
Muslim League, however, anxious to portray the collapse of the Coalition 
as the successful conclusion to their anti-Government movement, deliber­
ately nurtured the belief that their action was solely responsible for
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the event. Contemporary and recent commentators have been guilty of
perpetuating this misconception. Justice Muhammad Munir, in his report
to the Punjab Boundary Commission, claimed:
"Unable to cope with the agitation but on the pretext 
that in the intended transfer of power, the Muslim 
League Party ... should receive its share Sir Khizar 
Hayat Khan Tiwana resigned."^39
Similarly, Sardar Bahadur Mohan Singh, a former adviser to the Secretary
of State, informed P.J. Patrick in March 19*0 that the Premier had been
1*K)frightened out of office. In recent years, both Imran Ali (see above)
and Penderel Moon have recorded similar conclusions; the latter stating,
"The impotence of the Punjab Government in the face of a Muslim League
challenge was thus starkly revealed and on 3 March Khizar submitted his
1*f1Cabinet's resignation."
The Punjab Government, prompted by Jenkins' willingness to promul­
gate the Ordinance, did not exhibit impotence in meeting the League's 
challenge (see pp. 319-32*0. Khizar's decision to leave office, as 
Jenkins informed the Secretary of State and the Viceroy, on 2 March 19*+7i 
and as Khizar later admitted, resulted from his appreciation of the post- 
20 February situation. He accepted that the formation of a coalition
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Government, including the Muslim League, was essential for the safety and
peace of the Punjab, and he believed that it could not be achieved if the
Unionist bloc continued to act as a buffer between the League and the 
1k2minority parties. Before his resignation he had continually warned 
the Government that in the Punjab parliamentary majorities were of little 
importance, and that what really mattered was the strength of the "sanc­
tions" behind a Ministry, and that no Government could be stable unless
1^3it commanded the allegiance of a majority in each of the major communities.
In spite of this appreciation, however, up until 20 February Khizar had
been prepared to carry on. The British decision to quit India demolished
that resolve and totally disillusioned the Premier. The "bombshell" as
1he called it, had caught him totally unawares, and he bitterly
resented the decision, which he considered to be the "work of lunatics".
Khizar, by breeding and inclination,was essentially an Empire loyalist,
and he could not conceive of playing a rfcle in any situation in which the
British did not hold the balance of power. Those who knew him recognised
these sentiments, and attempted to exploit them in order to induce his
resignation in order to pave the way for the League’s assumption of power.
On 2k February 19^7 Maqbool Mahmud (former Unionist M.L.A.), claiming
the privilege of an old friend, exhorted the Premier to resign:
"there are occasions when you must force circumstances.
Such a situation has now hached [[sic]]. This is the zero 
hour. Attlees [^sic^ statement gives you the opportunity.
Seize it. Smaller persons might hesitate. You are big 
enough, I know ... Settlement of Punjab League tangle is 
a step in the right direction. Turn it to a bigger account.
... A big gesture is needed ... Do not hesitate. Help to 
bring in the League in office with Congress or even other­
wise ... Attlees [jsic]] statement adds to your responsibility 
to Moslims & to Punjab... . " ^ 6
The Congress High Command were naturally dismayed by Khizar’s 
decision, for it spelt the end of Congress participation in the adminis­
tration of the Province, and they attempted to exploit the situation to 
their own advantage, by denying that the retirement of the Premier had 
been precipitated by his acceptance of the urgent necessity to include 
the League in the Government of the Punjab,by blaming the Governor for 
his actions. Dewan Chaman Lall (Congress leader, M.L.A. 1937-19^). 
informed Nehru that Jenkins had attempted to persuade the Premier to
join the League, in order to form a more stable Ministry in the Province,
1 k7and that Khizar, rather than follow the advice, had preferred to resign.
Whilst it is a fact that Jenkins considered that "The situation might
have been saved by a genuine coalition between the Muslim League on the
q if 8
one hand and the Congress or the Panthic party on the other", there
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is no evidence to support Chaman Lall's accusation. The allegation was
1 ^ 9strongly denied by Abell (Private Secretary to Ithe Viceroy) and the
Viceroy, who stated "that he knows it to be quite untrue that the Governor
15Qbrought any pressure on Malik Khizar Hyat Khan to join the Muslim League."
151Despite this denial, which was conveyed to Nehru by Abell, the Hindu­
stan Times echoed Chaman Lall^ claim, stating that the situation had not 
merited the resignation of the Cabinet, and therefore by inference that
Muslim League participation in the Provincial administration was not 
152essential. The Statesman, in particular, emphasised this theme when
it opined that it was an extraordinary event that an administration
"supported by a Nationalist Coalition which is still in a 
majority should be dissolved and attempts should be made 
to set up an administration of a purely communal character 
which by itself does not commend Qsic^J a majority."^53
The real anxiety behind the Congress objections was that if the League
succeeded in forming a Ministry, it would use the advantage afforded to
it to seize the whole of the Punjab for 'Pakistan'. This was revealed by
Nehru who explaining to the Viceroy the basis of Hindu and Sikh fears
noted,
"This apprehension and conflict are obviously due to the 
fact that the Muslim League openly want to make the whole 
of the Punjab a Pakistan area and wish to use a League 
Ministry to that end."15**
Jenkins had charged Mamdot on 3 March 19*+7 with the responsibility 
of forming a Ministry, having advised him to seek an understanding with 
the Hindus and Sikhs, as any administration which did not have the 
support of those communities could not survive. In spite of this advice, 
however, the Governor initially was prepared to accept a League Govern­
ment regardless of its composition in the hope that it would prompt the
League to seek a rapprochement with the other major parties, particularly 
155
the Sikhs. Consequently he advised the Viceroy that even if the 
League was able to secure the support of only the Scheduled Caste and 
Anglo-Indian representatives in the Assembly, it should be allowed to 
assume responsibility, though failing a Hindu and Sikh inclusion, he 
recognised that a situation in which 'Governor's Rule' (section 93) 
would have to be imposed would not be long delayed, as there would be an
156immediate and possibly violent reaction by the Sikhs.
Jenkins proposal concurred with the views of both the Viceroy and 
the Secretary of State. Wavell instructed Jenkins to proceed along the 
lines which he had indicated; Turnbull (Asst. Secretary Political 
Department) at the India Office noting that if the League could form a 
Ministry which:
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"commands or has a chance of commanding a majority, 
they must surely be put into office and kept there 
until voted out by the Legislature or until an
impossible law and order situation has arisen.’1,157
These sentiments had been conveyed to the Viceroy by Pethick-Lawrence
158(Secretary of State for India) on 5 March. The collective decision to
support the Governor and permit the League to assume control in the Punjab,
reflected the British determination to avoid any accusations of partiality
159being levelled at them by the League, ' for as Abell noted, if the League
was denied the opportunity to govern in the Punjab, "They will claim that
they are being robbed by a British-Congress alliance of the power to which
1 fin
they are entitled as the majority community." Both Abell and Turnbull
in reaching their conclusions agreed with Jenkins, that if the League
assumed control with only the support of insignificant minority elements,
a declaration of section 93 would be inevitable. Thus the British
clearly desired that any League failure to hold office in the Punjab
should reflect the League's inability to secure the co-operatam dfthe other
major communities, rather than appearing to be the consequence of British
designs to frustrate Muslim ambitions.
On the same day (5 March) that the Secretary of State had informed
the Viceroy of his approval for a League Government, Jenkins abandoned
his original posture, insisting that the League should only be permitted
to assume office if it could provide proof that it would command a stable
Ministry, which from necessity would have to include Sikh and Hindu
support. In arriving at this 'volte face' Jenkins had reacted to the
degree of anti-League feeling which greeted the prospects of a Muslim
government, and the implications it posed for the paramount power should
civil strife occur. On the evening of 3 March both the Congress and the
Panthic Sikhs had held a large meeting in Lahore, at which extremely
violent anti-League speeches had been delivered, whilst on 4 March
163noting had broken out in the city. Jenkins, as a consequence of
these developments, believed that if the League was installed it would
precipitate a communal war spearheaded by a Sikh rising supported by the
Hindus, and that if that situation arose, then he as the Governor,
together with the police and the army would be compelled to support the
Muslim League, as the current Government, in what would amount to a
'civil war* for possession of the Punjab. In order to prevent such an
occurrence the Governor now urged the Viceroy to sanction the imposition 
164of Section 93* In soliciting Wavell's approval for 'Governor's Rule', 
Jenkins revealed that Mamdot had failed to substantiate his claim to 
possess a parliamentary majority as all but one of the Muslim Unionists
331
whose support he had cited were unlikely to join the League, and that as
a result it appeared that only one non-League Muslim and two Scheduled
165Caste members would support the League.
Jenkins' revised appreciation of the situation, particularly his 
repudiation of Mamdot's profession of control in the Assembly, persuaded 
Wavell to reluctantly agree to 'Governor's Rule’, on the understanding
166that every endeavour would be made to secure a coalition in the Province. 
The Government of India was clearly dismayed at the declaration of Section 
93 in the Province, and the belief still persisted in some quarters that 
if the League had been, or was given the opportunity to govern the Punjab, 
it would be conducive to a Muslim - non-Muslim rapprochement. Abell 
argued that the League should still be given the responsibility of forming 
a Government, though it would be necessary to temper the invitation with 
the warning that the Province would not be allowed to dissolve into dis­
order, and that to prevent such an occurrence the Governor would assume 
control if necessary. Such a proviso according to Abell would tempt the 
League to form a multi-communal coalition, as it clearly needed non-Muslim 
support in order to rule the whole of the Punjab, failing which it would 
face the alternative of controlling only the Muslim majority districts?^ 
In the face of Jenkins' warning, however, and the effect which it had on 
India Office policy, Abell's theory was never put into practice. Turn­
bull, who had previously supported the idea of allowing the League to 
assume office, even if it lacked Hindu and Sikh support (see above), 
completely revised his stand. As a result he considered that to promote 
the type of compromise envisaged by Abell would involve too great a risk 
as it would court a Sikh-Hindu rebellion, and thereby create a crisis at 
the centre, should the League seek military assistance to crush the
168revolt. The Secretary of State, acting on Jenkins and Turnbull's
interpretation of the situation, echoed the latter's sentiments, when on
7 March he informed the Viceroy that he considered Governor's Rule
preferable to a League Ministry possessing a majority, but which failed
to include a genuine representative of at least one of the important
minority parties, for if the British became involved in supporting the
Muslim League in the suppression of a Hindu-Sikh revolt "is it not
likely that serious situation would arise at once between yourself and
169your Government over use of troops for this purpose."
Thus as a result of Jenkins’ apprehension, and the misgivings which 
it fostered, particularly at the India Office, the door was firmly closed 
on the possibility of the League assuming office, even if it had enjoyed 
a small majority exclusive of Hindus and Sikhs. Though Jenkins continued
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to maintain that the League had never possessed a majority,League
leaders interpreted the Governor's action as partial, and encouraged the
belief that its purpose was to deliberately deprive the organisation of
171power in the Punjab. There is no doubt that Jenkins personally was
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opposed to the idea of'Pakistan1, and the possible partition of the Punjab.
In addition he believed, following discussions with Noon and Daultana,
that the League's determination to assume control originated not from the
local Muslim leaders, who were extremely apprehensive about the Sikh
reaction to such a move, but resulted from Jinnah's strategy to use a
League Government to lay claim to the entire Province for*Pakistan1,1^
and his total control over his provincial minions who "will act under
instructions from Jinnah who knows little and cares less about the real
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interests of the Punjab." Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the 
Governor's decision to oppose a League Government, though it may have 
reflected these views, arose primarily from his desire to prevent a civil 
war between the M^lim and non-Muslim communities, which would have necessi­
tated British intervention. Also the League in conducting an extreme 
religiously orientated election campaign, and by resorting to agitation 
to oppose the Coalition Ministry, had seriously prejudiced its own pros­
pects for assuming power in the Punjab.
Whilst the League's movement had not precipitated violence between
175
the communities, it had been decidedly communal in character as both 
Muslims and non-Muslims believed that its objective was the establishment 
of a 'Muslim Raj'; the latter had not relished boasts about the impending 
establishment of Muslim rule, nor had they appreciated having their cars 
forcibly decorated with Muslim League f l a g s . H i n d u  and Sikh senti­
ments had been further outraged by the celebration of 'Victory Day' by 
the League to mark the settlement with the Coalition, for as the Chief 
Secretary (Punjab Govt.) remarked,
"in affording evidence of Muslim solidarity and 
arrogance, they [[Muslims] intensified the fears and 
hatred of the other communities and increased their 
determination not to be subjected to unwanted 
domination."177
In view of the total commitment by the League to 'Pakistan?, and the 
reaction which it evoked from Hindu and Sikh alike, no real basis 
existed for compromise between the communities. Even so the Provincial 
League in maintaining its quest to form a provincial administration 
attempted to entice Sikh co-operation through an offer of near parity in 
an envisaged Muslim-Sikh Cabinet (five Sikh seats in a Cabinet of 11).
The initiative, however, was rejected by the Sikh leadership, as it 
remained convinced that the League was intent on seizing the whole of the
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Province, thereby placing the rights of the minority communities in 
178jeopardy. The fears and suspicions held by the Akali leaders, includ­
ing Master Tara Singh and Swaraj Singh, were fully shared by the Congress 
leadership. Their total abhorrence to the prospect of League control had 
been expressed by Gopi Chand Bhargava in February 19^7* when he had urged 
Khizar to use all the force at his command to crush the anti-Government 
movement:
"The events of [the) past few months show that the League 
is trying to overawe the minorities by adopting Fascist 
methods ... Pakistan has not been defined by Qaid-i- 
azam. If this what we see is foretaste of it, it shall 
be resisted even at cost of life. Therefore 2 courses 
are open to you. Either suppress this with all force 
at your command ... Or allow us to take law into our 
hands and protect ourselves."^79
Furthermore on 9 March the Working Committee of the All India Congress
Committee expressed its total opposition to Muslim designs on the Punjab,
and thereby the notion of League-Congress collaboration in the Province,
by demanding, in resolution form, the partition of the territory. The
resolution was accompanied by a joint Congress-Akali statement, which
effectively voiced the mutual determination of both parties to shun the
League and oppose its national goal:
"In no circumstances are we willing to give the slightest 
assurance or support to the Muslim League in the formation 
of a Ministry, as we are opposed to Pakistan in any shape 
or form."^ °0
The entry of the All-India National Congress into the provincial 
arena in this way was symbolic of the fact that there could be no settle­
ment of the provincial situation, unless accompanied by agreement at the 
"181national level. The prospects for such an occurrence were remote, as
*1 82Jinnah continued to demand a 'Pakistan' which remained undefined, but 
which was accepted to envisage the absorption of the Punjab, a Province 
which the Congress refused to concede in its entirety. The dispute 
could not fail to have serious communal repercussions in the Punjab.
The stage was set, the birth or abortion of 'Pakistan' would necessitate 
the rupture of the Punjab womb, and Muslim and non-Muslim alike, intoxi­
cated with communal fears, prejudices and jealousies, were prepared to 
spill blood to achieve their respective ends.
The riots and communal clashes, which began on 4 March 19^7 and 
continued until the following August, began as an anti-League protest by 
Hindus and Sikhs determined that there should be no League Government in
the Province. The Muslim community retaliated, determined to plunge the
'1
Punjab into civil war if necessary, to secure domination. Thus the 
disturbances were initiated by the communities against each other in the
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presence of an administration which was to transfer power to an undeclared 
successor not later than June 19^8, the object of each group being to 
secure a more favourable position for their community when Britain sur­
rendered responsibility. This was apparent from the fact that in the 
Rawalpindi Division the underlying idea was to eliminate the non-Muslim
'fifth column', whilst in Lahore Muslims desired to purge the district of
18*+the non-Muslim element in the population. As Jenkins reflected in
analysing the conflict in August 19^7,
"We are faced not with an ordinary exhibition of political 
or communal violence, but with a struggle between the 
communities for the power which we are shortly to abandon.
Normal standards cannot be applied to this communal war 
of succession. . "^85
The battle for the Punjab served the purpose of the national 
politicians of every major complexion, even though all were unanimous in 
their condemnation of violence, but their actions encouraged, rather than 
dissuaded, its continuance. Broadly speaking the League interpreted the 
Hindu and Sikh atrocities as a movement designed to prevent their demo­
cratic right to rule the Province, whilst the Congress and the Sikh 
parties regarded Muslim excesses as conclusive proof that non-Muslims 
could not tolerate Pakistani rule. Whilst the internecine conflict was 
waged, Nehru, Patel (leading national Congress figure, regarded as the 
'strong man' of the movement), and Baldev Singh visited the Punjab as 
members of the Central Government. In reality, of the three only Nehru 
behaved responsibly, thougi to the best of Jenkins' knowledge not one of them 
made any contact of importance with Muslims:
"Nehru was balanced and sensible; but Baldev Singh on 
at least two occasions went in for most violent communal 
publicity, and Patel's visit to Gurgaon was used to make 
it appear that the Hindus in that district were the 
victims of Muslim aggression, whereas broadly the contrary 
was the case. Similarly when Liaqat Ali Khan or Ghazanfar 
Ali Khan visited the Punjab, they did so not to assist the 
administration, but to assist the Muslims."186
Whilst it is apparent that these national figures, and Mamdot and Sachar
did not personally publicly incite murder and arson, certain local
leaders encouraged violence. The Sikh leaders, particularly Master Tara
Singh,whipped Sikh feeling to a fever pitch and Akali regiments were
187raised in preparation for a defensive attack upon Muslims, and
Shaukat Hyat, in order to curry favour with the Muslim farmers of
Lyallpur, actively encouraged them to take revenge on those Sikh farmers
188who remained in their midst. Also the actual campaigns of violence 
were directed and controlled by men connected with the major party 
organisations, and were in receipt of funds to pursue their respective
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189ends. x The Governor was convinced that,
"■there is very little doubt that the disturbances 
have in some degree been organised and paid for by- 
persons or bodies directly or indirectly under the 
control of the Muslim League, the Congress, and the 
Akali party."190
In addition recruitment to the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh, the Muslim
League National Guards, and the Akal Sena had been maintained, and
although by May 19^7 none of the organisations had been equipped with 
191modern weapons, their continued existence did not suggest that they were
merely expected to fulfil a spectator r8le; there was strong evidence
implicating the Swayam Sewak Sangh as the instigator behind the Hindu 
192excesses.
Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that the joint appeal 
issued by Gandhi and Jinnah in April 19^7 for a cessation of the inter­
necine strife, was discounted as being insincere, for as Akhter Hussain 
(Chief Sec., Punjab Govt.) reported:
"The joint appeal ... has not brought about the 
improvement for which so many fervently hoped. This 
is due to the unfortunate fact that many felt that one 
or both had been persuaded to a line of combined action 
which neither individually would have prompted ...
|_these doubts^] might have been overcome if the provincial 
followers of the principals had acted in a way which 
provided practical acceptance of the published wishes of 
the leaders."^93
It was not until the following June that the Province’s communal leaders
- Mamdot, Sachar and Swaram Singh - agreed under pressure from the
Governor, to co-operate in stopping the troubles, but none of them went
further than uttering pious statements, and no real effort was made,
either through private pressure, or the withholding of funds, to end the 
19*fconflagration.
Moreover the Punjabi leaders' attitude was really an extension of 
the political temper which had gripped the respective communities - 
reason having been submerged in a wave of communal hatred. Compromise 
was neither genuinely sought nor desired, as was reflected by the 
provincial press. The entire Hindu press, including the People, Hindu 
and Milap, was clamouring for partition, whilst extremist Hindu and Sikh 
publications (notably Ranjit, Khalsa Sewak and Sakh Jiwan) openly 
preached violent opposition to Pakistan. In retaliation the Muslim press 
(notably Dawn and the Eastern Times) united in its condemnation of the 
proposed division of the Punjab, and neither the Muslim or non-Muslim 
media was prepared to endorse Gandhi and Jinnah's plea for moderation, 
and forego the inherent urge of sniping at their opposite numbers, or to
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make political capital from the move. Hindu and Sikh newspapers rejected 
Jinnah*s stance as insincere, arguing that he had refrained from abandon­
ing similar agitation in Assam and N.W.F.P., and the League press which
received the appeal with some favour, could nevertheless resist using it
195sis a propaganda lever for the two-nation theory.
In such an atmosphere the protagonists of all persuasions reached 
for knives, rather than reason. Terrible atrocities were committed by 
all communities. The massacre by Muslims of non-Muslims in the districts
of Attock, Jhelum and Multan in March 1947 was answered by the retaliatory
196slaughter of Muslims in Gurgaon in May. The plight of refugees seeking
sanctuary amongst their co-religionists, helped to spread the tales of
horror, increasing the anger, and the desire for revenge on the opposite 
197communities. Whole villages entered the carnage, which as Williams
(I.G.S. officer, served in Punjab ±932.-47) recalled was made all the more
effective, and thereby terrible, due to the sporadic involvement of
serving army officers (Indian) who responding to their inherent communal
instincts, directed the slaughter:
"In the countryside the entire religious community of 
one village would take part in the wholesale slaughter 
of those of an opposite religion, and cases were known 
of Indian army officers on leave organising mass attacks 
of this kind."I98
By August 1947* following six months of communal warfare, the Governor
estimated that 5*000 persons had been killed and 3*000 seriously injured,
cfthe latter 1,200 and 1,500 respectively were Muslims and non-Muslims. In
respect of the damage done to property no accurate estimate was made,
but in Lahore the Deputy Commissioner assessed that up to 28 July 19^7*
of the 20,256 h o u s e s , 1,120 (5»5%) had been destroyed, whilst outside
200
the walled city, of the 50*519 dwellings, 225 (0.4%) had been levelled.
When national and provincial leaders did intervene, it was purely 
to attempt to secure political advantage. On 10 March Nehru suggested 
to Wavell that tranquility in the Punjab might be restored by the inaugu­
ration of two Ministries - one for the western, the other for the eastern 
part of the Province. The Congress leader claimed, quite unconvincingly,
that the measure was not intended to prejudice the partition issue, but
201merely to facilitate the continuance of the administration. The
shallowness of the ploy was immediately recognised by Wavell*s advisors,
Abell cautioned that the Muslim League would strongly object to such a
proposal "which is based on the Congress claim that the non-Muslim areas
202of the Punjab (and of Bengal) must be kept from Muslim domination." 
Nehru's advice was rejected on these grounds, and because the scheme was 
not practicable, as it was not considered appropriate at the time
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to divide the police force into two separate groups with allegiances to 
two governments, and as the work of Central Departments, e.g. Irrigation, 
Buildings and Roads, and Agriculture could not be re-organised quickly 
on a regional basis.
In contrast to Nehru's initiative, Raja Ghazanfar Ali, determined 
that the partition of the Punjab should not occur, requested a fresh 
general election to establish beyond doubt the League's claim to the 
entire Province, in the belief that a majority League Ministry would 
emerge. His views, however, were not received with enthusiasm by some of 
his provincial colleagues or the Governor. Both Daultana and Mamdot 
appeared to be resigned to acceptance of the fact that a League Govern­
ment would be unable to function in the face of non-Muslim agitation,
20bespecially on the part of the Sikhs. Although it was accepted by the
Governor's staff that there was little doubt that an election would result
in the League capturing approximately ninety seats, and thereby control 
205of the Assembly, Jenkins rejected Ghazanfar Ali's plea on the grounds 
that it would precipitate further bloodshed, and that following the out­
break of the disorders and atrocities "neither I nor any other British 
officer..." would have anything to do with a purely communal Ministry.
The new Viceroy (Mountbatten succeeded Wavell on 2b March 19^7) whom the 
Raja had also petitioned, endorsed the Governor's decision. Mountbatten 
regarded the Province, with its large minority populations, as a micro­
cosm of the Indian problem, and he informed Ghazanfar Ali that he had no
intention of prejudicing the issue of India as a whole, by giving a
207precipitate decision over the Punjab.
The rebuttal which the League received intensified rather than 
diminished Jinnah's determination to install a League Ministry in the 
Province. Mamdot, acting under the latter's instructions, and against 
his own apparent convictions (see above), persistently petitioned the 
Governor in April and May to be allowed to form an administration on the 
grounds that the League possessed a parliamentary majority. The move was 
intended to establish League domination in the Province on a constitution­
al and democratic basis to use the forces which would be at its command
to combat the non-Muslim opposition and so strengthen the negotiating
2oS
power of Jinnah at the national level. Jenkins remained determined 
that the League should be deprived of the opportunity to establish its 
will in the Province believing that it would cause an escalation of the 
violence. In expressing his views to Mountbatten, Jenkins again 
emphasised the implications the installation of a League Ministry would 
have for British personnel. He reported that the non-Muslims were
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concerned, with some justification, that not only would Mamdot use the 
police and armed troops, which would be at his disposal, to crush them, 
but that he would withdraw the criminal proceedings which were pending 
against Muslims accused of committing atrocities in the Rawalpindi 
Division and Multan, Consequently the civil services would divide along 
communal lines, and the task of British officials operating in civil war 
conditions would become impossible, which the Governor considered would 
result in a number of them, including several senior police officers, 
resigning. In seeking Mountbatten*s approval to refuse the League's 
request, Jenkins further urged the Viceroy to consider the effect which 
internecine strife between a League Ministry and non-Muslim opponents 
would have on the national negotiations pending between himself and the 
national leaders. If the Viceroy agreed, Jenkins proposed opposing 
Mamdot's claim on the grounds that a multi-communal administration was 
necessary to meet the Provisions of the 1933 Government of India Act 
(that the major communities should be represented in the Ministry).
Though Jenkins continued to doubt Mamdot's ability to control a majority 
in the Assembly, he considered that it would be tactically wrong to 
oppose him on that point, as by so doing he would automatically commit 
himself to accepting a communal Ministry if the existence of a majority 
was proved. Also Jenkins further requested Mountbatten to attempt to 
secure Jinnah's concurrence, in order to diffuse the tension in the
209Province.
210
Mountbatten agreed completely with the Governor's suggested strategy,
and on 26 April, during a meeting with Jinnah, the Viceroy informed the
211Muslim leader that Mamdot*s request would be rejected. Mountbatten 
reiterated Jenkins’ argument that the immediate outcome of the League 
assuming office would be further civil strife, and he reinforced the 
warning by revealing that both Tara Singh and Kartar Singh had given him 
the impression that a League Ministry would face armed opposition from 
the Sikhs. Furthermore the Viceroy counselled that it would be irres­
ponsible to precipitate further violence in the Punjab at a time when
official discussions were in progress concerning the transfer of power, 
particularly in view of "the great probability that Pakistan would 
emerge with a partition of the Punjab", and as such it would be pointless
to impose a government on the Province, which would be resisted at the
cost of bloodshed, merely to permit a Muslim League Ministry to operate 
for only a brief period. In seeking, without success, Jinnah*s 
acceptance of the argument, Mountbatten concluded:
"One day you will be thankful to me for saving you from
getting into this mess that you would like to get into
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in the Punjab; it is mainly in the interests of 
the Muslim League that I am making this decision, 
and I am sorry not to have your a g r e e m e n t . 2
It was a naive and deceptive explanation with which to confront
Jinnah. Mountbatten possessed an antipathy towards the Muslim leader,
whom he considered to be mentally deranged:
"I regard Jinnah as a psychopathic case; in fact 
until I had met him I would not have thought it 
possible that a man with such a complete lack of 
administrative knowledge or sense of responsibility 
could achieve or hold down so powerful a position."^3
Also the Viceroy's concern for the League was minimal, if it existed at
all, his primary motivation not unnaturally was to commit no act which
would involve British troops in a confrontation between a majority League
Ministry and non-Muslim Punjabis, and to avoid a further escalation of
the violence, which could have destroyed the possibility of a peaceful
British withdrawal from India. If Jinnah had endorsed the Viceroy's
declared intentions in opposing a League Ministry in the Punjab, he would
have given, in effect, his tacit approval for the division of the
Province, having publicly determined to oppose it. As a result the
Provincial League, acting in accordance with Jinnah's wishes, refused to
abandon its ministerial ambitions and continued to seek office, though
in view of what Mountbatten had told him, Jinnah could have been in no
doubt that Mamdot would not be successful. Nevertheless a united Punjab
remained a vital bargaining counter, not to be lightly discarded. In
the Province the apparent British reluctance to permit the League to
enjoy its democratic rights, combined with the insistence of the League
leadership to be granted office, maintained the tempo of the agitation
by increasing Muslim frustration and bitterness, as it was widely though
incorrectly believed that British policy reflected the anti-Muslim bias
of Jenkins, who desired, in the words of Liaquat Ali Khan, to "suppress",
21*+"intimidate" and "coerce" Muslims. It was an unfair and groundless 
denunciation of the Governor, for Jenkins had responded to the situation 
out of concern for the Punjab and British interests, in that he desired 
to contain the violence and loss of life, and prevent if possible British
personnel abandoning their non-partisan stance, as they would have been
215
forced to do, had a League administration faced rebellion (see pp.329-332) 
In order to achieve his objectives, however, it had been necessary to 
frustrate the League's political ambitions, and in the tense and violent 
atmosphere which prevailed in the Punjab from March 19^7 onwards, the 
Governor's stance was seen as partisan and anti-Muslim, and as such 
appeared to merit extreme resistance.
3^0
The Muslim desire to rule the Punjab as a prerequisite to its total 
absorption into1 Pakistan', and the non-Muslim determination, intensified 
by the Rawalpindi massacres which had occurred in March l9*+7,21^ to 
resist such domination at all costs presented the British (now desperately 
and sincerely attempting to extricate themselves from India) with a 
potentially explosive dilemma. In view of the highly inflammable atmos­
phere prevailing in the Province, the continued existence of a united
Punjab had become a liability which the British were no longer prepared
to countenance, as any settlement conceding the whole of the Province to 
'Pakistan'would have plunged the territory, and possibly India, into civil 
war, thereby preventing a peaceful British withdrawal from the sub­
continent. Both Nehru and Gandhi had accepted early in 19*f6 that 
'Pakistan' would become a reality, but both insisted'that its "birth 
would not be at the expense of Hindu dominated areas. Nehru had admitted 
to Woodrow Wyatt on 10 January 19*+6 that he believed that the British
Government would be forced to concede 'Pakistan', but that there would have
to be territorial readjustments to prevent the absorption of Hindu 
districts by the Muslim State. If such a concession was not granted, 
then Nehru warned that the Government of India would face a Congress 
mass movement which would eclipse all of its predecessors.2^  Similarly 
Gandhi, in a conversation with,Abell in March 19*f6, had opined that 
'Pakistan's boundaries could include only genuine Muslim areas.2^  Even 
Jinnah accepted that in view of Congress opposition, 'Pakistan' would 
never include the whole of Bengal or the Punjab, but he was careful not 
to publicise his opinions. In a private meeting with Wyatt in early 
February 19*+6, he told the M.P. that he was resigned to the exclusion of
the Burdwan Division of Bengal, but that he was determined to secure 
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Calcutta, and in the same month the Aga Khan confided to Wavell that 
the League leader was prepared to concede Amritsar and Ambala in the 
Punjab,
Jinnah's public attitude, however, hardened considerably following 
the League’s sweeping victories at the polls, and the British declaration 
that independence would be granted in June 19*+8. The Muslim electorate 
and masses had been encouraged to believe that 'Pakistan' would include 
large non-Muslim areas, and it became incumbent upon Jinnah to attempt 
to realise their expectations, even though they differed from his own. 
Jinnah, who was a superb negotiator, knew that it would be sheer folly 
to concede too much too soon, if he was to achieve any measure of 
success in countering Congress objections. Nevertheless his private 
utterances proved a grave error, for they created the impression amongst
3*+l
the British that he would accept far less than his public posturing 
221suggested. This belief was further enhanced by an unguarded plea
which Jinnah made to Wavell in November 19*+6: "He thought we should give
them their own bit of country, let it be as small as we liked, but it
222must be their own, and they would live on one meal a day."
Thus it was Jinnah's apparent willingness to make concessions, com­
bined with Congress and Sikh opposition to the inclusion of non-Muslim 
areas, and their determination to violently oppose absorption by 'Pakistan1, 
which helped to spawn Partition. Nevertheless great bitterness still 
exists among many Pakistanis who insist that the division of the Punjab 
and Bengal resulted from a concentrated Congress-British intrigue to 
cripple the new nation at birth. Unfortunately this belief has received 
great impetus from the pro-Congress sentiments of the last Viceroy, and 
the fact that as a private citizen following his retirement from public 
affairs, he did not attempt to conceal the contempt he felt towards 
Jinnah. Also it is a view which Campbell-Johnson's sycophantic exercise 
of glorification, Mission with Mountbatten, has encouraged. The author's 
portrayal of Jinnah's coldness and aloofness in his relationship with 
Mountbatten, is in marked contrast to the warmth and affection which 
Campbell-Johnson stresses existed between the Viceroy and Gandhi. In
addition, the narrative contains scornful references designed to
225belittle the Muslim leader.
Jenkins, in the belief that the division of the Punjab would be a
social and economic disaster, had hoped to elicit support for an initiative
to produce a truly representative multi-communal Government for the
Province, in order to replace Section 931 &nd to avoid the Province's 
22*+break-up, but his endeavours were doomed to failure. His conception
of the Punjab's political requirements was totally out of step with the
communal temper of the times, the declared wishes of the Sikhs and the
Congress, the expectations of the Viceroy, at least one of his senior
advisors, and of the senior officials at the India Office. On 11 March
19^7 Baldev Singh had impressed upon Wavell the necessity of dividing
the Punjab in order to create a new province "embracing the contiguous
area where non-Muslims form a clear majority as a whole and have larger
225property interests". Following meetings between Sikh leaders and 
Nehru in Lahore in the second week of March 19^7, the Congress adopted 
the Sikh demand in resolution form, though as is evident from the
opinions expressed by Nehru and Gandhi in the opening months of 19*^ 6
(see above) Mountbatten was wrong to conclude in June 19*+7 that the
Congress action had been precipitated "mainly at the request of the Sikh
3*+2
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community..." In fact the actions of both the Congress and the
Sikhs represented a response to the overwhelming Provincial League
victory at the polls, and its insistence that 'Pakistan* should include
the whole territory. The League success also convinced Menon (Reforms
Secretary, Govt, of India) that partition was inevitable,22*^ and it was
a view with which Wavell concurred. Similarly, the consensus of opinion
at the India Office favoured partition, in that it afforded Britain the
least dangerous option. Turnbull, whilst he considered Jenkins' desire
to maintain the unity of the Province was no doubt right for the Punjab,
nevertheless refused to support it as
"this matter is a crucial issue in the all-India 
situation and ought to be viewed in that light and in 
the light of H.K.G.'s policy. So viewed I think that 
partition is the only w a y . "228
Turnbull was broadly supported by Patrick (Asst. Under Sec. of State)f29
and Monteath (Permanent Under Sec. of State); the latter strongly
recommended the formulation of a scheme for the separation of the
Punjab on the supposition that it was an 'inevitable feature' of the
all-India problem of handing responsibility to more than one authority?-'50
Only one of their senior colleagues dissented. Croft (Deputy Under Sec.
of State) regarded the move as premature, favouring the preservation of 
251a united Punjab. ^
Croft’s desire to preserve the unity of the Province, however, 
failed to dissuade his associates, or influence the Secretary of State, 
who agreed with the majority view. Pethick-Lawrence was obsessed with 
realising one over-riding objective - a peaceful British withdrawal, and 
consequently he deprecated any developments which might prejudice that 
aim. On April he conveyed his views to the new Viceroy. He stressed 
that whilst he appreciated the motives behind Jenkins’ move, he consider­
ed that the creation of a multi-communal coalition would achieve nothing 
in the long run, and might cause serious problems for the British Govern­
ment. He argued that as it was probable that Britain would be obliged to 
transfer power to more than one recipient, a local coalition government 
in the Punjab would be bound to disintegrate as the Punjab Muslim League 
would wish to join with Sind and N.W.F.F. to create'Pakistan', whilst the 
non-Muslims would support union with India. If the government collapsed 
following the British departure, Pethick-Lawrence realised that it would 
be disastrous for India, but if it happened prior to independence, he 
feared that it would prove particularly embarrassing for the British 
Government, and in order to avoid either eventuality he concluded,
"the partition of the Punjab to such degree and in such
3^3
form as will satisfy the rival nationalisms in the 
Province is really unavoidable from the political point 
of view of the transfer of authority in June 19^8 ."^32
Thus at the outset of Mountbatten's viceroyalty the inevitability
of partition was an accepted fact, and on 17 April 19^7 the new Viceroy
informed the Secretary of State that he agreed with his analysis, and in
the event of the Cabinet Mission plan continuing to prove unacceptable
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to all parties, partition would be practically unavoidable* This 
plan, published on 16 May 19^ 6, had envisaged the creation of a three-tiered 
Indian Union, consisting of three groups of Provinces - Section A to 
include Madras, Bombay, the Central Provinces, the United Provinces and 
Bihar; Section B comprising N.W.F.P., Punjab and Sind; and Section C, 
incorporating Bengal and Assam. Each group would be free to decide upon 
the constitution for each of its constituent provinces, as for the 
section as a whole, and to define which subjects would fall under the 
control of the section governments. This constitutional formula also 
proposed the creation of an Interim Government at the Centre, represent­
ing the major political parties. Jinnah on 6 June 19^6 accepted the 
proposal, subject to the subsequent proviso, which Wavell accepted, that 
if the Congress rejected it, the League would still be able to join the 
Interim administration. Ispahani in explaining Jinnah’s acceptance, has 
argued that in effect it guaranteed‘Pakistan1 in fact, if not in name, as 
there were sufficient safeguards to protect the Muslim Provinces from 
interference from the Union Government, whose powers were limited to 
foreign affairs, defence and communications. Also any constitution 
agreed upon under the Plan would be revised at the end of a ten-year 
period, which implied that Provinces or Sections would be free to secede 
from the Union if they so desired. The Indian National Congress 
initially agreed to the compromise, but it refused to join an Interim 
Government, and on 10 July 19^6 Nehru repudiated the notion of the 
compulsory grouping of the Provinces into sections. Prior to that 
development the Cabinet Mission had informed Jinnah that should the 
Congress refuse to co-operate in the Interim Government, then the League
would not be permitted to participate. As a result Jinnah withdrew his
23^acceptance of the scheme.
Any desire which Mountbatten entertained concerning the resuscitation 
of the Cabinet Mission formula, however, was quickly dispelled by Jinnah. 
The Muslim leader was no longer prepared to place his trust in the propos­
ed formula. The revocation of Wavell's undertaking concerning League 
participation at the Centre, coupled with Nehru's objections to the 
compulsory grouping of Provinces, convinced him that he had been
3 ^
betrayed by the British, and that he would suffer a similar fate at the
hands of the Congress, in that the latter would use their permanent
majority at the Centre to destroy 'Pakistan'.2^  In view of Jinnah's
fear, Mountbatten realised that any attempt to enforce the Cabinet
236Mission solution would invite an armed Muslim rebellion, and as such 
the only apparent alternative was an independent and sovereign 'Pakistan', 
which because of the extreme opposition of Punjabi Sikhs and Hindus, 
would of necessity have to be limited in the Punjab to the Muslim 
majority districts. In reacting to this situation, the Viceroy, during 
the course of six meetings, held with Jinnah in mid-April 19^7, defined 
the ’Pakistan' which would emerge if Jinnah persisted in insisting on 
separation:
"I pointed out that the most he could hope for from me 
was to allow Provinces, and where applicable halves of 
Provinces, to decide whether they wished to join 
Pakistan. I pointed out that at this rate it looked 
as though he would get Sind and Western Punjab for 
certain; the N.W.F.P. would be a doubtful starter (and 
if he got it would cost him 3^ cror.es a year to keep the 
tribes quiet). In the east I pointed out that he would 
get the most useless part of Bengal, without Calcutta, „ _ 
and if he wished it he could have Sylhet back from Assam."
In view of the antipathy Mountbatten felt for Jinnah, and his dis-p-lQ
taste for the League, p there can be little hope that the stark 
prospects with which he confronted Jinnah, caused him little regret. 
Nevertheless he was not the Muslim nation's architect, so far as the 
Punjab was concerned. He had known at the time of his arrival in India 
that the Secretary of State had decided that division was the only 
plausible alternative (see p.3^3), and it had been made abundantly 
apparent to him by the Sikhs in particular that Muslim national aspi­
rations could only be satisfied at the expense of the unity of the 
territory. Tara Singh and Baldev Singh, in the last week of April 19^7 
had bluntly told the Viceroy that their co-religionists would fight to 
the 'last man* if placed under Muslim domination: "Any hopes that I still
entertained of being able to avoid the partition of the Punjab if Pakistan 
is forced upon us were shattered at this meeting..."2*^ Faced with 
irreconcilable communal elements, and in the knowledge that Britain had 
no desire to resort to arms to impose a settlement, Mountbatten accepted, 
and in no sense engineered, the Province's break-up:
"I realise that all this partition business is sheer 
madness... No-one would ever induce me to agree to it 
were it not for this fantastic communal madness that has 
seized everybody and leaves no other course open."2^ +0
3*+3
On 2 June 19^7 the fate of the Punjab and India was formally disclosed
to the Indian national leaders by the Viceroy, Jinnah bowing to the
241inevitable with a nod of his head. Although he had publicly main-
242tained his opposition to partition of the Punjab until the end, he
had known from mid-April that it would occur. He was powerless to
prevent it, the refusal of the Viceroy to consider the division of the 
243Indian army, deprived him of the opportunity to use the presence of 
pro-Pakistani troops as a bargaining factor. His only alternative 
could have been the incitement of a Muslim rising; such a course, how­
ever, was contrary to his constitutional character, and could not have 
guaranteed success. Jinnah at heart was not a political gambler, but a 
cautious strategist, and as such even a ’moth-eaten Pakistan* was prefer­
able to the risks involved in attempting to forge a nation through war 
or revolution.
On 3 June 19^7 Mountbatten announced that the Assemblies in those 
Provinces which were to be partitioned would be required to vote to 
signify their acceptance of the scheme, and that the actual details of 
the divisions would be formulated by a Boundary Commission, to be 
advised by a Committee appointed by the leaders of the respective commu­
nities. Significantly, the Viceroy also revealed that the Fourth 
Infantry Division, at the unanimous request of his Cabinet, would be 
stationed in those areas of the Punjab subject to division to prevent 
further bloodshed:
"'.that is the reason and the only reason why the Defence 
Member, Sardar Baldev Singh, announced last night the 
transfer of additional troops.... I do not need to tell 
you that this is not a British move."^*
The process of withdrawal had reached a critical stage for the British,
the deployment of troops was bound to heighten tension if interpreted as
a move to coerce any particular section of Punjabi society, and the
eventual award of the Boundary Commission could not fail but to leave all
the communities disappointed and more embittered, particularly as the
Muslims had been denied a united Punjab, the Sikhs were entertaining
hopes for a Sovereign State bordered by the Chenab and the Jamna, and the
245Hindus hoped to gain Lahore. Mountbatten considered that the clash of 
interests could precipitate civil war, and in order to reduce the risks
of a British involvement, he advanced the date for independence to 13
246
August 19^7*
Irrespective of the Viceroy's 'divide and quit’ announcement Jenkins 
faced the onerous task of attempting to contain the communal violence 
which continued to plague the Province. The national leaders, sobered by
3^6
the prospect of inheriting political responsibility at the end of a six-
week period, were all anxious to secure the tranquillity of the Punjab,
and thereby avoid the escalation of a full-scale communal war between
the two successor States. Jinnah complained to the Viceroy that the
Governor had adopted a weak attitude, declaring that "I don't care
2k7whether you shoot Moslems or not, it has got to be stopped."
Similarly Nehru also believed that strong action was necessary, and he 
favoured a declaration of martial law in all the troubled areas, includ­
ing Lahore and Amritsar, although this suggestion did not meet with the
2^8approval of Liaqat Ali Khan. The Governor, however, despite the fact
2^9that Mountbatten favoured strong action, refused to yield to extreme 
methods. From the time of the collapse of the Coalition Government, 
Jenkins had been determined to avoid any move which would lead to an 
escalation of the disturbances and the subsquent involvement of British 
soldiers. It was his considered opinion, which he shared with Bruce 
(Inspector General of Police, Punjab) and Brigadier Cazenore (the Lahore 
area Commander), that the deployment of troops could not succeed in com­
batting the agitation, as they would not be faced with widespread rioting 
but numerous bouts of terrorism of a 'cloak and dagger' nature. As such, 
Jenkins feared that having failed to crush the violence, the army, to the 
acute embarrassment of Britain, would become bogged down in attempting 
to combat a continually deteriorating situation. Furthermore he was 
opposed to the use of Indian troops, because he did not wish them to be
exposed to the type of communal attacks to which the provincial police
250had been subjected. Also Jenkins was highly suspicious of the true
motives behind the Congress call for martial law, being convinced that
"When a Hindu leader talks about 'utter ruthlessness1 or 'martial law',
251he means that he wants as many Muslims as possible shot out of hand."
In view of these objections, particularly concerning the involvement
of the army, and the almost total disintegration of the services, the
252morale of which had been seriously undermined by communalism, and the
near exhaustion of the police, the Governor reasoned that the only way
to stop the destruction and killings, was by persuading the provincial
political leaders to use their influence to secure that objective, "not
by press statements but by contacts which they unquestionably possess
253with violent elements". The Viceroy appreciated the logic of 
Jenkins' arguments, and in spite of Nehru's continued insistence, he 
refused to allow the imposition of martial law. It was agreed instead 
that the Governor should be permitted to seek the co-operation of the 
local leaders to join a Standing Security Committee to work with the
3^7
Governor for the restoration of peace and that at Patel’s suggestion the
provincial officials in Lahore should be replaced by men who enjoyed the
25*fconfidence of all the communities.
Jenkins readily agreed to Patel’s innovation - ”If by permitting
the poachers to select their own game-keepers we can stop them poaching,
so much the better” - and on 26 June he secured the participation of all
three communal leaders - Mamdot, Bhim Sen Sachar and Swara/i Singh - on
255the Security Committee. In spite of the apparent desire of these men 
256to restore order, the Committee disintegrated on 3 July as a result 
of Mamdot’s resignation. The Muslim leader attempted to portray his 
withdrawal as a protest against the anti-Muslim activities which were 
being condoned in the Province, having complained to the Governor on 
2 July of the ’’vindictive” and ’’outrageous” manner in which the adminis­
tration had used all its powers to oppress and victimise the Muslim 
public of Lahore, by organising searches solely in Muslim areas, and by 
using the Special Staff, which had been brought into existence under the 
supervision of the D.I.G. of Police to extort false statements from
Muslims. He also claimed that the communal partiality of that organi-
257sation was reflected by its overwhelmingly non-Muslim composition. In 
fact Mamdot’s claims were largely spurious. The personnel employed on 
the Special Staff amounted to 20 officers, 9 of whom were Muslims, the 
remainder including 3 Britons, 6 Sikhs and 2 Hindus, and up to the 2 July 
19^7 37 people had been interrogated, of whom 20 were Muslims, 12 were 
Hindus and 3 were Sikhs. The Governor denied that any improper methods 
had been used in questioning suspects at any time,emphasising that the 
presence of a multi-communal staff provided adequate safeguards against 
excesses being directed against the members of any particular community,
but he did admit that of the ^19 arrests and searches which had occurred
258
in Greater Lahore from 23 June to 2 July, 283 (68%) had involved Muslims.
Even so it would appear that although the figures seem to suggest a
degree of anti-Muslim bias, in all probability they reflected the fact
that so far as the Lahore area was concerned the activities of Muslim
terrorist groups justified such a high degree of surveillance. For in
reality the Muslims of Lahore in order to strengthen their claims on the
Provincial capital had perpetrated a deliberate campaign to drive as
many non-Muslims as possible from it. The success of their endeavours
can be measured by the fact that by the beginning of July 19^7 there was
259a large and continuous exodus of Hindus and Sikhs from the city.
Mamdot knew of their endeavours, and he was not prepared to be publicly 
associated with any genuine, concentrated effort to curtail them. For
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this reason, prior to his resignation, he had offered his continued co­
operation on the condition that all 'repressive' and 'oppressive'
measures would immediately cease, and would only be employed following
260full consultation with the Council, It seems evident that if the 
concession had been granted, Mamdot would have used it to attempt to
26*1prevent the further investigation of potentially dangerous Muslim areas.
Mamdot's retirement from the Security Committee effectively des­
troyed the last hope of diffusing the highly tense situation in the 
cities and rural areas of the Punjab. The murders, maimings and out­
breaks of arson continued unabated, and as a result the Province's last 
weeks of geographical unity were marked by mounting fear and chaos. The 
Assembly had voted on the partition issue on 23 June 1947, formally 
sanctioning the Punjab's division, the eight former Muslim Unionists, 
including Khizar having supported the transfer of the territory to 
*Pakistan'. An attempt by Mamdot to retain provincial unity was defeated
by M.L.As. from the Eastern Punjab, by 30 votes to 22. The drama was
almost over, only one act remained, and that was to culminate in tragedy. 
Whilst Mountbatten was not responsible for the decision to break the 
Punjab into two, his failure to ensure that the division was made as 
humanely as possible, contributed greatly to the mass slaughter which 
occurred. In April 1947 Jinnah had told the Viceroy "You must carry out
a surgical operation; cut India and its army firmly in half and give me
26^the half that belong to the Muslim League." Under Mountbatten's
direction, however, the'surgical operation' degenerated into sheer
butchery. At the Viceroy's insistence the period to achieve the transfer
of power had been dramatically reduced, a decision which whilst it
relieved Britain of any long-term commitment, sealed the fate of the
Punjab and condemned it to certain mayhem, for as Jenkins observed:
"It would be difficult enough to partition within six 
weeks a country of 30 million people which has been 
governed as a unit for 98 years even if all concerned 
were friendly and anxious to make progress."264
The Punjab, however, had tottered on the precipice of civil war for six
months, its communities were actively engaged in committing atrocities,
and exhorting reprisals against each other, and the mutual fears which
the acts of violence had bred, had precipitated mass migrations from the
265east of Muslims, and from the west of non-Muslims. The situation was 
considerably aggravated at the district level, particularly those which 
fell in the border areas, by the transfer of many senior Indian officials 
either to the Indian or Pakistan territories. This development, in the 
opinion of Belcher (I.C.S. Officer, served in the Punjab 1939-1947),
3*+9
increased the flood of refugees and the resultant chaos:
"A consequence of the requirement that senior Indian 
officials on each side of the border should be of the 
'right' community on Independence Day; it followed 
from this that at the very moment when minorities were 
feeling most vulnerable and in need of reassurance 
they found that senior District officials of their own 
community who might have given them that reassurance 
had themselves disappeared over the border. "266
Also no adequate measures were taken for the protection of the evacuees;
a totally inadequate'Border Patrol Force' was appointed to police the
frontier areas but it represented nothing more than a token gesture.
The force, comprised of only two divisions, was overwhelmed by the con-
p f . n
tinuous tide of human despair and misery which confronted it.
It was a serious error of judgement on the part of Mountbatten
which ensured that the withdrawal of British power in the Punjab would
take place amongst widespread suffering and carnage. Even so the Viceroy
was not the only villain of the piece. The Home Government acquiesced
in the Viceroy's action. But the key members of Attlee's Ministry had
little knowledge of India. For example until December 19^ +6, of the
Prime Minister's senior colleagues, Addison, the Secretary of State for
Dominion Affairs, was ignorant of the fact that the Sikhs originated from
and inhabited the Punjab, whilst Ellen Wilkinson, the Education Minister,
was surprised to learn that only approximately five hundred British
268officials were stationed in the Province. Mountbatten, however, knew
of the situation and dangers which prevailed in the Punjab, and as the
man who sanctioned the largely ill-prepared and unsupervised partition
he must bear the brunt of the blame for what occurred. The disgust which
his actions engendered was not confined solely to the victims, but has
been expressed by at least one British I.C.S. officer who served under
him. Cowley (served in the Punjab 1939-^7) has written:
"It was murder. This precipitate decision by the Labour 
Government which Wavell had refused to carry out, cost 
over a million lives.^69 There are some members of the 
Punjab I.C.S. who think it was correct ... The majority 
share my view that it was a disastrous error. Wavell 
himself had a plan for a two-tier withdrawal, retaining 
control of the disputed areas until some reasonable 
solution could be reached. This would have been sensible 
... Nothing could have been worse than the plan adopted 
and the timing and method of its adoption. I have the 
greatest admiration for Mountbatten as a Supreme Commander.
No doubt as Governor General of the new independent India 
he was a success. But for the Punjab ... he was a disaster."
Though the actual act of partition was brutal, the causes for the 
division emanated from a provincial society comprised of irreconcilable
350
elements. The growth of nationalism had divided the communities even 
further, especially as neither Muslims nor non-Muslims were willing to 
accept the rule of any community other than their own. Whilst the 
Unionist party had flourished until 19^3i its multi-communal nature and 
philosophy could only survive so long as the British held the actual 
power in the Punjab and in India. The decision of the British to 
relinquish control in August 19^7 created a power vacuum which multi- 
communal political philosophies could not fill, as fears and hatreds on 
both sides, having been aroused, particularly by the elections of 19^6 , 
totally prejudiced the prospects for co-operation between the communities 
following the transfer of power. In agreeing that the Punjab should be 
divided to satisfy the nationalist ambitions of the Muslim and non- 
Muslim communities, the Viceroy accepted the inevitable, though he did 
little to prevent the catastrophe which followed.
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CONCLUSION
The course which Muslim politics pursued in the Punjab in the 
decade before Independence, heralding as it did the suppression of 
provincialism and the destruction of Unionism as political philoso­
phies and the triumph of a separatist Muslim nationalism, made the 
partition of the Province unavoidable. This process was particularly 
bloody and horrific, and it has spawned a legacy of bitterness which 
in turn has clouded the interpretations of the pre-Partition history 
of the region. Broadly speaking the protagonists who have debated 
the issue fall into two main camps, 'Pakistani historians' arguing 
that the creation of an independent Muslim state necessitating the 
break-up of the Punjab and India was occasioned by the fact that the 
intrusion of Islam into Hindustan had generated the development of a 
Muslim 'nation', which ultimately responded to nationalist pressures 
by demanding and winning a geographical expression of its nation-hood 
in the form of Pakistan. 'Indian commentators' generally deny this 
assertion, opining that on the whole India's Muslims and Hindus were 
indistinguishable at the masses level, and that separatist tendencies 
resulted from the fact that Muslim leaders were willing to exploit 
religious fanaticism to establish a power-base for political power in 
the country independent of the Indian National Congress, and that the
British actively encouraged that process in pursuit of their 'Divide
2and Rule' policies.
Both the Pakistani and Indian hypotheses appear to contain 
elements of truth, but neither in isolation can adequately explain 
the course which Indian history followed in the years 1936 to 19^7, or 
the effect which it had on Muslim politics in the Punjab. There can 
be little doubt that the Muslims of the Punjab, whether as members of 
the educated or economic Elites,or of the peasantry, regarded them­
selves as different from other non-Muslim Punjabis. This was not the 
outcome of a divisive British-inspired plot, but the consequence of 
rigid religio-social practices which prevented inter-marriage and 
other intimate social intercourse (e.g. communal eating and drinking) 
between Muslims and caste Hindus. Even so the British were not slow 
to realise the advantages which this gave them in attempting to pro­
long their r&le in India by manipulating the incompatibility between 
Muslim and non-Muslim leaders, as was witnessed by the use IdnHthgow
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made of Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League (see pp. 185-188).
But Muslim leaders had not been forced by the British to adopt a 
separatist communal philosophy, though the latter clearly welcomed 
it.3
Muslim leaders in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, notably Sir Sayid Ahmed Khan and Moshin-ul-Mulk, anxious 
to avoid the prospect of Congress and Hindu domination had actively 
sought British help to frustrate such a developmentWhat of the 
Muslims of the Punjab, however, did they feel similarly threatened in 
the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century? The answer 
would seem to be that Punjabi Muslims did not believe their culture 
to be under threat, not until that is League propagandists made 
'Islam in Danger' an issue of the 19^6 election, but in the case of 
economics and politics they considered their position to be vulner­
able. As has been pointed out in Chapter I, the average Muslim was 
more economically depressed than his non-Muslim counterpart, and as 
such endured a greater degree of poverty. He lived in a Province in 
which Muslims were in the majority, yet everywhere were the signs of 
the greater affluence and influence of the Hindus and Sikhs. Conse­
quently the prevailing atmosphere, particularly regarding the non- 
Muslim control of the credit machine, provided a constant reminder to 
Muslims of their subordinate social status, and often of their 
economic dependency upon and exploitation by the non-Muslims. The 
response of the Muslim Elites took a different form. Educated 
Muslims resented their inability to break the Hindu monopoly of the 
professions and in particular the bureaucracy, whilst the economic 
^lite, personified by the wealthy zamindar class, were not prepared 
to countenance any measure of Hindu control over their political 
future. The large zamindars, who represented the Muslim political 
leadership of the Punjab, were the least vulnerable of all the 
Muslim groups. So long as the British maintained their rule in India 
they were prepared to accept the status quo because it afforded them 
protection from the possibility of a Hindu—dominated central govern­
ment. Once it became apparent, however, that the British were 
sincerely considering handing over power, and that the Indian 
National Congress in all probability would emerge as a major bene­
ficiary, complacency on their part was replaced by apprehension.
Even a staunch Punjabi provincialist like Sikander Hyat Khan, vehe­
mently opposed to Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League, and to whom 
the concept of 'Pakistan' was an anathema, never the less bitterly 
resented any political initiative which would place the destiny of
36*+
Muslim India and thereby the Punjab in the hands of the Hindu- 
controlled Congress (see p. 189). Such politically orientated 
alarm was conveyed down through the various strata of Muslim society, 
and in each it found a responsive audience as the activities of the 
Arya Samaj in the Punjab, an organisation which had supplied some of 
the most active members of the Punjab Congress, had been interpreted
by many Muslims as heralding the "virtual establishment of a Hindu
5
raj". Muslim trepidation in the Punjab was further increased by 
the refusal of the Congress following the 1937 elections to brook any 
cooperation with the Muslim League other than on their own terms (see 
p. 178).
Disquiet over the possibility of a Congress-ruled India, com­
bined with the socio-economic ascendancy of the Hindus and Sikhs in 
the Punjab provided the seeds for the growth of Muslim separatism and 
nationalism in the Province. To begin with, however, the Muslim 
zamindar leaders of the Punjab were equally concerned with preventing 
intrusions into the provincial sphere by any nationalist organisation, 
Congress or Muslim League. Yet the Punjab could not be isolated from 
national events, without the Province there could be no ’Pakistan1 
and failing the agreement of the Muslim leadership to accept absorp­
tion by an independent India there could be no sovereign Indian 
Union encompassing all of the Province, including the Muslim majority 
districts. In the final analysis the interests of the Muslim 
religious, economic and political elites could be more closely identi­
fied with the creation of a Muslim state, which would guarantee their 
continued political ascendancy in provincial affairs, and the curtail­
ment of Hindu and Sikh competition in the economic, educational, pro­
fessional and civic spheres, than union with India. Hence the fact 
that from the mid-19*+0's onwards many of the most influential 
zamindari personalities, together with large sections of the 
educated middle classes began to embrace the Muslim League. By the 
time that the 19*+6 elections were conducted in the Punjab, therefore, 
the League had largely replaced the Unionist Party as the repository 
of landed interest and power. It only needed the election results to 
proclaim that reality. Thus it is no exaggeration to claim that the 
zamindars* switch of allegiance from Unionism to the Muslim League 
greatly benefitted the latter, as it not only gave League candidates 
and propagandists access to the rural Punjab - the power house of 
Muslim provincial politics - but it guaranteed them the victories 
which it enjoyed in the great majority of those constituencies. In 
support of its impressive ’landed armoury' the League also enjoyed
363
the confidence and active support of the Punjab's religious leaders. 
Their involvement as canvassers for the League and ’Pakistan' con­
tributed greatly into turning the League success into a massive land­
slide victory, for no other political organisation in the province 
enjoyed the resources to resist a combination as powerful as the 
landlords and the Pirs.
All the available evidence, therefore, suggests that the 
eventual triumph of the Muslim League in the Punjab was achieved 
largely through its association with these two sections of Muslim 
society. That, however, does not necessarily militate against the 
popular appeal 'Pakistan' had for ordinary Muslims, whether enfran­
chised or not. As early as 19*+0-19*+l Sikander Hyat Khan had realised 
correctly that the Muslim masses would fall victim to the allure of 
''Pakistan' Thus whilst it is the contention of this thesis that 
the conversion of the Muslim Punjab from a Unionist to a Pakistanist 
philosophy was due in large measure to the fact that the Province’s 
Muslim landed and religious elites spearheaded that change, there can 
be no doubt that they espoused a cause which had considerable 
attraction for their tenants, murids, and constituents. The failure 
of the Indian National Congress to reassure Muslim leaders and the 
Muslim masses in general that their interests would be inviolate in 
a united India, and of the British or any other interested party to 
devise an acceptable realistic alternative to an independent Muslim 
state made the division of India and the Punjab unavoidable given the 
conditions prevailing in 19*+7* Thus Partition and thereby Pakistan 
had not one 'architect' but many; Muslim self-interest and fears, 
League intransigence, Congress obduracy and British deviousness to 
name but a few. The Muslim desire for separatism at whatever level, 
however, was not an illusion, it was a fact which found expression 
in the establishment of a sovereign state and the destruction of the 
'unity' which the British had imposed on India.
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pp. 33-84.
5- K.W. Jones, 'Communalism in the Punjab: The Arya Samaj Contri­
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APPENDIX A.
Occupations In the Punjab and the Degree of Participation by the 
Members of the Major Communities as Recorded by the Census of India
(Punjab), 1931.
1931 Total Muslim Hindu Sikh
Earners 6,957,062 3 ,895,947
(56#)
2,128,245 
( 3 W  .
932,870
(13%)
Working Dependents 1 ,772,21+7 624,040
(35$)
9151090 
(52%)
233,117
(13%)
Non-working Dependents 15,125,173 9,117,806
(60$)
3*952,753
(26515)
2,054,614
(14%)
AGRICULTURE
Income from Rent of Land 112,101+ 54,733
(4990
39,20*+
(35%)
18,167
(16%)
Cultivation of All Kinds 3,273,175 1,781,174
(54.490
849,28*+ 
(26%)
642,717
(19.6%)
Agents and Managers of 
Landed Estates;Planters; 
Forest Officers and their 
Clerks;Rent Collectors,&c. 16,1+65 10,010 
(60.89O
5,223
(31.7%)
1,232
(7.5%)
Field Labourers and 
Woodcutters, &c. 444,161 242,772
(54.790
148,527
(33.4%)
52,862
(11.9%)
Raisers of Livestock, Milk­
men and Herdsmen
316,237 235,037
(74.390
72,385
(22.9%)
8,815
(2.8%)
Fishing and Hunting 4,752 3,134
(6690
928
(19.5%)
690
(14.5%)
EXPLOITATION OF MINERALS
Owners,Managers,Clerks, &c. 1,336 923
(69%)
333
(25%)
80
(6%)
Labourers 10,1+83 5,48?
(52.3%)
3,656
(34.9%)
1,340
(12.8%)
INDUSTRIES
Owners,Managers,Clerks, & c. 5,247 2,723
(52%)
2,148
(41%)
376
(7%)
Labourers and Artisans 511,680 318,189
(62.2%)
136,553
(26.7%)
56,938
(11.1%)
TRANSPORT
Owners,Managers,Clerks,&c. 22,367 10,361
(46.3%)
10,764
(48.1%)
1,242
(5.6%)
Labourers,Boatmen,Carters, 
Palik Bearers
152,616 87,771
(57.5%)
42,417
(27.8%)
22,428
(14.7%)
TRADE 504,877 128,551
(25.5%)
339,618
(67.3%)
36,708
(7.2%)
(continued)
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1931 Total Muslim Hindu Sikh'
ARTS AND PROFESSIONS
Religious 97,056 42,532
(43.8%)
50,308
(51.8%)
4,216
(4.%%)
Lawyers, Doctors, Teachers 48,644 23,187
(4?.?%)
21,399
(44%)
4,058
(8.3%)
PERSONS LIVING ON THEIR 
INCOME
26,934 11,987
(44.5%)
9,78o
(36.3%)
5,167
(19.2%)
DOMESTIC SERVICE 372,488 178,758
(48%)
161,607
(43.4%)
32,123
(8.6%)
CONTRACTORS, CLERKS, 
CASHIERS, &C.
15,053 6,996
(46.5%)
6,814
(45.3%)
1,243
(8.2%)
LABOURERS UNSPECIFIED 188,182 127,511
(67.8%)
50,260
(26.7%)
10,4l8
(5.5%)
BEGGARS, PROSTITUTES, 
CRIMINALS AND INMATES OF 
JAILS AND ASYLUMS
280,169 211,868
(75.6%)
56,566
(20.2%)
11,735
(4.2%)
Source: Census of India, 1931, Punjab, Vol.XVII, Part II, Lahore, 1933,
pp. 219-227. IOR.
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SOURCE: Figures and Percentages calculated from information contained
in the following:
ASSESSMENT REPORTS
GURGAON DISTRICT, Rewari Tahsil, 1941, p.10, Statement No. V, p.11; Nuh 
Tahsil, 1941, pp.13-15, Statement No. V, p. 11; Firozepur-Jhirka, 1942, 
pp.14-15, Statement No. V, p.15? Gurgaon Tahsil, 1942, p.15i Statement 
No. V, p.21; Palwal Tahsil, 1943, PP*14-15, Statement No. V, p.12; 
Ballabgarh Tahsil, 1945, p.15, Statement No. V, p.11. GUJRAT DISTRICT, 
Phalia Tahsil, 1891, p.44, Statement No. V, p.30; Gujrat Tahsil, 1913, 
p.10, Statement No. V, p.vi; Kharian Tahsil, 1914, p.9, Statement No.VI, 
p.vii; Irrigated Tracts of Gujrat and Kharian Tahsils, 1927, pp.5*6, 
Statement No. V, p.ix; Phalia Tahsil, 1927, p.7, Statement No. V, pp.ix- 
xx. ATTOCK DISTRICT, Tallagang Tahsil, 1925, pp.10-11, Statement No. VI, 
p.xii; Attock Tahsil, 1925, pp.17*19, Statement No. VI, p.xxviii;
Fatehjang Tahsil, 1926, pp.18-20, Statement No. VI, p.xxx; Pindigheb 
Tahsil, 1926, pp.14-16, Statement No. VI, p.30. DERA GHAZI KHAN DISTRICT, 
Sanghar Tahsil, 1918, p.8, Statement No. V, p.xi; Rajanpur Tahsil, 1919, 
p.14, Statement No. V, pp.viii-ix; Jampur Tahsil, 1919, Statement No. V, 
p.xi; Dera Ghazi Khan Tahsil, 1919, Statement No. V, p.xi. AMBALA DISTRICT 
Rupar Tahsil, 1917, PP*7, 19*20, Statement No. V, p.vi; Kharar Tahsil, 
1917, P * 18, Statement No. V, p.vii; Ambala Tahsil, 1918, pp.5, 11, State­
ment No. V, p.vi; Naraingarh Tahsil, 1918, pp.2-8, Statement No. VI,p.ix; 
Jagadhri Tahsil, 1919, pp.11-12, Statement No. V, p.ix. JULLUNDUR DISTRICT 
Nakodar Tahsil, 1913, P*9, Statement No. V, p.vii; Jullundur Tahsil, 1913, 
p.10, Statement No. V, p.vii; Phillour Tahsil, 1916, pp.11-12, Statement 
No. V, p.v; Nawasahr Tahsil, 1916, p.12, 'Statement No. V, p.v. HOSHIARPUR 
DISTRICT, Hoshiarpur Tahsil, 1912, pp.9*10, Statement No. V, p.x; Dasuya 
Tahsil, 1913, p.15, Statement No. V, p.xiii; Una Tahsil, 1913, pp. 7,13, 
Statement No. IV, pp.viii-ix; Garshankar Tahsil, 1914, pp.3,13, Statement 
No. V, p.x. FEROZEPORE DISTRICT, Moga Tahsil, 1912, pp.12-15, Statement 
No. V, p.vii; Ferozepore Tahsil (East), 1912, pp.11-12, Statement No, V, 
p.viii; Mamdot Jagir, 1913, P P * 13*14, Statement No. V, pp.vi-vii; Zira 
Tahsil, 1913, pp.10-11, Statement No. V, p.v; Muktsar Tahsil, 1913, PP*
3, 8-9 , Statement No. V, p.v; Fazilka Tahsil, 1914, pp.3*4, 9, Statement 
No. V, p.viii. LUDHIANA DISTRICT, Jagraon Tahsil, 1910, p.9, Statement 
No. VI, p.ix; Samrala Tahsil, 1910, pp.14-15, Statement No. VI, p.vi; 
Ludhiana Tahsil, 1911, pp.11-12, Statement No. VI, pp.viii-ix. ROHTAK 
DISTRICT, Gohana Tahsil, 1907, Statement No. IV, p.v; Sampla Tahsil,
1908, Statement No. V, p.vi; Jhajjar Tahsil, 1908, p.17, Statement No. V, 
p.vii; Delhi District North (transferred to Rohtak in 1911 as Sonepat 
Tahsil), 1909, P«13, Statement No. VI, Pt.I, pp.xx-xxi; Rohtak Tahsil,
1909, Statement No. IV, p.vi. KARNAL DISTRICT, Kaithal Tahsil, 1908,p.5, 
Statement No. IV, p.xx; Panipat Tahsil, 1908, p.10, Statement No. IV, 
p.x; Thanesar Tahsil, 1908, Statement No. IV, pp.x-xi; Karnal Tahsil, 
1907-1909, p.27, Statement No. VI-A, p.lvii. MIANWALI DISTRICT, Bhakkar 
Tahsil and the Sadat Miani villages of the Mianwali Tahsil, 1902, pp.31* 
52, Statement No. V, pp.x-xi; Mianwali and Isakhel Tahsils, 1906, pp.20- 
21, Statement No. VIII, pp.xxxvi-xlii. IOR & PBRL
DISTRICT GAZETTEERS
Gurgaon, 1904, Vol.IVB, Table 15, pp.xxiv-xxix; Gurgaon, 1910, Vol.IVA, 
pp.59-66; Gujrat, 1892-93, PP.56-72; Gujrat, 1912, Vol.XXV-B, Table 15, 
pp.xxiii-xxv; Gujrat, 1921, Vol.XXV-A, pp.41-50; Attock, 1930, Vol.XXIX-A, 
pp.75, 79*119? Attock, 1933, Vol.XXII-B, Table 15, pp.xxxiv-xxxvii; Dera 
Ghazi Khan, 1885*84, pp.57-75? Dera Ghazi Khan, 1912, Vol.XXXV-B, Table 15 
pp.xxx-xl; Ambala, 1892-95, pp.46-50; Ambala and Kalsia State, 1912, Vol. 
VII-B, Table 15, pp.xxvi-xlv; Jullundur and Kapurthala State, 1904, Vol. 
XIV-A, pp.61-126, 128-130; Jullundur and Kapurthala State, 1912, Vol.XIV-B
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Table 15, pp.xxx-xxxviii; Hoshiarpur, 1904, Vol. XIII-A, pp.44-65; 
Hoshiarpur, 1904, Vol. XIII-B, Table 15, pp.xxv-xxxii; Ferozepore, 
1888-89, pp.50-515 Ferozepore, 1915, Vol. XXX-A, pp.71-111; Ferozepore, 
1913, Table 15, pp.xxi-xxxi, Ludhiana, 1888-89, pp.77-89; Ludhiana and 
Maler Kotla State, 1912, Table 15, pp.xxiv-xxxv; Rohtak, 1883-84, pp. 
56-69; Rohtak and Dujana State, 1912, Vol. III-B, Table 15, pp.xxvii- 
xxxiv; Karnal, 1892, pp.105-123; Karnal, 1912, Vol. VI-B, Table 15, 
pp.xxx-xxxix; Karnal, 1918, Vol. VI-A, pp.91-102; Mianwali, 1912, Vol. 
XXX, Table 15, pp.xxv-xxxiii; Mianwali, 1915, Vol. XXX-A, pp.58-64; 
Mianwali, 1935, Vol. XXIII-B, Table 15, pp.xl-xlv. IOR & PBRL.
SETTLEMENT REPORTS
Gurgaon, 1938-43, p. 9; Attock, 1923-27, pp. 5-6; Jullundur, 1913-17, 
pp. 6 , 25; Hoshiarpur, 1914, p. 5; Ludhiana, 1908-1911, pp. 2-3; Rohtak, 
1905-1910, pp.10-11; Karnal, 1909, p.19. IOR & PBRL.
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APPENDIX Biii(continued)
SOURCE: Figures and Percentages calculated from information contained
in the following:
ASSESSMENT REPORTS
JHELUM DISTRICT, Pind Dadan Khan Tahsil, 19*+1, pp.17-18, Statement No.
VI, p. 13; Jhelum Tahsil, 19*+1, pp.13-1*+, Statement No. VI, p.11;
Chakwal Tahsil, 19*+1, p.13, Statement No. VI, p.9. JHANG DISTRICT, 
Shorkot Tahsil, 1923, P*13, Statement No. VI, p.xx; Chiniot Tahsil,
1923, pp.13-1*+, Statement No. VI, p.18; Jhang Tahsil, 1925, pp.17-18, 
Statement No. VI, p.xxiii. SHAHPUR DISTRICT, Bhalwal Tahsil, 1923, p.7, 
Statement No. XVII, p.xx; Sargodha Tahsil, 1923, p.6 , Statement No. XVI, 
pp.xx-xxiii; Shahpur Tahsil, 192*+, p.-3, Statement No. XIV, p.xiv. 
RAWALPINDI DISTRICT, Gujar Khan Tahsil, 190*+, pp.32-3*+? Rawalpindi Tahsil, 
1905, pp.16-18. IOR & PBRL.
DISTRICT GAZETTEERS
Jhelum, 190*+, Vol. XXVII-A, pp.88-126; Jhelum, 190*+, Vol. XXVII-B, Table 
15, pp.xxiii-xxv; Jhelum, 193*+, Vol. XX-B, Table 15, pp.xxxi-xxxvii;
Jhang, 1912, Vol. XXXII-B, Table 15, pp.xxiv-xxvii; Jhang, 193*+, Vol. 
XXVI-B, Table 15, pp.xxxv-xlxii; Shahpur, 1897, pp.9^-112; Shahpur, 1912, 
Vol. XXVI-B, Table 15, pp.xxviii-xxxix; Shahpur, 1917, Vol. XXX-A, 
pp.83-100. IOR & PBRL.
SETTLEMENT REPORTS
Jhelum, 1937-*H, p.7 ; Jhang, 1928, pp.19-21. IOR.
377
APPENDIX Agricultural Land Held by the Various Communities in the
Biv Districts of Hissar, Kangra, Multan, Muzaffargarh, the
Khushab Tahsil of Shahpur District, and the Lower Chenab 
Colony (Jhang)"
Land in Acres
District A B Muslims Hindus Sikhs Christians
---1HU 0
i Given
Hissar 1908- 
1910, 
1921
26% 574,145  
(17.5%)
2,011,122
(62%)
244,193
(7-3%)
197,092
(6%)
233,57^
(7%)
Kangra 1919 5% 1,066,136 
(100%)
Shahpur . qi 
(Khushab -icn£ 
Tahsil only) 85%
1,115,971
(91%)
VI,556 
(3%)
24,626
(2%)
43,5^9
(4%)
(LowfrCtaBb W
Colony only)
82% 218,452
(95.3%)
9,359
(4.1%)
274
(0.1%)
1,086  
(0.5%)
Multan 1919- 
1920, 
1923
82% 1,955,200
(73%)
630,950
(2*+%)
84,827
(3%)
Muzaffargarh*
1923-
1924
87% 539,540
(75%)
179,8V?
(25%)
4,403,308
(48%)
3,938,970
(43%)
353,920
Wo)
197,092
(2%)
278,209
(3%)
* Cultivated land only.
A - Years of Assessment: B - Muslim Percentage of Population at
Assessment.
SOURCE: Figures and Percentages calculated from information contained
in the following:
ASSESSMENT REPORTS
HISSAR DISTRICT, Bhiwani Tahsil, 1908, p.15, Statement No. II, p.iv; 
Hansi and Hissar Tahsils, 1909, Statement No. Ill, p.vii, Statement 
No. VI, p.xi; Fatehabad Tahsil, 1910, Statement No. Ill, pp.viii-ix; 
Sirsa Tahsil, 1921, pp.8-9, Statement No. VI, p.x. KANGRA DISTRICT,
Kulu Subdivision, 1911, pp.30,33; Dera and Hamirpur Tahsils, 1911, P»4; 
Palampur Tahsil, 1914, P*7, Statement No. II, p.ii; Kangra Tahsil, 1913, 
Statement No. II, p.ii; Nurpur Tahsil, J-917, P»7, Statement No. II,p.ii. 
SHAHPUR DISTRICT, Khushab Tahsil, 1914, p. 14, Table IV-B, p.xiv. JHANG 
DISTRICT, Lower Chenab Colony, 1923, pp. 3-7* MULTAN DISTRICT, Mailsi 
Tahsil, 1919, p.1*M Kabirwala Tahsil, 1919, pp.18-20; Multan and 
Shujabad Tahsils, 1920, p.18; Lodhran Tahsil, 1920, pp.12-13; Khanewal 
Tahsil (Lower Bari Doab Colony), 1933, PP*5-6. MUZAFFARGARH DISTRICT, 
Alipur Tahsil, 1923, pp.7-8; Leiah Tahsil, 1924, pp.19-20; Muzaffargarh 
Tahsil, 1924, pp.10-11; Kot Adu Tahsil, 1924, pp.13-16. IOR & PBRL.
(continued)
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APPENDIX Biv (continued)
DISTRICT GAZETTEERS
Hissar, 190**, Vol. II-A, pp.72-98; Hissar, 1912, Vol. II-B, Table 15, 
pp.xxvi-xli; Hissar and Loharu State, 1915, Vol. II-A, pp.77-103, 
Kangra, 1912, Vol. X-B, Table 15, pp.xxx-xxxix; Kangra, 1924-25,
Vol. VII-A, pp.147-197; Multan, 1936, Vol.XXVII-B, Table 15, pp.lxxxv- 
xciv; Muzaffargarh, 1929, Vol. XXXIV-A, pp.71-81. IOR & PBRL
SETTLEMENT REPORTS
Kangra, 1913-19, pp. 3-5, Appendix I, p.i; Jhang, 1928, pp.19-21; 
Chenab Colony, 1915, PP*36-47; Multan, 1917-21, pp. 6-7? Muzaffargarh, 
1920-25, p. 7. IOR.
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APPENDIX C.
TOTAL ACREAGE PRIVATELY OWNED AND SUBJECT TO USUFRUCTUARY MORTGAGE IN
MUSLIM MAJORITY (LAND) DISTRICTS
Total Area Area Mortgaged With Possession
acres acres
Sialkot 879,535 (A) 205,448
(B) 50,779
Gujranwala 1,340,317 (A) 101,549
(B) 45,557
Sheikhupura 1,273,512 (A) 91,341
(B) 40,887
Gujrat 1,215,226 (A) 98,948
(B) 45,428
Shahpur 1,593,703 (A) 69,461
(B) 55,434
Jhelum . 1,199,854 (A) 39,383
(B) 23,552
Rawalpindi 875,503 (A) 24,573
(B) 18,461
Attock 2 ,023,887 (A) 95,503
(B) 50,643
Mianwali 1 ,848,766 (A) 184,437
(B) 76,661
Montgomery 1,380,314 (A) 39,074
(B) 43,197
Lyallpur 1 ,510,052 (A) 97,729
(B) 59,092
Jhang 1,577,743 (A) 46,495
(B) 133,965
Multan 2,528,389 (A) 36,264
(B) 213,491
Muzaffargarh 2,248,361 (A) 99,292
(B) 204,111
Dera Ghazi Khan 2 ,983,631 (A) 142,574
(B) 153,943
Jullundur 781,740 (A) 82,885
(B) 10,837
Totals (A) 1,454,956 (6%)
(B) 1,226,038 (5%)
Grand Total 25,260,533 2,680,994 (11%)
(A) By members of notified agricultural tribes.
(B) By non-agriculturists.
Source: Figures and Percentages calculated from information contained in
Pun.iab Land Revenue Administration Report. 1936. Statement No.Ill, 
pp. iii, v-vii. IOR.
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APPENDIX E.
TAXES PAID IN THE DISTRICTS OF LYALLPUR, GUJKANWALA AND 
SIALKOT IN THE YEAH 1945-46
Muslim Non-Muslim
LYALLPUR
Urban Immovable
Property Tax Rs. 22,900 d W Rs.140,300 (86%)
Sales Tax Rs. 17,000 (5%) Rs.308,000 (95%)
Income Tax Rs.300,000 (8%) Rs.5,950,000 (92%)
GUJRANWALA
Urban Immovable
Property Tax Rs. 13,000 (17%) Rs. 65,000 (83%)
Sales Tax Rs. 12,500 (6%) Rs.201,765 (94%)
Income Tax Rs. 50,000 (7%) Rs.700,000 (95%)
SIALKOT
Sales Tax Rs. 25,311 (16%) Rs.132,870 (84%)
Income Tax Rs.310,000 (21%) Rs.1,155,142 (79%)
Source:
Punjab Boundary Commission Proceedings and Report, Vol. I, pp.467-
4b8, pgrC.
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APPENDIX G.
Showing the Total Representation of the Communities Serving in the
Transferred Departments of the Punjab Government on 1 Jan. 1933*
Department or Office. ]Muslims. Hindus. Sikhs. Others,
Department of Agriculture. 347 184 149 5
Veterinary Department. 231 142 99 3
Co-operative Society Department 216 94 57 3
P.W.D.(Buildings and Road Branch) 207 273 56 10
Excise Department. 58 67 27 4
Education Department. 1,183 1,030 326 132
Medical Department. 413 795 223 107
Public Health Department. 56 69 15
Office of the Joint Secretary to the 
Punjab Govt., Transferred Departments. 12 2 2
Central Museum. 1 7 1
Department of Industries. 172 181 39 11
P.W.D.(Hydro-Electric Branch). 117 104 34 4
Office of the Secretary to the Govt., 
Punjab Electricity 6 1 1
Registration Department. 26 10 17
GRAND TOTALS. 3,048 2,959 1,045 280
PERCENTAGES. 4 2% 40% 14% 4%
Source: Figures and percentages calculated from information contained
Consolidated Statement Showing the Proportionate Representation of 
the Various Communities Serving in the Different Departments of the 
Punjab Government as it stood on 1st Jan., 1933* PP*12-23, enclosed 
with letter, C.C. Garbett to Under Sec. of State, 31 Aug. 1933i 
S&G.4093/1933, I/S&G/7/30. i o r.
384
APPENDIX H.
Reserved Departments of the Punjab Government on 1 Jan. 1933*
Department or Office Muslims. Hindus. Sikhs. Others.
P.C.S.(Executive Branch). 95 82 36 3
P.C.S.(Judicial Branch). 63 80 30 5
Police Dept.. 2,906 1,119 458 8
P.W.D.(Irrigation Branch). 2,270 3,035 810 12
Forest Dept., 488 629 67 5
Land Revenue Dept.. 5,082 4,403 831 4
Jails Dept.. 1,366 454 218 16
Reclamation Dept.. 25 25 8 3
Criminal Tribes Dept.. *+6 39 35 22
High Court. 572 801 95 13
Punjab Civil Secretariat. 80 77 22 4
Office of Director of Information. 6 3 1
Punjab Government Printing Office. 338 130 10 8
Central Jail and Borstal Presses. 20 12 2
Office of Financial Commissioners. 32 33 12 1
Office of Director of Land Records 12 9 2
Industries Department (Factory 
and Boiler Inspection). 1 6 5
Ambala Division (Commissioner's 
Office and District Offices in 
the Division). 177 256 25 7
Jullundur Division (Commissioner's 
Office and District Offices in 
the Division). 182 244 35 3
Lahore Division (Commissioner's 
Office and District Offices in 
the Division). 321 233 81 4
Rawalpindi Division (Commissioner' 
Office and District Offices in 
the Division).
s
285 50 4o 4
Multan Division (Commissioner’s 
Office and District Offices in 
the Division). 292 252 17 3
Nili Bar Colony Establishment. 10 11 3 1
Deputy Commissioner's Office,
Lyallpur Colony Branch. 3 5 1
Law Department. 17 22 5
GRAND TOTALS 14,689 12,010 2,849 126
PERCENTAGES 49.5# 40.5# 9.6# 0.4#
Source:Figures and Percentages calculated from information contained in 
Consolidated Statement Showing the Proportionate Representation of the 
Various Communities.... as in Appendix q .
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APPENDIX J (continued)
Source: Punjab Civil List, Jan. 1936, Parts II, pp. 6-8;
II-A, pp. 9-10; III, pp. 11-20; IV, pp. 21-23;
VIII, pp. 27-32; IX, pp. 35-51(a)5 XI, pp. 33-68;
XII, pp. 88-90; XIII, pp. 91-109; XIV, pp. 110-113;
XV, pp. 114-144; XVII, pp. 148-151; XXI, pp. 110-161;
XXV, pp. 165-171; XXVI, pp. 172-173; XXVIII, pp. 174-177;
XXX, pp. 179-182; XXXV, pp. 193-207; XXXVII, p. 213;
XLII, p. 236; XLVI, pp. 240-252;
Punjab Civil List, Nov. 1946, Parts II, pp. 9-11(b);
II-A, pp. 13-l4(a); III, pp. 15-26(a); IV, pp. 27-30;
VIII, pp. 35-41; IX, pp. 42-70; XI, pp. 72-90(a);
XII, pp. 116-119; XIII, pp. 120-142(c); XIV, pp. 143-146;
XV, pp. 147-186; XVII, pp. 191-194; XXI, pp. 204-205(a);
XXV, pp. 2lO-2l8(b); XXVI, pp. 219-220; XXVIII, pp. 222-225(g);
XXX, pp. 227-231; XXXV, pp. 246-261; XXXVII, p. 267;
XLII, pp. 290-291; XLVI, pp. 295-309(g), PGSA.
(The religion of each officer was determined on the basis 
of the individual's name.) PGSL.
* In order to fit the table into the space available, the following 
abbreviations have been used as column headings:
A - Indians (includes Parsis and Indian Christians)
B - Muslims 
C - Hindus 
D - Sikhs
E - Differential in Muslim Employment
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APPENDIX K.
Showing the Communal Composition of the All-India Services 
on 31st December of each of the Years 1925 and 1932
Year Hindus Muslims Sikhs
I.e.S. 1925 13% 3.4% 0.3%
1932 25% 5.8% 0.5%
Indian Police 1925 5.8% 4.7% 0.6%
1932 10.8% 6.9% 0.8%
Indian Forest Service 1925 19.7% 3.8% 1.9%
1932 27.4% 6.6% 2.4%
Indian Service of Engineers 1925 28.0% 4.0% 1.3%
1932 34.7% 4.0% 2.4%
Indian Medical Service 1923 10.7% 2.3% 0.8%
(Civil) 1932 18.1% 4.4% 3.4%
Superior Engineering,
Telegraph and Wireless 1925 24.2% 4.8%
Branches 1932 4o.4% 1.9% 3.8%
Indian Audit and Accounts 1925 48.9% 4.3%
Service 1932 62.4% 9.7% 1.1%
Imperial Customs Service 1925 20.6% 5.9%
1932 26.6% 10.0%
Military Accounts Dept. 1925 18.3% 1.5%
1932 27.1% 8.5%
Indian Kailway Service 1925 20.9% 1.3% 0.9%
of Engineers 1932 25.6% 5.0% 2.0%
Senior Revenue 1923
0
0 4.6% 0.2%
Establishments 1932 17.8% 4.7% 1.2%
Source: Statement Showing Communal Composition of the All-India
Services on 31 Dec. of each of the years 1925-32tenclosed with 
letter, C.M. Trivedi to F.W.H. Smith, Sec., S&G Dept., Oct., 1933, 
S&G/5415/1933, I/S&G/7/18. IOR.
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APPENDIX M.
I.C.S. Examinations Held in London, 1924-40
Year Successful Candidates - All-India Successful Candidates - Punjab
Muslim Hindu Sikh Others Muslim Hindu Sikh Others
1924 Nil 7 Nil 1 Nil Nil Nil Nil
1925 1 14 Nil Nil Nil 1 Nil Nil
1926 2 8 1 Nil Nil 1 1 Nil
1927 2 17 Nil 2 Nil Nil Nil Nil
1928 Nil 14 1 1 Nil Nil 1 Nil
1929 1 14 Nil 2 1 1 Nil Nil
1930 1 21 Nil 2 Nil Nil Nil Nil
1931 1 8 Nil 1 Nil Nil Nil Nil
1932 3 10 Nil 3 1 Nil Nil Nil
1933 2 11 Nil 3 Nil Nil Nil 1
1934 1 10 Nil 3 1 1 Nil Nil
1933 1 13 1 Nil 1 Nil 1 Nil
1936 Nil 19 1 1 Nil 2 1 Nil
1937 Nil 8 Nil 5 Nil 1 Nil 1
1938 Nil 8 Nil 3 Nil 1 Nil Nil
1939 1 3 Nil 3 Nil 1 Nil 1
1940 Nil 6 Nil Nil Nil 1 Nil Nil
Total 16 191 4 32 4 10 4 3
Percent­
ages 6.6% 78.6% 1.6% 13.2% 1995 48%
19% 14%
Source: Compiled from information contained in India Office Records,
I/S&G/7/131 - L/S&G/7/145, I/S&G/7/160, L/S&G/7/172, 
l/S&G/7/173i L/S&G/7/192.
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Appendix N. Candidates who Sat I.C.S. Delhi Examinations 
1930-19^+01 Grouped in Relation to Fathers1 
Occupations
to0>•HP
E
EOO
A
a
B
b
C D E
a
F
b c d
G H I
Totals 62 3 9 199 1 3 8 21 10 32 2
% K 18 0 .8 2.5 57 0.3 0 .8 2 6 3 9 0 .6
Totals 11 4 4 91 6 12 30 12 1 33 2 1
% L 5 2 2 44 3 6 14 6 0.5 16 1 0.5
Totals 13 2 3 45 9 4 1 8 1 1
% M 17 2 3 50.5 10 4.5 1 9 1 1
Totals 6 5 2
46 39 15
Grand
Totals 88 9 16 341 1 9 20 60 31 2 73 5 4
Overall
%s 13.*+ 1.4
2 52 0.2 1.4 3 9 5 0.3 11 0.7 0.6
Abbreviations:
A - Agriculture, Zamindars, Landlords, Jagirdars
B - Mixed Incomes: (a) Land and Trade and/or Businesses
(b) Land and Professional and/or Government Service
C - Government or State’s Service
D - Military Service
E - Government Contracting
F - The Professions: (a) Medicine, (b) Law, (c) Teaching, (d) Accounting. 
G - Commerce, Banking, Industry, Business 
H - Private Service 
I - Honorific Positions 
K - Muslims 
L - Hindus 
M - Sikhs 
N - Others 
% - Percentage
Source: Compiled from information contained in India Office Record
Files I/S&G/7/240 - L/S&G/7/250.
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APPENDIX 0.
Successful Candidates from the Punjab who appeared at the
London Examinations, !1924 to 19^0
Exam
Year Name of Candidate Religion Father's Occupation
192^ Nil
1925 Gopal Das Kholsa Hindu District & Sessions Judge
1926 Prem Nath Thaper Hindu Landowner & Banker
1927 Nil
1928 Nawab Singh Sikh Government Servant
1929 Ghulara Mueenuddin Muslim Zamindar, Departmental Supt.Police
Dharma Vira Hindu Chief Engineer, Irrigation Branch
1930 Nil
1931 Nil
1932 S.F. Hassan Muslim Punjab Police
1933 Arthur Samuels Lall Indian
Christian
Professor of Mathematics
193^ N. Sen Hindu Government Service
S.O. Ali ■Muslim Supt. Post Offices
1933 M. Ayub Muslim Merchant, Dairyowner, Contractor
B.S. Grewal Sikh States' Service
1936 T. Singh Sikh Asst.Commissioner, Income Tax,
Bombay
Government ServiceK.C. Chowdhry Hindu
H. Lai Hindu Professor
1937 P.G. Nair Hindu Barrister
J.S. Lall Indian
Christian
Professor of Mathematics
1938 Raghu Pati Kapur Hindu Tahsildar
1939 K. Chand Hindu Landlord
R.F. Isar Indian
Christian
Provincial Civil Service
19^0 Narottam Sahgal Hindu Chief Engineer,B & R Branch, Sec., 
Govt, of Punjab.
Source: Compiled from information contained in India Office Records,
I/S&G/7/132 - l/S&G/7/1^5, L/S&G/7/160, I/S&G/7/172, 
I/S&G/7/173, I/S&G/7/192.
APPENDIX P.
Successful Candidates from the Punjab who appeared at the
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Indian Examinations, 192*+ to 19*+0
Exam Name o:j> candidate Religion 
Year **
Place and date of 
Birth
Father's
192*+ Nil
1925 Balwant Rai Tandon H Jullundur, 8/10/1903 C.I.E. & I.S.O.
Sisir Kumar Sen H Jessore, Bengal*
3/2/1903 Not given
1926 Sheikh Abdur Rahman M Wazirabad, Gujranwalla,
W 1 9 0 3
»
Contractor
1927 Nil
1928 Nil
1929 Hafiz Abdul Majid M Kasur, 17/10/1907 Silk Merchant
1930 Dharm Pal Bhandari H Lahore, 28/9/1908 Punjab Civil 
Service
1931 Pir Ahsanud-Din M Ludhiana, 7/9/1909 Acting Comm., 
Lyallpur
Mohammad Ikram M Ledharanwala,
10/9/1908 of
Employed in Office 
Dir.of Agriculture 
Lahore
Parvez Mohammad Ismail I.C. Jagraon, 27/5/1908 Professor
1932 N.N. Wanchoo H Satna (Baghelkhand 
C.I.Agency)*1/5/1910
Supt.to A.G.G. 
Punjab States
1933 Nil
193*+ Nil
1935 Agha Abdul Hamid M Sialkot, 2/8/1912 E.A.C.,Dir.of 
Agri., Multan
1936 Ali Ashgar M Ferozepur, 15/7/191*+ Advocate
1937 Nizir Ahmed M Murree, 10/2/191*+ Cloth Merchant
1938 Basir Ahmad Khan M Quetta, Baluchistan,* 
1/12/191*+
E.A.
Commissioner
Gursaran Das Kalia H Jagraon, Ludhiana, Manager,British Autc 
22/2/1915 & Eng.Co., Govt., 
Police Transport 
Contractors
Kewal Singh Chaudhary S Lyallpur, 1/6/1913 Landlord
1939 Saroop Krishen H Ludhiana, 18/1/1915 Barrister
Ranjit Rai Bahl H Hoshiarpur,16/8/1915 Landlord
19*+0 Sahdve Vohra H Lahore, 5/7/1917 Businessman
Maqbul Mohammad Niaz M Hoshiarpur, 5/11/1917 Advocate
* Though these candidates were born outside of the Punjab they were 
of Punjabi parentage and were classed as Punjabis in the application 
forms and result lists.
** M - Muslim, H - Hindu, S - Sikh, I.C. - Indian Christian.
Source: Compiled from information contained in files I/S&G/7/235-250. ICR.
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APPENDIX Q.
Nominated Punjabi Candidates from Indian Examinations, 1924-1940 
Year Name Religion Place and Date Father's
of Birth___________ Occupation
1924 Nil
1925 Nil
1926 Shamsher Singh Dulat S No information given No information given
1927 Nil
1928 Nasir Ahmad M Karnal, 14/6/03 Surgeon
Aziz Ahmad M Lahor e, 24/6/06 Sub-Divl, Officer, 
Railway Service
Tarlochan Das Bedi S Kaparthala State, 
23/12/03 Tahsildar
1929 Muhammad Hadi Hussain M Gujranwala,13/1/06 Not given
Nazir Ahmed Faruqi M Gujar Khan,15/12/06 Asst. Surgeon
S.M. Burke I.C. Sheikhupura, 3/7/06 Teacher
1930 Niaz Md.Khan Barakzai M Gurdaspur, 12/6/07 Sub-Inspt. Police
Khwaja Abdur Rahim M Amr i t sar, 1/9/08 Sub-Judge
Mohammad Khurshid M Rawalpindi, 8/12/07 Not given
1931 Kapar Singh S Lyallpur, 2/3/09 Agriculturist
1932 Abdulla Khalid Nalik M Govali, 7/7/10 Not given
Mohindar Singh Randhaia S Zira, 2/2/09 Tahsildar
1933 Nil
1934 Nil
1933 Sheikh Nazrul-Bakar M Gu j ranwala,21/12/1 3 General Merchant 
and Contractor
1936 Muhammad Azim Husain M Gurdaspur, 5/10/13 Lawyer
Sardar Ata Muhammad 
Khan
M Lyallpur, 8/1/14
<
Hon.Army Lieut., 
{Agriculturist)
Gyan Singh Kahlon S Gurdaspur, 13/3/13 Headmaster
1937 Sheikh Muhammad Yusuf M Lahore, 13/13/13 Suptd. High Court, 
Lahore
Mirza Muzaffar Ahmad M Qadian, 23/2/13 Agriculturist
S.Ata Muhammad Khan 
Leghari M Dera Ghazi Khan,1913 Agriculturist M.L.C.
A.S. Wazir M Jammu Kashmir*23/2/14 Lecturer
Ashgar Ali Shah M Ludhiana, 3/4/l4 Dept. Post Master
1938 Syed Ghias-ud-Din Ahmed M Abbaspur, 1/6/15 Agriculturist
Mohd. Hussain Sufi M Gujranwala,13/2/14 Agriculturist
1939 Sheikh Anwaral Haq M N.W.F.P.* 11/5/17 Stationmaster NWFP
Muhammad Masud M Lahore, 25/6/16 Doctor
1940 Qudrat Ullah Shahab M Gilgit,Kashmir* Agriculture and
26/2/17 Service
Source: Compiled from information contained in files L/S&G/7/236-250.I0R.
* As in Appendix P. ** M-Muslim, H-Hindu, S-Sikh, I.C.-Indian Christian
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APPENDIX R.
THE MUSLIM LEADERSHIP OF THE PUNJAB IN THE 1919-194?-PERIOD
The families who dominated Muslim politics included the Arain Mians 
of Baghbanpura (Sir Muhammad Shafi, Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz, Begum 
Jahanara Shah Nawaz, Mian Iftikharuddin, Mian Bashir Ahmad), the Mokul 
family (Sardar Habibullah), and the Qizilbash clan (Nawab Sir Muzaffar 
Ali Khan Qizilbash) of Lahore District; the Chathas (Riasat Ali) of 
Gujranwala; the Janjuas of Darapur (Talib Mehdi Khan, Khair Mehdi Khan, 
Lahrasab Khan), the Pirs of Jalalpur (Nawab Sir Mehr Shah) and Khokars 
(Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan) of Jhelum; the Pirs of Makhad, the Kot Ghebas 
(Sir Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan), the Hyats of Wah (Sir Sikander Hyat 
Khan, Nawab Muzaffar Khan, Sardar Shaukat Hyat Khan), and the Shamasabad 
Awans (Nawab Muhammad Amin Khan) of Attock; the Noon-Tiwana family 
group (Sir Muhammad Hayat Khan Noon, Sir Muhammad Firoz Khan Noon, Malik 
Sardar Khan Noon, Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, Sir Khizar Hayat Khan 
Tiwana, Sir Allah Bakhsh Khan, Nawabzada Malik Muhammad Habibullah Khan), 
the Qureshis (Nawab Muhammad Hayat, Mian Saeed, Mian Zakir), Pirachas 
(Sheikh Fazle Haq, Sheikh Fazal Ilahi) and the Pirs of Jahanian Shah 
(Syed Ghulam Muhammad) of Shahpur; the Wanbachran (Malik Muzaffar Khan) 
and the Kalabagh (Malik Amir Muhammad Khan) families of Mianwali; the 
Pirs of Rajoa (Syed Ghulam Abbas) and of Shah Jiwana (Syed Mubarik Ali, 
Syed Abid Husain) and Sials of Jhang (S.Muhammad Amin); the Daultanas 
(Nawab Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, Mian Allah Yar Khan, Mian Mumtaz 
Muhammad Khan Daultana), the Gilanis (Mustafa Shah and Muhammad Hussain), 
Dahas (Khan Haibat Khan), Qureshis (Murid Hussain, Ashiq Hussain), 
Gardezis (Syed Ali Husain Shah) and Khaggas (Pir Budhan Shah) of Multan; 
the Gurmanis (Mushtaq Ahmad, Muhammad Ghulam Jilani Gurmani) and Dastis 
(Abdul Hamid Khan) of Muzaffargarh; the Legharis (Sir Jamal Khan), 
Drishaks (Allah Khan, Bahadur Khan), Mazaris (Balakh Sher, Sher Baz) and 
the Pirs of Taunsa Sharif of Dera Ghazi Khan and the Mamdots (Nawab 
Shawaz Khan, Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Khan) of Ferozepore.
The names underlined signify membership of the Punjab Legislative 
Assembly in the 1937-47 period.
Sources: C. Baxter, 'The People's Party Vs. the Punjab "Feudalists'",
Journal of Asian Studies, VIII (1973)» pp.168-175; Lists of 
Members and Constituencies, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1937»
1946; Punjab Legislative Assembly Library, Lahore.
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APPENDIX S .
THE PUNJAB ELECTORATE (1946)
Total Population 27,955, *+50
Total Male Population (+ 20) 7,642,950
Total Number of Voters 3,5^4,749
Percentage of Total Population Enfranchised 12.5%
Approximate Percentage of Total Adult Male
Population (+ 20) Enfranchised ................ 46%
Total Muslim Population 1 5,913,450
Total Adult Male Muslim Population (+ 20) 4,260,600
Total Number of Muslims Enfranchised 1,619,691
Percentage of Muslim Population Enfranchised 10%
Approximate Percentage of Adult Muslim Male
Population (+ 20) Enfranchised ................ 38%
Total Hindu Population 7,414,850
Total Adult Male Hindu Population (+ 20) 2,114,850
Total Number of Hindus Enfranchised 848,744
Percentage of Hindu Population Enfranchised 11.4%
Approximate Percentage of Adult Hindu Male
Population (+ 20) Enfranchised ................ 40%
Total Sikh Population 3,770,850
Total Adult Male Sikh Population (+ 20) 1,040,400
Total Number of Sikhs Enfranchised 659,396
Percentage of Sikh Population Enfranchised 17*5%
Approximate Percentage of Adult Sikh Male
Population (+ 20) Enfranchised ................ 63%
SOURCE: Census of India, 1941, Punjab, Table XI, p.68;
Times of India, 13 March, 1946.
The above population figures provide an approximation rather 
than an absolute truth. The 1941 Census of India was conducted 
in difficult wartime conditions, as a result of which the 
standard of accuracy declined.
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APPENDIX T.
THE PATTERN OF VOTING IN THE MUSLIM CONSTITUENCIES 
Details of abbreviations used given at end of Appendix, p. kOJ>.
Percentage 
of tot'al.
No.of 
Voters
(1)
Votes
Polled
(2)
Parties* 
share of 
votes cast
(3)
Percentage 
of votes 
cast
(4)
electorate 
who voted 
for success- 
ful Party 
(5)
RURAL
CONSTITUENCIES:
Hissar 19,870 10,218
(51.42%)
ML. 7,840 
U. 2,375 
I. 3
77%
23%
0.00%
39.5%
Rohtak 10,983 6,157
(56%)
ML. 5,150
u. 991
Inv. 16
83.64%
16.09%
0 .25%
47%
N.W.Gurgaon 15,018 9,794
(65#)
ML. 4,193 
U. 3,022 
Inv.2,579
43%
31%
26%
28%
S.E.Gurgaon 12,775 8,347
(65%)
ML. 3,821 
I. 1,763 
Inv.2,763
46%
21%
33%
30%
Karnal 19,068 11,461
(60%)
ML.10,072
c. 1,189
Inv. 200
88%
11%
1%
53%
Ambala and 
Simla
19,324 11,952
(62%)
ML.10,141 
U. 1,061 
Inv. 750
85%
9%
6%
52.5%
Kangra and 
E.Hoshiarpur
16,549 11,729
(68%)
ML. 7,803
u. 3 ,895  
c. 31
67%
33%
47%
Hoshiarpur West 19,669 12,503
(64%)
ML. 5,815 
U. 4,077 
Inv.2,611
46%
33%
21%
30%
Jullundur North 23,986 15,718
(66%)
ML.11,390 
A. 4,296 
Inv. 32
73%
27%
47.5%
Jullundur South 24,414 14,583
(60%)
ML. 8,428 
I. 3,417 
Inv.2,738
58%
23%
19%
34.5%
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APPENDIX T (continued)
RURAL CONSTITUENCIES:
O) (2) (3) (4)
Ludhiana
Ferozepore
Central
Ferozepore 12,503
East
Fazilka 13,138
Lahore 13,594
Chunian 23,618
Kasur 14,493
Amritsar 10,407
Tarn Taran 8,210
Ajnala 11,300
Gurdaspur 16,590
East
Batala
Shakargarh
13,087 ML. 8,927 68%
(64%) U. 2,707 21%
0. 1,453 11%
12,880 ML. 7,205 56%
(74.5%) U. 3,549 28%
0.8cInv,.2,126 16%
7,275 ML. 5,067 70%
(58%) U. 2,167 30%
0.8cInv, 41
8,994 U. 5,549 62%
(68.5%) ML. 3,441 38%
Inv, 4
10,104 U. 5,405 53.5%
(74%) ML. 4,656 46%
0.8c Inv,. 43
15,148 ML.11,761 78%
(64%) U. 2,699 18%
0.8c Inv,. 688 4%
• 9,389 ML. 6,969 74%
(65%) U. 2,118 23%0.8c Inv . 302 3%
7,372 ML. 5,151 70%
(71%) U. 2,209 30%
I. 12
5,779 ML. 3,399 59%
(70%) U. 2,217 38%
0 . 163 3%
7,222 ML. 5,326 74%
(64%) U. 1,476 20%
0. 420 6%
9,207 ML. 8,609 94%
(55.5%) U. 573 6%
0.8c Inv. 25
16,161 I. 6,266 39%
(71%) U. 5,651 35%
0.8c Inv.4,244 26%
9,015 ML. 4,516 50%
(70%) U. 3,779 42%
0.8c Inv. 720 8%
(3)
44%
42%
4 0.5%
42%
40%
30%
48%
49.3%
41%
47%
52%
27.5%
35%
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APPENDIX T (continued)
RURAL CONSTITUENCIES: 
(1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
Sialkot North 19,793 12,366
(62.5%)
0.&
ML. 9,080
u. 2,874
Inv. 412
73% ' 
23% 
3%
46%
Sialkot
Central
17,496 10,958
(63%)
0.&
ML. 6,353 
A. 4,514 
Inv. 91
58%
41%
1%
36%
Sialkot South 20,349 13,225
(65%)
0.&
ML. 8,351
u . 3,983
Inv. 891
63%
30%
7%
41%
Gujranwala
North
21,906 14,420 
(66%)
0.&
ML. 7,872 
U. 6,332 
Inv. 216
55%
44%
1%
36%
Gujranwala
East
21,362 16,172
(75%)
ML. 8,185
u. 7,905
Inv. 82
51%
49%
38%
Hafizabad 18,003 11,476
(64%)
0.&
ML. 8,290 
U. 3,168 
Inv. 18
72%
28%
46%
Sheikhupura 30,873 14,823
(48%)
0.&
ML.11,363 
U. 3,394 
Inv. 66
77%
23%
37%
Nankana Sahib 13,125 10,566
(70%)
ML. 5,576 
U. 4,862 
Inv. 128
53%
46%
1%
37%
Shahdara 14,714 10,119
(69%)
ML. 7,573 
U. 2,402 
Inv. 144
75%
24%
1%
51.5%
Gujrat North 19,161 12,512
(65%)
ML. 8,742 
U. 3,743 
Inv. 27
70%
30%
46%
Gujrat East 15,665 10,432
(67%)
u. 6,876
ML. 3,556
66%
34%
44%
S.E. Gujrat 22,409 13,15*+
(59%)
ML.10,838 
U. 2,316
82%
18%
48%
N.W. Gujrat 18,141 11,191
(62%) 0.&
ML. 8,253 
Inv.2,942
74%
26%
45.5%
S.W. Gujrat 15,235 9,717
(64%) U.&
ML. 6,794 
Inv.2,923
70%
30%
45%
APPENDIX T (continued)
RURAL CONSTITUENCIES:
(1 ) (2) (3) (4)
400
(5)
Shahpur 32,282 25,039 u . 14,553 58% 45%
(78#) ML. 10,411 42%
0.8c Inv. 75
Khushab 26,457 18,870 U. 10,654 57% 4o%
(71%) ML. 8,182 43%
0.8c Inv. 3^
Bhalwal 32,159 22,043 ML 12,732 58% 4o%
(68%) U. 9,219 42%
0.8c Inv. 92
Sargodha 27,394 19,752 U. 10,316 52% 38%
(72%) ML. 9,093 46%
0.8c Inv. 343 2%
Jhelum 20,059 12,077 ML. 9,887 82% 49%
(60%) U. 2,167 18%
0.8c Inv. 23
Pind Dadan 17,487 7,411 ML. 7,106 96% 41%
Khan (42%) U. 263 3.5%
0.8c Inv. 42 0.5%
Chakawal 18,656 11,133 ML 8,444 76% 45%
(60%) U.& Inv. 2,689 24%
Rawalpindi 17,822 io,48o ML. 5,624 54% 31.5%
Sadr (59%) I. 3,271 31%
0.8c Inv. 1,585 15%
Gujjar Khan 20,220 10,387 ML. 8,956 86% 44%
(51%) U. 883 9%
1.8c Inv. 548 5%
Rawalpindi 20,931 12,397 ML. 10,380 84% 49.5%
East (59%) U. 2,008 16%
0.8c Inv. 9
Attock North 21,820 14,999 ML. 7,639 51% 35%
(69%) U. 7,238 48%
0.8c Inv. 122 1%
Attock Central 21,094 U.unopposed
Attock South 19,926 12,545 U. 8,342 66.5% 42%
(63%) ML.8c Inv. 4,203 33-5%
Mianwali North 19,657 12,409 ML. 8,310 67% 42%
(63%) U.8c Inv. 4,099 33%
APPENDIX T (continued)
RURAL CONSTITUENCIES:
( 1) ( 2 ) (5 ) (4 ) (5 )
Mianwali South 29,710 19,864
(67%)
U.
ML 8c Inv.
10,049
9 ,815
51%
49%
54%
Montgomery 28,851 17,746
(61.5% )
ML.
U.
1 .8c Inv.
14,754
2 ,888
104
83%
16%
1%
51%
Okara 22,657 15,164
(67%)
ML.
U.
15,524
1,840
88%
12%
59%
Dipalpur 16,095 10,180
(65%)
ML.
U.
0.8c Inv.
6 ,882
5 ,190
108
68%
51%
1%
43%
Pakpattan 20,812 15,222
(65.5% )
ML.
U.
Inv.
8 ,555
4,867
2
63%
57%
40%
Lyallpur 25,812 14,701
( 62%)
ML.
U.
0.&  Inv.
10,412
4 ,256
55
71%
29%
44%
Samundri 24,387 16,205
( 66%)
ML.
U.
0.8c Inv.
10,255
5 ,906
64
65%
57%
42%
Toba Tek Singh 5 7 ,7 *0 25,570
( 62%)
ML.
U.
0 .8c Inv.
11,492  
10,294  
1,784
49%
44%
7%
30%
Jaranwala 17,159 12,282
(72%)
ML.
U.
0.8c Inv.
8,058
4,205
41
66%
54%
47%
Jhang East 21,491 ML. Unopposed
Jhang Central 21,817 14,580
( 66%)
ML.
U.
1 .8c Inv.
10,855
5,490
55
76%
24%
50%
Jhang West 18,502 6,176
(55%)
ML.
U.
I.
5,571
600
5
90%
10%
50%
Multan 20,291 14,384
(71%)
u.
ML. 
0.8c Inv.
7 ,415
6 ,759
210
52%
47%
1%
56.!
Shujabad 12,716 8,788
(69%)
ML.
U.
5,405
5 ,558
62%
58%
42.:
0.& Inv. 25
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RURAL CONSTITUENCIES:
(1) (2) (3) w (5)
Lodhran 18,200 10,606
(58%)
ML. 8,204 
U. 2,384 
Inv. 18
77%
23%
45%
Mailsi 27,826 17,694
(64%)
ML. 13,304
u. 4,315
Inv. 75
75%
24%
48%
Khanewal 21,096 13,705
(65#)
ML. 9,827
u. 3,832
0.8c Inv. 44
72%
28%
47%
Kabirwala 20,509 13,278
(65%)
ML. 9,193 
U. 4,060 
Inv. 25
69%
31%
45%
Muzaffargarh
Sadr
17,437 11,736
(67%)
0.&
ML. 6,093
u. 2,983
Inv. 2,660
52%
25%
23%
35%
Alipur 12,136 8,729
(72%)
0.&
U. 3,961 
ML. 3,597 
Inv. 1,171
^5%
41%
14%
33%
Muzaffargarh
North
18,725 11,644
(62%)
ML. 7,524 
U. 3,741 
Inv. 379
65%
32%
3%
40%
Dera Ghazi 
Khan North 9,105 ML. Unopposed
Dera Ghazi 
Khan Central
10,236 • 6,650 
(65%)
u. 3,655
ML. 2,986 
Inv. 9
55%
45%
36%
Dera Ghazi 
Khan South
14,414 9,431
(65%)
0.8c
ML. 3,237 
U. 3,133 
Inv. 3,061
34%
33%
32%
22.5%
URBAN CONSTITUENCIES:
Southern Towns 17,102 8,870
(52%)
ML. 8,627 
I. 215 
Inv. 28
97%
2%
50%
South Eastern 
Towns
23,498 13,^05
(65.5%)
0.8c
ML. 12,072 
A. 3,269 
Inv. 64
78%
21%
51%
Inner Lahore 20,413 11,349
(56%)
ML. 9,802 
I. 1,422 
Inv. 125
86.5%
12.5%
1%
48%
403
APPENDIX T (continued)
URBAN CONSTITUENCIES:
( D (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 )
Outer Lahore 39,650 13,414 ML. 13,053 97% 33%
(34%) I.& Inv. 361 3%
Amritsar City 28,130 17,241 ML. 11,172 65% 4o%
(6156) A.& Inv. 6,069 35%
N.E. Towns 29,948 24,116 ML. 14,813 61% 49%
( 80 . 5%) A. 9,077 38%
0.& Inv. 226 1%
Rawalpindi Div. 30,424 17,134 ML. 14,728 86% 48%
Towns (5650 U. 2 ,346 14%
0.& Inv. 60
Multan Div. 30,402 17,024 ML. 12,905 76% 42%
Towns (56%) A. 4 ,112 24%
0. 7
Abbreviations:
ML. - Muslim League 
U. - Unionist
C. - Congress
A. - Ahrar
I. - Independent
0. - Others
Inv.- Invalid
SOURCE: Times of India, 13 March, 1946
APPENDIX U .
kok
The Incidence of Official Interference in Muslim 
Constituencies in the Punjab During the 19^6 Election
Out of a total of 56 Muslim constituencies which were examined, 
official interference was reported in 39 of them.
Constituencies Surveyed Party Illegally Employing Government Officials
Dera Ghazi Khan North Muslim League
Chakwal it it
Dipalpur !l it
Mianwali North ti it
Muzaffargarh North it it
Jhang West it it
Attock South Unionist Party
Multan ii n
Kabirwala Muslim League
Sheikhupura ii ti
Shakargarh ti it
Gurgaon it it
N.W. Gurgaon ii it
Montgomery n it
N.E. Towns ii it
Rohtak it it
Tarn Taran ii it
Dera Ghazi Khan South it it
Gujranwala North ii tt
Jullundur North ti tt
Sialkot Central ii it
Alipur Unionist Party
Ludhiana Muslim League
Rawalpindi East ti it
Sargodha Unionist Party
Fazilka ti ti
Hissar Muslim League
Southern Towns ii ii
Batala Independent Candidate
Shahpur Unionist Party
Lahore ii it
Lyallpur Muslim League
(continued)
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Constituencies Surveyed
Gujrat North 
Hafizabad 
Gujranwala East 
Rawalpindi Division Towns 
Mianwali South 
Khushab
Toba Tek Singh
No cases of official interference were reported in East Jhang, S.E. 
Gujrat, N.W. Gujrat, Pakpattan, Ferozepore Central, Muzaffargarh Sadr, 
Outer Lahore, S.W. Gujrat, Hoshiarpur West, Khanewal, Pind Dadan Khan, 
Nankana Sahib, Attock North, Bhalwal, Samundri, Jhang Central and 
Sialkot South.
Source: Punjab Government Gazette, Part III, 21 June 1946, pp.286-289,
293, 301; 28 June 1946, pp.321-374; 5 July 1946, pp.383-392; 12 July
1946, pp.424-463; 19 July 1946, pp.473-486; 26 July 1946, pp.506-561;
2 Aug. 1946, pp.3S7-606; 9 Aug. 1946, pp.613 -6 5 0; 16 Aug. 1946, pp.670  
-708; 23 Aug. 1946, pp.724-748; 6 Sept. 1946, pp.802-838; 13 Sept.
1946, pp.839-887; 4 Oct. 1946, pp.918-928; 26 March 1947, pp.240-241;
11 April 1947, pp.155-177, 211-213; 18 April 1947, pp.226-237, 255-258; 
25 April 1947, pp.299-302, PGSL.
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Party Illegally Employing 
Government Officials
Muslim League
i t  11
i t  i i
Unionist Party
i t  11
Muslim League
APPENDIX V.
The Incidence of Bribery in Muslim Constituencies in the Punjab 
During the 1946 Elections
Out of a total of 56 Muslim constituencies which were examined 
(see Appendix U) bribery was alleged to have occurred in 24 of them.
Constituenc ies
East Jhan
Chakwal
Dipalpur
Multan
Kabirwala
Sheikhupura
Muzaffargah Sadr
S.E. Gurgaon
N.W. Gurgaon
Montgomery
Khanewal
Pind Dadan Khan
Gujranwala North
Jullundur North
Sialkot Central
Ludhiana
Hissar
Bhalwal
Samundri
Shahpur
Lahore
Gujranwala East 
Mianwali South 
Khushab
Name of Candidate on whose 
behalf Bribes were offered
M. Ghulam Muhammad
Raja Mohd. Sarfraz Ali Khan
Syed Ashaq Hussain
Major Ashiq Hussain
Nau Bahar Shah
Mahammad Hussain
K.S. Abdul Hamid Khan
Mihtab Khan
M. Ahmad Jan
M. Khan of Kot
Pir Buddan Shah Khagga
Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan
Chaudhri Salah-ud-Din
Mahammad Abus Salam
Safraz Khan
Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed Khan
K.S. Chaudhry Sahib Dad Khan
Sheikh Fazal Huq
Mohammad Khan
Sultan Ali Mian
Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash
Zafrulla Khan
Mohd. Abdullah Khan
Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana
Party
Muslim League 
Muslim League 
Muslim League 
Unionist 
Muslim League 
Muslim League 
Muslim League 
Muslim League 
Muslim League 
Muslim League 
Muslim League 
Muslim League 
Muslim League 
Muslim League 
Muslim League 
Muslim League 
Muslim League 
Muslim League 
Muslim League 
Unionist 
Unionist 
Muslim League 
Unionist 
Unionist
Source: Punjab Government Gazette, Part III, 21 June 1946,
pp.286-289, 295-501; 2$""June 1946, pp. 521-574; 5 July
1946, pp. 585-418; 12 July 1946, pp. 424-465; 19 July
1946, pp. 475-486; 26 July 1946, pp. 506-5*0, 5^8-561;
2 Aug. 1946, pp. 587-606; 9 Aug. 1946, pp. 615-650;
16 Aug. 1946, pp. 670-708; 25 Aug. 1946, pp. 724-748:
6 Sept. 1946, pp. 802-858; 15 Sept. 1946, pp. 859-887  
4 Oct. 1946, pp. 918-928; 26 March 1947, pp. 240-241
11 April 1947, pp. 155-177, 211-215; 18 April 1947,
pp. 226-257, 255-258; 25 April 1947, pp. 299-302. PGSL.
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APPENDIX W.
Incidence of Coercion and Intimidation Which Occurred in Muslim 
Constituencies' in the Punjab During the 1946 Election
Out of 56 Muslim constituencies surveyed (for full list of constituencies 
see Appendix U ), the irregularities referred to above occurred in the 
following:
Constituency
Mianwali North 
Attock South 
Multan
Ferozepore Central
S.W. Gujrat
N.E. Towns
Pind Dadan Khan
Dera Ghazi Khan South
Nankana Sahib
Sargodha
Fazilka
Hissar
Shahpur
Gujrat North
Gujranwala East
Mianwali South
Khushab
Toba Tek Singh
Candidate Party
Khan Abdul Sattar Khan Muslim League
M.Mohi-ud-Din Lai Badshah Mukhad Unionist 
Major Ashiq Hussain "
Nawab of Mamdot Muslim League
Ghulam Rasul 
K.B.Karamat Ali 
Raja Ghazanfar Ali 
Sardar Bahadar Khan 
Shahadat Khan
Sir Malik Allah Bux Khan Tiwana 
M. Bagh Ali
K.S.Chaudhry Sahib Dad Khan 
Sultan Ali Mian 
Fazal Ilahi 
Zafrulla Khan 
Mohd. Abdullah Khan- 
Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana 
Mian Nur Ullah
11
Unionist
it
Muslim League 
Unionist 
Muslim League
tt it
Unionist
tt
Muslim League
Source: Punjab Government Gazette, Pt.III, 28 June 1946, pp.525-526,
545-548; 5 July 1946, pp.593-398, 405-418; 19 July 1946, pp.478-482;
26 July 1946, pp.512-521, 553-558; 2 Aug. 1946, p.601; 16 Aug. 1946,
pp.676-706; 6 Sept. 1946, pp.814-820; 15 Sept. 1946, pp.879-887;
4 Oct. 1946, pp.918-928. PGSL.
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APPENDIX X.
Pirs and Religious Leaders Who Supported the Muslim League - 
Listed According to the Constituencies they Visited, or in 
which Fatwas were issued in their names
S.E. Gujrat
Maulvi Mohd. Abdullah Sulemani of Kurjab, Qazi of the Ilaqa. Haji Syed 
Pir Yaqub Shah of Majra (Gujrat Tahsil). Pir Nawazish Hussain (Gujrat
Tahsil). Riaz Hussain of Jehran Wali (Gujrat Tahsil). Syed Said Karim
Shah (son of Murtza Shah of Mugho Wal, Gujrat Tahsil). Hafiz Fazal
Hussain of Rajeki. Maulvi Mohd. Alam (Gujrat Tahsil). Syed Mahmud Shah
(son of Wilayat Shah, President of the Sunni Conference, Gujrat). Syed 
Malang Shah of Suq Kalan (Gujrat Tahsil). Syed Fazal Shah of Khepra 
Wala (Gujrat Tahsil). Syed Gul Hussain Shah of Majoki (Gujrat Tahsil). 
Syed Nur Shah of Majoki (Gujrat Tahsil). Syed Akhar Shah of Bhidana 
(Gujrat Tahsil). Syed Shekoor Shah of Bukan (Gujrat Tahsil). The Pirs 
of Jheran Wali. Syed Mahmud Shah (son of Syed Wilayat Shah of Gujrat). 
The Khalifa of Qadian (Ahmadia Spiritual Head). Pir Jamat Ali Shah of 
Alipur (Sialkot District).
Mianwali North
Pir Jamat Ali Shah of Alipur. Also local Pirs who were not named 
confronted electors at the polling stations.
Muzaffargarh North 
Pir Jamat Ali Shah of Alipur and local Pirs.
Jhang West
Makhdum Nazar Husain. Mian Habib Sultan. Mian Nur Hussain. Mian Faiz 
Sultan. Mian Ghulam Jilani. Faqir Ghulam Yasin. The Sajjada Nashins 
of Hassu Bale, Sultan Bahu of Shorkot. Maulana Fazal Shah, Qureshi 
Mufti. Pir Abdul Rehman. Maulana Faiz Mohd. Awan. Maulana Pandit Lekh 
Ram. Maulana Azan Husain.
Sheikhupura
Pir Jamat Ali Shah of Alipur. Pir Kutab Shah. Pir Imdad Hussain Shah of 
Hujra Sharif. Maulvi Mohd. Hussain of Amenabad. Pir Ashgar Ali Shah.
Ali Husain Shah, Sassad Nashin of Khangah Dogran.
N.W. Gujrat
Pir Mohd. Fazal Shah of Jalalpur Sharif (Jhelum District). Sufi Mohd.
Din (President of the Jama Masjid Committee). Pir Sayet Arif Hussain of 
partab Pura. Faqir Sayed Imdad Ali Shah Jilani. Hazrat Pir Syed Jama4t 
Ali Shah. Syed Fazl Shah. Malik Sufi Mohd. Din (Municipal Commissioner, 
Mandi Bahauddin). Mian Shah Mohd. (Manager, Islamia High School). Wara 
Allam Shah (Phalia Tahsil). Maulvi Ghulam Mohd. (Imam of Jama Masjid, 
Mandi Bahauddin). Pir Hayat Shah of Nurpur Piran (Phalia Tahsil).
Shakargarh
Pir Ali Akbar. Pir Qutab Nisar. Pir Aslam Shah.
(continued)
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Ferozepore Central
Hazrat Pir Syed Jamat Ali Shah. Hazrat Pir Badan Din. Diwan Sayyed 
Al-o-Rasul.
Muzaffargarh Sadr.
Maulvi Din Mohd., Shah of Muzaffargarh. Maulvi Ghulam Qasim of Basti 
Lunda. Diwan Abdulla Shah of Mahal Khaki. Churab Ali Shah of Jal Wala. 
Mubarak Shah of Pir Jagi.
S.V. Gujrat
Syed Riaz Hussain. Nawazish Hussain of Jhiranwali. Pir Fazal Shah of 
Jalla. Pir Sharif Ghulam Hussain Thatha. Master Mirza Khan of Pindi 
Lala. Hafiz Mohd. Hussain of Senthal. Mian Khan of Chak. Master 
Ghulam Haider Sohawa Warranchan. The Khalifa of Qadian.
S.E. Gurgaon
Maulvi Mohd. Daud (Shakrawa). Maulvi Abdul Jahhar (Sakhpuri). Maulvi 
Abdul Shakur (Bisru). Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Pir Sayed Arif Hussain 
(Jullundur District). Pir Haji Yaqub Ali Shah of Majra Sharif. The Pir 
of Sayal Sharif (Shahpur District).
N.W. Gurgaon
Pir Jamat Ali Shah. The Pir of Sayal Sharif. Pir Sayad Arif Hussain of 
Pratappur (Wazila, Jullundur District). Pir Yaqub Ali Shah of Majra 
Sharif.
Khanewal
Sayyed Ghulam Nabi Shah Gilani. Sayyed Imam Shah of Qatalpur. Sayyed 
Ahmad Shah of Rahim Shah. Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Pir Makhdum Mehr Hussain 
Shah. A further 28 minor religious leaders were also active in the 
constituency.
N.E. Towns
Maulvi Mohammad Ibrahim. Maulvi Jaundat of Rampur. Pir Jamat Ali Shah.
Rohtak
Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Mahboob Ellahi (Gen.Sec. Rohtak District Muslim 
League). Hazrat Khawaja Aziz-ul-Rehma Madzallahu, Sajjada Nashin of 
Kot Abdul Khaliq. Ch. Zaferyab Kyan of Rohtak.
Pind Dadan Khan
Hazrat Pir Fazal Shah of Jalalpur (nephew of Raja Ghazanfar Ali, Muslim 
League candidate - Pind Dadan Khan). Pir Amir Shah. Maulvi Said Rasul 
of Bhochal Khurd. Maulvi Faiz Mohammad Khan of Makhial. Mohammad Shah 
(nephew of Pir Fazal Shah). Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Pir Walayat Shah. 
Maulvi Noor Mahammad of Baghancala.
Gujranwala North
Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Pir of Sial Sharif (Shahpur District). Saadat Azam 
(Jullundur District). Pir Sayeed Arif Hussain (Jullundur District). 
Hazrat Khawaja Muhammad Amir Badshah (Gujrat). Faqir Sayid Imdad Ali 
Shah Gilani, Sajjada Nashin, Hujra Shariff. Sayed Fazal Shah, Sajjada
(continued)
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Gujranwala North (continued)
Nashin, Jalalpur Shariff. Hazrat Pir Sayed Yaqub Ali Shah, Majra Shariff. 
Sajjada Nashin Sambaryal. Pir Walayat Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Darbar 
Shariff, Sahotra (Pindadan Shah Tahsil). Pir Sayed Muhammad Hussain 
Sahib Zaffar Bukhari (Gurdaspur District). Pir Muqarab Hussain Shah 
(Jullundur District). Syed Pir-ud-Din Daryai, Shah Daula Shah (Gujrat 
District). Pir Sayed Muhammad Yakub Shah (Gujrat District).
Nankana Sahib
Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Hazrat Pir Fazal Shah of Jalalpur. Pir Imdad 
Hussain of Hujra Sharif. Maulvi Khair Din. Hazrat Pir Sayed Yaqub Ali 
Shah of Majra Sharif.
Jullundur North 
Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Pir Fazal Shah of Jalalpur.
Sialkot Central
Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Sayed Zahur Ali Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Chaura Shariff. 
Shaibzada Muzaffar Hassan Vadalvi. Rana Mohammed Amir Vadalvi. Pir 
Fazal Shah of Jalalpur.
Attock North
Pir Ashaq Hussain of Hassanabad. Pir Lai Hussain Shah of Hassanabad. 
Maulvi Abdul Haq of Pind Sultani.
Ludhiana
Pir Jamat Ali Shah.
Hissar
Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Pir Fazal Shah of Jalalpur. Pir Sayed Yaqub Ali 
Shah of Majra Shariff.
Southern Towns 
Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Mahboob Elahi.
Bhalwal
Maulvi Muhammad Harif (Kot Momin). Maulvi Habibur Rehman of Bhalwal.
Batala
Mahammad Hussain, Abdur Rahman, Zahur Ahmad (Ahmadia leaders). Pir Sayyed 
Hussain Ali Shah.
Samundri
Syed Iqbal Hussain.
Jhang Central
Syed Karamat Hussain. Farid Kaplana. Syed Abid Hussain.
Lyallpur
Maulvi Ali Mohd.. Maulvi Asmat Ullah. Pir Mohammad Hussain. Pir Jamat 
Ali Shah. Mohd. Sharif Zahoor Ali Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Chura Sharif.
(continued)
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Lyallpur (continued)
Pir Khadam Hussain Shah. Master Khushi Mohammad. Saadat Uzaam 
(Jullundur District). Pir Syed Afar Hussain Shah (Jullundur District). 
Hazarat Khawaja Mohd. Amir Badshah (Gujrat District). Faqir Said Imdad 
Ali Shah Gilani, Sajjada Nashin, Hujra Sharif. Said Fazal Shah, Sajjada 
Nashin, Jalalpur Sharif. Hazrat Pir Yaqub Ali Shah, Majra Sharif. The 
Sajjada Nashin, Sambraial. Pir Walayat Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Darbar 
Sharif (Pind Dadan Khan). Pir Said Mohd. Hussain Zafar (Gurdaspur Dis­
trict). Pir Mukarab Hussain Shah (Jullundur District). Said Pir-ud- 
Din Dariai (Gujrat District). Pir Said Haji Mohd. Yaqxb Siah (Gujrat District). 
Maulana Pir Said Mohd. Hussain (Gurdaspur District).
Gujrat North
Syed Mulk Ali Shah of Shakrila. Syed Hafiz Fazal Shah of Qazi Bakar.
Mian Nur Ilahi, Imam Majjid of Bhagnagar. Mian Fazal of Baulvi Sharif. 
Syed Sardar Shah of Fatehpur (Jammu State). Syed Shah of Kolta Sahdan. 
Syed Mohsan Shah of Abhial. Syed Fazal Hussain of Jandowla. Qazi 
Mohammad Shafi of Wadaichanwala. Maulvi Akhtar Ali (Bahawalpur State). 
Syed Mahmud Shah of Gujrat. Maulvi Ibrahim (Zamindara College, Tanar). 
Hafiz Ghulam (son of Sheikh Fateh Hakim of Guliana).
Sialkot South
Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Sadat Azam, Khantora Sharif (Jullundur District).
Pir Arif Hussain Sahib (Jullundur District). Hazrat Khawaja Mohd. Amir 
of Chura Sharif (Gujrat District). Faqir Sayed Imdad Ali Shah Gilani, 
Hujra Sharif. Pir Syed Fazl Shah of Jalalpur Sharif. Hazrat Pir Syed 
Yaqub Ali Shah, Majra Sharif. Pir Vilaiat Shah of Sahotra (Pind Dadan 
Khan Tahsil). Pir Muhammad Hussain. Zaffar Bukhari (Gurdaspur District). 
Pir Muqarrab Hussain Shah of Jullundur. Syed Pir-ud-Din Daryai Shah 
Daula Sahib (Gujrat District). Pir Syed Mohd. Yaqub Shah (Gujrat 
District).
Hafizabad
Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Pir Fazal Shah of Jalalpur. Maulvi Pir Hayat Shah. 
Pir Ishrad Hussain.
Gujranwala East
Maulvi Sayeed Ahmad (Mokhal village). Maulvi Nur Mohammad (Eminabad 
village), Maulvi Sharif Ahmad (Gakerke village). Maulvi Niaz Ahmad 
(Talwandi Musekhan village). Maulvi Ghulam Mahommad (Ferozewala 
village). Maulvi Abdul Aziz (Talwandi Musekhan village). Pir Jamat Ali 
Shah. The Pir of Sial Sharif (Shahpur). Sadat-i-Uzzam of Khanora 
Sharif (Jullundur District). Pir Sayyed Araf Hussain Sahib, Partap Pura 
(Jullundur District). Hazrat Khawaja Mohammad Amir Badshah (Gujrat 
District). Faqir Sayyed Imdad Ali Shah Gilani, Sajjada Nashin, Hujra 
Sharif. Sayyed Fazal Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Jalalpur Sharif. Hazrat Pir 
Sayyed Yaqub Ali Shah, Majara Sharif. Pir Walayat Shah, Sajjada Nashin, 
Darbar Sharif, Sahotra (Pind Dadan Khan Tahsil). Pir Muqarab Hassain 
Shah (Jullundur District). Sayyed Pir-ud-Din Daryai, Shahdaula Sahib 
(Gujrat District). Pir Sayyed Haji Mohammad Yaqub Shah (Gujrat District). 
Sayyed Mohammad Hussain Qadri Ulkmari, Sajjada Nashin, Shergarh (Mont­
gomery District). Chan Pir (son of the leading Sajjada Nashin, Montgomery 
District).
(continued)
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Rawalpindi Division Towns
Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Sayed Mohammad Hussain (son of Pir Jamat Ali Shah). 
Maulana Shabir Ahmad Usmani (President, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam). Syed 
Sardar Hussain (Toba Tek Singh Tahsil). Zafar Ahmad Thanwi. Abdul 
Raoof. Mohammad Ibrahim Sialkoti. Pir Sahib Syal Sharif. Khawaja Ahmad 
Yar, Sajjada Nashin, Chora Sharif. The Sajjada Nashin, Dargah Bu-ali- 
Qalandar. Maulana Ghulam Mohammad, Sajjada Nashin, Karor (Leiah Tahsil). 
The Sajjada Nashin, Darbar Ghaunsia, Japuranwali. Chan Pir (son of Pir 
Jamat Ali Shah). Syed Mohammad Fazl Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Darbar 
Jalalpur Sharif. Maulana Razvi (all-India Ulema-i-Islam Conference).
Pir Ghulam Abbas, Sajjada Nashin, Shergah. Pir of Sayal.
Toba Tek Singh
M. Muhammad Amir (son of Chogate Khan of Maghiana). Sayed Faqir Shah of 
Tolamba. M. Shakur Ahmad. M. Muhammad Ismail. M. Ghulam Raza Khan.
Syed Muhammad Iqbal Hussain. The Pir of Sial Sharif. Pir Arif Hussain 
Shah. Hazrat Khawaja Mohammad Amir Badshah, Shora Sharif. Faqir Syed 
Imdad Ali Shah. Syed Fazal Shah of Jalalpur. Pir Syed Yaqub Ali Shah.
The Sajjada Nashin, Sambrial. Pir Walaiyat Ali Shah. Syed Pir Muhammad 
Hussain of Gurdaspur. Pir Mukarrab Hussan Shah of Jullundur. Syed Pir- 
ud-Din Daryai Shah (Gujrat District). Pir Sayed Muhammad Yaqub Shah of 
Gujrat. Sajjada Nashin, Jhamra. Pir Abdullah Shah. Khawaja Hafiz 
Sayed Badar-ud-Din. Imam Bakhsh Khan. Makhdum Nazar Hussain Shah.
Sajjada Nashin of Quranga (Kabirwala Tahsil). Sayyed Ghulam Nabi Shah 
Gilani (Multan District). Sayyed Imam Shah of Multan. Sayyed Ahmad 
Shah of Rahim Shah (Multan District). Sayyed Nur Shah of Rahim Shah 
(Multan District). Pir Jamat Ali Shah. Sayyed Mohammad Hussain Shah, 
Sajjada Nashin, Shergarh. Hazrat Maulana Shabir Ahmad Usmani. Khan 
Abdul Ghafoor Khan Sahib (Leader, Ifghan Jirgha). Hafiz Zahur Ali Shah 
Sahib, Sajjada Nashin, Chura Sharif. Pir Hazarat Pir Mohammad Saddiq 
Azad, Sajjada Nashin, Gujranwala. Hazrat Haji Pir Sardar Ali Shah,
Sajjada Nashin, Fatehpur. Hazrat Maulana Abdul Wafa Sanna Ullah Sahib 
(Amritsar District). Pir Makhdum Mehr Hussain Shah, Sajjada Nashin,
Karor Lai Isan. Hazrat Maulana Maulvi Mohammad Ibrahim Sahib (Sialkot 
District). Hazrat Maulana Maulvi Mohammad Abdul Hamid Sahib (Lahore 
District). Makhdum Hamid Mohammad Said Naubahar Shah Qibla, Darbar 
Uchh Sharif. Khawaja Aziz-ur-Rehman, Sajjada Nashin, Kot Abdul Khaliq. 
Hazrat Pir Abdul Hamid Sahib (Ludhiana District). Hazrat Sultan 
Mohammad Hassan Sahib, Sajjada Nashin, Sultan Bahu. Hazrat Sayyed Ghauns 
Shah (Gujranwala District). Hazrat Sayyed Altaf Hussain Sahib, Sajjada 
Nashin, Musa Khel. Hazrat Allama Ghulam Murshid Sahib (Lahore District). 
Makhdum Pir Sadar Din Shah, Qibla Gillani (Multan District). Hazrat 
Sajjadah Nashin Sahib (Shah Jewana Tahsil).
Dera Ghazi Khan South
Syed Jamiatali Shah. Syed Fazal Shah. Pir Nasir-ud-Din. Maulana Fazal 
Shah Sahib Qazi Baqravi. Sahibzada Mian Yusuf Shah, Taunsa Sharif. Pir 
Jamat Ali Shah. The Pir of Syal Sharif. Sadat-i-Uzzam, Khandwa Sharif 
(Jullundur District). Hazrat Khawaja Muhammad Amir Badshah, Chora Sharif 
(Gujrat District). Faqir Syed Ahmed Ali Shah Gilani, Sajjada Nashin,
Hujra Sharif. Pir Syed Arif Hussain Sahib (Jullundur District). Pir 
Jamat Ali Shah. Syed Fazal Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Jalalpur Sharif. Hazrat 
Pir Haji Syed Yakub Ali Shah, Majwa Sharif. The Sajjada Nashin, Sambarial. 
Pir Walayat Shah, Sajjada Nashin, Darbar Sharif (Pind Dadan Khan Tahsil). 
Pir Mukarrab Hussain Shah Sahib (Jullundur District). Pir Syed Muhammad
(continued)
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Dera Ghazi Khan South (continued)
Hussain Sahib (Gurdaspur District). Hazrat Sahib Pir Nasir-ud-Din 
(Multan District). Hazrat Sahib-ul-Sair, Sajjada Nashin, Hajipir Sharif. 
Sahibzada Mian Yusuf Shah, Taunsa Sharif. Pir Syed Nabhan Shah. Maulvi 
Abdul Karim. Syed Zain-ul-Abudin. Chan Pir (son of the leading Sajjada 
Nashin, Montgomery District).
Source: Punjab Government Gazette, Pt. Ill, 21 June 19^6, pp.293-296;
28 June 1946, pp.325-342, 350-356; 5 July 1946, pp.385-405,
407-417; 12 July 1946, pp.431-439; 19 July 1946, pp.^73-^84; 
26 July 1946, pp.5^2-520, 537-540, 548-561; 2 Aug. 1946,
pp.588-600; 9 Aug. 1946, pp.615-618, 633-650; 16 Aug. 1946,
P P -703-708; 23 Aug. 1946, pp.724-748; 6 Sept. 1946, pp.802-
813; 13 Sept. 1946, pp.843-844, 856-857, 879-887; 26 March
1947, pp.240-241; 18 April 1947, pp.255-258. PGSL.
The style of names, titles, and localities have been 
reproduced as they appeared in the Punjab Government 
Gazettes, which on occasions has given rise to discrepancies.
APPENDIX T.
Example of Election Poster Distributed by 
The Muslim League
RELIGION WORLDLINESS
(1) On one side Pakistan.
(2) On one side there is [[the]] 
auspicious personality of 
Mohammad (may the blessings 
of Allah be on his posterity) 
"and" Ali (may God be pleased 
with him).
(3) On one side the question is 
of organising the people of 
the Kalima.
(4) On one side the Honour of 
the green flag.
On the other side Kufirstan
On the other side are Baldev 
Singh and Khizar Hayat.
On the other side there is 
idol worship, brotherhood and 
[[the]] caste system.
On the other side there is 
the Government of the Khiziri 
Ministry.
(Translation)
Source: Punjab Government Gazette, Pt. Ill, 2 Aug. 19^6, p.589• PGSL.
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ROHTAK
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F.W. Kennaway, Gurdaspur Settlement Report, 1912, Lahore, 1912.
F.C. Channing, Gurgaon Settlement Report, l8?2-82, Lahore 1882. 
Akhtar Husain, Gurgaon Settlement Report. 1938-43. Lahore, 1944.
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E.B. Steedman, Jhang Settlement Report. l874-8o. Lahore, 1882.
Mian Abdul Aziz, Jhang Settlement Report, 1928, Lahore, 1928.
R.G. Thomson, Jhelum Settlement Report, 187**-80. Lahore, 1883.
Prem Nath Thapar, Jhelum Settlement Report, 1937-^1. Lahore, 19^8.
R. Temple, Jullundur Settlement Report, 1846-51. Lahore, 1852.
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Hoshiarpur District Gazetteer, 190*+. Lahore, 1906.
Hoshiarpur District Gazetteer (Statistical Tables). 190*+. Lahore, 
190*+.
Hoshiarpur District Gazetteer (Statistical Tables), 1935, Lahore,
1936.
Jhang District Gazetteer, 1883-84. Lahore, l88*f.
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S.P. Jain, Relationship Between Fertility and Economic Social 
Status in the Punjab, Lahore, 1939- PPL.
M.H. Mahraood, Urban Working Class Cost of Living Index Numbers
(19^1) in the Punjab, Lahore, 19^3■ PPL.
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